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Abstract 
 
Property in land is a dependable institution, often dull, sometimes arcane. Without giving it 
much thought, we tend to respond to property in conventional, unreflective ways.  We 
assume with property that ’what we see is what we get’.1   
 
However this unimaginative way of looking at property in land may be but a half-truth of 
the dialectic.  Perhaps, property is a lot more diverse than the orthodoxy we suppose? 
This question forms the core of this thesis, the elaboration of an alternative description of 
property in land termed ‘property diversity’. The thesis argues that the descriptive truth of 
property, its grounded reality, is far more heterogeneous than we are conditioned to 
recognize. What we have got with property in land is what ‘we have talked ourselves into 
seeing’2, a liberal, post-enclosure paradigm that is universalizing in its effect. Contrary to 
the descriptively inadequate private model, human landscapes are ‘intensely propertied 
places’3 where a plethora of rights, uses and claims overlap, compete and co-exist amidst 
inter-connective ‘mosaics’ of private, public and common interests in land. These 
‘interests’ are themselves equally diverse; ancient as well as novel, common law and 
statutory, shared and exclusive. And to complete the mosaic, our ‘ownerships’ are likewise 
pluralistic, ranging from strictly enforceable right through to vague concepts of belonging, 
illusory at law, yet routinely acted upon.  
 
In articulating a reconceptualized property right in land, the thesis adopts the following 
broad structure.  First, it seeks to explain why the private ownership model prevails, such 
that ‘property’ and ‘private property’ are mostly synonymous.  Both dominant and 
domineering, this narrow view stresses the primacy of individualism, the power of 
exclusion, and the values of commodity. Second, it argues that this perspective is an 
incomplete description of property in land, canvassing the richness of the public and 
common estates, and the under-regarded social and communitarian nuances of private 
property.4  Third, it describes a theory of property diversity in land, more like Hanoch 
Dagan’s ‘full (sometimes cacophonous) symphony’ than any ‘singular melody line’5. 
1 Carol Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of 
Ownership (1994), 297.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City Urban Land and the Politics of Property (2004) xvi. 
4 For example, Gregory Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (2014) 99 Iowa 
Law Review 1257. 
5 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (2011).   
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Fourth, it considers the implications of property diversity for two ‘blind spots’ in modern 
property discourse, the proprietorial place of community, described by Joseph Sax as the 
‘missing blank in American law’6 and the generation of obligation as an incident of land 
ownership, again in Sax’s   words, the law’s ‘awkward little secret’7.  
 
The thesis canvasses the literature of the private, public and common estates, property 
and community scholarship, and stewardship discourse. It also reaches beyond legal 
property with a brief foray into legal geography and sustainable urban design.  Its novelty 
lies in not only collating this literature into one body of work, but in viewing it through the 
prism of landed property diversity.   
 
This reconceptualization has consequences; it shifts the focus from the private right to a 
wider perspective, contextualizes the res as a critical element of propertied relations, and 
provides a theoretical construct for an alternative ‘seeing’ of property right in land, one 
where a ‘swarm of possibilities’8 offers new imaginings for property in land.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Joseph Sax, ‘The Rights of Communities: A Blank Space in American Law’, July 11,  
1984, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, School of Law.  
7 Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt Public and Private Rights in Cultural Treasures (1999) 59.  
8 Paul Carter, Dark Writing Geography, Performance, Design (2009) 1. 
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The Implications of Property Diversity  
 
Introduction 
 
 
Lawyers and non-lawyers alike derive great comfort in the much-vaunted 
stability of property in land.  It is a dependable institution, often dull, 
sometimes arcane. Without giving it too much thought, we tend to respond to 
property in conventional, unreflective ways.  We assume with property that 
’what we see is what we get’.1 
 
However this unimaginative way of looking at property in land may be but a 
half-truth of the dialectic.  Perhaps, property is a lot more diverse than the 
orthodoxy we suppose?  This question forms the core of this thesis, the 
elaboration of an alternative description of property in land I call ‘property 
diversity’. I argue that the descriptive truth of property, its grounded reality, is 
far more heterogeneous than we are conditioned to recognize. What we have 
got with property in land is what ‘we have talked ourselves into seeing’2, a 
liberal, post-enclosure paradigm universalizing and totalizing3 in its monistic 
effect. This thesis argues that contrary to the descriptively inadequate private 
model, human landscapes are ‘intensely propertied places’4 where a plethora 
of rights, uses and claims overlap, compete and co-exist amidst inter-
connective ‘mosaics’ of private, public and common interests in land. These 
‘interests’ are themselves equally diverse; ancient as well as novel, common 
law and statutory, shared and exclusive. And to complete the mosaic, our 
‘ownerships’ are likewise pluralistic, ranging from strictly enforceable right 
through to vague concepts of belonging, illusory at law, yet routinely acted 
upon.  
 
Early inspiration for this thesis came from American property scholar Carol 
Rose.  Rose writes of ‘seeing’ property in land, a phenomenon especially 
1 Carol Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion Essays on the History, Theory 
and Rhetoric of Ownership (1994), 297.  
2 Ibid. 3 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City Urban Land and the Politics of Property (2004) 102. 
4 Ibid, xvi. 
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observable in places of great natural beauty, imperious landscapes where 
property ‘hits you in the eye’. Rose describes seeing property in diverse 
forms, as pictures, metaphors, narratives or illusions.  For her, the fence, well-
trodden path, keep out sign, bundle of sticks, or folkloric tales of scarcity, are 
convenient ways of ‘seeing’ property, easily recognizable images that enable 
us to relate to the places in which we live. Canadian legal geographer 
Nicholas Blomley is another seminal influence. Blomley uses a neighborhood 
in his home city of Vancouver, British Colombia, to ‘map’ the unreliability of 
the private ownership model to represent the lived experiences of its 
inhabitants.  
 
Critically, to begin to ‘see’ property in the expansive and imaginative ways that 
Rose envisages, or Blomley endeavors to ‘map’, reveals certain self-evident 
truths about property in land. This enhanced ‘visibility’ renders itself 
incrementally to the observer, a re-imagination that ultimately offers an 
alternative account of property in land. As a reconceptualization, it provides a 
more contextualized explanation that describes property patterns at a level of 
detail and accuracy that the private ownership model can only begin to sketch 
out.  
 
The thesis adopts the following broad structure.  First, it seeks to explain why 
a narrow private ownership model of property prevails, such that ‘property’ 
and ‘private property’ are for most purposes synonymous. Both dominant and 
domineering, this singular liberal view stresses the primacy of individualism, 
the power of exclusion, and the values of commodity. If represented 
geographically, this paradigm depicts only the boundaries of private parcels, 
the arbitrary de-contextualized lines that pre-figure the extent of an owner’s 
right to exclude. Second, it argues that this perspective is an inadequate and 
incomplete description of property in land, canvassing the richness of the 
public and common estates, and the under-regarded social and 
communitarian nuances of private property.5  Third, it describes a theory of 
property diversity in land, an articulation more representative of Hanoch 
5 For example, Gregory Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends The Publicness of Private Law Values’ 
(2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 1257. 
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Dagan’s ‘lived experiences’ of property. Fourth, it considers the counterveiling 
implications of property monism and diversity for certain ‘blind spots’ in 
modern property discourse, the proprietorial place of community, and the 
generation of obligation as an incident of land ownership. This thesis suggests 
that a simplistically private view of property in land yields normatively 
undesirable outcomes. However it is not the intent of this thesis to make the 
normative argument that we ought not to ‘see’ property in land through this 
hegemonic view. Instead, its focus is to identify these descriptive failings, to 
offer up an alternative vision, and to explore a number of implications of a 
reconceived diverse property mosaic.  
 
Property diversity in land is described in detail in part 2, chapter 4. But given 
its amorphous nature, and how this thesis is structured, it is desirable in this 
Introduction to offer a brief, overarching description of the concept. Property 
diversity sees the fullest range of property patterns in human landscapes, a 
‘higher altitude’ perspective that yields an unfamiliar vantage of a familiar 
subject. Importantly, it places the orthodox private right in proportionate 
context, amongst other less ‘seen’ and less familiar property forms. Property 
diversity is the aggregate of a plurality of types, interests, and ownerships. 
Characteristically, it is contextual, multivalent, use-premised and eclectic, 
amongst others. Our many and varied relationships with land define its scope 
and form its content. 
 
Type refers to the full panoply of existing private, public and common interests 
in land, and the many hybrid variants that arise in response to context or 
exigency. Interests comprise the vast array of ‘estates’ we hold in land; 
corporeal, incorporeal, common law, statutory or sui generis. Ownership 
describes the vested interests we claim over land, the full gamut of propriety 
ranging from enforceable right under Joseph Singer’s ‘castle’ view, to qualified 
forms of private ownership tempered by norms of social-obligation, 
‘ownerships’ based on public and common title, and beyond right to vague 
concepts of ‘belonging’.  
 
14  
Contextual qualities of diverse property make the res the central object of the 
landed relationship. It defies the ubiquity of the bundle metaphor, where any 
stick can be substituted for another. John Lovett cites the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA) as an innovative exemplar of a property regime 
that contextualizes a new property right6 to particular place. The LRSA 
overcomes an ‘imaginative paralysis… about what is possible in property law 
design.’7 Much like real property’s ‘extraordinary return to the land’,8 working 
examples of re-physicalized (and diverse) property dilutes the hegemonic 
paradigm. Context also de-emphasizes the importance of arbitrary boundary 
lines. Analogous to Larissa Katz’s ‘agenda-setting’, diverse property prioritizes 
an owner’s use of their land, not it’s bounded dominion. When exercised in 
ways that are reasonable and proportionate, use enlivens the potential of 
other ‘owners’ to enjoy co-existing, contemporaneous rights in the same land. 
 
The LRSA also actualizes a property regime that incorporates multiple values, 
another key characteristic of diverse property. That public rights of 
responsible access can be accommodated with an owner’s privacy and 
security of residential use, demonstrates that competing values need not be 
mutually exclusive.  And finally, the eclecticism of diverse property, perhaps 
an inevitable corollary of context, is another defining attribute.  Escaping the 
closed list of ‘what is property’ in land requires an awareness of the 
‘otherness’ in real property, and a willingness to consider the proprietorial 
attributes of erstwhile marginal interests.9  
 
As stated, the thesis is structured in two parts. Each part consists of three 
chapters. Part 1 argues that the hegemonic depiction of property in land is 
inaccurate and incomplete. In so arguing, Part 1 seeks to ‘clear’ a theoretical 
6 The ‘responsible right of access’ 
7 John Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’ (2011) 
89 Nebraska Law Rev. 739, 742. Lovett cites extensive public education for both access 
takers and landowners as overcoming law and economics analyses that deride contextual 
property as imposing unfeasibly high information processing costs. 
8 This describes the recent resurgence in community gardens, urban farms etc. identified by 
Sue Farren in ‘Earth Under the Nails The Extraordinary Return to the Land’ in N Hopkins ed, 
Modern Studies in Property Law (7th ed., 2013)  
9 A J van der Walt, ‘The Marginality of Property’ in G Alexander & E Penalver eds, Property 
and Community (2010). 
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space for a different conceptualization, the diverse property mosaic. In 
chapter 1, private property is shown to be an adaptable ‘institution’,10 more 
qualified than its absolutist rhetoric suggests. The chapter challenges private 
property’s ‘exclusion thesis’,11 arguing that the right to exclude is inherently 
contingent, and as such capacious of other co-existing interests in land. In 
chapter 2, public property is described not as a passive res awaiting capture, 
but an under-regarded estate with its own tenets and rationales, a comedy12 
where ‘the more the merrier’ diffuses ownership and fosters propriety in the 
pursuit of an egalitarian, well-ordered society.  In chapter 3, common property 
is seen to be different again, a halfway house, where an outside private shell 
conceals an inside communitarian collective. Common property manifests in 
unlikely, but everyday places, sporting clubs, community associations, 
company title units, and so on, its ‘obviousness’ and under-estimated 
strengths giving lie to the overstated tragedy of the commons.  
 
Part 1 adopts an accepted but not universal typology of property interests in 
land - private, common, and public. What distinguishes one form of property 
from another is (to borrow a bundle analogy) ‘how the quality and content of 
the bundle of rights varies in practice, and who holds the sticks.’13  With 
private property, the ‘who’ question is fairly straightforward.  Jeremy Waldron 
describes this as the ‘single organizing idea’ of private property that a ‘certain 
specified person’ is able to determine how a specified resource is to be 
used.’14   
 
10 Hanoch Dagan, Property, values and institutions (2011) 
11 ‘Private property is generally ‘characterized by rights of exclusion… while that which is 
characterized by rights of inclusion are termed public or common property.’ Jonette Watson 
Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The Literature on Property Law 
Theory’ in A. McHarg et al eds,,Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources 
(2010) 
12 Carol Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property’, (1986) 53 U. Chi LR. 711. 
13 Richard Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources (2009) 11. 
14 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988) 59-60; Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is 
Private Property?’ (1985) 5 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 313. 
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While private property is relatively uncontested,15 there is frequent 
misapprehension as to meanings of the ‘common’ and ‘public’ estates. Many 
jurists lump non-private property into a single ‘collective’ property category. 
Others talk of ‘state’ property.  Others confuse the two.  Michael Brill observes 
that common property provides for ‘community life’, a sociability ‘with people 
you somewhat know’, 16 while ‘public property’ provides for ‘public life’ and a 
shared sociability ‘with a diversity of strangers.’17 Common property is not 
public property; it refers to use rights vested in community members who 
derive their propertied relationship with land through membership of that 
community. Outsiders are trespassers on common lands.  By contrast, the 
‘who’ in public property is less clear.  Chapter 2 posits that ultimately the ‘who’ 
is the diffused ‘unorganized public’.  
 
In Part 2, chapter 4, the mosaic is particularized and deconstructed; its 
underlying principles, unifying themes, and constituent elements canvassed in 
separate turn. Chapter 4 also locates the mosaic in the literature of 
sustainable community, and then ‘places’ it in situ, through three case studies. 
These studies note a serendipitous coincidence between sustainable, so-
called ‘livable’ communities, and their diverse patterns of property. The 
chapter does not argue that property diversity is a cause of such livability, but 
it does observe its otherwise unremarked presence. Chapter 5 next examines 
the routine failure of the private ownership model to generate obligation 
alongside right as an incident of land ownership.  By contrast, property 
diversity offers a paradigm where obligation is both theoretically feasible and 
normatively desirable, where stewardship is less likely to remain the law’s 
‘awkward little secret’.18  Chapter 6 concludes with an analysis of our under-
15 Uncertainty lies on the fringes, for example government ownership of an office building may 
be the practical equivalent of private ownership, but generally the ‘owner answer’ is clear 
16 Michael Brill, ‘Problems With Mistaking Community Life for Public Life’ (2002) 14(2) Places 
48, 50. ‘Each is different, in scale, density and the ‘physical environments it needs to be 
robust.’ 
17 Brill, above n15, 50. Brill identifies community sociability occurring at varied locales, ‘a mix 
of both semi-public and semi-private places, like the neighborhood bar, the often- walked 
public street, the school PTA meeting and the church dinner.’ Public sociability occurs ‘in the 
square, park and street.’ 
18 Joseph Sax, ‘The Rights of Communities: A Blank Space in American Law’ presented July 
11,  
1984, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, School of Law 
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developed proprietorial relationship with community, a consequence of a 
polarizing liberal paradigm that views community as a suspicious intermediary 
between the welfare-maximizing individual and the regulatory state. Again, it 
offers an alternative view, one where community has a resonance that helps 
to fill Joseph Sax’s ‘blank legal space’.19  Describing property in land in ways 
that connect people to context, rather than as abstract rights between persons 
about things, makes notions of community and obligation more feasible within 
a diverse property discourse.  
 
In this thesis, the word ‘property’ is liberally used. But in restricting itself to real 
property (and not for example personalty or intellectual property), the term 
refers only to our many propertied relationships with land. Its remit is broad 
and expansive. As foreshadowed, it encapsulates not only formal rights 
enforced by the state, but also uses, practices, and claims ‘observed’ or 
‘enforced’ through custom, norm, or other unlikely sources outside property’s 
‘central logic’.20 Its open-ended approach to propertied interests in land is the 
antithesis of Wesley’s Hohfield’s precise taxonomy. To restrict its meanings to 
a closed list is to subvert a key purpose of this thesis, to ‘notice the 
margins’,21 and the diversity inherent therein.  To cite the Australian High 
Court, ‘property’ is ‘not a monolithic notion of standard content and invariable 
intensity [but] the most comprehensive of all the terms which can be used… 
indicative and descriptive …of all or any of the very many different kinds of 
relationship between a person and a subject matter.’22  
 
As a forceful advocate of the private right to exclude, Henry Smith is an 
unlikely ally to enrol in support of property diversity. However Smith’s 
observations of property as ‘the law of things’23 are insightful and cogent. 
Smith writes, ‘[t]he first step toward understanding private law is to try not to 
take things for granted  and to be as attentive to how things are not as to how 
things are.’  This thesis agrees with, and seeks to enact Smith’s observations.  
19 Ibid 
20 AJ van der Walt, ‘The Marginality of Property’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n8.  
21 Ibid 
22 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 
23 Henry Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (2012) 125 Harvard Law Rev. 1691, 1692 
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It does not take ‘property’ in land for granted. It does not unthinkingly assume 
that ‘what we see is what we get.’  In large part, its attentive focus is on ‘how 
things are not’.  In (unwittingly) following Smith’s prescriptions, its ambition is 
to take an imaginative step toward a better understanding of the vast and rich 
diversity of property in land.  
19  
Chapter 1 Private Property and the Domineering Right to 
Exclude 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Private property has been the dominant (and domineering) form of property in 
land since the 18th century. It has successfully marginalised and discredited 
alternative forms of property, such that today we see ‘property’ through a 
myopic prism of private property rights. Hence for most people, the terms 
‘property’ and ‘private property’ are synonymous and interchangeable. This 
chapter 1 challenges this narrow and incomplete description of modern 
private property that has conflated its reach and concealed its nuance. The 
chapter’s aim is to better depict the private estate, and in so doing, clear 
sufficient ‘space’ for property diversity.  
 
The all-consuming edifice of private property, its ‘sole and despotic dominion’1 
and hallmark right to exclude, is a structure less absolute than its persuasive2 
rhetoric exhorts. Private property was never unqualified or unfettered in its 
reach; public and communal rights and restraints have long defined the ambit 
of private rights. Likewise, the divide between public and private is (and was) 
porous, private rights exist in public property and public rights in private. For 
all its apparent and substantive dominance, a dual paradox lies at the heart of 
private property. First, the absoluteness of private rights, manifested in the 
right to exclude, is reliant on a flawed assumption that the public-private 
dichotomy is distinct and inviolate. This misassumption accentuates the 
propensity of private property rights to conflate, in the process distorting their 
integrity and obfuscating the coherency of private property’s rationales. 
Second, the flawed public-private divide itself is premised on an historic 
interpretation of private property frozen in time. The mantra that private 
property must be stable and certain, does not equate to its immutability. 
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, A Facsimile of the First Edition 
of 1765-1769 (1979) 
2 Rose argues that property is ‘persuasion’, who can yell loudly and consistently and get their 
message heard, Carol Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion: Essays on the 
History, Theory and Rhetoric of Ownership (1994). 
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Private property is a dynamic social institution, subject to historical, societal 
and political pressures, one that is constantly (albeit incrementally) dynamic. 
 
The substance of private property is the security it affords right holders in their 
exclusive use and enjoyment of their rights.  Yet the narrative or rhetoric of 
private property has diverged from this central organizing basis. Secure 
exclusivity of use has become exclusivity simpliciter, with the paramount right 
to exclude overshadowing the complexities and nuances of private property.  
Like private property itself, the right to exclude is not only singularly dominant, 
but domineering.   This perversion has unduly distorted property discourse 
and fed a propensity for courts and legislatures to overstate the extent of 
private property rights.  Private property is better understood as securing an 
exclusivity of use, coupled with a qualified freedom from interference, and not 
an arbitrary exclusivity of possession.  Such a descriptive re-emphasis does 
not diminish the essence of private property, its security of title. However it 
does enable the theoretical ‘oxygen’ for other potentially co-existing property 
rights, uses and claims, as well as duties or obligations, to subsist.  By seeing 
private property in such a light, we begin to see it in a pluralistic, diverse 
context.  
 
In this chapter the history of private property is analysed as it pertains to 
‘settler societies’, particularly Australia, the United States, and New Zealand. 
Beginning in part 2, and the seminal 17th and 18th century writings of William 
Blackstone and John Locke, parts 3 and 4 then trace the shift from a pre-
industrial to industrial society, and the implications and opportunities this 
presented to a burgeoning private property freed from the inconvenient 
strictures of English property doctrine and energised by the bundle of rights 
metaphor. Parts 5 and 6 concentrate on the often-overlooked dynamism of 
private property, and the complexities that arise when stasis distorts key 
aspects of private property, exemplified by the public-private divide. Part 7 
then considers the plausible yet descriptively flawed narrative of private 
property that has come to dominate, while part 8 distils the qualitative 
attributes of private property that form the core of its revised description. The 
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chapter concludes in part 9 by re-examining the rationales and justifications of 
the critical right to exclude in light of this re-defined paradigm.  
 
2. Blackstone, Locke and historical origins 
 
In charting the rise of private property and its hallmark right to exclude, it is 
convenient (but not contrived) to commence with the Commentaries of William 
Blackstone in 1765. Blackstone wrote his Commentaries at a crucial era as 
England vigorously expanded its colonial empire.  Blackstone’s timely 
summation of the great body of common law jurisprudence enabled this 
important (and transportable) compendium to reach far beyond English 
shores, as Anglo-settler societies extended across North America and the 
Pacific Rim.3 Blackstone’s thinking proved foundational to many newly 
establishing jurisdictions.4 Indeed his summaries of the law were noetic. This 
was particularly so for concepts of ‘property’ as nascent societies struggled 
with the political and social imperatives of settling vast, empty hinterlands, 
whether in pursuit of Manifest Destiny, or more mundane, practical policies of 
closer settlement.5  Blackstone captured a notion of property that conformed 
to the spirit of the times, an articulation that matched the zealous conquering 
of frontier.  
 
In writing of ‘property’, Blackstone famously observed 
 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the 
affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the right of ay other individual in the universe. 
 
Unsurprisingly, much emphasis was placed on Blackstone’s ‘sole and 
despotic’ prescription to justify an absolutist, highly individualised and 
exclusive notion of property in settler societies.  Moreover, his definition 
3 Stuart Banner, Possessing the Pacific (2008). 
4 Albert Alschuler, ‘Rediscovering Blackstone’ (1996) 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1. 
5 The U.S. Homestead Act 1862 limited fee grants to new settlers of (unviable parcels of) 160 
acres, the objective to promote closer settlement. 
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divorced property from the things of the external world.  But as Carol Rose 
observes, Blackstone’s definitive assertion (Rose called it the ‘Exclusivity 
Axiom’) was immediately followed by his own doubts as to the origin of such 
seemingly unequivocal rights (Rose’s ‘Ownership Anxiety’):6 
 
And yet there are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to consider 
the origin and foundation of this right. Pleased as we are with the possession, 
we seem afraid to look back to the means by which it was acquired, as if 
fearful of some defect in title…We think it enough that our title is derived by 
the grant of the former proprietor,…not caring to reflect that (accurately and 
strictly speaking) there is no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set 
of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land; why the son 
should have a right to exclude his fellow creatures from a determinate spot of 
ground… 
 
Rose argues that the problem is that not enough property jurists ‘have read 
that much Blackstone.’ If those who quote Blackstone’s definition read further, 
they might come to think that Blackstone posed his definition more as a 
metaphor than a literal description….a point of departure.’7  Indeed, had 
scholars selectively preferred the later line in the same chapter ‘so it is 
agreed…that occupancy gave…the original right to the permanent property in 
the substance of the earth itself; which excludes everyone else but the owner 
from the use (emphasis added) of it’, then property rights may have been 
more widely viewed as usufructs or use rights?   Rose concludes that 
Blackstone’s so-called ‘Exclusivity Axiom’ is a metaphoric over-statement, a 
‘trope’, that ‘conceal[s] the interactive character of property and give[s] an 
inappropriately individualistic patina to this most sociable of human 
institutions.’8   
 
Yet it is not just Blackstone’s text that was problematic, it was also the context 
in which he wrote. As Eric Freyfogle notes, Blackstone had different ideas 
6 Carol Rose, ‘Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety’ (1998) 108 Yale L.J. 601; 
Carol Rose, ‘The Moral Subject of Property’, (2006) 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1897, 1904. 
7 Rose, above n6, 602. 
8 Ibid, 632. 
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about ‘dominion’ derived from late 18th century English agrarian society, than 
we may understand the term in a 21st century urban environment. Freyfogle 
argues ‘dominion’ to Blackstone meant ‘the right to quiet enjoyment…the right 
to halt any appreciable interference by a neighbor’.9 Pointedly this did not 
equate to the absolute right to exclude.  Rather it contemplated contexts 
where multiple rights co-existed lawfully, where reasonable co-enjoyment was 
implied, but unreasonable interference with another’s peaceful use and 
enjoyment was an actionable breach of ‘dominion’.  Carol Rose likewise 
factors in context, positing that Blackstone was aware of the ‘pervasive and 
serious qualifications on exclusive dominion’ arising from then feudal and 
entailed limitations on estates, and the ‘general neighborly responsibilities of 
riparian and nuisance law.’10  Murray Raff is likewise dismissive of the 
dogmatic common law view that property is ‘an absolute egocentric dominion’. 
Raff describes this view as a ‘self-evident truth without the extensive 
reference to authoritative sources which one might expect with respect to 
such a dramatic conclusion’.11 Raff also contextualises Blackstone’s writings, 
‘at a time when common lands were being enclosed, and memory of the 
English Revolution was not so distant, it was not surprising that he would 
have in mind the power to exclude others from private property – especially 
the Crown.’ 12 Blackstone the alleged absolutist similarly acknowledged the 
law of waste and nuisance as limits on the private owner’s dominion.13  
 
More significantly, Blackstone’s ‘context’ was one where non-exclusive 
property rights subsisted and co-existed with private rights. While the 
enclosure movement had gained considerable momentum in the second half 
of the eighteenth century, common property rights were still widespread. The 
myopia that ‘property’ and ‘private property’ were synonymous and 
interchangeable terms had not taken hold, rather property existed in more 
diverse and pluralistic forms. But Blackstone’s ‘sole and despotic’ refrain was 
the contemporary equivalent of private property’s ‘sound bite’. Like most 
9 Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the Common Good (2003) 68. 
10 Rose, above n6, 603. 
11 Murray Raff, ‘Environmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property Concept’, (1998) 
22 Melb. Univ. Law Rev. 657, 662. 
12 Ibid, 665. 
13 Ibid. 
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‘sound bites’, they sell perception, a message, not substance or nuance. This 
message, Rose’s ‘trope’, proved too successful, thereby informing (and 
distorting) an absolutist exclusive notion of private property, to the detriment 
of private property’s more subtle and intricate qualifications.  
 
If William Blackstone articulated a key (albeit selective) mantra, John Locke 
provided the theoretical underpinning for private property in the crucial early 
phases of settler society. Indeed Lockean notions of ‘property’ continue to 
stress the primacy of individual dominion, and are often used to describe 
politically conservative approaches to private property rights. Locke wrote a 
century before Blackstone, but his themes of the inherent worth of individual 
labour struck an especial chord in republican America.  
 
The basic Lockean system of property as a license for unlimited individual 
accumulation via unilateral action has held a powerful place in the American 
pantheon of political thought since the Revolution.14  
 
According to Locke, ownership of one’s own body was the starting point to 
justify the private ownership of external things. When one mixed individual 
labour with things found in the common fund, or natural world, something of 
value was created. Morally the fruits of one’s labour justified that ‘thing’ being 
owned by the person whose labour had created it.15 Moreover this transfer of 
ownership was good for both the individual and the collective whole, 
improving land adds value (by ten-fold in Locke’s estimation), an apt political 
narrative.  Some value owned by an individual is better than no value owned 
by the collective.  Locke’s ‘labour theory’ corroborated the individual 
acquisition of private property transformed by ‘sweat equity’, and provided a 
powerful albeit naïve justification for private property. But Locke also 
recognised the qualifications to his theory of property, the oft-cited proviso 
that there remained ‘enough and as good’ land for others, and that there was 
to be no wasteful surplus in one’s acquisition, no ‘spoilage’.  Absolutism, even 
at the frontier, was always tempered by limit and restraint. 
14 Leigh Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources (2003) 45. 
15 Raymond above n14, 44-45; Freyfogle, above n9, 110-115. 
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 The Lockean vision of an ‘agrarian democracy of small, self-sufficient property 
owners’16 proved more potent in its rhetoric than its reality, as settler societies 
continued to evolve. Its rhetoric of rugged individualism however has 
remained a resilient image for the institution of private property, and much like 
Blackstone’s ‘sole and despotic dominion’ has developed noetic qualities that 
continue to speak to simplistic absolutism rather than complex subtlety. 
 
3. The expansion of private property in settler societies 
 
Informed by Blackstonian and Lockean ideals, the subsequent expansion of 
private property in settler societies in the later 18th and earlier 19th centuries 
was driven in large part by two contemporaneous influences: the political 
imperative of government to encourage closer settlement, and the desire for 
secure and durable property rights on the part of the new settler. The political 
imperative was ‘nation building’; fledgling colonies or republics such as 
Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. were encouraging their citizens and 
subjects to settle the so-called ‘waste lands’ in ways that corroborated Locke’s 
labor theory of property.  Rewarding work on the frontier with land on the 
frontier seemed an equitable and efficient means of achieving Manifest 
Destiny, particularly where unoccupied land was perceived as a liability or 
weak point in the new colony or nation.17  Because unoccupied land carried a 
negative value to the Crown or federal government, giving it away to those 
who would strengthen the nation geographically and economically made 
sense.  In the latter regard, the Lockean view of ownership also intersected 
with the classical economic view of efficient use of resources.   
 
The second half of the equation was a desire on the part of the waves of new 
settlers to acquire land. Legal historian John McLaren observes the 
unparalled opportunities settler societies provided to new immigrants to 
16 Sally Fairfax et al, Buying Nature: The Limits of Land Acquisition as a Conservation 
Strategy, 1780-2004 (2005) 16. 
17 Daniel Bromley, ‘Private Property and the Public Interest: Land in the American Idea.’ in 
William G. Robbins and James C. Foster (eds), Land in the American West: Private Claims 
and the Common Good, (2000). 
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secure more durable and clearer private property rights, particularly 
accentuated by recent experiences of dispossession from common lands. 
McLaren further observes a ‘selective historical amnesia’ when it came to the 
‘forgetfulness of customary rights in common to land which settlers or their 
recent ancestors had enjoyed under English or Scots law’.18 Opportunity and 
selective amnesia signalled a strong preference for private property, and its 
attributes of security or fixity of tenure. Thus governments promised 
homestead title, or fee simple selection rights under legislation such as the 
1862 Robertson Land Act in New South Wales. Frequently the grants were a 
post-hoc validation of the status quo of possession.  
 
Andrew Buck identifies this trend as an early manifestation of a distinctly 
Australian form of property law.19 Australian property departed from its 
English parentage by its emphasis on a universal and egalitarian access to 
land.  Buck considers such ‘possessive egalitarianism’,20 an equal right to 
acquire, as a defining feature of Australian property. More broadly, property in 
the settler context was a market commodity, not an incident of family privilege, 
power, and sinecure. Such universality of access triggered an early land rush 
by ‘squatters’, who defied colonial authorities and ignored vain attempts to 
restrict settlement within the official boundaries.21 Land settlement policies 
had to adapt quickly to meet this expansionary exigency, initially in the form of 
a sui generis private pastoral tenure22 and finally selection rights to freehold 
provided the settler improved their parcel.  The vicissitudes of drought in New 
South Wales in the late 1840s forced many sheep men, known as ‘Prophets’, 
to New Zealand, where runs were taken up in the foothills and eastern slopes 
of the South Island Alps, again with the exhortation to settle the empty 
18 John McLaren, ‘The Canadian Doukhobors and the Land Question: Religious 
Communalists in a Fee Simple World’ in Land and Freedom: Law Property Rights and the 
British Diaspora (2001) 135.  
19 Seen in unique property rights like crop liens or pastoral leases, Andrew Buck, The Making 
of Australian Property Law (2006). 
20 Ibid, 138. 
21 Stephen Roberts, History of Australian Land Settlement 1788-1920 (1924); Stephen 
Roberts, The Squatting Age in Australia (1935); C J King, An Outline of Closer Settlement in 
NSW (1957); Peter Burroughs, Britain and Australia 1831-1855 A Study in Imperial relations 
and Crown lands Administration (1967). 
22 Imperial Waste Lands Occupation Act 1846 and Order in Council March 1847; Henry 
Reynolds and Jamie Dalzeill, ‘Aborigines and Pastoral Leases – Imperial and Colonial Policy 
1826-1855’, (1996) 19 UNSW Law Journal 315. 
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interior.23 In the United States westward-bound ‘settlers created the impetus 
for legal change by running roughshod over established property laws 
(favouring absentee land speculators) and creating for themselves 
communities governed by their own self-serving conception of just property 
relations…. Echoing John Locke’s discussions of property… settlers 
frequently argued that “possession was the best title” and that to obtain true 
ownership of the wilderness lands on the frontier, a putative owner “must not 
only claim it, but annex his labor to it, and make it more fit for the use of man; 
till this be done it remains in the common stock, and anyone who needs to 
improve it for his support, has a right.”’24 By 1862 the Homestead Act 
accommodated this factual reality by sanctioning the grant of 160 acres of 
private fee simple title to settlers who improved their holdings. 
 
In this relatively narrow temporal window, the expanding institution of private 
property reflected its pre-industrial, agrarian context. Eric Freyfogle saw this 
expression of private ownership as a peaceable exercise of dominion or quiet 
enjoyment of the land, a settled agrarian image of private ownership that 
‘today might be called the community or ecological vision of private property, 
given that it protects lands and communities while encouraging lasting ties 
between people and places.’25 ‘The essence of this private property was the 
right to remain undisturbed in one’s use of it’26 and conversely not to interfere 
with other’s peaceful use of their lands. It did not require nor demand an 
absolute right to exclude. Ironically (and tragically) such ‘settled’ and 
‘protective’ principles did not apply to the dispossessed indigene.27  The 
settled agrarianism of Freyfogle was enforced by the ‘do no harm’ principle of 
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a way so as to 
not disturb/harm others).  Nuisance law thus protected ‘settled’ property rights 
23 These settlers had ‘unlimited faith in the squatting system and a great contempt for 
freehold.’ L Acland, Early Canterbury Runs (1930) 2; William Jourdain, Land Legislation and 
Settlement in New Zealand (1925). 
24 Eduardo Penhalver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and 
Protestors Improve the Law of Ownership (2010) 55-56. 
25 Freyfogle above n9, 37-38. 
26 Ibid, 56. 
27 The irony lost on new settlers was that the dispossession of indigenous landholders 
mirrored in historical terms the dispossession arising from the efficient enclosure of common 
‘waste lands’ into productive private lands. Buck, above n 19, 14-30.  
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in terms of restraining interferences with a private owner’s use and enjoyment 
rights.  
 
4. The evolving bundle of rights and the right to exclude 
  
Locke’s idealised agrarian society was a transitory phase; the advent of the 
unstoppable capitalist/industrial age required a re-articulation of private 
property that stressed the primacy of individual exclusionary power and the 
right to exploit. The ‘bundle of rights’ metaphor gathered significant 
momentum in the late 19th century, in the process transforming modern 
property to conform to the economic imperatives of the new age.28 The 
evolution of the bundle metaphor is described in the American context in the 
following terms: 
 
[I]n the nineteenth century, … property evolved from a unilateral and 
exclusive power over a material item, to a more malleable and divisible set of 
specific rights. Prior to the Civil War, property in the United States was 
generally viewed in terms discussed by John Locke…. After the Civil War, 
America’s strong commitment to the Lockean view of ownership weakened, 
and our concept of property fragmented. The familiar “bundle of sticks” 
metaphor emerged, allowing society to treat rights as easily severable.29 
 
The term ‘bundle of rights’ is often attributed to John Lewis’ treatise on the law 
of eminent domain, published in 1888.30 Stuart Banner’s history of American 
property traces its first use to US Supreme Court Justice James Wilson in the 
late 18th century. The term was popularised by English law professor John 
Austin in the 1830s who lectured that property ‘was not a thing a person 
owned…[but] the assemblage of rights a person had over a thing.’31 Banner 
agrees that its use became mainstream by the 1880s, its ‘definition had been 
28 Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests’, 
(2002) 26 Harvard Environmental Law Review 281, 284-291. 
29 Fairfax, above n16, 16. 
30 Robert Goldstein, ‘Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and 
Ecology into Real Property Law’, (1998) 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 347, 367. 
31 Stuart Banner, American Property, A History of Who, Why and What We Own (2011) 57. 
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repeated so often that American lawyers thought of property as a bundle of 
rights and no longer the thing itself.’ 32 
 
The bundle envisages a series of divisible rights or sticks,33 including rights to 
use and enjoy, exploit, alienate, possess, and of course, exclude.  The fee 
simple holder arguably enjoys the greatest bundle of rights known to the 
common law, while a life estate holder has fewer sticks, deprived for example 
of full rights of alienation.  The bundle metaphor highlights the divisibility of 
property rights, that rights can be separated and re-constituted in a flexible 
variety of right bundles.  The metaphor also highlights the relativity of 
property, and the potential for the simultaneous ownership of divergent 
interests in the one land by multiple owners, ‘ownership is not one aggregate 
right; it is many distinct rights, and a landowner can possess few or many of 
them.’34 The metaphor suited the changing times because it enabled the right 
to intensively exploit.  And inherent in the untrammelled right to exploit was a 
security of exclusive possession free from any interference.  The absolute 
right to exclude captured the full value of private capital in land and was 
incentive for its efficient and intensive development. What was once qualified 
became absolute, conveniently building on the simple (yet incomplete) 
narratives of Blackstone and Locke.  
 
This shift was most evident in Anglo-American common law. For example, in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Sanderson35 in 1886, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court (in keeping with a broader trend in American property jurisprudence in 
the late 19th century) affirmed the primacy of the right to develop and exploit. 
‘In Sanderson, the pendulum had completed its swing…from an agrarian 
property system that protected quiet enjoyment and enforced sic utere tuo 
firmly, … to the industrial property side, freely permitting intensive land uses 
with only modest concern about resulting harms…. Property law was now 
32 Ibid, 58. ‘Even the dullest individual knows and understands that his property in anything is 
a bundle of rights.’  
33 Goldstein, above n at 367. 
34 Freyfogle, above n9, 19; Warren Samuels & Nicholas Mercuro,The Fundamental 
Interrelationships between Government and Property (1999). 
35 113 Pa. 126 6 A 453 (1886). 
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chiefly about the right to use land for maximum gain.’36 Private property was 
by this point firmly entrenched as a market commodity, a series of divisible 
and exploitable sticks, where values of personhood or community were 
obsolete.  Integral to the maximal intensive use of land was freedom from all 
types of interferences, substantial or peripheral, guaranteed by the private 
stick to exclude, a new core right ‘to halt physical invasions of … spaces - the 
right to exclude.  This was the legal right that industries valued the most, 
because it allowed them to keep people off their lands.’37 
 
The separable bundle also reinforced the abstract nature of private property 
rights. In the early 20th century, scholar Wesley Hohfield claimed there was no 
such thing as a legal right between a person and a thing, but merely between 
persons. In landmark articles in 1913 and 1917, Hohfield argued that property 
rights were ‘multi-tal’, a series of identical personal rights enforceable against 
a large indefinite mass of individuals. The Hohfeldian analysis successfully 
removed legal relations from the physical facts, such that ‘land is not property, 
but the subject of property.’38 
 
Its abstract utility meant that the right to exclude became the signature right 
amongst the other bundle rights. The U.S. Supreme Court described it as ‘one 
of the most essential sticks’39 or ‘one of the most treasured strands in an 
owner’s bundle of property rights.’40 In 1954 Felix Cohen provided a simple 
formula for private property and its dominant right to exclude. 
 
 [T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached: 
 
To the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant 
or withhold. 
36 Freyfogle, above n9, 73. 
37 Eric Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land 
(2007) 56. 
38 Wesley Hohfield ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning’ 
(1913) Yale LJ 16. 
39 Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 U.S. 164, 177; Dolan v City of Tigard 512 U.S. 374, 384 
(1994); Nollan v California Coastal Commission 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987); ‘The right to 
exclude others is perhaps the quintessential property right’. Nixon v United States 978 F.2d 
1269, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
40 Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435. 
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Signed:    Private citizen 
 
Endorsed: The state.41 
 
American property jurist William Merrill is a leading contemporary advocate for 
private property’s exclusivity thesis.  
 
The right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
identifying the existence of property. Whatever other sticks may exist in a 
property owner’s bundle of rights in any given context, these other rights are 
purely contingent in terms of whether we speak of the bundle as property.  
The right to exclude is…fundamental to the concept of property. The right to 
exclude is a gatekeeper right that should be given primary place in defining 
property.42 
 
Merrill castigates ‘property realists’ for their attempts to downgrade the 
significance of the right to exclude.‘[G]ive someone the right to exclude others 
from a valued resource… and you give them property.  Deny someone the 
exclusion right and they do not have property.’43 
 
Yet by the beginning of the 21st century, disquiet over its unqualified pre-
eminence increased, particularly when it impeded innocuous public access 
expectations. Jerry Anderson’s comparative study of public access rights in 
England and the United States, criticised the U.S. Supreme Court for 
‘canonizing’ this right, its placement of the exclude ‘stick’ at the ‘top of the 
woodpile’ without regard to context, community values, or norms.  
 
Completely absent from the Court's analysis is recognition that the 
landowner's right to exclude involves a balance with the public's interest in 
access. The public may desire access …for the purpose of reaching some 
communal property, such as a beach or park, or it may value access for its 
own sake, to enjoy the aesthetic values the private land and its surroundings 
41 Felix Cohen, ‘Dialogue on Private Property’, (1954) 9 Rutgers Law Review 357. 
42 Thomas Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’, (1998) 77 Nebraska Law Review 730, 
731. 
43 Ibid, 730. 
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offers. While the public interest has figured into a few state court decisions on 
access, the Supreme Court has not so much as mentioned it in upholding a 
seemingly absolute right to exclude…. Rather than simply accept the right to 
exclude as a given, courts should carefully consider the interests it serves 
and determine whether, in some circumstances, it may be possible to 
accommodate greater public access without damaging the private owner's 
interests.44 
 
Anderson criticises the arbitrariness of the right to exclude; that it monopolises 
the spatial spectrum of use without regard to the theoretical (or practical) 
consideration that other use(s) may peaceably co-exist. Anderson contrasts 
ancient English traditions about access to the countryside, with less 
entrenched American social and cultural values where primacy is placed on a 
landowner’s private right to exclude.  
 
Anderson’s comparative study of public access to private countryside 
highlights that private property is a social institution, that its limits are defined 
and set by societal expectations and norms that vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and over time.  ‘Briton’s… longed valued public access to the 
countryside’45 combined with simmering ‘class outrage46 dating from the 
enclosure period, proved an irresistible impetus for the enactment of the 
Countryside and Rights of Way Act in 2000. This legislation clarified 
uncertainties and ambiguities surrounding public access rights, and opened 
up ‘millions of acres of private land to public access, without compensating 
the landowners for this limitation on their right to exclude.  As a result, the law 
represents a dramatic shift in the allocation of the bundle of sticks.’47 By 
contrast, in the United States, and analogously Australia and New Zealand, 
the historical emphasis has focused on the role of private property as a 
secure and developable commodity, such that any experiments with property 
44 Jerry Anderson, ‘Britain’s Right to Roam: redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks’, 
(2007) 19 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 375, 377- 379.  
45 Ibid, 412-417. 
46 John Sprankling et al, Global Issues in Property Law (2006) 90-93. 
47 John Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’ (2011) 
89 Nebraska Law Rev. 739. 
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rights other than private have been transient48 or peripheral.49  The 
consequence in such jurisdictions, where the social and cultural context is 
less favourable, is that public access rights are weak and vulnerable.  
 
However, a lack of legal formality is not to say that social pressures and 
norms in settler societies cannot exert inroads into a dominant right to 
exclude.  Changed social attitudes to racial discrimination collided with the 
‘canonized’ right to exclude, in the U.S. common law of public 
accommodations. Joseph Singer compared public accommodations laws 
across numerous U.S. states, in particular the rights of business owners to 
exclude customers on the basis of race. Singer’s comparative analysis 
provoked generic observations about the right to exclude in private property 
jurisprudence 
 
What can the history of public accommodations law teach us about private 
property? It suggests that there are substantial limitations to the classical 
conception of property as ownership…It further suggests that all rights  - even 
the basic right to exclude- are limited by the rights of others and by social 
interests… they also reflect and structure the contours of social 
relationships.50 
 
Moreover, in terms of the sticks found in a standard ‘bundle’, Singer did not 
assume that automatically the right to exclude was a given,  
 
Yet if property involves a bundle of rights, it is not at all clear that all the sticks 
in the bundle fit comfortably together…The owner’s right to exclude 
may…conflict with and may be limited by, the public’s right of access to the 
market without discrimination…if the individual entitlements comprising 
ownership constitute a family of rights of a certain class, the members of the 
family do not necessarily get along with each other all the time.51 
 
48 Freyfogle, above n 9, 23-24. 
49 John Page, ‘Grazing Rights and Public Lands in New Zealand and the western United 
States: A Comparative Perspective’ (2009) 49(2) Natural Resources Journal 403. 
50 Joseph Singer, ‘No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property’, (1995) 
90 Nw. U.L.Rev. 1283, 1450. 
51 Ibid, 1452. 
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Interestingly, Singer argues that where a fee simple owner invokes the state’s 
aid in enforcing trespass laws (presumably the common law of trespass 
enforced by court order), the private owner’s interests inextricably overlap, or 
become ‘imbricated’ with those of the state52, blending private and public, and 
diluting the absolutism of the right to exclude with legitimate interests of the 
state.  More broadly, Singer concentrated on the overlooked sociability53 of 
property, that it needs to be understood as both contingent and contextually 
shaped, and conversely that property helps to structure and shape the 
contours of social relationships.54 
 
Richard Barnes likewise draws the nexus between property as a social 
institution, ‘an institution that is responsive to the needs of society’, and the 
limits of private property.  Like Singer, Barnes does not automatically accept 
the right to exclude as paramount in terms of its absolute priority over other 
interests 
  
Although strong private rights may dominate many areas of property 
discourse, the prioritisation of private rights is not a logical requirement of 
property per se, but a product of the social context in which property rights 
have evolved… To narrowly construe property in ‘terms of raw exclusory 
power’ is to locate property in the hands of the past, not the present.55 
 
Eric Freyfogle takes an historical rather than a normative perspective on this 
issue. ‘To understand private property fully…we need to gain a sense of the 
path that private property has followed to get to where it is today.’56 Freyfogle 
cites early public rights to unenclosed woodlands in the New England, grazing 
rights on rangelands, and customary hunting and fishing rights (the ‘lost right 
to roam) to argue that exclusion has always been qualified.’57 ‘[T]he right to 
exclude has not been absolute in American law, nor is it an inherent or 
52 Ibid, 1451. 
53 Margaret Davies, Property Meanings, histories, theories (2007). 
54 Ibid, 1462. 
55 Richard Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources (2009) 25-26.  
56 Ibid, 28. Freyfogle was more direct in a personal conversation with the author in April 2013, 
when he stated that we are ‘clueless if we do not understand property history’.  
57 Freyfogle, above n37, 29-60. 
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necessary part of land ownership. Private ownership can function perfectly 
well with landowners possessing a limited right to keep outsiders away.’58 
Freyfogle believes the onus should shift. ‘The right to exclude needs to be 
justified in terms of the common good, where it allows a landholder to halt 
disruptive intrusions, it is a valuable and justified right.  But what about the 
right to exclude people who are merely passing across …land in ways that do 
not disrupt, do not invade privacy, and cause no physical harm?’59 Freyfogle 
concedes that his arguments are unlikely to take root while lawmakers ‘cannot 
imagine and do not remember a different [pre-industrial] legal world.’60  
 
Parts 2, 3 and 4 illustrate that private property rights are not immutably fixed. 
Change is constant, but it is slow, and appears imperceptible.  The apparent 
inability to ‘remember or imagine a different legal world’ to which Freyfogle 
refers is symptomatic of a wider malaise that affects private property, that it is 
not sufficiently cognizant of the dynamic of change.  This is exemplified by the 
tenacity of the obsolete private/public divide.  Dynamism, stasis, and the 
public/private divide, and their collective impacts on how we define private 
property in land, are canvassed in the succeeding parts 5 and 6.  
 
5. The dynamism of private property 
 
As a social institution, private property conforms to social, political and 
economic pressures. A multitude of scholars affirm its dynamism.61 Hanoch 
Dagan writes of the dynamic ‘public dimensions of private property’.62 Joseph 
Sax describes property as ‘continuously adjust[ing] to reflect new economic 
and social structures.’63  Eric Freyfogle observes that ‘[p]rivate property… has 
58 Ibid at 57.  
59 Freyfogle, above n9, 250. 
60 Ibid, 60. 
61 Emma Waring, ‘Private-Private Takings and the Stability of Property’ (2013) 24 Kings Law 
Journal 237. 
62 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Public Dimension of Private Property’ (2013) 24 Kings Law Journal 
260. 
63Joseph Sax, ‘Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council’ (1992) 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1433, 1446. 
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been an evolving, organic institution with ownership rights that have varied 
greatly from era to era and place to place.’64 And Jerry Anderson notes  
 
The recognition of private property interests involves trade-offs with 
community values and egalitarian goals; therefore, the exact composition of 
the bundle of sticks must be recognized as a mediation between these 
interests.   Moreover, the balance struck is always tentative, subject to 
constant re-evaluation in light of current needs and norms.65 
 
Yet the mantra that private property rights must be secure, certain, and 
stable66 feeds a widely held counter view that private property rights are fixed 
and inviolate. The difficulty lies in understanding that stability can encompass 
change - indeed the latter enhances it. ‘The very nature of a property regime 
demands that property be stable only relatively, not absolutely.’67 Relative 
stability means principled evolution, the ongoing development of property 
principles and doctrines within coherent parameters, not ad hoc or 
unpredictable declarations of individualised ‘justice’.68 By contrast, absolute 
stability means no change at all, an ossified stasis that is an anathema to the 
incremental common law, the bedrock of property.   
 
In coping with relative stability, and the relative certainty it enables, the 
challenge for the law is to remain simultaneously principled and 
contemporary. To borrow a Carol Rose aphorism that ‘property is persuasion’, 
the ‘persuasion’ needed to ground new or evolving property rights must be 
consistent with principles and precedent. As English Law Lord Millett 
observes  
 
Property rights are determined by fixed rules and settled principles.  They are 
not discretionary.  They do not depend upon ideas of what is “fair, just and 
64 Freyfogle, above n9, 7. 
65 Anderson, above n44, 376-377. 
66 National Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175. 
67 Carol Rose, ‘Property and Expropriation’, (2000) 25 Utah Law Review 1, 14.  
68 Dynamic private property can be ‘founded on a contextual application of normative 
judgment, [not] a decision-maker’s subjective preferences.’ Hanoch Dagan, Property Values 
and Institutions (2011) 43. 
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reasonable.” Such concepts, which in reality mask decisions of legal policy, 
have no place in the law of property.69 
 
In the absence of principled balance, it is open to exploit Rose’s aphorism, 
and the discourse of property generally, such that ‘persuasion (becomes) 
property’, a perverse reversal.  
 
Property also retires ‘obscure, neglected or outmoded’ property sticks, and 
crafts novel ‘off the rack’ property rights to respond to societal demands.70 
Andrew Buck identifies the mid 19th century as an innovative period for 
Australian land law, when English rights unsuited to local conditions (for 
example primogeniture or the fee tail) were abolished, and new property 
regimes such as Torrens title were enacted.71  In the early 21st century the 
propertisation of carbon poses like dilemmas, are ancient rights such as 
profits a prendre relevant to propertise sequestered carbon, or is a sui generis 
statutory right more appropriate.72  
 
Private property in land maintains its relevance by being dynamic. Where its 
descriptions become stagnant or outmoded, its inaptness risks its integrity.73 
The private/public divide, and its universalisation of property rights as ‘private’, 
is a standout example of problematic definitional stasis. 
 
6. The public/private divide 
 
The public/private divide views ‘property rights’ as private individualised rights 
diminished or restricted by public regulation. The dichotomy is relatively 
simple; the right to develop or exploit land is a natural private right, an incident 
of owning land.  Public restraints on that private right are not an incident of the 
69 Foskett v McKeown [2000] 1 AC 112, 127 per Lord Millett. 
70 Carol Rose, ‘What Government Can do for Property (and Vice Versa)’ in Warren Samuels 
and Nicholas Mercuro (eds.), The Fundamental Interrelationships between Government and 
Property 211; Charles Reich, ‘The New Property’, (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733. 
71 Buck, above n19. 
72 Samantha Hepburn, ‘Carbon Rights as New Property: the benefits of statutory verification’, 
(2009) 31(2) Sydney Law Review 239. 
73 Dagan, above n68, 43. 
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private right, but an overarching regulation or impediment sourced from a 
detached public realm.74  
 
The consequence of the public/private divide is that property is exclusively 
within the private realm, and a matter for the private law.  Public ‘interests’ in 
property constitute a restriction or encumbrance on the private right, imposed 
from the other side of the divide.  Public interests in property are therefore not 
‘property rights’, since ‘rights’ belong only in the private realm.  Conceptually 
the dichotomy emphasises simplicity over complexity, and duality over 
plurality. Property is either private, or it is not. And the concept that private, 
public or common rights may subsist simultaneously in a given parcel is the 
antithesis of the clean duality.  
 
The origins of the public/private divide stem from the late 19th century, rising in 
tandem with the bundle of rights metaphor and an urban/industrial 
intensification of land use. Freyfogle writes 
 
By late century evolving legal thought had come to portray American life as 
separated into two spheres:  a private sphere and a public, governmental 
sphere.  Private property was placed in the private category…. Regulation, by 
contrast was a public governmental act…. the mere fact that legal rhetoric 
divided the public and private realms represented a critical shift in thinking, a 
shift that would have far-ranging implications up to our day.75 
 
The quarantining of property into the private realm set the scene for later 
conflicts over the ostensible loss of private property rights as environmental 
and planning regulation encroached into the private owner’s bundle of rights.  
The conflation of private ownership into a form of allodial or absolute 
ownership was fed by the noeticism of the sole and despotic dominion mantra 
in a purely private environment.76   
 
74 Kelo v City of New London 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
75 Freyfogle, above n9, 80. 
76 Freyfogle, above n37, 20-24.  
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In particular the divide reinforced the ideology that property was solely 
concerned with the promotion of personal economic welfare and the 
protection of individual privacy. Land was no longer a part of an inclusive 
compact rooted in context or community; rather private rights were an 
exclusive, autonomous abstract.  ‘As an intellectual concept, private property 
had largely been freed from communal obligations in a way that both reflected 
and fuelled the breakdown of community-centred sentiment.’77  The 
public/private divide also proved the catalyst for the ‘curious’ modern myopia78 
that ‘property’ and ‘private property’ are one and the same, even where 
alternatives to private property are patently ‘ubiquitous, if unremarked’.79 
Carol Rose cites economic and social reasons for this contemporary 
unwillingness to see property other than private property.  
 
Hanoch Dagan is critical of the polarities of the public/private divide. The 
private law of property ‘cannot and should not have its own inner 
intelligibility.’80 Rather it is a series of related ‘institutions’ with varying ‘public 
dimensions’, dependent on public factors such as social context, human 
relationships, and the nature of the propertied resource. In Dagan’s account, 
private property ‘rests on a pluralist view of society’81 and correspondence to 
its grounded truth. In terms of the right to exclude, Dagan identifies three 
public values that qualify the right; autonomy, personhood and community.  
 
None of these values sanctions an absolute right to exclude; furthermore, to 
varying degrees, they even positively require curbing such a right and 
recognising the right to entry of non-owners.82 
 
Autonomy arises where non-owners or marginalized groups enjoy limited 
rights of entry; a qualification that serves their independence and sustains 
human dignity. Equally a qualified right to enter may be constitutive of a non-
77 Freyfogle, above n9, 81. 
78 Carol Rose, ‘The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems’, (1998-1999) 83  Minn. L. Rev. 129, 132. 
79 Ibid, 132. 
80 Dagan, above n62, 270. 
81 Ibid, 262. 
82 Ibid, 284. 
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owner, a furtherance of personhood, particularly where the owner’s property is 
merely fungible. Lastly Dagan says that qualified rights to enter serve public 
values of community, by creating ‘institutional infrastructure’ that fosters co-
operation and the attainment of human flourishing.83 
 
The public/private divide is a late 19th century construct, an artifice detached 
from both present and past. For centuries, private freehold estates have been 
subject to wide restrictions that collectively represented an amorphous public 
interest in land. Feudal or Crown obligations were the hallmark of the 
doctrines of tenure and estates. The fee socage tenure that prevailed after the 
Tenures Abolition Act of 1660 remained an estate of uncertain duration, 
capable of reversion to the Crown through escheat. Natural rights of support, 
air, and light modified landowner’s rights since time immemorial, while 
common law doctrines of prescription and adverse possession acknowledge 
the relativity of a landowner’s title, and the supervening interests of third 
parties in private property. Since the 17th century, the vesting of future 
interests in land has been subservient to the public interest in freedom of 
alienation, enforced by the rule against perpetuities. Private property in the 
common law tenurial tradition has rarely been absolute. Arguably it is less so 
now, as land use and environmental regulatory laws intersect with property 
with increasing frequency and sophistry.  
 
In the 21st century, the notion of a pure private/public dichotomy is even less 
defensible. Joseph Sax says it was dated in the 1970s, when high profile 
cases such as Just v Marinette County, and Penn Central84 legitimised the 
subsistence of public rights in private property without the former constituting 
the ‘taking’ of a private property right.  Rather, such cases exemplify that the 
private/public divide is porous85 and that any former distinctiveness (real or 
perceived) is blurred. Private property rights are burdened with public 
83 Ibid, 285-6. 
84 Joseph Sax, ‘Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property’ 58 Wash. L. Rev. 481 
(1982-1983); Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
85 Ann Brower et al, ‘The Cowboy, the Southern Man, and the Man from Snowy River: The 
Symbolic Politics of Property in Australia, the United States and New Zealand’, (2009) 21(3) 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 455. 
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restraints and public interests proliferate,86 while public and private rights co-
mingle in public lands.87  We have moved from perceptions of transparent 
dichotomies, to realities of translucent blends. This progression has not 
passed unobserved.88 Margaret Davies states that ‘the distinction between 
public and private…is not a bright line.’89 Kevin and Susan Gray see public 
and private operating, ‘not dichotomously, but continuously across a spectrum 
in which adjacent connotations shade easily into one another.’90 Amnon 
Lehavi describes modern property as a ‘conscious jigsaw puzzle [where]…the 
boundaries between the public and private realms are not clear-cur nor 
hermetic…the two spheres are sophisticatedly intertwined.’’91  
 
Yet despite these (and other similar) observations, the common law ‘has not 
uniformly incorporated or internalised this understanding of the deep structure 
of property’ and continues to ‘articulate the notion of property in terms of raw 
exclusory power.’92 The primacy of the right to exclude is directly correlative of 
the rhetorical primacy of the public/private divide, yet the latter is a flawed and 
unrepresentative dichotomy.  The arbitrary right to exclude is wedded to an 
outmoded concept. ‘The ideology of property as uncontrolled exclusory power 
is nowadays just as untenable as is the dichotomous distinction between the 
domains of the private and the public.‘93 
 
This mismatch is highlighted when public rights of access intersect with the 
right to exclude. Security of private use invariably requires freedom from 
interference, but a blanket position is not always accurate, it depends on 
context, geographic, historic and cultural.  The importance of context is 
86 Richard Babcock & Duane Feurer, ‘Land as a Commodity “Affected with a Public Interest”’, 
(1976-1977) 52 Wash. L. Rev. 289. 
87 Brower et al, above n85. 
88 Courtney White, ‘Conservation in the Age of Consequences’ 48 (2008) Nat. Resources J. 1, 
3-4. 
89 Davies, above n53, 11.  
90 Kevin Gray & Susan Gray, ‘Private Property and Public Propriety’ in Property and the 
Constitution (Janet McLean ed.) (1999) 11. 
91 Amnon Lehavi, ‘The Property Puzzle’ (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Review 1987. 
92 Gray & Gray, above n90, 13. 
93 Ibid, 15. 
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exemplified by countryside access legislation in England and Scotland.94 The 
risk of having an absolutist, arbitrary starting point when defining private 
property is that it ignores such social context, and disregards the different 
types of property to which it may relate. Kevin and Susan Gray describe this 
‘prerogative’ of property as ‘both total and totalitarian.’95 Perhaps a more 
appropriate metaphor for its re-evaluation is Kevin and Susan Gray’s 
‘spectrum’ where ‘connotations of public and private shade easily into one 
another’, one inherently defined by its lack of any artificial divide.  
 
7. The ‘plausible’ narrative of private property 
 
The tenacity of the public/private divide and the primacy of the right to exclude 
has entrenched a ‘plausible’, yet narrow narrative of private property that 
airbrushes away inconvenient truths, historic and contemporary. In the 17th 
and 18th centuries, Locke and Blackstone recognised the significance of 
qualification and context.  In the 21st century, limitations on the right to 
exclude have increased in number and scope, as statute expands its reach. 
But as Freyfogle instinctively surmises, the force of this curiously detached 
narrative is likely to endure while ever lawmakers ‘cannot imagine and do not 
remember’ a different, diverse legal world. As a result, private property 
holders continue to enjoy 
 
an unqualified prerogative to determine – no matter how arbitrarily, 
selectively, or capriciously - who may have access, and on what terms, to his 
or her land…An ancient territorial imperative accordingly receives the 
supportive sanction of the law…For the most part the common law engages 
in no subtle gradation of the exclusory powers inherent in ownership; the rule 
of peremptory exclusion makes no distinction between the species of property 
to which it may relate.96 
 
94 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (UK); The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 
analysed in Lovett, above n47.  
95 Gray & Gray, above n90 15. 
96 Ibid, 14. 
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Absolute, arbitrary and capricious exclusion has also proved enduring 
because it is part of a generally positive story about private property. Carol 
Rose’s normative view of property is strongly influenced by her earlier career 
as professor of English literature.  She wrote in 1990   
 
The existence of a property regime is not predictable from a starting point of 
rational self-interest; and consequently from that perspective, property needs 
a tale, a story, a post-hoc explanation. That…is one reason Locke and 
Blackstone…are so fond of telling stories when they talk about the origin of 
property. It is the story that fills the gap in the classical theory…that makes 
property “plausible”.97 
 
In settler societies, much of the property narrative stems from a formative 
nation-building era, when the settlement of empty hinterlands was a political 
imperative.  Thus possession is the origin of property, landowners should not 
sleep on their rights, the law rewards the productive use of land,98 and so 
forth. All tend to justify questionable title99, to assuage Blackstone’s self-doubt 
or ‘ownership anxiety,’ and serve to make the arbitrary exclusiveness of 
private property plausible as the key to a wider story.  
 
However, what if the dominant narratives of private property were those of 
Blackstone’s self-deprecation rather than despotic dominion? How different 
would our defined understanding of private property be?   There is no 
definitive answer to such rhetorical questions. However the continuing 
‘felicity’100 of private property’s ‘plausible narrative’ can be examined from an 
alternative perspective, by ascertaining the strengths of a pluralistic private 
property, and re-evaluating the rationales for the modern right to exclude in 
such a pluralistic context. Parts 8 and 9 address each of these tasks in turn. 
 
 
97 Carol Rose, ‘Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory’, (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 37, 52. 
98 Brower et al, above n85. 
99 Rose, The Moral of Property, above n6.  
100 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Performing property, making the world’ at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2053656.  
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8. Attributes and propensities of private property in land 
 
If we are to escape an all-consuming exclusionary view of private property in 
land, exclusivity must be seen in the context of the institution’s other co-
existing (yet under-regarded) characteristics. This part 8 identifies security of 
use, clarity and durability (as well as a redefined exclusivity) as critical 
attributes of private interests in land. The quality of dynamism, already 
traversed in part 5, could likewise be added to this list. 
 
There is no unanimity about the precise content of private property rights. 
Tony Honore describes 11 ‘incidents’ of property ownership – ‘the right to 
possess, the right to use, the right to manage, the right to the income of a 
thing, the right to the capital, the right to security, the rights or incidences of 
transmissibility and absence of term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to 
execution, and the incident of residuarity.’101 Anthony Scott discerns fewer - 
six ‘characteristics’ of exclusivity, duration, flexibility, quality of title, 
transferability, and divisibility.102 Curiously, neither Honore nor Scott identifies 
the right to exclude.  
 
This omission is perverse given that the right to exclude has become the 
defining incident of modern private property, a process Richard Barnes 
describes as a ‘thinning out’ of private rights, a hierarchical ordering where 
excludability is at the top of the qualitative ‘woodpile’.103 Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith say that exclusivity,104 in particular the presence or not of the 
right to exclude105 is private property’s sina qua non.106  What other presently 
existing yet under-regarded rationales could explain the ‘propertiness’ of a 
private thing, such that we can digress from this definitional closed loop? 
 
101 A.M. Honore, “Ownership’ in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, (A G Guest ed., 1961) 107, 
113.  
102 Anthony Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights (2008); Anthony Scott, 
‘Development of Property in a Fishery’, (1988) 5 Marine Resource Economics 289. 
103 Anderson, above n44.  
104 Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, ‘The Morality of Property’ (2007) William & Mary Law 
Rev. 1849, 1850 
105 Merrill, above n42, 748. 
106 Merrill and Smith, above 104, 1850. 
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It is submitted that the quality of private rights turn on a plurality of 
characteristics - the security and exclusivity they offer their individual holder, 
and their more generic clarity and durability. The latter attributes of clarity and 
durability remain the same desired qualities that 19th century settlers sought in 
response to the equivocal and vulnerable common rights they left behind in 
their metropolis, a phenomenon that continues to inform the narrative of 
private property in settler societies.  
 
In terms of security, private property delivers the benefits of secured and 
assured title. Secure title provides the holder with the requisite (self) 
confidence to invest in the right over the long term. Assurance of title is the 
institutional guarantee the state provides private property.  
 
Assurance of property rights refers to institutional support for systems of 
creation and enforcement of property rights. Assurance of property rights 
differs from the security of property rights in that assurance refers to the 
general political and legal environment in which those rights exist. In contrast 
security…refers to characteristics of specific rights. Secure rights are those 
which the owner is not in danger of losing.107 
 
Consider the core private rights. The right to possess is a secure right, 
assuredly enforced by remedies premised on interferences with possession, 
and a common law conception of property that is one of possession not 
ownership.108 The right to use and enjoy is likewise secure, there is no 
compulsion to share private use rights, individual use is certain, and is 
capable of whole or part transfer to others.  The right to exclude, as previously 
discussed, is ‘absolute, arbitrary and capricious’, and as a result of such 
excess, is excessively secure.  Rights can be secure (in the sense that the 
right is not in danger of loss) without the added requirement of untrammelled 
freedom from interference. By shifting the focus from exclusive dominion to 
secure use, security of title remains unaffected. Of course, there are 
107 Doris Fuchs, An Institutional Basis for Environmental Stewardship The Structure and 
Quality of Property Rights, (2003) 67-68. 
108 Sarah Green and John Randall, The Tort of Conversion (2009) 80-81; Kevin Gray & Susan 
Gray, ‘The Idea of Property’ in Land Law Themes and Perspectives (1998) 21. 
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circumstances where security of title is best guaranteed through exclusion, 
but not automatically so. Equally, there are ‘large slabs’ of property law that 
would cease to exist if exclusion was private property’s sole organising 
principle.109 As Hanoch Dagan surmises, property rights depend on social 
context, human relationships, and the nature of the resource itself, not its 
purported exclusivity.110 
 
Thus exclusivity is a conundrum.  Exclusivity has been largely construed 
through the private/public prism of ‘raw exclusory power’, and an extreme 
interpretation of the term ‘exclusion.’  The latter is what Larissa Katz calls 
‘proponents of the boundary approach trading on an ambiguity in the meaning 
of “exclusive”’.111 ‘Exclusivity’ has subtler, less absolutist meanings, a point 
clearly made by Katz. ‘There is a distinction between a right that is exclusive 
in the sense that it has the function of excluding others from the object of the 
right and one that is exclusive in the sense that its holder occupies a special 
position that others do not share.’112  Anthony Scott likewise illustrates its 
nuances, describing ‘exclusivity’ as a freedom from interference in the valid 
exercise of the right, not necessarily a right to keep all others out. Such 
‘interferences’ may come from adjoining landowners (spill over problems) or 
governments (by regulation).113 
 
[R]ight holders need exclusivity to be independent - to free themselves from 
losses and costs. Exclusivity has two distinct meanings; freedom from 
interference with having to share a resource with others; and freedom from 
government regulation that restricts the ways he can use the resource in 
order to promote the public good.114 
 
109 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Property and the Public Domain’ (2009) 18 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 84, 85-6 
110 Dagan, above n68.  
111 Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’ (2008) Univ. of Toronto Law 
Journal 275, 277 
112 Ibid. 
113 Jonette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The 
Literature on Property Law Theory’ in A. McHarg et al eds, Property and the Law in Energy 
and Natural Resources (2010) 26. 
114 Anthony Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights (2008). 
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The freedom from having to share a resource with others is patently achieved 
by the raw exclusory power of an arbitrary right to exclude. But equally it is 
achievable through a secure and exclusive right to use, a ‘special position’115 
reserved to the holder and therefore free from neighbourly interference in the 
exercise of its use. This latter interpretation is consistent with Freyfogle’s 
notion of a qualified right of freedom from interference, rather than an 
absolute right to exclude. It is also consistent with a view of private property 
as regulating access to and exclusive use of scarce resources. Private 
property’s attribute of exclusivity feeds the propensity for private rights to 
overwhelm or dominate property discourse generally, but it is the slanted 
interpretation of ‘exclusion’ to equate to ‘raw exclusory power’ that triggers 
this inherent propensity to conflate.  
 
If the strengths of private property rights lie in their clarity, durability, security 
and exclusivity (howsoever the latter is construed), then private property’s 
propensity to dominate wider property discourse is its inherent institutional 
flaw.  This encroachment is well illustrated when seen in the context of private 
rights in public resources.  
 
Private rights in public resources have a propensity to encroach into the 
public domain, and privatize residual rights and interests lacking legal 
certainty or definition.  The corollary of this tendency is the suppression of any 
latent public rights in the public resource.  However where the nature and 
extent of both private and public rights are clearly and transparently defined, 
there is less scope for the private right to over-reach and a commensurately 
greater scope for public right(s) to subsist and prosper.116 
 
The tendency for private rights to fill and expand the vacuum of legal 
uncertainty reduces the chances for a ‘mosaic’117 of private and non-private 
rights to co-exist simultaneously in a multiple use context. Its conflation arises 
115 Katz says that ownership of private property is not so much about exclusion, but ‘a special 
position to set the agenda about the use of a resource.’ Katz calls the former the ‘boundary 
approach’, an approach that ‘fails to explain the true significance of much of property law and 
property-related tort law to the creation and preservation of the owner's special position.’ 
Katz, above n111, 278. 
116 Page, above n49. 
117 Fairfax et al, above n16. 
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from a convergence of influences traversed to date in this chapter, the settler 
narratives of private property, the private/public divide, and the pre-eminence 
of raw exclusory power in defining exclusivity. This ‘conflation propensity’ 
flourishes when the scope and ambit of property rights, non-private and 
private, are weak or ill defined.118  
 
9. Modern justifications of the right to exclude 
 
In a pluralistic understanding of private property, the right to exclude must be 
justified by reasons other than its own self-assertion. The economic rationale 
for the right to exclude is a logical starting point.  It is logical because the right 
to exclude originally rose to prominence as private property adjusted to an 
expanding industrial economy, re-configuring itself into the familiar bundle of 
rights.  Freedom from any interference, substantial or peripheral, secured the 
maximum economic advantage for the landowner, rather than the less 
assertive right to quiet enjoyment.  However the pursuit of untrammelled 
economic expansion is no longer an overriding imperative. Indeed there are 
parallels between the fading economic justifications of the right to exclude and 
the antiquated rationales for the private/public divide. In the early 21st century, 
environmental concerns occasionally trump the ‘good’ of economic growth. 
The need to imbue property with an environmental ethic119 is an equally 
desired and expanding public good. Moreover, secure rights of use and 
enjoyment are now equally effective in delivering the economic ‘goods’ of 
prosperity or growth, suggesting that the late 19th century monopoly that 
exclusion once enjoyed is past.  
 
There is also a moral justification for the right to exclude. Thomas Merrill and 
Henry Smith argue that ‘morally grounded exclusion rights [subsist] at the 
118 Conflation can be seen in the NZ high country, where a private right of pasturage in Crown 
pastoral tenure lacked an explicit right to exclude, and the public right of access was weak 
and diffuse. The private right ultimately expanded into a quasi-freehold estate, eliminating any 
residual public interests in the land, A Brower & J Page, ‘Trespassers W…, ‘ (2012) 42 
Environmental Law Reporter 12 555. Only the public footpath is seen as the counter-example 
to this conflation propensity, Nicholas Blomley, Rights of Passage Sidewalks and the 
regulation of public flow (2011). 
119 Carol Rose, ‘Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics’ (1994) 
24 Envtl. Law 1. 
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core of property.’120 Enforceable property rules require widespread respect 
and support, and as such they must be ‘grounded in robust moral notions that 
are easy to communicate and shared by the relevant members of the 
population.’121 The importance of protecting possession against unwarranted 
intrusion, the priority accorded to those ‘first in time’, and the protection of 
property itself as a moral good, are proffered as moral justifications for the 
right to exclude. In support of the latter, the authors cite scenarios such as 
intentional trespass, ‘bad faith’ adverse possession, and ‘takings’ for 
economic development122 as examples of moral outrage engendered by 
‘taking from the innocent and distributional injustice’.123  Shramkrishna 
Balganesh justifies the right to exclude by the moral norm of inviolability.124 
He describes the right as ‘a normative device, which derives from the norm of 
resource inviolability…the right to exclude operates as an analytic tool, which 
seeks to transplant the norm of inviolability from morality to law.’125 
Importantly the right is seen as ‘the correlative of the duty to keep away from 
a resource over which the norm applies.’  The example of cars parked and 
locked on the street is used to illustrate the norm; we keep away from locked 
vehicles (unless acting criminally) because we adhere to a societal norm 
respecting the inviolability of someone else’s resource. Yet conversely, 
Hanoch Dagan describes the morality of exclusion as ‘normatively 
disappointing’,126 an account that fails to reflect the reality of an owner’s social 
responsibilities, or a non-owner’s limited rights of entry.  
 
Morality, like private property, is dynamic; it is not frozen in time. What if 
public sentiment shifts about what is morally deserving of protection, or what 
is inviolate? To adopt a well-used example, the taking of ‘innocent’ public 
access rights could become Merrill and Smith’s ‘moral outrage’. If so, 
‘distributional injustice’ may turn on its axis and the morality tales of 
120 Merrill & Smith, above n104, 1852. 
121 Ibid, 1855.  
122 Ibid, the authors cite the ‘controversy’ over the decision in Kelo v City of New London 125 
S. Ct. 2655 (2005) as being based on basic moral intuitions. 
123 Ibid, 1880. 
124 Shramkrishna Balganesh, ‘Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, 
and Automatic Injunctions’, (2008) 31 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 593. 
125 Ibid, 600. 
126 Dagan, above n68, 44. 
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unwarranted intrusion or inviolability may fall away or lose resonance when 
privileged private interests collide with legitimate public ones. In such cases, 
the morality of inclusion, not exclusion, could deliver the public good desired.  
 
Another powerful justification for the right to exclude is that it is the origin of 
property rights; all other rights are derived or sourced from the right to 
exclude, the ‘first right argument’. Thomas Merrill explains it as one of logical 
primacy 
 
If one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive most of the other 
attributes commonly associated with property through the addition of relatively 
minor clarifications about the domain of the exclusion right. On the other hand 
if one starts with any other attribute of property, one cannot derive the right to 
exclude by extending the domain of that other attribute, rather one must add 
the right to exclude as an additional premise. This mental exercise strongly 
suggests that the right to exclude is fundamental to our understanding of 
property.127 
 
However the argument is not universally logical. There are important property 
rights where the right to exclude is irrelevant, an easement is one example.  
Easements include rights of footway, and are non-possessory incorporeal 
rights that permit the use of another’s resource in a sanctioned way.  The right 
to exclude is not the basis of an easement right; rather it is the antithesis of 
the easement’s ongoing subsistence. Nor is the right to use and enjoy 
particularly grounded on exclusion, use rights exist in common property where 
the right may be shared by many community members. Carol Rose also sees 
it differently,’ she argues that the right to possess deserves first right status. 
128 Moreover possession and exclusion are also not always inextricably 
linked.  Rather the notion of possession of land in the Anglo common law 
tradition, dominated by the combined effects of the doctrines of estates and 
tenure, is a nuanced, technical one.  Mark Wonnacott clarifies that the term 
‘possession’ of land is used in a number of ways, but the proper or technical 
127 Merrill, above n42, 740. 
128 Carol Rose, ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’, (1985) 52(1) Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 
73. 
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meaning describes an abstract relationship between a person and a corporeal 
estate.129 ‘[P]ossession in this sense describes a relationship between a 
person and a corporeal estate in land (a fee simple, a lease…) rather than the 
relationship between a person and any physical feature of the land.’130  Like 
its once dominant economic rationale, exclusion no longer enjoys monopoly 
status as the universal origin of all property rights.  
 
Conversely, there are reasons why the right to exclude should be qualified. 
The history of property, and the private estate’s dynamism suggest that an 
exclusivist, land as commodity version of private property is merely a present 
iteration, not a timeless, fixed one. Indeed the high water mark in its current 
form may have already passed. Historical precedents suggest that private 
property takes many forms, like Freyfogle’s ‘settled agrarian’ model, where 
private, public or common rights co-existed with a private owner’s (more 
qualified) right to quiet enjoyment, and ‘the rights of one landowner [we]re 
necessarily constrained by the rights of neighbors, [the] right to quiet 
enjoyment, [the] right to remain undisturbed.’131 Freyfogle posits that this era 
may return in an environmentally informed future, a ‘modern, ecologically 
informed variant of the agrarian property regime of the late 18th century.’132 
This view of property sees a heightened place for private use, ‘[p]erhaps we 
need to apply more broadly the idea that all of nature remains in a sense in 
public hands, with private owners receiving only prescribed rights to use.’133 
Such ideas are an anathema to dominion-centric notions of exclusive 
possession.   
 
Similarly, long established doctrines that protect the interests of third parties, 
as well as the widespread intervention of statute, also erode absolute 
exclusive possession. The doctrine of prescription, relying on practices going 
back to time immemorial, creates new third party property rights ‘where a 
129 Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land (2006) 1-18. 
130 Ibid, 2. 
131 Freyfogle, above n9, 16-17. 
132 Ibid, 94. 
133 Freyfogle, above n38, 141. 
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court finds long, open and uninterrupted use’134 of another’s private land. 
Legislatures also find little compunction in diminishing the right to exclude if it 
is convenient for the purposes erecting a dividing fence, sanctioning an 
encroachment, or trimming overhanging branches from trees.135 Such 
limitations on the right to exclude, whether sourced from ancient common law 
doctrine, or recent legislation, corroborate the more general thesis that other 
private, public or communal rights or sticks may exist in a parcel of private 
property.   Joseph Sax describes this as ‘qualified private ownership’.  He 
argues by analogy that  
  
a more accurate picture of property use is suggested by an example in which 
a number of owners each claims a right of use in a common resource such as 
a lake or a common grazing field. The rights of each user can only be defined 
with reference to the claims of other users, and there may be incompatibilities 
not subject to solution by simply parcelling out the resource in equal 
shares.136 
 
Another analogy through which one may see137 qualified private ownership is 
that of a water-based (rather than a land-based) paradigm.  
 
When we think about water, then, we are forced to cast aside all of our 
reassuring, but ultimately confining, notions about what it means to own 
private property. Indeed, the law of surface water today, at least in California, 
bears little resemblance to our traditional conception of property. 
Autonomous, secure property rights have largely given way to use 
entitlements that are interconnected and relative…Private property in the 
coming decades, like water today, might well exist principally in the form of 
specific use-rights.138 ….Once we begin to focus on specific use-rights, we 
may begin to question many existing property arrangements: Should I not be 
able to paddle down your stream if I leave your activities undisturbed? Can I 
134 Peter Butt, Land Law (6th ed, 2010) 470. 
135 Access orders can be made by courts, effectively qualifying the private owner’s right to 
exclude, Access to Neighbouring Land Act 2000 (NSW). 
136 Joseph Sax, ‘Takings, Private Property and Public Rights’ (1971-1972) 81 Yale L.J. 
149,154. 
137 Rose, above n2.  
138 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law’, (1988-1989) 41 
Stanford L. Rev. 1529, 1530. 
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seek petition signatures in your shopping center if I do not disrupt your 
patrons? 139 
 
The once dominant ‘plausible narrative’ of ‘despotic dominion’ is not the only 
narrative of private property. There are many alternative, incommensurable 
accounts and rationales that affirm private property as a pluralistic institution.  
As Dagan observes, ‘the pluralism of private property reflects the 
heterogeneity of [its] real-life manifestations.’140  Ultimately, the ambit of the 
modern right to exclude is ‘justified only when it contributes to the common 
good…If property is legitimate only when it promotes the common good, and if 
ideas about the common good shift, then the rules of ownership ought to shift 
along with them.’141  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter argues that private property affects how we ‘see’ property in land 
because of its disproportionate emphasis on an absolute, arbitrary right to 
exclude, leading to a modern myopia that ‘property’ and ‘private property’ are 
synonymous.  We have been seduced by the noetic writings of Blackstone 
and Locke and the pedagogical elegance of the bundle of rights, in the 
process overlooking or forgetting that private property is a social institution 
moulded and informed by change and context.  We have also overlooked the 
relatively recent history of private property, and ignored the evidence that the 
public/private ‘divide’ is more a graded spectrum of degree than an undivided 
dichotomy.   
 
Private property is critical in so many respects; it serves the ‘public good’ by 
providing secure title that enables certainty and stability in property, and its 
efficient exploitation forms the basis of economic prosperity. Its narratives 
reward the productive use of land. But the security of title and economic 
prosperity that it engenders do not necessarily rest on an arbitrary right to 
139 Ibid, 1551. 
140 Dagan, above n68, xii. 
141 Freyfogle, above n37, 20, 26. 
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exclude.  The justifications for an unqualified right to exclude are not beyond 
critique.  The extent to which the all-consuming right can be modified to allow 
a more nuanced freedom from interference permits the theoretical ‘oxygen’ for 
other rights (private, public or common) to subsist and co-exist. In many 
cases, the net practical effect may be the same, particularly in densely 
populated cities.  However by articulating a revised private property that 
acknowledges that property is relative, and supersedes an obsolete 
public/private divide, the possibility to ‘see’ property across human 
landscapes in all its forms is enhanced, substituting singular use for multiple 
uses, and critically, private uniformity for property diversity. 
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Chapter 2 Towards an Understanding of Public Property 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Public property in land is remarkable for its unremarked ubiquity, obvious to 
identification, yet oblivious1 to coherent understanding. While richly 
embroidering human landscapes, we remain pauperized by the public estate’s 
theoretical under-development. 2 As American scholars Sally Fairfax and Jon 
Souder observe, ‘[t]he flourishing literature concerning property…is little 
reflected in the debate surrounding U.S. public resources.  Discussions of 
public lands - our national parks, forests, wildlife refuges, and grazing districts 
- has been surprisingly unconcerned with theories of property, access and 
ownership.’3  Leigh Raymond concurs, noting the surprising absence of 
property rights from the public lands ‘conversation’.4  This chapter agrees. It 
argues that public property in land exists, but that it is under- recognized (and 
indeed often unseen) because of the dominance of the private paradigm. This 
chapter sets out to reveal the extent of the public estate in our midst, to 
legitimize and thereby normalize the already existing place of public real 
property in a diverse property mosaic.  
 
Part 2 commences with a brief definition of public property in land. Part 3 then 
reviews the spectrum of public property type, from corporeal to incorporeal, 
and beyond to custom and illusion. Part 4 aims to identify public property’s 
proprietorship.  The conundrum of ‘who owns public property’ and in what 
capacity, are vexing, inexact issues. Part 5 scrutinizes inclusion, its elusive, 
unconsummated relationship with access, analogies to use and enjoyment, 
 
1 Carol Rose, ‘The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems’, (1998-1999) 83  Minn. L. Rev. 129, 132. 
2 ‘There is little written about public property…except in contradistinction to private property.” 
J.W. Hamilton & N. Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The Literature on Property Law 
Theory’ in A. McHarg et al eds Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources, 19-20 
(2010).  
3 Jon Souder and Sally Fairfax, ‘In Lands We Trusted: State Trust Lands as an Alternative 
Theory of Public Ownership’, in Charles Geisler and Gail Daneker eds, Property and Values: 
Alternatives to Public and Private Ownership (2000) 89.  
4 Leigh Raymond, ‘Sovereignty Without Property? Recent Books in Public Lands’, (2003) 43 
Nat Res. J. 313, 315.  
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and how it facilitates property as propriety. Part 6 concludes with a call for 
greater sophistry in public property discourse. 
 
As Fairfax and Raymond intimate, scrutiny and analysis of public property in 
land is overdue.  To myopically overlook the public estate is to consign its 
values and meanings to the periphery. Conversely, to better “see”5 the 
diversity of public property in land is to dispel the corrosive implication that it is 
at one extreme, an oxymoron,6 or at the other, a perverse variant of private 
ownership.7 To better understand public property is to make clearer sense of 
what is ours.  
 
2. Defining public property 
 
Public property is frequently defined by what it is not; property that is not 
private property, a residual and counter-contextual explanation.8  Common 
property is arguably better understood.9  The public estate suffers the 
paradoxical risk that it is non-property, a passive res awaiting capture.10 As 
Margaret Davies argues, ‘within the liberal context, the private nature of 
property is naturalised and universalised, as though other forms are somehow 
less ethically defensible.’11 Centuries of marginalization of non-private 
property, dating from the enclosure period,12 have obscured public property; 
it’s ‘seeing’ dispersed and drowned out by private rhetoric.  
5 Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and Rhetoric of 
Ownership (1994). 
6 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711. 
7 Merrill dismisses public property as a variant of private property, the only difference being 
that a state agency holds the right to exclude ‘stick’ instead of a private holder.  Thomas 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, (1998) 77 Nebraska L. Rev. 730; Kevin Gray & 
Susan Gray, ‘Private Property and Public Propriety’ in Janet McLean (ed.) Property and the 
Constitution (1999), 13 
8 Ann Brower, Who Owns the High Country? (2008). 
9 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(1990); Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, ‘The Liberal Commons’ (2000) 110 Yale Law 
Journal 549, 558. 
10 Blomley describes public property as being ‘bereft of property, a terra nullius’. Nicholas 
Blomley, ‘Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor’ (2008) 17 Social & Legal 
Studies 311, 321. 
11 Margaret Davies, Property meanings histories theories 13 (2007).   
12 Carol Rose, ‘Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the 
Information Age’, (2003) 66 Law & Contemporary Problems 89, 91.   
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 To define public property is to jettison the familiar private paradigms of 
exclusion and alienability. By necessity, it is to embrace that property is ‘not a 
monolithic notion of standard content and invariable intensity [but] the most 
comprehensive of all the terms which can be used… indicative and 
descriptive …of all or any of the very many different kinds of relationship 
between a person and a subject matter.’13  For narrative purposes, public 
property is defined as the sum of ‘interests [in land] in which the individual 
concerned has no greater claim than any other member of the public,’14 
collective rights, enjoyed by individuals in common with others, and measured 
by their public sum.  
 
This chapter expands on this preliminary definition by identifying three 
indicators of public property in land: the diversity of its type; the conundrum of 
its ownership; and its right of inclusion. Each attribute amplifies further 
comprehension; type expands recognition; ownership exposes the fault line 
between property’s collective and individual values, while inclusion represents 
the hope of a nascent touchstone right, presently ill formed and amorphous.  
 
3. The spectrum of type 
  
Public property in land takes a plethora of form. This part seeks taxonomic 
order by adopting a blunt categorization familiar to property lawyers, corporeal 
versus incorporeal. Corporeal public property refers to tangible, identifiable 
lands. Incorporeal public property comprises non-possessory, intangible, less 
than fee interests in land. The study of type then diverges to examining the 
sources of public property beyond statute and the common law, those of 
custom, even illusion.15    
 
Traditionally seen as ‘government-owned’ land, the spectral breadth of public 
property type demonstrates both a surprising diversity, and a refutation of any 
13 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 
14 Stow v Mineral Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1977) 51 ALJR 672, at 679. 
15 John Merryman, ‘The Public Interest in Cultural Property’, (1989) 77 Cal. L. Rev. 339, 341; 
Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003) 110. 
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distinct public/private divide in property.  Rather public property occupies 
space across a broad continuum, where degrees of “public-ness” are relative, 
not absolute questions. 
 
3.1 Corporeal public property 
 
Public property is most recognizable in its corporeal form, typically alienated16 
land held by the State or Crown, state agencies,17 or public lands leased to 
long-term private right-holders.18  Public land held by government agencies is 
primarily land dedicated19 or reserved for public purposes.  Its usage depends 
on its public function: conservation; resource exploitation;20 education; 
transport; health; defense; public administration; recreation; and so on.  Then 
there are public lands with no present use; unalienated Crown lands or non-
allocated public domain lands that have not been dedicated, reserved, or 
otherwise dealt with. Interspersed is an inchoate miscellany, the like of 
permissive occupancies, travelling stock routes, or ‘paper’ roads, ad hoc 
interests that reflected periodic policy imperatives. To list the broad sweep of 
corporeal public property in land in any one jurisdiction is to embark on an 
exercise of miscellany, as table 1 below illustrates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16Part 5 Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW). 
17 In the western United States, the dominant landholding agencies are the Bureau of Land 
Management, the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Parks 
Service, One Third of the Nation’s Land: A report to the President and to the Congress by the 
Public Land Law Review Commission, (1970) 20-21. 
18 State lands leased or licensed to pastoral right holders under various Land Acts in 
jurisdictions including NSW, Queensland, or New Zealand. In the United States, a loose 
equivalent is the Taylor Grazing Act permit.  
19 Randwick Municipal Council v Rutledge (1959) 33 ALJR 367, 372-3. 
20 For example, the Bureau of Land Management and the US Forest Service administer, 315 
million acres of public grazing lands, Karl Hess, Visions Upon the Land, Man and Nature on 
the Western Range, (1992) 11. 
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Table 1 – Corporeal public property in land in New South Wales 
National parks estate 
Principal Act: National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) 
National parks, section 30E National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) 
Historic sites, section 30F 
State conservation areas, section 30G 
Regional parks, section 30H 
Karst conservation reserves, section 30I 
Nature reserves, section 30J 
Aboriginal areas, section 30K 
Wildlife refuges, section 68 
Wild rivers, section 61 
Marine parks, Marine Parks Act 1997 (NSW) 
Conservation agreements, Part 4 Division 12 
 
Crown land estate 
Principal Act: Crown Land Act 1989 (NSW) 
Crown lands available for lease, special lease, or licence, Part 4, Divs 3, 3A, 
& 4 
Crown lands dedicated for public purposes, Part 5 Division 2 
Crown reserves, Part 5 Division 3 
State Parks, Part 5 Division 3  
Crown reserve trusts, Part 5 Divisions 4 and 5 
Enclosure permits, Part 4 Division 6 
Crown public roads, (formed and unformed), Roads Act 1993 (NSW) 
Travelling stock reserves, Rural Lands Protection Act 1998 (NSW) 
Submerged lands, coastal harbours and river entrances, Section 172 
Commons*, Commons Management Act 1989 (NSW)  
Residual Crown tenures: 
Principal Act: Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) Act 1989 (NSW) 
Incomplete purchases 
Perpetual leases 
Term leases 
60  
Special leases 
Permissive occupancies 
Leases to the Commonwealth 
 
Western lands pastoral estate 
Principal Act: Western Lands Act 1901 (NSW) 
Pastoral holdings, Part 6 Division 2 
Rural leases, Part 6 Division 2 
Urban leases, Part 6 Division 3 
Special purpose leases, Part 9E 
 
Forestry estate 
Principal Act: Forestry Act 1916 (NSW) 
State Forests, Part 3 Division 2 
Timber reserves, Part 3 Division 2 
Flora reserves, Part 3 Division 2 
 
* Commons are technically common property, not public property 
 
 
The physical footprint of corporeal public property is impressive. In the United 
States, one-third of the continental landmass comprises federally owned 
public lands.21 In three of the 11 western states, the percentage exceeds 50 
percent.22  In Australia, Crown land amounts to fifty percent of the landmass 
of the populous state of New South Wales.  In more sparsely settled Western 
Australia, it is 93 percent. State-owned conservation land alone constitutes 
one-third of New Zealand’s area.  Yet despite its superlative acreage, public 
property lacks the legitimacy or normalcy of private property, a consequence 
of a binary liberal worldview that naturalizes the primacy of the private rights 
21 One Third of the Nation’s Land: A report to the President and to the Congress by the Public 
Land Law Review Commission, (1970). 
22 In Nevada it is 82%, Utah 64%, and California 61%. Scott Lehmann, Privatizing Public 
Lands (1995) 4, 22-23. 
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holder and views the state with deep suspicion.23  Hence, its boundaries, 
physical and metaphorical, are perpetually tested, while collective values are 
seen as inferior to the individual values of private property. In the western 
United States, ‘sagebrush rebellions’24 or ‘storms over the rangelands’25 are 
well-documented episodic revolts against the public property estate.  
Elsewhere, the unidirectional propensity of private rights to encroach into 
public space has been observed.26  
 
The sheer size of the corporeal public estate seemingly fails to address such 
existential or normative shortcomings. That it may take incorporeal form 
unlocks potentialities for new, non-reactive ways to ‘see’ and understand 
public property in land.  
 
3.2 Incorporeal public property 
  
Less recognizable is public property’s manifestation as an array of incorporeal 
property rights. As less than fee interests, they comprise a panoply of 
covenants, easements, servitudes and sui generis statutory rights, held by the 
state, state agencies, the public at large, or private entities that act in the 
public interest. Incorporeal rights subsist over both private lands, as public 
rights encumbering private title, and corporeal public land.27   
 
Conceptualized as abstract, non-possessory sticks within the bundle 
metaphor, incorporeal public rights are separate and divisible from the 
physical land itself. For example, the right of recreational access to private 
property is a use and enjoyment ‘stick’ held by the general public.  When 
enacted in England by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, the 
23 Gerard Frug, ‘The City as a Legal Concept’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1057; Nicholas 
Blomley, Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power (1994). 
24 Robert Nelson, Public Lands and Private Rights: The Failure of Scientific Management 
(1995) 
25 Wayne Hage, Storms Over Rangelands (1989) 
26 Ann Brower et al, The Cowboy, the Southern Man, and the Man from Snowy River: The 
Symbolic Politics of Property in Australia, the United States and New Zealand (2009) 21 Geo. 
Int’l Envtl. L. Rev 455. 
27 Part 4A, sections 77A and 77B Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW). 
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statutory right was described in bundle terms as a transfer or re-allocation of 
‘a valuable property right from private landowners to the public.’28  
 
Despite its abstract nature, incorporeal public property plays a (surprisingly) 
key role in contextualizing property right to place29 and connecting otherwise 
fragmented land parcels.30 Examples include scenic easements that preserve 
natural vistas,31 public footpaths that link villages across privately owned 
farmland,32 or conservation covenants that form wildlife corridors across 
private habitat.  Re-inserting links between disparate property ownerships 
militates against Eric Freyfogle’s ‘tragedy of fragmentation’, the private rights-
dominated landscape where property holdings are island enclaves33 ‘with no 
mechanisms to achieve landscape-scale goals’. Freyfogle prescribes as a 
remedy the reconceptualization of private property and a need to ‘reassert the 
public’s varied interests in private lands.’ 34  
 
The conservation easement exemplifies the connectivity potential of 
incorporeal public property.  A statutory interest modeled on the common law 
easement,35 the U.S. conservation easement is defined as  
 
A nonpossessory interest of a holder of real property imposing limitations or 
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting 
natural, scenic, or open space values of real property, assuring its availability 
for agricultural, forest, recreational or open-space use, protecting natural 
28 Jerry Anderson, Countryside Access and Environmental Protection: An American View of 
Britain’s Right to Roam, 9 Envtl. L. Rev. 241, 246 (2007).  
29 It is surprising because of the historical tendency of private property since enclosure to 
decouple property right from context. Nicole Graham, Lawscape Property Environment Law 
(2010) 66. 
30 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society: Land, Culture, Conflict and Hope (2007) 
107-127. 
31 William Hutton, ‘Conservation Easements in the Ninth Federal Circuit’, in J Gustanski and 
R Squires eds, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements Past, Present and Future, 
(2000) 381; Roger Cunningham, ‘Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program’, 
(1968) 45 Denv. L.J. 167. 
32Angela Sydenham, ‘The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000: Balancing public access 
and environmental protection?’, (2002) 4 Envtl. L. Rev. 87, 95-96. 
33 Freyfogle, above n30, 35. 
34 Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the Common Good (2003) 177, 
203. 
35 Todd Mayo, ‘A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements’, in J Gustanski 
and R Squires eds, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements Past, Present and Future, 
(2000) 27. 
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resources, maintaining air or water quality, or preserving the historical, 
architectural, archeological, or cultural aspects of real property.36 
 
Conservation easements first appeared in the 1930s,37 but their use did not 
become widespread until 50 years later, when taxation incentives encouraged 
the donation or sale of perpetual conservation easements to public agencies 
or land trusts.38 By the beginning of the 21st century, conservation easements 
were ‘the fastest-growing method for protecting land’ in the United States 
preserving 1.2 million acres from development, at growth rates over the 
preceding decade of 377%.39 Many conservation easements vest in or benefit 
land trusts, ‘non-profit organizations that preserve or enhance environmental 
amenities…on private land.’40 Landscape resources protected by 
conservation easements include open space, wetlands, forests, scenic views, 
recreation and trails, greenways, and coastlines.41  The legal justification for 
conservation easements is said to be “significant public benefit.”42 Often the 
public benefit is indirect, the provision of ‘ecosystem services… a nice view… 
habitat for wildlife, [or] protected farmland.’43 Direct public ‘goods’ manifest as 
walking trails linking national parks, or trails using disused railway corridors. 
‘Some 78% of land trusts are reported as being involved in maintaining land 
for public access or recreational purposes.’44  
 
In Australia, conservation agreements,45 or positive covenants protecting 
environmental, cultural, heritage, or natural resource values,46 are analogous 
incorporeal public rights, the benefit vesting in the relevant land conservation 
36 § 1(1) Uniform Conservation Easement Act 
37 Cunningham, above n31, 181-183. 
38 The term was first coined in 1959, Richard Brewer, Conservancy: The Land Trust 
Movement in the United States 155, 148 (2003).  
39 Julie Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary Actions, and 
Private Lands in J Gustanski and R Squires eds, Protecting the Land: Conservation 
Easements Past, Present and Future (2000) 14. 
40 Dominic Parker, ‘Land Trusts and the Choice to Conserve Land with Full Ownership or 
Conservation Easements’, (2004) 44 Nat. Res. J. 483; Brewer, above n 38, 13-40; Sally 
Fairfax et al, Buying Nature, 178-202. 
41 Gustanski, above n39, 21.  
42 Brewer, above n38, 116; Susan French, ‘Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and 
the Problem of the Future‘ (2006) 27 Cardozo Law Rev. 2523, 2532 
43 Brewer, above n 38.  
44 Gustanski, above n39, 22. 
45 § 69C(1)(a) National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) 
46 § 77A Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW); § 88D & § 88E Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 
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agency. 47 Such interests protect private or Crown leased land containing 
‘scenery, natural environments or natural phenomenon worthy of 
preservation.’48 The American land trust is replicated by not for profit 
organizations such as the Nature Conservation Trust,49 where voluntary 
landowner agreements and revolving fund arrangements protect natural and 
cultural heritage50 and run with the land through registration.51 In New 
Zealand, conservation52 or open space53 covenants fulfill similar functions to 
protect ecological or landscape values.54 
 
The English public footpath is yet another example of incorporeal public 
property.  It differs from the wider right to roam in that the footpath right is 
restricted to established pathways.55 The public footpath was the transport 
corridor of agrarian England.56  130,000 miles of public footpath remain in 
England and Wales, as part of original enclosure orders, easements protected 
through prescription or dedication, or common rights.57  The public right is 
resilient, private owners cannot obstruct a footpath’s continued access, nor 
discourage its public use.  If an affected landholder seeks to divert the 
pathway, a ‘public path diversion order’ may be made, but only where the 
alternative is not ‘substantially less convenient for the public in consequence 
of the diversion’.58  
 
The public trust doctrine,59 the impression of public obligations on private and 
public lands, also fits the incorporeal tag.  Harrison Dunning describes the 
47 Land and Property Management Authority for NSW Crown land, National Parks Service for 
conservation land. 
48§ 69C(1)(a) National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW); § 77A(1) Crown Lands Act 1989 
(NSW). 
49 Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001 (NSW). 
50 § 30(1) Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001 (NSW).   
51 § 37 Nature Conservation Trust Act 2001 (NSW).    
52 Conservation Act 1987 (NZ); Reserves Act 1977 (NZ) 
53 Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977 (NZ) 
54 Debra Donohue, ‘The Law and Practice of Open Space Covenants’ (2003) 7 NZJEL 119; or 
Kellie Ewing, ‘Conservation Covenants and Community Conservation Groups: Improving the 
Protection of Private Land’ (2009) NZJEL 316. 
55 Anderson, above n28,  380-1. 
56 Ibid, 381. 
57 Ibid,  382-3. 
58 § 119(6) Highways Act 1980 (UK) c. 66. 
59Joseph Sax, ‘The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention’, (1969-1970) 68 Michigan Law Rev. 471. 
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public trust in incorporeal terms as a ‘public property right [that] manifests 
itself as an interest, like an easement, that burdens ownership of the 
resource.’60 Kevin Gray’s ‘regulatory property’ is analogous, private property 
subject to an overriding public interest that effectively ‘vests the property in 
the citizenry subject only to such privileges … the state positively confers for 
the time being on the nominal ‘owners’ of the assets concerned.’61 
  
The significance of incorporeal public rights is threefold.  First, they broaden 
our understanding of public property to encompass a diversity of rights 
beyond fee simple state ownership. Second, they highlight the anachronism of 
any distinct public/private divide.  Conservation easements or public footpaths 
exemplify that public rights subsist on private lands, and condemn by their 
existence the notion of a distinct property duality as ‘confusion elevated to 
principle.’62 Third, they demonstrate public property’s potential to invigorate 
connections across human landscapes; to link property with place and 
context, and obviate the risks of countless ‘tragedies of fragmentation’.  
 
3.3 Customary public property 
 
The sources of public property are not restricted to the mainstream. Property’s 
commodification has masked its ancient alter ego, one with meaning for 
personhood, identity, and community.63 Customary public property evidences 
faint but ‘surprising connections’ between ‘informal usages and 
understandings’ about public property, and their binding effect amongst ‘those 
who practice and share them.’64  
60 Harrison Dunning, ‘The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law’, 
(1988-1989 19 Envtl. L. 515, 520; Tim Eichenberg et al, ‘Climate Change and the Public Trust 
Doctrine: Using an Ancient Doctrine to Adapt to Rising Sea Levels in San Francisco Bay’, 
(2010) 3 Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 243, 247-8.  
61 Kevin Gray, ‘Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of Quasi-Public Trust’ (2010) 32 
Sydney Law Rev. 237, 245. 
62 Charles Geisler, ‘Property Pluralism’, in C Geisler and G Daneker eds, Property and Values 
Alternatives to Public and Private Ownership, (2000) 79. 
63 Gregory Alexander & Eduardo  Penalver, Property and Community (2010); Joseph Sax, 
‘Do Communities Have Rights? The National Parks as Laboratories of New Ideas’, (1984) 45 
University of  Pittsburgh LR 499; Gregory Alexander, Commodity & Propriety: Competing 
Visions of Property in American Thought 1776-1970 (1997). 
64 David Bederman, ‘The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings’, (1996) 96(6) Columbia Law Review 1375. 
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 Custom65 is an awkward, seemingly anachronistic source of modern property 
law, particularly in settler societies lacking the social history from which 
customary rules arose. Nonetheless customary norms find ways to percolate 
into the margins of property discourse. Robert Ellickson’s ‘order without law’ in 
Shasta County, California, observes the powerful, all-pervasive effect of 
custom in generating rights, including property rights, amongst tightly knit 
communities of ranchers.66  Ellickson concludes that such informal rules arise 
‘through decentralized social processes, rather than from the law.’67 Similarly, 
Gregory Duhl studies food cart owners at Temple University, and surmises 
that ‘the ordering of lunch trucks and carts … illustrates how, in the absence 
of private property ownership, communities adopt and follow customs and 
norms to create and order property rights.’68  
 
Carol Rose escapes territorial constraints to explore the wider relationship 
between custom and public property, noting that ‘custom provides powerful 
insights into the nature of “inherently public property”’.69 Rose posits that the 
effective management of public property arises ‘through the medium of the 
customs and habits of a civilized citizenry.’70  Efficient albeit informal 
governance of public resources by the customary public averts a tragedy of 
the commons, and instead enhances a sociable ‘comedy of the commons’, 
where the greater the use of public property, the greater the resource’s social 
value is maximized, and the ‘solidarity and fellow-feeling of the whole 
community’ is reinforced.71   
 
Custom's bright and cheery demeanor has been forcefully espoused… by 
65 There is no universal agreement as to the meaning of the term ‘custom’. Andrea Loux, The 
Persistence of the Ancient Regime Custom, Utility and the Common Law in the Nineteenth 
Century (1993) 79 Cornell LR 183 
66 Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).  
67 Ibid, 139 
68 Gregory Duhl, ‘Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Spaces’ (2006) 79 Temple 
L. Rev. 199, 200, 207. 
69 Rose, above n6, 722. 
70 Ibid, 774. 
71 ‘In a sense, this is the reverse of the “tragedy of the commons”: it is a “comedy of the 
commons” as is so felicitously expressed in the phrase, “the more the merrier.”’ Rose, above 
n6, 759. 
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many legal writers. And one would have to be a bit of a boor not to feel some 
favor for a doctrine that allows the rustic villagers to dance around the 
Maypole on the manor lawn, that permits hardy fishermen to dry their nets on 
the shore as they have from time immemorial … that gives you and your 
loved one the right to take a midnight stroll on a windswept beach.72  
 
Daniel Nazer’s study of surfer norms similarly escapes the strictures of a 
small community. Rather the global surfing community was a ‘large and 
heterogeneous’ one that developed normative patterns of property over public 
surfing waves, with only minor geographical variations73.  Such norms require 
users to ‘respect the rules and respect the locals.’74  
 
The paradox of custom75 and property is ‘how often custom wins’76.  Even in 
the courts, custom as the basis of a public right occasionally prevails.77 In 
Oregon, the celebrated case of State ex rel. Thornton v Hay78 established a 
statewide public easement over private dry sands on the basis of customary 
practice.79  
 
3.4 Illusory public property 
 
This discussion of type concludes with a foray into illusory public property. 
Carol Rose argues that people ‘see’ property in a variety of ways, even as 
false claims, ‘the imaginative construction of property… where the law 
recognizes none.’80  Much of Rose’s discussion centres on people claiming 
72 Bederman, above n64, 1381-2. 
73 Daniel Nazer, ‘The Tragicomedy of the Surfers’ Commons’, (2004) 9 Deakin Law Rev. 655, 
677. 
74 In 2012, police were called to enforce surfer norms on crowded waves on Australia’s Gold 
Coast, “Police begin surf rage patrols” on 
http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2012/01/19/3411501.htm (12 February 2012). 
75 Duhl, above n68, 238. 
76 Leigh Raymond, ‘Viewpoint: Are grazing rights on public lands a form of private property?’ 
(1997) 50(4) Journal of Range Management 431; Terry Anderson & Peter Hill, The Not So 
Wild, Wild West (2004). 
77 Navjit Ubhi and Barry Denyer-Green, Law of Commons and Town and Village Greens 135 
(2004); Steven Eagle, ‘Unitary Law of State Takings’, (2010) 69-2 Planning & Environmental 
Law 6. 
78 462 P.2d 671 (1969). 
79 Steven Bender, ‘Castles in the Sand: Balancing Public Custom and Private Ownership 
Interests on Oregon Beaches’ (1998) 77 Oregon Law Rev. 913, 917. 
80 Rose, above n6, 274 
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transient entitlements to public spaces as their imagined own, such as 
lunchtime ‘rights’ to park benches. Kevin Gray’s study of the property norms 
of spatial order in queues is an analogous example.81  
 
Arguably the modern shopping mall best typifies illusory public property, 
‘private space masquerading as a public space.’82 As ‘open-access private 
properties’83 or privately owned ‘quasi-public property,’84 these hybrids foster 
illusory expectations of public rights of inclusion.  The illusion is shattered 
when private owners enforce behaviour or dress codes, or restrain public 
assembly or political protest. In such circumstances, ‘private proprietorial 
power [the right to exclude] intrudes into the public sphere.’85 According to 
James Kunstler, ‘the mall commercialized the public realm.’86  
 
3.5 Type and property diversity  
 
The diverse range of public property type is a reminder that public property is 
capable of being ‘seen’ in the most likely and unlikely of places. Incorporeal 
property in particular underscores that there is no bright line,87 no distinct 
public/private divide.  Rather public property can be found across a 
continuum, where ‘notions of “public” and “private” operate, not 
dichotomously, but continuously … in which adjacent connotations shade 
easily into one another,’88 and ‘finely intercalated distinctions or gradations’89 
segue from state-owned public lands to customary public rights. In seeking to 
understand public property through the spectrum of type, it is the differing 
degrees of ‘public-ness’ in land, rather than the formal technicality of 
individual type, that may prove the most instructive. 
 
81 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in a Queue’, in Property and Community, 165-95 (Gregory Alexander 
& Eduardo Penalver eds., 2010). 
82 James Kuntsler, The Geography of Nowhere (1993) 119-120. 
83 Geisler, supra note 61, at 75. 
84 Gray and Gray, above n7, 20-31; K Gray and S Gray, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-
Public Space’ (1999) European Human Rights Law Review 46. 
85 Davies, above n11, 11.  
86 Kuntsler, above n82, 119-120. 
87 Davies, above n11, 11.  
88Gray, above n84, 11. 
89 Ibid, 18 
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Importantly, a wider ‘seeing’ of public property in land enlivens a pluralistic 
mosaic90 of property rights and uses.  Public property contributes to the 
mosaic by adding different tiles, corporeal and incorporeal to the private 
monotony.  The more we ‘see’ a variety (and greater quantity) of different 
property types91, the less conditioned we become to a self-imposed 
straitjacket where property and private property are synonymous.92 
Optimistically, property plurality has the potential for human landscapes to 
become less like a universalized Blackacre,93 and more representative of 
where we live.94  
 
Legal geographers such as Nicholas Blomley, emphasize that property is best 
understood by context, ‘by reference to its place in and relationship to social, 
economic, political and ecological systems…”95 In so doing, they reject an 
idealized paradigm where the ‘law’s separateness… [is] deaf to material, 
physical, spatial and cultural influences.’96 Edward Relph, a humanist 
geographer, argues ‘an authentic attitude to context or place is 
important…because from such a relation, authentic places emerge, places 
which … sustain the earth and those dwelling on it.’97 Property matters in the 
pursuit of authenticity, ‘both symbolically and literally.’98 Eric Freyfogle’s bleak 
description of Champaign County, Illinois, where the public owns less than 1% 
of the county ‘setting aside roadways and the remnants of a now-abandoned 
[and contaminated] air force base’99 is a depressing and literal vision of 
property uniformity. To Freyfogle, public lands are the ‘remedy for private 
90 Fairfax above n40.  
91 Ann Brower & John Page, ‘Property rights across sustainable landscapes: Competing 
claims, collapsing dichotomies, and the future of property’ in David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor 
(eds.) Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological 
Challenges (2011) 305. 
92 Macpherson identifies as a modern ‘misusage’ the identical treatment of property and 
private property. Crawford Macpherson, ‘The Meaning of Property’, in Property: Mainstream 
and Critical Positions (1999) 2.  
93 Freyfogle, above n34, 110.  
94 Rob Garbutt, The Locals (2011) 29-30.  
95 Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, ‘Connecting Law and Geography’ in Jane Holder & 
Carolyn Harrison (eds.), Law and Geography  (2003) 3. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Relph, quoted in Garbutt, above n94, 54-55. 
98 Harvey Jacobs, Is an Answer Blowin’ in the Wind? (2010) 62-9 Planning & Environmental 
Law 8. 
99 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights in Nature: Two Paradigms’ in P. Burdon (ed.) Wild Law The 
Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (2011) 271 
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irresponsibility’.100  James Kunstler’s The Geography of Nowhere is an 
equally grim visage of the decline of the American public realm, the 
‘landscape tissue that ties together the thousands of pieces of private property 
that make up a town, a suburb, a state.’101  
 
While largely a descriptive exercise, the spectrum of type subverts the 
inevitability of Kunstler’s thesis or the unremitting bleakness of Freyfogle’s 
imagery. Its opportunities lie in expanding the definitional parameters of what 
is public property.  Its significance lies in its consequence, a weakening of 
private ubiquity, and the optimistic consequences this may pose for re-
physicalizing property rights to place. It demonstrates that we are not 
prospectively fated by the constraints of Eduardo Penalver’s land memory, 
‘the consequences of countless decisions made decades (even generations) 
ago’102 about singular property patterns, that there are alternatives to 
Champaign County-like uniformity.  Seeing a wide diversity of public type may 
alter such restrictive ‘path dependencies’ for the better. 
 
4. The conundrum of ownership 
 
Ownership is premised on the vesting of property rights in a recognizable 
entity in their capacity as owner,103 a ‘right to have and to dispose of 
possession and enjoyment of the subject matter.’104 In the case of public 
property, the ownership entity assumedly has a public status, the state, or an 
agency of the state.105 But this assumption poses further questions; does the 
state or state agency own the land absolutely, or pursuant to some trust for 
and on behalf of its citizens? And what of private organizations such as land 
trusts that hold stick rights in property that benefit the public? These questions 
suggest that like the public/private divide, the issue of ownership is likewise 
not a ‘bright line.’106   
100 Freyfogle, above n34, 96. 
101 Kunstler above n 82. 
102 Eduardo Penalver, ‘Land Virtues’ (2009) 94 Cornell L.R. 822, 830-1 
103 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (1988) 47. 
104 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351. 
105 Rose, above n6, 719. 
106 Davies, above  n11.  
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 Putative ownership by the public at large is a further muddying of the 
ownership waters. Carol Rose argues that rights in ‘inherently public property’ 
are controlled neither by government agencies nor private entitles, but by 
society at large.107  Rose calls this owner the ‘unorganized public’.108 In the 
United States, ownership of inherently public property by the unorganized 
public is given effect by the doctrine of public trust.  Originally concerned with 
core areas such as navigable waterways, the public trust has proven a 
‘resurgent concept’,109 bringing within its ambit new forms of contestable 
‘inherently public property’110 that recognize community or public values in 
diffuse resources.111 This in turn expands the types of property capable of 
ownership by an amorphous unorganized public.  
 
Joseph Sax frames ownership from a values perspective, in the process 
identifying a fault line common to the cultural divide between property as a 
private commodity, and property’s social or communitarian meanings.112 Sax 
states that ‘[t]he debate over ownership of the public lands is basically part of 
a much larger controversy over the legitimacy of collective versus 
individualistic values.’113 Courts tend to prefer individualistic values: ‘[t]he 
common law tradition is not entirely friendly to group rights.’114  In Australia, 
the High Court held that members of the public generally do not acquire any 
proprietary estate or interest in public land.115 But its judgment was framed 
from the perspective of the private paradigm, where ‘right …does not in its 
107 Rose, above n6, 720. 
108 Ibid., 722. 
109 Joseph Sax, ‘Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property’, (1982-1983) 58 Wash. L. 
Rev. 481, 482  
110 Mark Squillace, ‘Common Law Protection for our National Parks’ in David J. Simon (ed.) 
Our Common Lands Defending the National Parks (1988) 96-97; Alison Rieser, ‘Ecological 
Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory’, (1991) 
15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393; Jack Archer et al, The Public Trust Doctrine and the 
Management of America’s Coasts (1994) 22-30; Charles Wilkinson, ‘The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Public Land Law’, (1980-1981)14 U.C. Davis Law. Rev 269. 
111 Carol Rose, ‘Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust’, (1998-1999) 25 Ecology L. Q. 
351, 355  
112Alexander, above n63.  
113 Joseph Sax, ‘The Claim for Retention of the Public Lands’, in Rethinking the Federal 
Lands (S. Brubaker ed., 1984) 130. 
114 Carol Rose, ‘Property and Language, or the Ghost of the Fifth Panel’ (2006) 18 Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 1, 13.   
115 Stow v Mineral Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1977) 51 ALJR 672 
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context mean a public right; it means an individual right of a proprietary 
nature’, and ‘interest’ mean ‘interests held by persons in their individual 
capacity.’116 Yet the court did touch on what public ownership may entail 
 
It [the statute] does not embrace interests in which the individual concerned 
has no greater claim than any other member of the public. All members of the 
public have a right to pass freely along and across public highways but none 
have in their capacity as members of the public any estate or interest in such 
land. Likewise members of the public may be entitled pursuant to particular 
statutes to use specified areas of Crown lands for the purpose of recreation… 
All members of the public may have the right to go upon such land [to] freely 
walk thereon…and may resist attempts by the Crown or anyone else to eject 
them from such land. 
 
Ownership of public property must be seen in context, informed by property’s 
collective values, where rights are measured in terms of their collective sum 
rather than individual entitlement.  In this Part 4, three specific questions will 
be canvassed: must public property be owned by a discrete ownership entity; 
is public ownership an absolute concept; and is the better question one of 
state agency management or control rather than ownership?  
 
4.1 Entity or no entity? 
 
Unlike private property,117 the involvement of a distinct ownership entity may 
not be a theoretical necessity for public property.  Rose’s ‘unorganized public’ 
exemplifies that inherently public property may be owned by the collective 
public at large.118 The prima facie answer to this question suggests there is no 
limitation on who owns public property. The state, a state agency, the public 
at large, even (in the case of conservation easements) private owners, may 
‘own’ public interests in land.  
 
116 Ibid, 679. 
117 Jeremy Waldron, ‘What is Private Property?’ (1985) 5 Ox. J. Legal Stud. 313, 327. 
118 ‘The customs of a civilized citizenry ensure good governance of such resources,’ Rose, 
above n6. 
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Direct ownership by the state or a state agency is a paradigm framed within 
(private) property’s individualistic values and rhetoric of exclusion.119 It also 
has perverse consequences. Richard Barnes observes that ownership of 
collective property by the ‘individual’ state is in effect a variation of private 
ownership that precludes it generating ‘a specific normative meaning.’ 120 
Margaret Davies agrees in part.  In articulating a ‘taxonomy of owners’, 
Davies lists five possible classes of owner: private individuals, companies, 
governments, a limited community, or the public at large. Davies argues that 
individual and corporate ownerships are ‘private’, while ‘government 
ownership of resources such as office buildings [is also] essentially private.’121 
On the other hand, ownership by limited communities or the public at large 
are ‘dispersed.’ But government ownership of ‘public infrastructure, and 
environmental resources such as parks and beaches on trust for the public’122 
are neither private nor public, an unsatisfactory lacuna. Crawford Macpherson 
describes ‘state property’ as ‘corporate private property’, where a ‘smaller 
body of persons authorized to command its citizens’ exercise a corporate right 
to exclude.123 It is as if explicit ownership by a state or state agency taints 
public property’s public-ness, and relegates the ownership of key public 
places (such as Davies’ parks and beaches) to an uncertain no-man’s land.  
 
By contrast, ‘public domain goods’ are in Davies’ terms ‘fundamental to a 
flourishing community; they provide us with the basic ability to move about, to 
undertake trade and commerce, to engage in recreation, to situate ourselves 
historically, culturally, or even spiritually, to communicate and express 
ourselves.’124 As Rose argues, they vest in an unorganized public. 
Macpherson also writes of an ‘unorganized public’, a mass of individuals with 
individual rights in ‘analogous common property.’125 He argues that rights in 
119 Merrill, above n7; S. Balganesh, ‘Demystifying the Right to Exclude’ (2008) 31 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 593 
120 Richard Barnes, Property Rights and Natural Resources (2009) 154. 
121 Davies, above n11, 63-4. 
122 Ibid, 64 
123 Macpherson, above n92, 5-6; Gray & Gray, above n7, 13. 
124 Davies, above n11, 65-6 
125 Macpherson uses the examples of ‘public parks, city streets, highways’, as property for 
‘common use’, Macpherson, above n92, 4. 
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such property are ‘the most unadulterated kind of property’, a right of each 
natural person not to be excluded from the property’s use and benefit.’126 
 
Ownership by the public at large, whether Rose’s amorphous mass, or 
MacPherson’s mass of individuals, may be preferable since it avoids 
unfavourable analogy with private ownership and sidesteps the implications of 
exclusion. And by invoking property’s collective values, it may prove the 
sanguine catalyst for greater normative meaning for public property in land.  
 
4.2 In trust for the public? 
 
References to public property in land frequently invoke the concept of trust.  
To borrow its terminology, the trust may be express (in the case of charitable 
trusts), or implied or resulting (where ‘trust’ is used in a non-technical sense).  
Private land trusts also conform to this paradigm, signifying that the public 
stick they hold over private land is impressed by obligations in favour of local 
communities, the wider public, or the public interest.127 
 
Fairfax and Souder use the educational state land trust as a platform for 
arguing, ‘trust principles ought to occupy a more prominent place in our 
understanding of publicly owned land than they do.’128 Rather than some 
scholar’s wishful thinking of ‘wouldn’t it be lovely’, Fairfax and Souder argue 
that the state land trust as ‘arguably the oldest of all federal programs and … 
the most durable national approach to public resource ownership’,129 already 
provides an enduring template. Raising its profile presents an opportunity for 
a ‘new but not untested route to thinking about public ownership.’130 
 
By contrast, the public trust doctrine enjoys a high profile, and is the subject of 
a rich literature. Its contemporary resurrection since the 1970s is attributed to 
126 Ibid, 6; Barnes, above n123, 154 
127 Conservation trusts are ‘clearly invested with the public interest.’ Sally Fairfax and Darla 
Guenzler, Conservation Trusts (2001) 5. 
128 Souder & Fairfax, above n3, 87, 89.  
129 Ibid, 90.  
130 Ibid. 
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Joseph Sax,131 although its history can be traced to the jus publicum of 
Roman law, and the English common law before its reception in the United 
States.132 It origins lie in the nature of property in rivers, lakes, and foreshores 
adjoining water bodies as inherently public property, or ‘at least subject to a 
kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes.’133 While private 
ownership of foreshores was possible, the incorporeal public property inherent 
to those lands (such as rights to navigable waters) was itself inalienable.134  
 
Its common law credentials were affirmed in the ‘lodestar’135 case of Illinois 
Central Railroad Company v Illinois,136 where the US Supreme Court upheld 
the State’s repeal of a land grant comprising foreshores and submerged lands 
of the Chicago waterfront. The court held that these lands were public trust 
resources, such that the initial grant by the state to the railroad company was 
void.137 The doctrine was neglected until growing environmental awareness in 
the late 1960s re-awakened its potential, ‘liberating it from its historical 
shackles,’138 to protect public rights in a diverse range of public resources.139 
These include access rights over the dry sands of beaches, limits on the 
appropriation of water to serve public trust values,140 and even ‘property’ in 
surfing waves.141 This expansion has relied on a lateral interpretation of its 
founding shackles, a creative linking of new public resources with the 
common denominators of navigable waters or foreshores below the high 
water mark.142 These newer forms of public trust property have been 
described as possessing a ‘natural suitability for common use’ and tendency 
131 Sax, above n59. 
132 Ibid, 475-478; Megan Higgins, ‘Public access to the shore: public rights and private 
property,’ in D Whitelaw and G Visgilio (eds.) America’s Changing Coasts: Private Rights and 
Public Trust (2005) 183-4. 
133Rose, above n6, 351.  
134 Dunning, above n 60, 516. 
135 Sax, above n59, 489-491 
136 146 U.S. 387 (1892) 
137 Dunning, above n 60, 521; Archer  above n110, 11.  
138 Joseph Sax, ‘Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles’ (1980) 14 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185. 
139Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise Antolini, Creative Common Law Strategies for Protecting 
the Environment (2007). 
140 National Audubon Society v Superior Court (‘Mono Lake’) 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 3 
141 Nazer, above n73, 678. 
142 For example, in Mono Lake, the link was the potential navigability of waters in the lake.  
The substance was however concerned with preserving environmental flows from the lake. 
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towards ‘scarcity’,143 or qualities essential for communication, travel and 
sociability.144 Despite its critics,145 the public trust is ‘a recognition of important 
public property rights’146 premised on the fragmentation of ownership between 
bare legal title and beneficial property subject to public trust. In the case of 
private lands, the grantee holds a naked fee subject to public trust rights.147 In 
the case of public lands, there is no merger that extinguishes the public trust. 
 
Trust relationships in public property also arise through the gift or transfer of 
private land to public authorities for specified purposes,148 as conditions of 
planning consent,149 or by operation of statute. For example, in New South 
Wales, the Crown reserve trust is a statutory creature under the Crown Lands 
Act.150 The New Zealand Reserves Act establishes a similar regime. That Act 
applies to Crown land classified under section 16 according to its primary or 
principal purpose. Purposes include recreation,151 historic,152 or scenic153 
reserves.   Title to reserves is vested under sections 26 and 26A, such that ‘all 
land so vested shall be held in trust for the purpose or purposes for which the 
reserve is classified.’ In a New Zealand High Court judgment dealing with 
conflicting private uses on Crown land,154 section 26A was scrutinized, the 
court concluding that ‘the general public of New Zealand must be regarded as 
the beneficiaries. The concept is one of public ownership.’ 155 The Reserves 
143 Dunning, above n60, 523. 
144 Rose, above n6.  
145 Steven Jawetz, ‘The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective- And Undesirable- 
Judicial Intervention’, (1982) 10 Ecology L.Q. 455.  
146 Dunning, above n60, 516. 
147 Jan Stevens, ‘The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People’s 
Environmental Right’, (1980) 14 U C Davis L. Rev. 195, 215-6. 
148 In Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1978] 3 CLR 299, land transferred on 
the condition that it be preserved as a showground gave rise to a charitable trust that 
precluded its owner, the Brisbane City Council, from selling the land. 
149 Adrian Bradbrook et al, Australian Real Property Law (5th ed., 2011) 357. 
150Crown reserve trusts are “[a] legal body which cares for a Crown reserve on behalf of the 
people of NSW.’ http://www.lpma.nsw.gov.au/trusts/trusts2  (May 29, 2011). See also 
Divisions 4 and 5, Part 5, Crown Lands Act 1989 (NSW). 
151 § 17 Reserves Act 1977 (NZ). 
152 § 18 Reserves Act 1977 (NZ). 
153 § 19 Reserves Act 1977 (NZ). 
154Gibbs v The New Plymouth District Council [2006] NZHC 231 
155Gibbs v The New Plymouth District Council [2006] NZHC 231, [16]-[17] 
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Act ‘confer[s] legal ownership … in the Crown while making it clear that the 
land is held on trust for all New Zealanders.’156 
 
Nor is the language of trust necessarily restrained by a lack of an equitable or 
statutory basis for the beneficial relationship claimed. Narratives surrounding 
the public property estate, particularly iconic public property, often describe 
such lands as being held ‘in trust for’, or ‘on behalf of’ its citizens.  This 
proprietorial claim is substantiated by broad-brush references to the nature of 
democratic governance, or the people’s common legacy in important natural 
resources. On the 50th anniversary of the U.S National Park Act in 1966, 
National Geographic magazine quoted its first director Stephen Mather 
claiming that the park system belonged ‘to everyone-now and always.’157  The 
landmark Report of the Public Land Law Review Commission in 1970, 
repeated this common legacy view, ‘[t]hese lands are a natural heritage and 
national asset that belong to us all.’158 
An implied trust seemingly results from state ownership, accentuated where 
the lands are iconic, or under threat of loss.159 While the nominal owner may 
be the state, its title is a threadbare one.  The true beneficial owner, illusory or 
otherwise, is the people.  Margaret Davies’ description of ‘parks and beaches 
being held in trust for the public’160 is a previously traversed exemplar of this 
narrative. Carol Rose speaks similarly of ‘the public… as a kind of beneficial 
owner of diffuse resource rights…’,161 while legal historian Harry Schneiber 
talks of legislatures acting as trustee ‘for the best interests of the public’162 
with regard to certain types of public property. 
The concept of trust permeates public property, its doctrines, statutes, and 
rhetoric.  Its redolence suggests an inclination for public property to vest in the 
156Gibbs v The New Plymouth District Council [2006] NZHC 231, [14] 
157 National Geographic, July 1966, Vol. 130(1), 2. 
158 One Third of the Nation’s Land: A report to the President and to the Congress by the 
Public Land Law Review Commission, 20 (1970). 
159 Matt Philp, ‘The No-Go Zones’, North & South, August, 2008, 44.  
160 Davies, above n11, 64. 
161 Carol Rose, ‘A Dozen Propositions’, (1996) 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 265, 276. 
162 Harry Scheiber, ‘Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History’, (1984) 72 
Cal. L. Rev 217, 223. 
78  
                                                        
collective sum of us. But where does that leave the individualistic state or 
state agency? 
 
4.3 Ownership or management rights? 
 
Eric Freyfogle believes that the ‘biggest difference between public and private 
lands has to do with management power over the land.’163 Yet again there is 
no bright line. 
 
Decisions about public lands are mostly made by public decision-makers, but 
not completely so. Public decision-makers are often influenced by private 
parties who want to use the lands. Indeed, private involvement in public-lands 
processes is extensive, too extensive, some people say .164 
 
Freyfogle’s emphasis on state management rather than ownership may be 
apt. Where the state is a bare trustee, its role is reduced to management of 
trust assets for the exclusive benefit of the true beneficial owners, who retain 
the bulk of the key bundle rights. The state’s residual right is essentially a right 
to manage, and this right is constrained by trust obligations.  Shorn of most of 
the hallmark property rights, it may be unrealistic to describe the state’s 
dearth of bundle rights in public property as proprietorial.165   
 
Indeed from the state’s perspective, is ownership per se the prime objective 
for its public property estate? As Sally Fairfax and her colleagues observe 
 
Ownership does not ensure control. The relevant myth here suggests that if 
you own land, you can protect it.  The reality… is that formal ownership 
frequently provides little control or resource protection at all. This is 
particularly true on federally owned land, despite federal ownership being 
163 Freyfogle, above n34, 93. 
164 Ibid 
165 ‘In some cases… property rights may contain so few traditional sticks in the bundle as to 
defy continued description by the term property.’ Leigh Raymond, Private Rights in Public 
Resources (2003) 18. 
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commonly portrayed as the preferred tenure arrangement for 
conservation….166 
 
The state as bare owner may be better employed devoting its energies to the 
effective control of the public land it manages on behalf of its citizens. Good 
state management may reinforce the integrity of public property, and silence 
its critics.167  
 
Ownership of public property is a vexed issue. Its inexactitude suggests that it 
is not the defining characteristic of public property that it should be.  Who 
owns public property, and in what capacity, are complex questions lacking 
ready answers. Part of the struggle to respond may be attributed to a values 
paradigm of dominant individualism. Its end result leaves us less equipped to 
meaningfully understand the ownership of public property in land. 
 
4.4 Ownership and diffusion 
 
One clearer way to explain the conundrum of ownership is the idea of 
diffusion, Rose’s ‘the more the merrier.’168 Simply, the more dispersed our 
sense of ‘ownership’, the more interested we become in its management and 
welfare. Diffusion rests on an instinctive imperative that citizens should 
conceive of public property as ‘their own’, no matter how ‘thin’ the ownership.  
  
The disaggregation of property ownership amongst the public at large, 
decentralizes property ‘rights’ and spreads relative degrees of ownership 
amongst a wide class of persons.169  Joseph Singer describes this dispersal 
166 Fairfax, above n40, 257. A topical example is the Victorian Government’s ownership of its 
high country national parks. Its title did not prevent the Australian Federal Government 
enforcing a ban on private cattle grazing in alpine national parks, Patricia Karvelas, 
‘Commonwealth overrides Victoria on issue of grazing in alpine park’, The Australian, March 
18, 2011.  
167 Again in the Victorian high country a criticism of national parks is their failure to manage 
fire risk.  This in turn corroborates the argument for private cattle grazing rights in national 
parks to ‘eat down’ the fuel. Such perceptions in local communities diminish the wider 
integrity of public land holding; Brower, above n26.  
168 Rose, above n6, 7. 
169 John Page, ‘Towards a Sustainable Paradigm for Property’, (2011) 1 Property Law Journal 
86. 
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as inherent in his ‘nuisance’ or citizen’ model of property.   ‘The effect is to 
identify multiple persons who have legally protected interests in the same 
piece of property and therefore have something to say about how it is 
used.’170   Singer further refines this view into a relational one where links to 
place became more explicit, the ‘environmental’ or ‘good neighbor’ model,171 
where dispersed property rights are ‘overlapping or imbricated’,172 such that 
individual or collective acts have wider flow on effects to neighbors and the 
environment.  Diffusion facilitates self-adjusting ‘checks and balances’ though 
the spreading of ownership across landscapes. ‘These trans-boundary 
overlaps … constrain an owner’s ability to act unilaterally, while at the same 
time diffuse ownership to a wide range of owners with different vested 
interests in their ownerships.’ 173 
 
The exponential expansion of a class of (self) interested public owners has 
two effects, first it spreads the individual public’s sense of ownership, second, 
intricate levels of overlap mean that everyone has a vested interest in the 
consequences of another’s (adverse) acts over public property. One’s sense 
of property in a public place thus elevates itself from ambiguity to a diffused 
sense of propriety, a concern for its welfare, and a willingness to get involved 
to protect it.  That the law will act to protect public property rights174, 
sometimes at the behest of the state, but often at the instigation of informal 
community or representative groups, is a tangible outcome of the diffusion of 
ownership of public property in land. 
 
Diffusion is deeply conceptual and problematic in practice. How can scattered 
public ‘ownership’ rights be regulated and enforced? What can prevent a 
motivated, self-interested few capturing the public estate to the detriment of 
an apathetic many? The American experience of the public trust suggests a 
170 Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 88. 
171 Joseph Singer, ‘Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership’ in Gregory 
Alexander & Eduardo Penalver (eds.) Property and Community (2010) 57, 60; Joseph Singer, 
‘The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations’, 
(2006) 30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 309  
172 Ibid, 57, 60.  
173Ann Brower & John Page, ‘Does (Property) Diversity beget (Landscape) Sustainability?’ in 
Environmental Governance and Sustainability, Paul Martin et al (eds.), (2012). 
174 ‘Legal institutions protect property rights, both public and private’, Rose, above n6. 
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role for the judiciary as guardians of the public interest in public property. This 
chapter does not purport to provide ready answers to such prosaic matters. 
Yet, fundamentally, developing a sense of public propriety requires 
paradigmatic change. Articulating what a right of inclusion may encompass is 
one step in beginning such an incremental shift.  
 
5. The right to include 
 
If exclusion is the hallmark right of modern private property,175 logically 
inclusion should be public property’s inverse gatekeeper.176 As a guiding 
principle, what is meant by a right to include? Does its foil define it, such that it 
is a right not to exclude?177 Or does it have an independent, positive meaning, 
a right to access ‘material resources’? 178 
 
Carol Rose warns that  
 
It is a serious mistake to think of property only in metaphors of exclusion, 
boundaries, and disengagement.  These are metaphors drawn chiefly from 
land, but human[s] have devised ways to allocate property in many other 
things …  We have created not only individual property, but also partnership 
property, common property and public property. Human interactions make 
property into a thoroughly malleable institution, and one that adjusts to a vast 
variety of subjects.179 
 
 
Rose’s advice intimates that exclusion is a flawed place to start. Nor is Rose 
alone in observing that property is a ‘thoroughly malleable institution’ that 
moulds to context.180 To define inclusion by what it is not is counter-contextual 
175 Merrill, above n7. 
176 Hamilton & Bankes, above n2, 19, 26.  
177 Jonathan Mitchell, ‘What Public Presence? Access, Commons and Property Rights (2008) 
17 Social & Legal Studies 351, 353. 
178Waldron, above n117, 31. 
179 Carol Rose, ‘Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers’, (1992-
1993) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 2409, 2420  
180 Singer, above n 170; Joseph Sax, ‘Property Rights and the Economy of Nature’, (1992) 45 
Stanford Law Review 1433, 1446. 
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and affirms that exclusion is the sine qua non of property.181 Inclusion 
deserves a stand-alone definition.  
 
Language is one starting point. Roget’s Thesaurus lists numerous synonyms 
for inclusion: participation; membership; affiliation; eligibility; admission – 
terms that embody shared or common possession of space.182 The links 
between language and property are intimate and powerful; Carol Rose calls 
them ‘a central project of her legal scholarship.’183 Language is not only words 
in a thesaurus, but in a broader sense a means of persuasive communication; 
in the case of property, its symbols, visual cues, or collective narratives.184  
Rose proffers a number of images as the ‘expressive endeavor’ or ‘symbolic 
presentation’185 of public property, streetscapes, parks, highways, and most 
evocatively, a fresco of a sociable street scene in medieval Siena, a ‘good life’ 
where ‘people stop to chat with one another and with the street vendors, … 
laugh at a pet monkey’s antics, drop into a shop and buy something, or have 
a seat and watch the other passers-by.’186  The democratic sharing of a public 
space is an uncomplicated way to see public property, an image that captures 
the diverse language of inclusion. It is the antithesis of private property’s 
‘expressive endeavor’: the fence, gate, keep-out sign, and private world 
inside. 
 
5.1 Inclusion and access 
 
Access ought to be the epitome of inclusion. It lies at the heart of Rose’s 
street scene. Yet the right of access is far from clear-cut. Some public lands 
are openly accessible; others have conditions attached to their intrusion (such 
as the payment of entrance fees in popular national parks), while in other 
cases, there is no access at all (military land, or dedicated wilderness, or 
181 Merrill, above n7. 
182 Roget’s Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases (1962) 755. 
183 Carol Rose, ‘Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel’, (2006) Yale Journal 
of Law and the Humanities 1, 2. 
184 Carol Rose, ‘Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, 
Feminist Theory’, (1990) 2 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 37. 
185Rose, above n6. 
186 Ibid, 18. 
83  
                                                        
wildlife preservation areas187).  In the United States there is also a 
constitutional overlay affecting public property historically open to the public, 
so-called ‘public forums.’ ‘[I]n such places [parks, sidewalks, town squares] 
the government’s ability to permissively restrict expressive conduct is very 
limited.’188 Conversely ‘[p]ublicly owned or operated property does not 
become a ‘public forum’ simply because members of the public are permitted 
to come and go at will.’189 In Australia or New Zealand, no such constitutional 
implications impact on public access.  In other cases, legislation may give an 
occupier of prescribed public lands the discretion to eject intruders provided a 
prior demand to leave is made, deeming the recalcitrant intruder a 
trespasser.190 Such legislation places the emphasis on the right to exclude, at 
times confusing Barnes’ ‘needs of society as a whole’ with the ‘self-serving 
interest’ of the particular occupier, public or private.191  In sum, access as a 
proposition is a mélange of unqualified, qualified, or denied entitlement.192 
 
Even where access appears unfettered, externalities may practically restrict 
freedom of entry.  A surrounding landholder may effectively capture the public 
lands by impeding the most feasible points of access. A consequence of 
effective capture is their de facto privatization. Private capture of public lands 
in New Zealand’s iconic high country is the subject of separate academic 
scrutiny.193  Equally, contested access through private land to beach and 
coastal foreshore attracts vocal, high profile attention.194 In June 2010, Stop 
the Beach Renourishment v Florida Department of Environmental 
187 There is no public access to Codfish Island in New Zealand, home to the Department of 
Conservation breeding program for the endangered flightless kakapo parrot. 
188 United States v Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
189 Ibid. 
190 Inclosed Lands Protection Land 1901 (NSW); Trespass Act 1980 (NZ) 
191 In New Zealand, the Trespass Act 1980 (NZ) is described by its opponents as draconian, 
Proceedings of the Federated Mountain Clubs Backcountry Recreation 2000 Conference, 
Ruling and Regulating or Freedom of the Hills, St. Arnaud, Nelson Lakes, September 27-29, 
1991. 
192 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and The Issue of Freedom’ (1992) 39 UCLA Law Rev. 
295, 297-8. 
193 Brower, above n8; John Page and Ann Brower, ‘Property Law in the South Island High 
Country – Statutory Not Common Law Leases’ (2007) 15 Waikato Law Rev. 48 
194 Dion Dyer, California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust, (1972) 2 
Ecology L.Q. 571, 573. 
84  
                                                        
Protection195 was ‘the [US Supreme Court’s] case of the year for planners and 
land use practitioners’,196 a curious dispute about property rights, accretion 
and littoral access.197  Beaches are much-loved public places.198  Access to 
them engages the many as well as the few199 in both its practice and idea. Yet 
despite their revered status, a brief comparison of ‘beach law’ in the United 
States and New Zealand illustrates that access is far from being a uniform 
touchstone of the public estate and its inclusiveness.  
 
Access to the wet sands of American beaches through privately owned dry 
sands is a ‘perplexing’200 issue.  Public rights are piecemeal,201 limited by the 
low tide in some states, extending to the mean high tide mark in others, and in 
Texas protected by public rolling easements to the first vegetation line.202  
Inconsistent applications of doctrines such as prescription or implied 
dedication yield unpredictable outcomes.  In a handful of states, there has 
been a ‘Lazarus-like’203 resurrection of beach access rights, which David 
Bederman ascribes to four customary models; ‘failed attempts to extend 19th 
century common law doctrine in the New England, statutory codification of 
custom in Texas,204 judicial instrumentalism in Oregon, and protection of 
uniquely indigenous rights in Hawaii.’205 Outside Bederman’s ‘four corners’, 
the extension of the public trust to the dry sands has been most expansively 
achieved in New Jersey.206  Elsewhere, the public trust has produced 
195 130 S.Ct. 2592, June 17, 2010. It was held that building sand buffers to protect coastal 
communities was a ‘public property right…that had no effect whatsoever on any property 
rights held by coastal property owners under Florida law.’ John Echeverria, ‘Green Light for 
Beach Renourishment, Red Light for Judicial Takings’, (2010) 62-9 Planning & Environmental 
Law 4. 
196 Lora Lucero, ‘Stop the Beach Renourishment – Six Perspectives’, Planning & 
Environmental Law (2010) 62-9, 3. 
197 It is ‘curious’ because the petitioners were private landowners protesting about state 
efforts at sand buffering. 
198 Bederman, above n64.  
199 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(1968).  
200 Stevens, supra note 145, at 230. 
201 Bender, above n79, 914. 
202 Eichenberg et al, above n60; Margaret Peloso & Margaret Caldwell, ‘Dynamic Property 
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate’ (2011) 30 Stan. Envtl. 
L.J. 51, 57-8. 
203 Bederman, above n64, 1379. 
204 Duhl, above n68, 215-6.  
205 Ibid, 1408. 
206 Archer, above n110, 107-108. 
85  
                                                        
outcomes that are underwhelming.207  In California, a famous beach culture 
has not equated to universal access rights over upland dry sands. While 
Californian courts have been active in expanding other categories of public 
trust property,208 sea-locked tidelands remain contested.209 The Supreme 
Court’s oft-cited decision in Nollan v California Coastal Commission210 held 
that a consent condition requiring owners of a beachside home to grant a 
public easement over their private beach, was a compensable taking of 
property. Nollan affirms that beachfront easement access is ‘purchased by the 
landowner…  [it was never] a separate, state-owned legal interest.’211 Rather 
eminent domain, resumption with compensation, is the most appropriate 
means of securing public beach access.212  In contrast, uniform beach access 
rights in Oregon were achieved on the basis of a statewide custom in State ex 
rel. Thornton v Hay (‘Hay’).213 Despite its critics,214 Hay delivered to 
‘Oregonians…the unique privilege of beach access and recreation… on 
Oregon’s 362-mile coastline.’215 Steven Bender evaluates the bundle held by 
the Oregon littoral landholder post-Hay, and concludes that only the right to 
exclude is missing.  Hay is an interesting exemplar of property plurality; 
Bender observing that side by side with the public right of access is the 
private right to prevent unreasonable public use.    Accessing wet sands of 
American beaches is fraught with inconsistency. Entitlements vary widely, 
with rationales ranging from state custom (implemented by statute or common 
law) to divergent interpretations of the public trust.   
 
In New Zealand, public confidence in access to the beach and coastal 
foreshore, once a given, has eroded since 2003.216 A ‘perfect storm’217 of 
207 Ibid, 82, 106; Higgins, above n132, 183-4. 
208 Archer above n110, 23 
209 Dyer, above n194, 578. 
210 483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
211 Michael Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’, (1998) 108 Yale L.J. 1163, 120; 
Archer, above n110, 83, 105.  
212 Brower & Page, above n173.  
213 462 .2d 671 (1969) 
214 Duhl, above n68, 216-217; Bederman, above n64, 1381. 
215 Bender, above n79, 913.  
216 David Grinlinton, ‘Private Property Rights versus Public Access: The Foreshore and 
Seabed Debate’, (2003) 7 NZ Journal of Envtal. Law 313. 
217 Ibid, 314. 
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indigenous Maori customary claim to the foreshore (the Ngati Apa case),218 a 
government report identifying the incomplete nature of the Queen’s Chain,219 
and the ongoing decline of traditional conventions about access to the 
outdoors220, contributes to heightened disquiet about public “no-go zones”.221 
The Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (NZ)222 and its extinguishment of Maori 
customary title, failed to assuage underlying anxiety, seemingly confirming the 
view that the feared specter of plurality of foreshore ownership was 
‘something of a red herring… a comparatively minor aspect of a much bigger 
issue.’223   Its repeal and replacement by the Marine and Coastal Area 
(Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ),224 ushers in an untested regime for access to 
foreshores. Section 11 divests Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed, 
and substitutes it with a new concept of a ‘common marine and coastal 
area’,225 land owned by no one.226 Critics describe this nomenclature as ‘spin 
doctoring’, one that does not change radical title in the New Zealand 
Crown.227 Public access to the ‘common marine and coastal areas’ is 
preserved under section 26(1),228 yet others charge that this is flawed; access 
is precluded where there are sacred Maori lands,229 and the Act is silent on 
customary owners imposing fees for access.230 A vocal campaign to restore 
Crown ownership of the foreshore and seabed is reactively driven by the fear 
218 Attorney-General v Ngati Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 461 
219 The Land Access Ministerial reference Group, Walking Access in the New Zealand 
Outdoors (August 2003) (‘the Acland Report’). 
220 Proceedings of the FMC Backcountry Recreation 2000 Conference, Ruling and Regulating 
or Freedom of the Hills, St. Arnaud, Nelson Lakes, September 27-29, 1991; Grinlinton, above 
n216, 319.  
221 The front cover of NORTH & SOUTH magazine in August 2008 pictures a beach and a 
strand of barbed wire, ‘ Your access to public places is under threat.’ North & South, August 
2008. 
222 Since repealed. 
223 Richard Boast, Foreshore and Seabed (2005) 6. 
224 The new Act responds to Maori grievance over the loss of customary rights in the seabed 
and foreshore. 
225 Earlier drafts of the Bill had called the ‘common marine and coastal area’ the ‘public 
domain.’ 
226 § 11(2) Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ) 
227 Grinlinton, above n216, 326. 
228 § 26(1) Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ) 
229§ 26(2) Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 (NZ) 
230 David Round, Foreshore and seabed public access at http://www.nzcpr.com/guest217.htm 
(May 29, 2011) 
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of losing a New Zealand ‘birthright and common heritage’231, the right of free 
access to the beach. 
 
The divergent U.S. and New Zealand experiences are indicative of a wider 
malaise. The right of public access is an underdeveloped, incomplete 
discourse in the common law,232 no more so in the case of the much-loved 
beach. Its immaturity means that access is far from a default benchmark of 
public property rights. In speaking of coastal access in New Zealand, Richard 
Boast opines that the right is in need of ‘serious consideration of what such a 
right may involve … how it should influence law and policy.’ “[P]rincipled 
public discussion… has been sadly absent.” 233   
 
The Countryside and Right of Way Act 2000 (UK) (‘CRoW’), and its extension 
to coastal areas by the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009234 is a proactive 
intervention into the vagaries of public access.  CRoW is idiosyncratically 
English, a long delayed,235 ideologically couched236 response to the loss of 
ancient access rights. Jerry Anderson compares public access rights in 
England and the United States, and concludes that different social histories, 
landowning patterns, geography, and cultural mores, lead to different attitudes 
to public access.237 Anderson’s observations of America share parallels with 
other settler societies, such as Australia and New Zealand.  
 
CRoW balances competing interests, private landowner versus public access, 
its objective being the creation of a functional mosaic of property pluralism in 
the open countryside. The Act does not institutionalize unrestricted access; 
rather it imposes measured restraints that do not ‘interfere unduly with the 
landowner’s privacy or business.’238 Hence ‘excepted land’ excluded from 
231 A public advocacy group, The Coastal Coalition, leads the campaign; see 
http://www.nzcpr.com/CoastalCoalition.htm (May 30, 2011). 
232 Anderson, supra note 33, at 404 
233 Boast, above n 223, 6 
234 § 296 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 (UK). 
235 John Sprankling et al, Global Issues in Property Law 88 (2006); Anderson, above n28, 
402-5. 
236 Sprankling above n235, 90-93. 
237 Anderson, above n28, 418-421. 
238 Sydenham, above n32 88. 
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access includes cultivated land, or land within 20 metres of a dwelling.239 
Alternatively conditions are imposed on public conduct, a breach of which 
leads to the loss of rights of access. These include not closing gates, lighting 
fires, or disturbing persons engaged in lawful activity on the land.240  Such a 
policy-based approach justifies the denial of access in the wider public 
interest.  CRoW is a template for accommodating public and private property 
interests in landscapes where recreational access is desired or feasible.241   A 
more extensive statutory right of access has been enacted in Scotland, a 
‘responsible right of access’ to land and inland waters.242 The Scottish 
scheme exemplifies that 
 
it is practically possible for a modern, democratic nation committed to the rule 
of law, the protection of private property, and open markets to create, if it 
wants, a property regime that to a considerable extent replaces the ex ante 
presumption in favor of the right to exclude … with an equally robust, but 
rebuttable, ex ante presumption in favor of access.243 
 
‘Settler’ societies with different social, political and historic contexts244 are less 
likely to generate the demands for similar access entitlements over private 
lands.  
 
5.2 Inclusion and use and enjoyment 
 
In the absence of direct legislative intervention, access is an inadequate (or at 
least premature) indicator of inclusion. Inclusion must embrace wider 
meanings than physical ingress and egress.  Can public property be used and 
enjoyed without physical access? As discussed, the incorporeal conservation 
easement serves a multitude of ‘public goods.’  These include the provision of 
239 Schedule 1, CRoW. Landowners also have the right to exclude access for up to 28 days 
per year upon notice, section 22 CRoW. 
240 Schedule 2, CRoW 
241Cf Jonathan Mitchell, ‘What Public Presence? Access, Commons and Property Rights 
(2008) 17 Social & Legal Studies 351, 356. 
242 John Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’ 
(2010) 89 Nebraska Law Rev. 739, 776. 
243 Ibid, 816-7 
244 Hostile reactions by adjoining landowners to the New Zealand Walking Access Act 2008 
(NZ) watered down public access rights; Lovett, 817. 
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ecosystem services, ‘viewsheds’,245 open space,246 or wildlife corridors.247 
Inherent in each is an intangible and indirect public enjoyment absent access.  
 
The right of use and enjoyment is described as hierarchically lower, ‘less 
compelling’ 248 than other significant property rights, in particular the right to 
exclude.  Despite its importance, for example Tony Honore listed use as one 
of 11 critical incidents of ownership, ‘surprisingly little is written about its 
content.’249 While the private right is dominated by the descriptor of active 
use, its public equivalent may have a different emphasis, one where physical 
use is ancillary to a primary enjoyment. Alternatively, the public right may be 
conjunctive, a right of use or enjoyment.   Where physical access is permitted, 
the public right may encompass both limbs - use and enjoyment - but where 
other indirect public benefits ensue minus access, the right falls away to one 
of enjoyment simpliciter. The umbrella right of inclusion is analogous to a 
diffuse public enjoyment of land, in which individual members of the public 
derive a public good, but where individual enjoyment of that good is no 
greater than any other member’s enjoyment.  Pointedly, access is a non-
essential component.  
 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, public and private littoral rights intersected. 
While academic attention focused on the case’s implications for the judicial 
taking of private property,250 the U.S. Supreme Court decision also had 
resonance for public property, and its inherent enjoyment. There the ‘public 
property right’ to ‘place a sand buffer on publicly owned submerged land…to 
protect coastal property owners and the community as a whole’251 overrode 
any private right to future landward accretion.  ‘[T]he (private) right to 
245 Seth McKee, ‘Conservation Easements to Protect Historic Viewsheds: A Case Study of the 
Olana Viewshed in New York’s Hudson River Valley’, in J Gustanski and R Squires (eds.) 
Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements Past, Present and Future (2000). 
246 Brewer, above n38, 155; Debra Donohue, above n54, 119; Samuel Silverstone, ‘Open 
Space Preservation through Conservation Easements’, (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 105. 
247 For example Ewing, above n 54.  
248 Laura Underkuffler calls the right to use ‘less compelling, its ‘protection is far more a 
matter of collective whim’, Underkuffler, above n15, 25.  
249 Simon Douglas, ‘The Content of a Freehold: A ‘Right to Use’ Land, in Modern Studies in 
Property Law (7th ed., 2013) 359, 360. 
250 Lucero, above n196. 
251 Echeverria, above n195. 
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accretions was … subordinate to the State’s right to fill.’ By contrast, in New 
South Wales, Vaughan v Byron Shire Council similarly concerned a right to 
fill. But in Vaughan the private landowner was demanding the right to 
renourish storm-damaged sea front, while the council asserted a public 
expectancy to future landward erosion, so-called ‘planned retreat’ against 
expected sea level rises arising from climate change. In Florida, an active 
public property right prevailed over a passive private right. In NSW, the 
reverse applied, a passive public property right yielded to an active private 
right. While public enjoyment in erosion retreat is nuanced, public enjoyment 
in accretion seaward of beach renourishment is more identifiable.  The 
enjoyment facilitates a wider public good, namely the immediate protection of 
coastal communities.  Equally, reasons for denying a public enjoyment (in 
Vaughan the council’s policy of planned retreat) should satisfy an overriding 
public good, for as Carol Rose explains ‘[a]ny encroachment on public rights 
has to be justified by an even greater benefit to the public’s well-being.’252   
Beach renourishment cases suggest that the enjoyment of public property 
rights requires a weighing up of relative ‘public goods’, straightforward in 
some cases, finely balanced in others. 
 
The ‘public good’ is a malleable, circumstantial concept, periodically invoked 
to justify property in its various forms. Jeremy Waldron observes the 
paramountcy of a ‘collective social interest’ in defining collective property. 
 
In a system of collective property, the problem of allocation is solved by the 
application of a social rule that access to and the use of material resources in 
particular cases are to be determined by reference to the collective interests 
of society as a whole…resolved by favouring the use which is most conducive 
to the collective social interest.253 
 
Richard Barnes concurs, ‘[t]he organizing idea of collective property is that the 
needs of society as a whole take precedence over those of individuals.’254  
What overarching ‘public good’ explains public enjoyment? Why should the 
252 Rose, above n181, 278. 
253 Waldron, above n117, 328. 
254 Ibid, 154. 
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public enjoy a general right to be included? Propriety offers the beginnings of 
at least one answer to these questions. 
 
5.3 Inclusion and propriety 
 
To Gregory Alexander, the commodity view of property is only one-half of the 
dialectic of modern property.  The missing half, ‘property as propriety’, 
provides the ‘material foundation for creating and maintaining the proper 
social order’, a civic conception of a ‘properly ordered society’.255 Propriety 
enables the ‘well-lived life’,256 in which individual interaction and reciprocity of 
social obligation within community constitutes ‘human flourishing in a very 
deep sense.’257 Human flourishing speaks to property’s marginalized personal 
and communitarian values.258 
 
Flourishing is an unavoidably cooperative endeavor rather than an individual 
pursuit or purely personal project. Our ability to flourish requires certain basic 
material goods and a communal infrastructure ... However much we value our 
personal independence, it is quite literally impossible for a person to flourish 
without others.259 
 
Public property in land is an important component in the propitious, well-
ordered community.   It is the ‘communal infrastructure’, the physical and 
metaphorical common ground, where shared activities ‘socialize, democratize 
and educate society.’260 Rose’s evocative street market is testament to this. In 
its corporeal form, it provides space for egalitarian recreation.261 In its 
incorporeal form, it may minimize the tragic risk of fragmentation,262 or 
engender what Kevin Gray terms ‘pedestrian democracy’, a ‘flourishing of the 
255 Alexander above n63, 2-3; Barnes, above n 120, 112.  
256 Gregory Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in North American Property Law’, (2009) 
94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 763  
257 Ibid, 761 
258 Margaret Radin, Reinterpreting Property (1993); John Moutsakas, ‘Group Rights in 
Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inalienability’ (1988-89) 74 Cornell L.R. 1179.  
259 GS Alexander and EM Penalver, An Introduction to Property Theory (2012) 87. 
260 Rose, above n6, 779, 781. 
261 J Laitos and T Carr, ‘The Transformation on Public Lands’ (1999) 26 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 178 
262 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society (2007) 9-24. 
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civil and ecological communities of which we humans are a part’263 that 
heightens ‘civic responsibilities and … participation in an integrative society of 
equals.’264  By contrast, modern private property265 marginalizes propriety. Its 
commoditization leaves scant scope for alternative paradigms, the likes of 
stewardship266 or economies of nature,267 to take root.   Its abstraction de-
couples right from place, preferring anonymous cartographic space268 to the 
lived sociable experience of community. 
 
James Kunstler’s study of the decline of America’s cities highlights the 
importance of public property to properly ordered communities.  Kunstler 
writes of growing up in a soulless suburbia whose “motive force [was] the 
exaltation of privacy and the elimination of the public realm.”269 By contrast, 
summer camp visits to Lebanon, New Hampshire, with its ‘town square, band 
shells, elm street trees, and various civic buildings of agreeable scale- the 
library, the town hall, the opera house’ highlighted the lost dignity and 
consequence of public space.270 
 
Public property forms a key part of ‘organically whole communities.’ Kunstler 
cites ‘productive work, markets, cultural institutions, (and) different classes of 
people’271 as critical to the social fabric.  Public property informs to varying 
degrees many of these civil pre-requisites.  Its facilitation of recreation, 
democratic values, and overarching sociability, (to be discussed next in turn) 
are factors that mold ‘well-lived lives.’ Rather than a false dawn for public 
access, the right to include may be best understood as a right to a proper 
social order, a right to inclusive enjoyment of a well-ordered community.  
263 Kevin Gray, ‘Pedestrian Democracy and the Geography of Hope’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
Human Rights 
and the Environment 45, 52. 
264 Ibid, 54. 
265 Cf, Freyfogle above n34, 177, 203.  
266 William Lucy & Catherine Mitchell, ‘Replacing Private Property: The Case for Stewardship’, 
(1996) 55(3) CLJ 566 
267 Joseph Sax, Ownership, Property and Sustainability,(2011) 14; Joseph Sax, ‘Property 
Rights and the Economy of Nature’ (1992) 45 Stanford Law Review 1433, 1446. 
268 Curt Meine, Correction Lines Essays on Land, Leopold, and Conservation (2004). 
Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (2004) 91. 
269Kuntsler, above n 82. 
270Ibid, 13 
271 Ibid, 48 
93  
                                                        
 The links between recreation272 and public lands are many, ranging from 
practical to ethereal, passive to active, and co-existing to competing. There is 
near academic unanimity in the U.S. that recreation replaced commerce as 
public property’s socializing raison d’etre by the second half of the 20th 
century.273 ‘Dispersed recreation… the opportunity to hunt, fish, hike, 
explore…’274 constitute new reasons to retain public lands. Sally Fairfax 
describes the American public estate ‘riding into a different sunset’,275 with 
once alternative ideas (relaxation, health, adventure, exploration, social, 
scenic and natural values, solitude and spiritual replenishment) becoming 
mainstream. Joseph Sax explores the spirituality of passive recreation, tracing 
the origins of the parks system to landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted 
and his ‘contemplative visitor’, the non-consumptive recreationist whose 
reflections on nature ‘provide a chance to express distinctiveness and to 
explore our deeper longings.’ 276 Scott Lehmann similarly writes of the 
restorative qualities of public lands, places that ‘take us out of ourselves, … 
release us from unrewarding preoccupations while  
at the same time engaging our interest and curiosity.’277 Such observations 
are redolent of property’s ancient role of identity.278  
 
Ideologically, public property reinforces democratic values,279 a ‘powerful 
symbolic affirmation of the egalitarian ideal in a largely private system.’280 
Olmsted views the urban public park as ‘particularly helpful for democratic 
values… rich and poor would mingle… and learn to treat each other as 
272 Recreation on public lands is treated as a natural resource as much as mining, forestry or 
grazing, George Coggins et al, Federal Public Land and Resources Law (6th ed, 2007). 
273 ‘Following World War II, recreation demand boomed as the country’s population became 
larger, richer, and more mobile.’  Herman D Ruth & Associates, ‘Outdoor Recreation Use of 
the Public Lands’, Report prepared under contract with the Public Land Law Review 
Commission, Berkeley, CA, 1969, Vol. I, [I-5]. 
274 Nelson, supra note 28, 211, 240; Coggins above n272, 907. 
275 Sally Fairfax, ‘Riding into a Different Sunset’, (1981) 79 Journal of Forestry; Anderson, 
above n28, 413-416. 
276 Joseph Sax, Mountains Without Handrails, Reflections on the National Parks (1980) 42. 
277 Lehmann, above n22, 170. 
278 Laitos & Carr, above n261.  
279 Joseph Singer, ‘Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society’, 
(2009) 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1009. 
280 Nelson, aboven 24, 213. 
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neighbors.’281 Andrew Buck identifies egalitarianism as the distinguishing 
feature of Australian property law,282 hastened by the opening of the Crown 
estate for settlement after 1861.283 In New Zealand an ethos of open access 
to land and natural resources,284was manifested by indicators such as public 
rights to fish and game,285 and the convention of public access to the 
outdoors.   In settler societies, egalitarianism is a powerful sub-current that 
finds outlet and expression in public property.  
 
Finally public property fills a gap in the narrative of property ignored in a 
private commoditized paradigm, that of sociability.286  Rose’s ‘comedy of the 
commons’ has been previously traversed as an overarching rationale for 
public property.  At its base is the need for public property to serve society by 
making us sociable.287  
 
Public property is critical to the social and communal fabric. It fills the void 
vacated by a commoditized private property, such that Alexander’s theory is 
optimally public property as propriety. Rather than a false dawn for access, 
the right to include may be better understood as a universal entitlement to 
flourish in well-ordered communities, places symbolized by Rose’s deeply 
expressive streetscape. Public property enables well-lived lives by acting as 
an ‘entrance to community’288, the vehicle through which public inclusion 
imposes and legitimizes the idea of public property rights in land. 
 
 
 
 
 
281 Rose, above n6.  
282 Andrew Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law (2006) 
283 Crown Lands Act 1861 (NSW) 
284 Nigel Curry, ‘Rights of access to land for outdoor recreation in New Zealand; dilemmas 
concerning justice and equity’, (2001) 17 Journal of Rural Studies 409. 
285  The ethos and principles of the early Acclimatisation Societies (forerunners to the NZ Fish 
and Game Council) were to keep freshwater fisheries and wildlife game in the public estate, s 
23 Wildlife Act 1953 (NZ), s 26ZN Conservation Act 1987 (NZ).  
286 Graham, above n29.  
287 Rose, above n6.  
288 Eduardo Penalver, ‘Property as Entrance’ (2005) 91 Virginia Law Review 1889. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
While some advocates for public property may argue for its greater ‘public-
ness’,289 it has been an objective of this chapter to highlight the little-regarded 
‘property’ in the equation.  In so doing, diverse interests in public land have been 
explored; vexed issues of ownership canvassed; and aspects of inclusion laid 
open to initial scrutiny.  
 
Structure, sophistry and coherence should be our ambitions for public property 
in land, such that we ‘see’ more clearly and better understand the vast public 
estate that exists in our midst. 290 If such a descriptive ‘seeing’ becomes 
normalized, property in land will be enriched by the greater diversity that 
ensues, the addition of an undisputed and commensurately valued public tile in 
the mosaic.  
289 Project for Public Spaces at http://www.pps.org (May 30, 2011). 
290 In the western United States, there is widespread teaching of Public Land Law, Earl Arnold, 
‘The Study of Public Land Law in the Western Law Schools’, (1916) 4 Cal. L. Rev. 316.  In 
Australia and New Zealand, there is a dearth of public land literature.  In NSW there has not 
been a book on public lands since 1973, Andrew Lang, Crown Land in New South Wales: the 
principles and practice relating to the disposal of and dealings with crown land (1973). In New 
Zealand it is 1967, J O’Keefe, The Law and Practice Relating to Crown Land in New Zealand 
(1967). 
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Chapter 3 The Obviousness and Obliviousness of Common 
Property 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Common property is arguably the greatest victim of private property’s 
dominance. It is ‘seen’ (if at all) as marginal, tragic, or anachronistic,1 yet 
American property jurist Carol Rose describes it as ‘oddly ubiquitous’,2 a 
paradox where common property is obvious in its frequency, but oblivious to 
precise identification.  
 
This chapter will examine traditional and contemporary manifestations of 
common property, and the theories and myths that surround its application to 
natural resource management. These diverse perspectives reveal that common 
property has much to add to a vibrant property mosaic, a putative contribution 
disproportionate to its apparent size or profile. The chapter will then assess 
common property’s understated strengths, the centrality of use rights, an 
inherent sociability, and its environmental norms and values, before concluding 
with its overstated weaknesses, its tarnished image and near-invisibility.  
 
That we ‘see’ common property through the overblown prism of its ‘failures’ has 
pushed it to the periphery. Yet to dismiss it as marginal is to overlook its 
potential. It also ignores that common property is more ‘obviously there’ than our 
obliviousness to it suggests. The identification of common property in any given 
landscape requires a consciously concerted effort that rewards the viewer with 
an enriched mosaic of property types. 
 
 
 
 
1 The 18th century enclosure movement exemplified this phenomenon in terms of common 
property.  As a consequence, common property is criticized as economically inefficient, socially 
improper, or a  “tragedy of the commons” waiting to happen.   
2 Carol Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems”, (1998-1999) 83  Minn. L. Rev. 129, 132. 
97  
                                                        
2. Traditional common property 
 
Common property in its traditional form was, and remains, intrinsically linked 
to an agrarian, village-based, pre-industrial conception of society.  In England, 
‘common land had a significant role in …agricultural life’,3 and remains most 
prevalent outside metropolitan areas.4 In Europe, ongoing common property 
models have been studied as irrigation cartels in rural Spain5 and centuries-
old land tenure patterns in isolated mountainous cantons in the Swiss Alps.6  
 
Common property rights in 18th century England were described as 
 
The interest which a commoner has in a common is…to eat the grass with 
the mouths of his cattle, or to take such other produce of the soil as he may 
be entitled to… The soil itself, the land, was not the commoner’s but the use 
of it was.  That use…was common right. Its history had important 
consequences for small landholders, rural artisans and landless labourers in 
18th century England….their very sense of who they were and how well they 
lived were all in part dependent on [it]…7 
 
Common lands reflected the (once) central importance of agriculture to the 
English economy, in particular the open-field system of agricultural practice.  
Common lands since Norman times comprised the ‘waste lands of the manor’, 
uncultivated, unenclosed lands outside the lord’s individual demesne, or lands 
held by tenants under copyhold or customary freehold tenure.8 Rights of 
common are legal interests in land, incorporeal hereditaments in the nature of 
profits a prendre (‘profits’), a non-possessory right to enter someone else’s 
3 Navjit Ubhi & Barry Denyer-Green, Law of Commons and of Town and Village Greens 
(2004) 4 
4 Common land in 2004 comprised ‘some 550,000 hectares – about 4% of the total land area 
in England and Wales…. Surprisingly just over 51% of all registered commons in England are 
less than 1 hectare in area, and only 1.3% are 1,000 hectares or more in area.  Just over half 
of England’s common land is in Cumbria and North Yorkshire.’ Ibid.  
5 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 
(1990) 69-82. 
6 Robert Netting, Balancing on an Alp: Ecological change and continuity in a Swiss mountain 
community (1981). 
7 J M Neeson, Commoners: common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-
1820 (1993) 1 
8 Ubhi & Denyer-Green, above n3, 34-5 
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land and remove some thing or produce off that land.  As the authoritative text 
Gale on Easements points out, while all rights of common are profits, not 
every profit is a right of common, since some profits may be enjoyed 
individually, or severally with others, not necessarily in common with a defined 
class.9  
 
Traditional Anglo common law common rights are capable of classification 
into one of four categories: rights of common appendant;10 rights of common 
appurtenant;11 rights of common in gross;12 and rights of common by reason 
of vicinage.13 Since 1970, rights in common in England must be registered to 
remain valid and enforceable under the Commons Registration Act 1965 
(UK), thus rendering these categories (for all practical purposes) obsolete.14  
 
Importantly common rights are not public property rights15, they vest in 
members of a locality, or to a defined class of persons within that locality, and 
operate as ‘legal rights over the surface of lands, exercise(d) together or in 
common.’16 Thus strangers from outside a locality are not entitled to access 
common lands, or exercise privileged use rights.17  A third party (historically 
the manorial lord, but now often local borough councils) holds title, and their 
use of the land is assured in common with that of the commoners.   While use 
rights such as pasturage are the most prevalent18, other common rights 
include the gathering of wood, turf, or gorse for heating,19 the gathering of 
9 Gale on Easements (17th ed, 2003) 1-129 
10 Rights of common annexed to lands by operation of law that existed as at Quia Emptores 
1290. 
11 Rights of common attached to a particular parcel of land. 
12 Rights of common not attached to any particular parcel of land. 
13 Permissive rights of common that arise when two common lands adjoin or are contiguous 
14 Ubhi & Denyer-Green, above n3,  85-109 
15 Cf W. G. Hoskins and L. Dudley Stamp, The Common Lands of England & Wales (1963) 4, 
81. 
16 Ibid, 4 
17 Unless statute otherwise permits access, Countryside Rights of Way Act 2000 (UK) 
18 Pasturage generally referred to ‘cattle’, being animals needed to plough the land (horses), 
or animals needed to manure the arable land, such as cattle proper, and sheep. Variants to 
pasture include vesture and herbage. Rights of pasture could be limited to specific numbers 
of cattle through ‘stinting’, Neeson, above n7, 114.  Alternatively on some lands, rights of 
pasture could only be exercisable at specified times of the year (‘commonable lands’), Ubhi & 
Denyer-Green, above n3, 27-30.  Pigs (pannage), geese, and goats were separate common 
rights. 
19 Turbary. 
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timber for repair of fences and houses20, fishing in common streams,21 access 
across the countryside,22 the gleaning of crops,23 the gathering of wild foods 
such as nuts, mushrooms and berries, and recreational uses, including rights 
of air and exercise.24 The diversity of common rights varies according to local 
custom and usage. ‘In reality on the ground, the range of common produce 
was magnificently broad, the uses to which it was put was minutely varied, 
and the defence of local practice was determined and often successful.’25 
 
The commons were also more than a platform for natural resources; they 
were an integral component of community.  As Jeanette Neeson surmises, 
common rights had deeper social meaning and implication. ‘[T]he broad 
relationships engendered by independence of the wage enhanced leisure and 
community time, while access to the openness of the commons brought 
solitude…each usage of common waste created a sense of self; it told 
commoners who they were, a part of a tribe.’26  The common lands 
themselves were ‘literally and metaphorically common ground’, a space where 
‘contact, familiarity and exchange’ established connections between 
commoners and others of mutuality and respect.27 
 
The enclosure movement that culminated in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries represented the loss of much customary common right, and more 
broadly the wholesale transfer of property rights from the community to the 
individual, and from the landless to the landed.28  It also triggered social 
upheaval, emigration and demographic change, and as argued more broadly 
in this thesis, a fundamental realignment of our conception of property. Yet 
20 Estovers (including house-bote, cart-bote and hay-bote). 
21 Piscary. 
22 ‘To local people almost entirely employed in agriculture…there simply was no notion of 
rights of access onto the common separate from the rights and incidents of rights of common. 
With the massive urbanisation of the 19th century, and the disengagement of many people 
from agricultural activities, many commons came to be seen to have separate or additional 
recreational purposes.’ Ubhi & Denyer-Green, above n3, 133. 
23 The collecting of the remains of a harvest left in the fields. 
24 Customary activities include cricket, Morris dances, and village fairs. Hoskins and Stamp, 
above n15, 4. 
25 Neeson, above n7, 313. 
26 Ibid, 180. 
27 Ibid, 182. 
28 In 1963 a Royal Commission on Common Lands reported there were 1.5 million acres of 
commons in England and Wales, Hopkins & Stamp, above n15.  
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elsewhere in Europe common property rights proved more durable, in the 
forests and meadows of alpine communities, common property remains a 
functioning component of social and economic activity. 
 
Anthropologist Robert Netting studied a ‘closed corporate community’, the 
village of Torbel in alpine Switzerland in the early 1970s, and ‘the ecological 
balance achieved between its inhabitants and the environment.’29 Netting 
described a patchwork of private and communal tenure that had existed from 
the mid 15th century, a deliberately planned and inter-connected pattern of 
land ownership that achieved an ecological and economic equilibrium ‘created 
and maintained by intensive human effort for the physical benefits it could 
confer…private good and gain are weighed against village well-being and 
security.’30  
 
Village-owned common property in Torbel generally comprises less 
productive higher altitude holdings,31 pastures used for summer grazing, and 
alpine woodlands managed sustainably for annual fuel and timber needs. 
Common property also includes usufructs over alpine passes, used 
historically for inter-village access, hunting, the collection of stones for 
foundations and roofing slate, and the cutting of alpine grasses as a fodder 
supplement. Rights to common property, dating from 1453, are restricted to 
citizens of Torbel. Non-citizens who acquired private land in the village did not 
necessarily obtain common rights, while citizens who sold their private 
property in the village relinquished their common rights. ‘Although outsiders 
could be admitted at the pleasure of the community, competition for obviously 
scarce resources was decisively restricted. The definition of citizenship was 
equivalent to erecting a barrier around the community.’32 The village 
rigorously self-managed and policed individual access to communal 
resources, such that in the 1970s at the time of Netting’s extended stay at 
Torbel, there was no evidence of any ‘tragedy of the commons’.  Rather, 
29 Netting, above n6, (vii). 
30 Ibid, 225. 
31 ‘[T]he high mountain catchment basin of Torbel’s principal irrigation stream also was 
treated as common land,…guarding the vital water rights of the village.’ Ibid, 68. 
32 Ibid, 60. 
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‘common holdings and corporate administration by the village promote three 
things; an efficiency of utilization that would be threatened by fragmented 
private ownership, the potential for maintaining yields by enforced 
conservation; [and] the equitable sharing of necessary resources by all group 
members.’33 Netting concludes that  
 
[t]he Torbel case…reflects a situation in which clearly differentiated individual 
property and communal property exist side by side.…. It appears that the 
historic persistence of both types of property in a single community must be 
explained in ecological terms rather than solely as a projection of certain 
cultural or ethnic origins or the artefact of some system of legal ideas.34 
 
 
In the New World, traditional common property found little traction in emerging 
colonial societies. In New South Wales, despite commons being set aside 
from 1804 to satisfy the need for grazing lands in populous districts,35 early 
settlers demonstrated scant interest in common title.  A seemingly limitless 
frontier available for freeholding, an alien social context, and recent memories 
of displacement from common lands in England or Scotland, rendered 
common title a brief footnote in the history of settler land tenure. As John 
McLaren observes 
 
For people denied customary rights and displaced from the enjoyment of 
rights in common, the prospect of securing the clearest and most durable of 
rights over land in the colony, ‘their land’, must have proven seductive and 
seemed necessary to their survival and prosperity.36 
 
Nonetheless in New South Wales, the legislature has considered the remnant 
tenure worthy of retention; the Commons Management Act 1989 (NSW) is the 
33 Netting, above n6, 63. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Enid Campbell, ‘Rights of Common in New South Wales: A History’, (2007) 11 Legal 
History 243, 246. 
36 John McLaren, ‘The Canadian Doukhobors and the Land Question: Religious 
Communalists in a Fee Simple World’ in Land and Freedom: Law property rights and the 
British Diaspora (2001) 135. 
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current statute that regulates about 200 commons in that state.37 When the 
bill was debated in 1989, the original rationale for commons was explained on 
the basis that 
 
The commons had originally been created, and the permitted uses of them had 
been defined, at a time when people living in villages and towns had no way of 
having their milk delivered to them, and nowhere to retain a horse for their 
transport. The commons attached to the villages or towns were used for milking 
cows, maintaining food supplies, ... keeping horses for transport and for 
providing a source of fuel for local agricultural labourers.38 
 
Original uses such as grazing and watering of stock persist, but more 
contemporary rationales include recreation. Use of commons is restricted to 
persons who meet defined eligibility criteria to be entered on a commoners’ 
roll39, usually town residents or nearby farmers. Non-commoners are 
effectively strangers to the use of the land, and their unauthorised use of the 
commons is enforceable through trespass. Commoners elect a ‘commons 
trust’, which manages the common, and establishes by-laws and 
management plans.40  
 
In the United States, particularly in the northern New England,41 local 
common rights developed informally. As Eric Freyfogle describes, early 
America was a ‘polyglot world, in terms of the legal ideas, and land-use and 
land tenure practices that people brought with them across the Atlantic.’42 As 
a form of customary practice, local residents in the New England43 thus used 
unenclosed rural lands for open grazing, hunting, fishing, and collecting 
firewood and berries, in ways understood as common practice in their ‘home 
37 Campbell, above n35, 244. 
38 Ibid, 260-1. 
39 Sections 10 & 12 Commons Management Act 1989 (NSW) 
40 Part 2 Commons Management Act 1989 (NSW) 
41 In the United States, common property is said to survive in ‘property niches’.  Historically it 
existed ‘in the form of woodlots and pastures in New England and the antebellum South, and 
among the Hispanic and Indian communities of the Southwest.’  Charles Geisler, ‘Property 
Pluralism’, in Property and Values: Alternatives to Public and Private Ownership  (2000) 72-3. 
42 Eric Freyfogle, On Private Property Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land 
(2007) 53, 29-60. 
43 Freyfogle argues that a large proportion of early immigrants were Celts, who had a 
disrespect for the English common law of property, Ibid. 
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country’.  However common rights were insecure and short-lived, by the mid-
19th century courts  
 
[l]ooked askance at customary practices that were not in line with the 
common law and its clear definition of trespass.  They were particularly 
suspicious of customary arrangements in which multiple people had rights to 
use the land at the same time…. Local customary practices became suspect. 
The common law, including a nearly full right of landowners to exclude, was 
gaining the upper hand.44 
 
Traditional common property is captive to both its rich and ancient social 
history, and its agrarian, pre-industrial settings.  It may be legally ‘frozen’ in 
the uplands and village greens of rural England, across small country towns in 
New South Wales, or balancing on a Swiss Alp. Yet the ‘idea’ of traditional 
common property has potential to escape these confines, and take root in 
more modern forms and contexts. And as Eric Freyfogle predicts, one 
optimistic image of modern property may be a variant of the 18th century 
agrarian model, ‘a community, or ecological vision … given that it protects 
lands and communities while encouraging lasting ties between people and 
places.’45  The concept of modern limited common property, a model that 
builds on its historical antecedent, is next considered. 
 
3. Modern limited common property 
 
Carol Rose argues that we need to consider and refine our thinking about 
‘limited common property’, a property type that was ‘neither entirely 
individualistic nor entirely public’.  Rose defines ‘limited common property’ as 
property ‘held as a commons among the members of the group, but 
exclusively vis-à-vis the outside world. ’46 This ‘inside commons/outside 
private property’ structure is the key to a wider ‘seeing’ of modern limited 
common property.  We are oblivious to the ubiquity of limited common 
44 Ibid, 54. 
45 Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the Common Good, (2003) 37-
38. 
46 Rose, above n2, 132.  
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property47 because we are conditioned to ‘see’ only the private external 
shell.48 As a consequence, we tend to ignore the significance of the ‘inside 
commons’.  This oversight is not surprising, the march of private property has 
meant that ‘[t]he common law tradition is not entirely friendly to group rights.’49   
 
Yet this preoccupation disguises the fact that individual private title has a 
capacity to accommodate communal rights. Alvin Esau’s observation is made 
in the context of the communal title of religious communities in North America, 
but it has wider implications. 
 
While we conceive of the law as flowing out of concerns to protect individuals 
rather than groups, …our law actually displays a “deep reverence for the 
group, as long as it assumes corporate or quasi-corporate form.” By 
incorporating, the group right can be articulated as an individual property right 
and this group right can be vindicated in the law.  In corporate or trust form, 
communal property becomes compatible with fee simple.50 
 
Esau’s articulation of the ‘inside commons/outside private property’ dichotomy 
(in the case of North American Hutterite communities) allows‘[t]he drafting of 
corporate constitutions and by laws to put inside-law communal norms into 
the form of outside-law … arrangements.’51 Taking this dichotomy as a guide, 
limited common property materializes more readily.  Inner-city company title 
units,52 ski lodges,53 surf life saving clubs,54 community gardens,55 or a floor 
47 Ibid. 
48 J W Hamilton & N Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The Literature on Property 
Law Theory’ in Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources, (2010) A McHarg et 
al (eds.) 36 
49 Carol Rose, ‘Property and Language, or the Ghost of the Fifth Panel’ (2006) 18 Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 1, 13.   
‘On the other hand, American legal institutions have generally been quite friendly to the 
category of collective property [called] “liberal common property”…non-public collective 
properties in which the members may participate in somewhat formalized “private 
government” and in which they always retain the ultimate protection of exit.’  Examples 
include corporations, cooperatives and condominiums, that ‘courts have supplied a body of 
common law for their governance.’ Carol Rose, ‘Left Brain Right Brain’ (2000) Oregon Law 
Rev. 485, 486-7. 
50 Alvin Esau, ‘The Establishment and Preservation of Hutterite Communalism in North 
America, 1870-1925’, in Despotic Dominion Property Rights in British Settler Societies, John 
McLaren, Andrew Buck & Nancy Wright (eds.) (2005) 217-218.   
51 Ibid, 209. 
52 Peter Butt, Land Law (6th ed, 2010).  
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of barrister’s chambers56 all exemplify the potential for modern limited 
common property. Carol Rose argues that non-public collective property is all 
around us, ‘many of us live in co-ops and condominiums, [and] most of use 
belong to institutions that collectively own property – clubs, churches, and the 
like.’57 All share a structure where internalized common use rights of 
‘community’ members lie beneath the surface of private fee simple title. 58   
 
In essence, the defining feature of modern limited common property is its 
structure.  Specifically, title vested in an external entity (typically incorporated) 
with member use rights a consequence of entity membership. Thus in inner-
city company title units, a company holds the real property title.  Individual 
shareholders enjoy rights of use, exclusive rights of occupancy over the unit 
to which the share relates, and shared use rights to lifts, foyers, and other 
common areas. By contrast, strata title apartments remain substantively 
private property, as the ownership structure is dominated by individual fee 
simple titles.  However body corporate-owned facilities in the apartment 
complex59 may constitute modern limited common property, such that the 
typical property ‘split’ is one of dominant private/peripheral common.  
 
Conversely, the use or purpose of the property holding does not characterize 
modern limited common property. If, as asserted, company title units, ski 
lodges, surf life saving clubs, community gardens, or barrister’s chambers, 
each exemplify the potential for modern limited common property, such 
divergence of use defies any ‘common purpose’ definition.  Nor is modern 
limited common property necessarily contingent on the number in the 
53 For example, the Peninsula Ski Club Inc. owns the Peninsula Ski Club in Mt. Hotham, 
Victoria. Formed in 1975, ownership of debenture stocks in the association entitles members 
to use rights over the ski lodge, built on subdivided Crown leasehold. The lodge comprises 
unallocated member’s accommodation, a communal kitchen, dining area, lounge, and other 
common facilities, such as a dry rooms and laundry. 
54 Ann Brower and John Page, ‘Property Rights Across Sustainable Landscapes: Competing 
Claims, Collapsing Dichotomies, and the Future of Property’, in David Grinlinton and Prue 
Taylor (eds.) Property Rights and Sustainability; The Evolution of Property Rights to Meet 
Ecological Challenges (2011) 305-321. 
55 For example managed by incorporated associations. 
56 Legal historian Wilfred Prest’s observation to the author, personal conversation, December 
2009. 
57 Rose, ‘Left Brain Right Brain’ (2000) Oregon Law Rev. 485 
58 Rose, above n2, 155. 
59 Such as lifts, gardens, pools, driveways, stairwells, visitor parking bays. 
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communal group. It is the universal nature of the common use right that is 
critical (albeit subject to internal variance60), a unity of ‘ownership’ with some 
analogy to a private joint tenant’s ‘four unities’ of possession, interest, time 
and title.  
 
Property academic Robert Ellickson extends the concept of modern common 
property beyond structure, or the need for any formal external entity, 
corporate or otherwise.  Ellickson’s study of the property-like norms of the 
‘household’,61 yield original observations about common property by focusing 
on the content and substance of relevant domestic arrangements.  Ellickson 
sees ‘common property’ in shared dormitory rooms, and describes multi-
person households as limited-access ‘commons’, with complex mixes of 
private and common space.62 Ellickson’s expansive model illustrates that 
modern limited common property is remarkable for its ubiquity and unseen 
incidence.  
 
4. Common property – the natural resource perspective 
 
Garrett Hardin published a seminal work in 196863 that gave enormous 
impetus to an assumption that common property regimes were inevitably and 
remorselessly on a trajectory towards tragedy.  The ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
describes the ‘degradation of the environment to be expected whenever many 
individuals use a scarce resource in common.’64 Hardin exemplifies the 
tragedy by describing the ‘rational’ herder of cattle, who overstocks an open 
access pasture by adding more and more cattle. Hardin argues that the 
individual rational herder’s self-interest is served by increasing the number of 
cattle feeding on the pasture.  Conversely any loss occasioned by the 
deterioration of the paddock is delayed and dispersed amongst all herders 
using the resource. In short, the herder’s individual benefit from overstocking 
outweighs the shared cost of loss of productivity. And ‘what is true for one 
60 For example, ‘stinting’ in traditional common property. 
61 Robert Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth (2008). 
62 Ibid, 117-9. 
63 Garrett Hardin ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) Science 162. 
64 Ostrom, above n5, 2. 
107  
                                                        
grazier is also true for others: each has an incentive to drag down the pasture 
as a whole.’65  
 
Therein lies the tragedy.  Each man is locked into a system that compels him 
to increase his herd without limit- in a world that is limited.   Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in 
a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.66 
 
Hardin’s solution to averting the tragic outcome of common property involves 
either privatization of the resource, such that market forces ordain its best and 
highest use, or state intervention to directly and centrally regulate the 
resource. The clear inference is that common property is an inferior and tragic 
tool for resource management.  Hardin’s terminology of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons67’ has passed into everyday use, and further entrenches an 
institutional bias against the commons that can be traced to the enclosure 
period, when the privatization of so-called ‘waste-lands’ was lauded a victory 
for efficiency and modernity in improvement discourse.68 
 
Elinor Ostrom rose to prominence by challenging the ‘remorseless’ 
inevitability of Hardin’s thesis. Ostrom placed Hardin’s tragedy in context, as a 
work influenced by powerfully similar theories in vogue in the 1960s and 
1970s.  In particular Ostrom cites the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a theory that 
provoked intense academic interest,69 and Mancur Olson’s 1965 book The 
Logic of Collective Action. Prisoner’s dilemma involves resource users 
embarking on rational strategies that lead to third-best outcomes, more 
formally known as ‘Pareto-inferior equilibrium outcomes’.70  The appeal of the 
theory lies in the paradox of rational decisions leading to irrational outcomes, 
an end-result not dissimilar from an inevitable, fatalistic tragedy.   Similarly, 
65 Freyfogle, above n45, 158. 
66 Hardin, above n63, 1244. 
67 Ostrom argues that Hardin was not the first to coin the term, Ostrom, above n5, 2-3. 
68 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: property, environment, law (2010) 51-84. 
69 Ostrom cites more than 2,000 articles devoted to prisoner’s dilemma theory by 1975, 
Ostrom, above n5, 5. 
70 Ibid, 3-5. 
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Mancur Olson’s work affirms the rational supremacy of individual self-interest 
over collective good.  
 
Unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion, or 
some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests.71  
 
Olson’s basic premise is that a participant in the use of a natural resource, 
who cannot be excluded from the benefits of a collective good, has no 
incentive to contribute voluntarily to that collective good. Olson’s rational actor 
bears strong analogy to Hardin’s rational herder.72 
 
Ostrom offers an alternative to Hardin’s ‘either/or’ private or state answer to 
averting the tragedy. Ostrom’s ‘third way’ to resolve the commons problem is 
common property itself, successful common pool resource (CPR) institutions 
that defy the erstwhile logic of unremitting environmental degradation, and act 
as an effective tool for natural resource management. Ostrom identifies a 
number of successful CPR institutions73 (including the Swiss village of Torbel 
studied by Robert Netting74) that escape the rigidity of Hardin’s public/private 
divide, and mirror the argument for property plurality. ‘Institutions are rarely 
either private or public – “the market” or “the state”.  Many successful CPR 
institutions are rich mixtures of “private-like” and “public-like” institutions 
defying classification in a sterile dichotomy.’75 
 
In trying to discern what made some CPRs ‘long enduring’ and ‘robust’, and 
others not, Ostrom identifies and analyses seven factors that help successful 
CPRs break the ‘shackles of a commons dilemma.’76 They are: clearly defined 
boundaries that ‘close’ the common area and the rights of users to extract 
71 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965) 2. 
72 The supremacy of the rational actor has since been challenged, with altruism or 
‘uncommon decency’ Joseph Singer, The Edges of the Field Lessons on the Obligations of 
Ownership (2000) pp. 1-17. 
73 Ostrom, above n5, 58-102. 
74 Described as communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests. 
75 Ostrom, above n5, 14. 
76 Ibid, 21. 
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common resources; a convergence between use rights and prevailing local 
conditions; non-static collective-choice arrangements that allow the 
modification of resource rules as exigency demands; effective self-monitoring; 
graduated sanctions for users who violate resource rules, enforced by other 
users or the collective community; low-cost conflict-resolution mechanisms; 
and minimal external interference in the community’s self-governance and 
self-enforcement.77 The simplicity of Ostrom’s research lies in its isolation of 
the key indicators of functionally healthy common property arrangements.  
 
Ostrom’s defence of common property builds on an earlier rejection of the 
universality of Hardin’s tragedy thesis in an article by Ciriacy-Wantrup and 
Bishop in 1975.  Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop develop a conceptual framework 
for common property, defining it as ‘a distribution of property rights in 
resources in which a number of owners are co-equal in their rights to use the 
resource,’78 and then use this definitional framework to attack a fundamental 
flaw in Hardin’s argument, his equating of the open access commons with the 
internally regulated commons. ‘Common property is not “everybody’s 
property.”… [to confuse the terms is to] slur fundamental institutional 
relationships.’ 79 Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop further argue that the evidence 
of economic history of common property is not the inevitable tragedy that 
Hardin’s ‘herder analogy’ alleges, but a mixed bag of success and failure. 
Indeed common property can be helpful for modern problems of natural 
resource policy. ‘Common property, with the institutional regulation it implies, 
is capable of satisfactory performance in the management of natural 
resources, such as grazing and forest land, in a market economy.’80 Common 
property overcomes many problems of private property; it delivers a larger 
spatial perspective in land management,81 it may be more suited to certain 
77 Ibid, 90-101. 
78 S Ciriacy-Wantrup & R Bishop, ‘Common property as a concept in natural resources 
policy’, 15 (1975) Nat. Resources J. 713, 714. 
79 Ibid, 715. 
80 Ibid, 721. 
81 Freyfogle, above n45, 99.  Freyfogle uses as an example the ‘Tilbuster Commons’ on the 
Northern Tablelands of NSW, where ‘private landowners lease their private lands to a 
collectively managed grazing co-operative. Their combined lands are worked in concert – like 
open field farms of centuries ago- with their animal herds mingled.’ Freyfogle at 100; Sima 
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physical locations, or ‘there may be limitations of human administration [or] 
technology that make individual propertization difficult.’82 
 
Many scholars83 have subsequently criticized Hardin’s tragedy thesis on the 
basis of either or both of these two flaws: the confusion between open access 
and limited commons, and the simplistic ‘glossing over’ of successful 
commons management precedents. Eric Freyfogle comments 
 
Other scholars had spent lifetimes studying common property regimes, 
including common grazing lands, and they knew full well that common 
property arrangements sometimes worked just fine, with nothing like the 
tragedy Hardin predicted. What Hardin had described was essentially an 
open-access commons, one in which outsiders could show up at any time 
and start using it or in which existing users could increase their use at will.84  
 
Similarly Doris Fuchs refers to  
 
Literature on common property resources [that] provides empirical evidence 
against a necessary link between common pool resources and collective 
failure. This literature emphasizes that Hardin’s tragedy of the commons 
generally applies to open-access resources, but often is not the outcome for 
common property resources.  Numerous case studies …illustrate that groups 
of appropriators can jointly and sustainably manage natural resources.85 
 
One ‘upside’ of the natural resource perspective on common property is the 
insight it provides into successful common property regimes.  Elinor Ostrom’s 
seven factor analysis has been previously traversed.  Doris Fuchs similarly 
Williamson et al, Reinventing the Common: Cross-Boundary Farming for a Sustainable 
Future (2003). 
82 Rose, above n2, 139. 
83 Margaret Davies, Property Meanings, Histories, Theories (2007) 73; Edward Barbanell, 
Common Property Arrangements and Scarce Resources: Water in the American West (2001) 
112; Lee Godden, “Communal Governance of Land and Resources as a Sustainable 
Property Institution’, in David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds.)  Property Rights and 
Sustainability; The Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges (2011) 249-
272; Carol Rose, ‘Environmental Lessons’, (1993-1994) 27 Loyola of Los Angeles Law 
Review 1023, 1025. 
84 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society (2003) 160. 
85 Doris Fuchs, An Institutional Basis for Environmental Stewardship: The Structure and 
Quality of Property Rights, (2003) 59-60. 
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identifies related factors that ‘foster the ability of joint appropriators from a 
resource to overcome collective action problems’, including group 
homogeneity, the presence of leadership, the ability to exclude outsiders, and 
an ability to communicate and learn.86  Eric Freyfogle talks of responsive 
institutions, succession planning, and ‘a fundamental precept: a commons 
regime can only work if the vast majority of local residents view it as fair and 
only if they sense they have voices in its management.’87 Robert Ellickson’s 
study of American pioneer settlements emphasizes group efficiency, he 
concludes that common property is more efficient for so-called ‘large events’, 
for reasons of increased returns to scale and the spreading of risk.88 Such 
insights in turn instill confidence in others to advocate the common property 
model as a solution to resource scarcity. Thus Edward Barbanell recommends 
common property as a sustainable resource management tool for water 
security in the Colorado River basin in America’s West.89 Similarly Evan van 
Hook advocates the ‘ecocommon’, a common property management model 
for sensitive ecosystems and buffer zones adjoining resource-dependent 
communities.90 
 
Another ‘upside’ is the clarity it brings to conceptual definitions of common 
property.  When emphasis is placed on the exploitable resource, and the 
rights of eligible appropriators to access that resource, coherent definitions of 
common property, and common property rights, ensue. This clarity minimises 
the risk of misunderstanding, and elevates common property from esoteric 
curiosity to feasible alternative.  Fuchs defines common property as 
‘resources for which the exclusive title is in the hands of a group of 
individuals. This group has control over access to the resource, is frequently 
backed in this capacity by the state, and has general decision-making 
capacity over the resource.’91  Barbanell’s definition is ‘ a state of affairs 
where (only) the members of the resource community have limited rights to 
86 Ibid, 60. 
87 Freyfogle, above n45, 172. 
88 Robert Ellickson, ‘Property in Land’ (1993) 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1322-1323. 
89 Barbanell, above n83.  
90 Evan van Hook, ‘Note, The Ecocommons: A Plan for Common Property Management of 
Ecosystems’, (1993) 11 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 561. 
91 Fuchs, above n85, 49. 
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use the resource, and where such limits are determined by a process of 
collective choice…[made] by members of the resource community.’92 Contrast 
these resource-premised definitions to traditional articulations such as ‘rights 
of commoners…  to eat the grass with the mouths of his cattle.’ Common 
property is transformed from museum exhibit to viable property option through 
the prism of natural resources. 
 
The obvious ‘downside’ is the oft-cited, instantly recognizable tragedy of the 
commons.  Like William Blackstone’s ‘sole and despotic’ trope, Hardin’s 
noetic ‘tragedy’ taints common property with its broad–brush application, and 
overwhelms the detail of any counter-argument. For example, William Lucy 
and Catherine Mitchell’s argument for the replacement of private property by a 
notion of ‘stewardship’ rejects common property as a viable alternative 
because it is ‘almost as problematic when applied to land … as private 
property.’93 Lucy and Mitchell canvass both a ‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ common 
property,94 the ‘strong’ version features unrestricted use with attendant risks 
of ‘over- consumption, over-use or pollution.’95 The ‘weak’ interpretation 
entails some regulation of access, but the authors conclude that ‘we do [not] 
know of any account of common property that fills this gap.’96 For Lucy and 
Mitchell the myth of tragedy is all consuming.  Dealing with this powerful yet 
misleading narrative is a burden which modern common property must 
accommodate.  The dominant discourse of common property overstates its 
weaknesses and understates its strengths. To restore balance, common 
property’s weaknesses must be understood in context, and its strengths 
highlighted.  
 
 
 
 
 
92 Barbanell, above n83, 67. 
93 William Lucy & Catherine Mitchell, ‘Replacing Private Property: The Case for Stewardship’ 
(1996) 55(3) Cambridge Law J. 566, 579. 
94 Ibid, 579-582. 
95 Ibid, 581. 
96 Ibid. 
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5. The strengths of common property 
 
5.1 Sociability 
 
The sociability of common property is the measure by which it contributes to 
community and social cohesion.  Sociability is an underrated attribute of 
property,97 which is, after all, a social institution.98 An inherent strength of 
common property is its ability to ‘counteract the individualised and exclusive 
notion of property … by regarding property as that which potentially brings a 
community together rather than that which separates it into exclusive units.’99 
 
Jeanette Neeson saw 18th century English common property as more than a 
platform for natural resources, it was literally ‘common ground’, a place where 
commoners could interact, and develop concepts of identity and relation to 
place. In the early 1970s, idealistic rural communalists again looked to 
property to provide some social meaning for both self100 and the collective.101  
Today the phenomenon of the community food garden speaks to similar 
desires.  Sociability is a strength shared with public property, although 
arguably common property may be a more effective agent for sociability 
because the ‘group’ to which it relates is smaller and more identifiable. 
 
The impact of the enclosure period in diminishing the link between property 
and sociability cannot be underestimated.  Nicole Graham calls it a time of 
‘immense geosocial significance … [that] sheds light on the ongoing necessity 
97 Carol Rose, “The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property”, (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711.  
98 Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000); Joseph Singer, The Edges 
of the Field Lessons on the Obligations of Ownership (2000). 
99 Davies, above n83, 127.  
100 The plethora of rural communes that appeared in the early 1970s provided the venue for a 
generational journey in personal spiritual discovery.  Peter Cock personalized this when he 
wrote in 1979, ‘My basic concerns were…similar to those of people within the alternatives 
movement.  I was asking: Who am I? What am I going to become? How will I live? What do I 
need and want...I was dissatisfied, feeling the fruitlessness of protest and seeking something 
more meaningful than being a graduate in money-making.’ Peter Cock, Alternative Australia 
(1979) 2 
101 Margaret Munro-Clark, Communes in Rural Australia: The movement since 1970 (1986) 
33. 
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and cost of the separation of people and place in dominant forms of 
contemporary property law.’ 102Andrew Buck describes it as a period of   
 
[a] hardening and concretion of the notion of property in land, and the 
rectification of usages into properties which could be rented, sold, or willed…. 
The process of dispossession did not involve legal decisions alone, but also 
changes in assumptions, which were themselves reflected in language and 
rhetoric. What was involved…was the creation of a mindset conducive to the 
acceptance and operation of market-oriented concepts of property.103 
 
This ‘hardening’ squeezed aside alternative conceptions of property that did 
not have realisable value in money or commodity terms.  Pushed to the 
periphery, or indeed off the edge, were more settled104 values of property, 
sociable values that connected people to place. Yet the post-enclosure 
paradigm shift was not completely extinctive of such settled values. Academic 
Leigh Davidson describes his ‘home’ interest in communal land in northern 
New South Wales in the early 21st century as ‘liberating’. 
 
We can only sell it to someone who has been accepted by the community as 
a member. In other words, we probably can’t liquefy our assets and move on 
with any appreciable amount of capital.  This arrangement has many 
advantages. For example we don’t waste time wondering if we would be 
better off living somewhere else, so we have a commitment to place and 
community.105 
 
Re-connecting property with ‘place and community’ is a latent attribute of 
common property. It is a value worthy of wider infusion into mainstream 
property discourse.    
 
102 Graham, above n68, 83. 
103 Andrew Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law (2006) 24-25. 
104 Freyfogle sees the two competing values of property as ‘settled’ versus ‘intensive’. 
105 Bill Metcalf, Co-operative Lifestyles in Australia: From Utopian Dreaming to Communal 
Reality (1995), 52. The Northern Star describes ownership at Dharmananda in the following 
terms; ‘If a person leaves they are not paid for their buildings or their share in the trust…The 
community feels that because members cannot sell their shares, there is an incentive to 
make the community work.’ Kevin Corcoran, ‘The Search for a Better Way’, The Northern 
Star (Lismore), 24 August 1988. 
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5.2 Use rights 
 
Common property rights are exclusively rights to use.  They are proprietary 
interests in the nature of non-private profits a prendre. By contrast, private 
property rights are on the whole possessory, with a smattering of second-tier 
usufructs. Public property rights lack developed definition, but may be 
generically characterised as rights of enjoyment. By a process of elimination, 
common property becomes the unassuming ‘standard-bearer’ for rights of 
use. 
 
Use rights occupy an uncomfortable place in modern property, yet another 
consequence of the hegemony of private property. The right to exclude 
garners far greater attention and enforcement than the ‘less compelling’ or 
‘less protected’ use right.  This is despite A.M. Honore’s listing of ‘the right to 
use’ as second in his list of eleven property incidents.106  Use rights are 
uncertain property interests, dismissed pejoratively as ‘personal’, or 
automatically relegated on property hierarchies107. As Laura Underkuffler 
explains 
 
[t]he almost absolute protection for rights to exclude and devise must be 
contrasted with the “sliding scale” of protection afforded to other property 
rights.  Other rights…are simply not held with the same sense of inviolable 
protection; their protection is far more a matter of collective whim. For 
example the right to use – in particular, the right to protect or to enhance 
value through continuation of pre-existing, permitted use – has been 
consistently characterized as “less protected” or “less compelling” than other 
property interests.  The former has an attenuated sense of stringency of 
protection…the different ways in which the claimed rights were treated…can 
be explained only by the differing degrees of stringency with which these 
rights are, as an initial matter, protected.108 
 
106 Anthony Honore, ‘Ownership’ in A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) 
107,113.  
107 Native title rights are perceived as ‘weak’ because of their communal nature, Godden, 
above n83, 249-272. 
108 Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003) 25. 
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Their low profile in property law mirrors the standing of common property. Yet 
use rights have much utility and potential significance. The ‘tailoring of use 
rights’ to land resources is the modus operandi of U.S. natural resources 
law,109 a mindset that has much to offer property law. Conceptually, the 
usufruct enlivens multiple, simultaneous rights and ownerships of property 
across human landscapes. Conversely dominion entrenches a sterile 
monopoly. Freyfogle uses everyday examples to reinforce this argument 
 
Once we begin to focus on specific use-rights, we may begin to question 
many existing property arrangements: Should I not be able to paddle down 
your stream if I leave your activities undisturbed? Can I seek petition 
signatures in your shopping center if I do not disrupt your patrons?110 
 
The straightforward example of the non-possessory right of way easement 
illustrates how use rights enable multiplicity of property use.  The grant of a 
right of way easement does not exhaust other co-existing uses of the 
easement site; the burdened landowner can continue to use their land 
provided access is not impaired. Nor is the easement itself absolute; it is 
subject to restrictions and constraints.  Consider however if access was 
protected by common law lease, where exclusive possession is integral. The 
lease leaves little scope, theoretical or practical, for other complementary 
rights to subsist.111 On common land, the simple easement example is 
exponentially diversified.  There multiple uses may occur contemporaneously, 
exercised by different owners under different rights.  If the image of the 
easement is an intermittent link joining burdened and benefited landowners, 
common property is an inter-connected and complex ‘web of interests’, an 
allegory of Tony Arnold’s reconstituted image of property.112  
 
109 Eric Freyfogle, Natural Resources Law Private Good and Collective Governance (2007) 
607-616.   
110 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law’, (1988-1989) 41 
Stanford L. Rev. 1529, 1551. 
111 But for the freeholder’s right of reversion.  
112 Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property as a Web of Interests’ (2002) 26 
Harv. Envtl. L.Rev. 281. 
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Raw exclusory power suffocates property diversity by devouring the 
theoretical ‘oxygen’ that enable other rights, including use rights, to co-exist.  
That is why common property, and its emphasis on use not dominion, is 
important. Use rights place property rights in context, as mere ‘sticks’ in a 
greater whole.  Use rights are ‘context dependent rather than abstract.’113 
They also invite the logical corollary that because a simultaneous plurality of 
uses is possible, ideally use rights should be compatible and sustainable 
rather than’ resource-intensive [with] short-term orientation.’114 Importantly 
use rights de-couple property and possession, without necessarily derogating 
from the need for security critical to property rights.  
 
The right to use and enjoy is also a pathway for concepts such as land 
stewardship.  Eric Freyfogle predicts a heightened place for use rights in his 
‘Bill of Rights for the Responsible Landowner’. 
 
Perhaps we should embrace a notion that landowners are stewards, with 
clear rights to use but only limited rights to degrade and consume. Perhaps 
we need to apply more broadly the idea that all of nature remains in a sense 
in public hands, with private owners receiving only prescribed rights to use.115 
 
Freyfogle’s right to use has as its jural correlative116 a duty not to degrade, to 
act as steward.  ‘Property use entitlements will be phrased in terms of 
responsibilities and accommodations rather than rights and autonomy. A 
property entitlement will acquire its bounds from the particular context of its 
use, and the entitlement holder will face the obligation to accommodate the 
interests of those affected by his … use.’117 Pioneering conservationist Aldo 
Leopold famously articulated ‘stewardship’ in terms of his much quoted ‘land 
ethic’, a responsibility that was the concomitant of the right to use. 
113 Freyfogle, above n110, 1545. 
114 Klaus Bosselman, The Principle of Sustainability (2008) 15. 
115 Freyfogle, above n42, 141, 131-156; Joseph Sax likewise incorporates use rights in his 
concept of ‘qualified private ownership’, Joseph Sax, ‘Takings, Private Property and Public 
Rights’ (1971-1972) 81 Yale L.J. 149 154.   
116 However Wesley Hohfield would consider the right to use a privilege if it was to invoke a 
commensurate duty. Wesley N. Hohfield, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
to Legal Reasoning’, (1913) 23 Yale LJ 16.  
117 Freyfogle, above n110, 1531.  
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We abuse land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us.  When 
we see land as a community to which we belong, we may begin to use it with 
love and respect….[t]hat land is a community is the basic concept of ecology, 
but that land is to be loved and respected is an extension of ethics.118 
 
Use rights may enable property duties by removing the all-consuming spatial 
inherency of possessory rights to fill the available void. This tendency is 
evidenced with private rights, freehold or leasehold,119 and their conflation of 
exclusive possession. If the extremes of ‘despotic dominion’ are less 
polarizing, and use rights achieve credible parity with possession, duties, 
including environmental obligations of stewardship, may begin to populate the 
space vacated by private property’s conflated right to exclude.  
 
Christopher Rodgers argues that environmental stewardship is enhanced 
when a use-premised conceptualization of property replaces one dominated 
by an ownership discourse. Rodgers describes a ‘resource allocation model of 
property rights’ comprising ‘elements or strands of utility (emphasis added) 
that combine to make up the constituent elements of a land interest’120 Use 
rights transform the landowner from an entity with absolute control, to the 
holder of a ‘residuum of socially permitted power over land resources… a 
state-approved usufruct.’121 ‘The role of property rights in this context is to 
allocate access to a disputed resource, and to define the terms on which 
access to that resource will be permitted by the law.’122  Rodgers places 
primacy on use, not possession, and the consequent dividend is greater 
environmental stewardship of land.  
 
Another view is that property is already pervaded by responsibilities, that 
there is no need to ‘construct’ a corresponding obligation or duty from a pre-
118 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac with other Essays on Conservation from Round 
River (1966). 
119 John Page & Ann Brower, ‘Property Law in the South Island High Country – Statutory not 
Common Law Leases’, (2007) 15 Waikato L. Rev. 48 
120 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental 
Stewardship’, (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 550, 557. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, 551. 
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existing right or privilege.123  Murray Raff argues that environmental (and 
social) obligations are ‘implicit in the owner’s right to make beneficial use and 
enjoyment of the object of ownership,’124 they are not some ‘external 
constraint.’125 Raff describes the belief that property owners have rights to use 
and enjoy so ‘extreme’ that they may embrace the destruction of the property, 
regardless of its environmental value, as a dogma, a ‘self-evident truth without 
the extensive reference to authoritative sources which one might expect to 
such a dramatic conclusion.’126  
 
The centrality of use rights presents an opportunity for common property, as 
both a ‘role model’ for new conceptualizations of property, and possible 
enabler of property obligations. And if Freyfogle’s prediction for use rights 
comes to pass, common property may be an unintended beneficiary of their 
resurgence.   
 
5.3 Environmental values of proportionality and moderation of use 
 
The norms and values of common property are important in the implications 
they pose for property’s future direction, and its ‘quest for an environmental 
ethic.’127  They have a distinctly environmental resonance. As Carol Rose 
articulates, ‘[t]here are great bodies of law about common property, and they 
revolve around an ethic of moderation, proportionality, prudence and 
responsibility to the others who are entitled to share in the common 
resource.’128 
Rose argues that such values should influence property rhetoric, such that our 
rights and relationships with land are seen through the prism of a ‘gift’ rather 
123 Joseph Singer, The Edges of the Field Lessons on the Obligations of Ownership (2000) 
16-17. 
124 Murray Raff, ‘Environmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property Concept’, 
(1998) 22 Melb. Uni. L. Rev. 657, 691. 
125 Ibid, 672. 
126 Ibid, 662. 
127 Carol Rose, “Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics” 
(1994) 24 Envtl. L. 1, 14-31. 
128 Ibid, 25. 
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than a ‘given’.129  Sustainability is a natural consequence of these values of 
restraint, not the inexorable ‘tragedy’ pre-destined to befall common property.  
 
Such qualities of common property are not a recent invention. In 18th century 
England, common property did not fail for ‘tragic’ reasons of unsustainable or 
irresponsible use.  As Nicole Graham observes 
 
The death of the laws and customs of the commoners and the peasant 
economy was not brought about by any intrinsic failure or inevitable collapse. 
Contrary to the claims of the improvers (those who stood to benefit from 
enclosure), the laws and customs of the commoners were neither 
unproductive nor non-viable.130 
 
Klaus Bosselmann likewise cites a rich tradition of sustainable land use in 
Europe dating from the end of the 14th century to the beginnings of the 19th 
century, when common property systems (known in German as ‘Allemende’) 
institutionalised principles of sustainable land use.  Informing Allemende 
practices were ethics of land use where ‘land was respected as an essential 
ingredient of life with humans being mere users’, and where land could only 
be ‘owned within the limit of ecological sustainability.’131  Bosselman 
describes this human-nature relationship as one of stewardship, arising from 
restrictions on land use imposed by an overarching structure of common 
property rights. Common property imposed restrictions of both a practical and 
ethical nature, the latter comprising ‘an important ecological limitation … the 
relational context of land use rights… regarded as heritage from the past and 
obligation for the future.’132  
 
The strengths of common property are intangible and ill defined.  Belonging to 
place, or ‘group-hood’ values are ‘warm and fuzzy’ concepts. It is far easier to 
‘see’ common property’s weaknesses. 
 
129 Ibid. 
130 Graham, above n68, 54. 
131 Bosselman, above n114, 14. 
132 Ibid. 
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6. The weaknesses of common property: profile and reputation 
 
The flaws of common property are its obscurity and tarnished reputation. In 
the latter case, this is understandable given the normative force of Hardin’s 
tragedy thesis. But the former is perplexing.  We have lost the skill to ‘see’ 
common property.  Legal historian John McLaren attributes this in the first 
instance to ‘selective historical amnesia’, a ‘forgetfulness of customary rights 
in common to land which settlers or their recent ancestors had enjoyed under 
English or Scots law.133  This forgetfulness, conscious or otherwise, has 
transformed into a societal or corporate loss of knowledge as generations 
pass.  McLaren’s explanation is relatively simple; we cannot ‘see’ common 
property if we no longer know what common property is, or what it represents. 
 
Carol Rose identifies more modern factors for the obliviousness of limited 
common property, and its problematic place in western legal traditions. Such 
obliviousness is ‘odd’, Rose argues, because ‘common property itself is 
actually ubiquitous, if unremarked.’134 Rose cites a combination of economic 
and cultural reasons for this myopia.  Economically, common property is 
perceived to be inefficient, its rules are internally complex and unwieldy when 
compared to individual private property.  This unwieldiness is particularly 
exacerbated in the case of alienability.135  Also, ‘claims of entitlement [to 
limited common property] may be more difficult to recognize, monitor, transfer, 
and enforce.’136  Membership of the entitled group is often amorphous, who 
belongs and who does not, is not always readily defined, and common 
property’s responsive, dynamic nature to resource availability means that 
resource rules fluctuate over time and according to exigency. The economic 
stability or assuredness demanded of property takes a slightly different, less 
comfortable form for common property.  
 
133 McLaren, above n36, 135. 
134 Rose, above n2, 132. 
135 This property characteristic is overstated; many forms of property have restrictions on 
alienability, for example freehold life estates.  
136 Rose, 140 
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Culturally, Rose submits that communal property claims are often made by 
groups ‘somehow deemed inappropriate to make claims of entitlement.’137 
These claims by groups with ‘questionable’ social status offend social notions 
of the propriety of property-ownership.  Joseph Singer claims that our sense 
of propriety plays a significant role in resolving ownership disputes and ‘public 
concepts of entitlement.’138 For Kevin and Susan Gray, ‘a deep subtext of 
propriety has always pervaded the social and legal definition of “property.”’139 
Margaret Davies explores the resonance of property’s propriety, the idea that 
‘property is there to reflect and cement propriety – the proper order of the 
social and political spheres.’140  The social status of the property claimant is 
often problematic for common property, whether they are landless 
commoners, indigenous peoples141, or ‘long-haired hippies’ in 1970s rural 
intentional communities.142 The combination of unconventional communal 
claim and dubious social status ‘overlap and conspire against [common] 
property recognition.’143 
 
Rose (later and separately) added a third reason for common property’s 
problematic profile, at least in the American common law. Politically, informal 
customary governance fell out of favour with American courts in the mid 19th 
century.  Community practices that gave rise to customary forms of collective 
property were ‘mired in the swamps of medieval feudalism, hierarchy, and 
rigidity.’144  Such ideas were unpalatable because they were ‘incompatible 
with democratic forms of government’.145  Laws (including property laws) 
should be made by forward thinking, democratically elected representatives; 
not communities looking backwards to history.  Common property was no 
longer in vogue with progressive democratic ideals of law making.  
137 Ibid, 141 
138 Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 190 
139 Kevin Gray & Susan Gray, ‘Private Property and Public Propriety’ in Property and the 
Constitution (Janet McLean ed.) (1999) 13 
140 Davies, above n83, 12. 
141 Rose claims that American law was hostile to common property as a ‘historically self-
serving myopia’ that ignored the collective property claims of Native Americans. Rose, above 
n57. 
142 John Page, ‘Common Property and the Age of Aquarius’, (2010) 19(2) Griffith Law Review 
172  
143 Rose, 141 
144 Rose, above n57.  
145 Ibid.  
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 Lastly, as previously traversed, the reputation of common property has been 
tainted by the stigma of Garrett Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’.146 This 
essay has become a ‘bellwether in the debate on community versus individual 
rights…’147 But it is worth repeating that Hardin was not talking of internally 
regulated common property when he advanced his tragedy thesis, but rather 
‘open access’ property, the unregulated commons.148 Tragedy’s counter-
argument is that properly regulated common property may be its 
antithesis,149a potential ‘comedy of the commons.’150 Yet this counter-
argument faces an uphill task in overcoming the pervasive, crowding-out  
‘white noise’ of the commons tragedy.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Common property is a multi-faceted paradox. It is simultaneously ‘there’ and 
‘not there’ in terms of presence and visibility.  It is both anachronistic and a 
mooted model for future natural resource management. It is stuck in its 
historical milieu, yet the ‘idea’ of common property can take root in unlikely 
modern contexts.  It is tragic or comedic. On the ‘inside’ it is communal and 
inclusive, but on the ‘outside’ it is private and exclusive. It was removed from 
property consciousness by enclosure, but its rights are incapable of being 
physically enclosed. It is vulnerable yet persistently resilient.  
 
This chapter has canvassed the traditional and less traditional forms of 
common property.  From rights of pasturage, to 21st century urban forms, and 
natural resource theory, the diversity and insight of common property is rich 
but underestimated.  Despite (or because of) its manifest internal 
contradictions, common property adds vital layers of diversity and complexity 
to the expansive notion of property plurality.  It is a small but important piece 
146 Hardin, above n63. 
147 Preface to David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds.) Property Rights and Sustainability; The 
Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges (2011). 
148 An example is the American rangeland prior to the enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act of 
1934. See also Fuchs, above n85, 59-60; Freyfogle, above n45, 177; Davies, above n83, 73.   
149 Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, above n78; Bosselman, above n114, 13-15. 
150 Rose, above n97.  
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in the property mosaic because of the qualities it brings to property, its 
emphasis on use, community, and non-commodity values, and a propensity to 
infuse wider property discourse with its paradoxical originality.  In sum, its 
influence outweighs its size.  To lose sight of common property is to pauperise 
the property mosaic, and in turn diminish the potential of property to sustain 
human landscapes.  
125  
Chapter 4   Seeing the diverse property mosaic 
 
1. Introduction: The imaginings of property 
 
From time-to-time, the transformative potential of property law has been 
glimpsed, serendipitous-like imaginings of the many and different ‘futures of 
property’.1 In 1964, Charles Reich saw property as the vanguard of an 
emerging civic compact, a New Property ‘right’ to ‘government largess’ that 
would address social inequity.2  In the early 1970s, Christopher Stone was 
inspired by the constantly evolving nature of property to imagine that trees 
had legal standing,3 while Joseph Sax envisaged an environmental future 
where public property rights were equal to their private equivalents.4  In the 
21st century, Jedediah Purdy argues for a new approach to property to 
address the existential threat of climate change.5  When confronted with 
insurmountable challenge, scholars aspire to property, and invoke in it an 
imagination of seemingly limitless potential.   
 
How property in land is imagined is the thrust of this chapter. Premised on 
Carol Rose’s ideas of ‘seeing’ property,6 and the impetus that unorthodoxies 
such as property marginality7 give to the imaginings of new paradigms, this 
chapter describes the ‘property mosaic’ as a means to a wider ‘seeing’ of 
property patterns in human landscapes.  It also lays the foundations for 
subsequent chapters, the potent implications of property diversity for land 
obligation (chapter 5) and community (chapter 6).   To ‘see’ property diversity 
is to imagine what Joseph Sax calls ‘a different attitude towards land and the 
nature of land ownership itself’,8 a reconceptualization that reflects the 
1 Carol Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems”, (1998-1999) 83  Minn. L. Rev. 129. 
2 Charles Reich, ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73 Yale LJ 733. 
3 Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects’ (1972) S. Cal. L. Rev. 450. 
4 Joseph Sax, Defending the Environment A Strategy for Citizen Action (1971) 174. 
5 Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property: Freedom, Community, and the Legal Imagination  
(2010). 
6 Carol Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion Essays on the History, Theory 
and Rhetoric of Ownership (1994) 274. 
7 A J van der Walt, ‘Marginality and Property’ in Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver 
(eds.) Property and Community, (2010). 
8 Joseph Sax, ‘Property Rights and the Economy of Nature Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council the Economy of Nature’ (1992) 45 Stanford Law Rev. 1445. 
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heterogeneity of people’s proprietorial relationships with land, one that 
escapes the narrow constraints of a prevailing monistic paradigm. 
 
Part 2 commences by articulating the guiding principles of a doctrine of 
property diversity in land.  Part 3 then compartmentalizes the constitutive 
elements of the ‘mosaic’, incorporating aspects of preceding chapters devoted 
to public, private and common property. Part 4 seeks to migrate the ‘property 
mosaic’ from untested theory to grounded practice, looking for its telltale signs 
in sustainable communities literature. Part 5 builds on the observations of part 
4, by a process of descriptively ‘mapping’ the ‘property mosaic’ in three case 
studies. Part 6 concludes by taking Carol Rose’s ‘seeing’ of property literally, 
pictorial manifestations of diverse property patterns and narratives, observed 
and explained in context.  
 
2. Guiding principles of a doctrine of property diversity in land 
 
It is trite to observe that without diversity, there can be no mosaic. This part 2 
outlines the core tenets that give structure and content to a nascent doctrine 
of property diversity in land.  Many of these foundational principles are further 
developed in chapters 5 and 6.    
 
Property diversity sees the fullest range of property patterns in human 
landscapes, dense mosaics of private, public and common estates, and 
hybrid variants in between, that collectively explain the propertied truth of ‘who 
gets to do what and where.’9 It also sees property patterns holistically, their 
connections and interactions. Diverse property is likewise contextual, 
grounded in actual place, not de-objectified abstraction. It favours use rights 
over possession, and situates exclusion alongside inclusion. It celebrates that 
property is multivalent, a paradigm where no single value is universal. Lastly, 
it confronts the challenge (and opportunity) of eclecticism, embracing the idea 
that property is particularized, variable, and on occasions untidy.  
 
9 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society: Land Culture Conflict and Hope (2007) 
107. 
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2.1. Diverse property in land is visible 
 
Carol Rose argues that ‘“seeing” property is … an act of imagination [that] 
opens the door to … persuasion.’10  By contrast, an inability to see property is 
a ‘kind of imaginative disability.’11 Rose’s seeing of property in land arises 
through four media - as pictures, metaphors, narratives and illusion. The first 
three have especial resonance for property diversity.  By accentuating 
difference, diverse property shifts the ‘seeing’ of property in landscapes from 
near-invisible abstraction to contexted relief.  
 
To see diverse property as pictures is to recognize its many visual markers or 
physical indicia. For private property it may be the fences, locked gates, or 
keep out signs that ‘yell’12 of exclusion. For public property it may be well 
trodden grassed paths, crowded beach foreshores, or the ‘close the gate’ 
signs that speak of inclusion.  Pictures likewise inform us of land boundaries, 
survey pegs that artificially demarcate newly subdivided lots, or wet sands 
that ‘naturally’ divide public and private on American beaches. Yet pictures 
may likewise show blurred overlaps, where public and private converge in 
ambiguity.13 Pictures also include maps that while abstract, enable complex 
visualities to be reduced to simple, easily understood representations. Maps 
also ‘yield unexpected new information’ about property by ‘bringing data 
together in a single perceptible space’14, revealing otherwise concealed 
connections. ‘The map, far from stifling the imagination, invites the viewer to 
reflect on the story behind the case.’ 
 
To reflect on ‘stories behind the case’ is to segue into the seeing of property 
as narrative, stories set in tangible, propertied settings. By example, Rose 
writes of ‘the battered remnants of last century’s fences, meandering…though 
the blissfully resurgent woods’ of America’s New England, a ‘vision [that] 
10 Rose, above n6. Persuasion then leads to action, ‘the ways that humans think they can and 
should interact with their environment.’ Ibid, 296. 
11 This ‘disability’ inter alia stops people from ‘envisioning risks to land, or ways to deal with 
risks sensibly.’ Ibid, 285. 
12 Carol Rose, ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’ (1985) 52 U Chi. LR 73. 
13 For example, the bach photo in part 6. 
14 Rose above n6, 277 
128 
 
                                                        
reveals the impermanence and pathos of (private) property’s aspirations to 
eternity.’15  Property’s narratives ‘enlist the visual imagination to tell a story 
about property generally.  They aim at making the audience understand 
property relationships… by watching in the mind’s eye the changes that occur 
in the shape and configuration of ownership and control.’16 Classic stories of 
property are those of tragedy, improvement, or scarcity,17 sweeping morality 
tales that entrench private dominance and drown out alternative narratives.  
More mundane, but equally significant stories are those of everyday 
commerce or sociability, acted out on private or public lands. Narratives are 
also important in anchoring people to place, the ‘folklore’ that orients residents 
through a sense of continuity from past to present.18  
 
To see property as metaphor is more nuanced and less obvious. Yet Rose 
argues that apartment owners typically see property in terms of metaphor, a 
larger bundle for their private strata unit and an altogether different and 
reduced one for common or shared areas.  To see property as metaphor is to 
accentuate property’s duality, at one level the divisibility of its sticks, and at 
the other, to ‘reclaim a sense of the whole and the relatedness of the various 
elements of entitlement.’19 
 
To see property in land is more likely where there is contrast, where there is a 
visible ‘warp and woof’20 in the property patterns of human landscapes. 
Seeing patchworks of private, public and common property, or the variegated 
stories they tell, accentuates difference. Conversely, ‘seeing’ is less likely 
when camouflaged in a property monotone.  Carol Rose saw property in the 
‘forceful and imperious landscape’ of Hawaii, islands of striking physicality 
where ‘people who live there seem to take an unusual interest in property law, 
15 Ibid, 286-7 
16 Ibid, 289 
17 Harold Demsetz’s tale of the fur skin trade amongst Indian communities ended with the rise 
of private property when the resource became scarce through over-hunting. 
18 Property secures historic streetscapes through restrictive covenants, the preservation of 
public squares or parklands. 
19 Rose, above n6, 282 
20 Leopold describes a ‘pepper-and-salt pattern in the warp and woof of the land-use fabric’, 
Aldo Leopold, For the Health of the Land: Previously Unpublished Essays and Other Writings 
(J. Baird Callicott & Eric Freyfogle (eds.) 1999), 168. 
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and … know a great deal about it.’21 In such places, seeing property is 
intuitive, it ‘hits you in the eye.’ 
 
The landscape has directed Hawaii’s property law to an intense concern for 
issues of land and water; but the intervention of property law, in its various 
guises, has in turn affected the landscape.  Those effects are visible too: the 
waterworks, the patterns of cultivated and natural vegetation, the tall buildings 
in Oahu and the low ones in Kauai, these matters are creatures of law, 
among other things, and most particularly the law of property.22 
 
It is no accident therefore that the case studies in part 5 are mostly found in 
landscapes of striking physicality. It is much easier to see and explain 
property diversity where it ‘hits you in the eye’. But once recognized, its 
patterns manifest in more everyday places.  
 
2.2 Diverse property sees land as an inter-connected whole 
 
Once seen, property diversity then shifts the imaginative focus from the 
artificially imposed lines that divide land parcels, to the holistic landscape in 
between and across the lines.  It refutes the paradigm that looks ‘to the lines 
first, not the land upon which the lines were laid,’23 and affirms Paul Carter’s 
intuition that ‘I have begun to see the straight edges of our constructed 
environment as narrow pencils of shadow, as dark mortar joining the parts of 
the world together.’24  
 
Joseph Sax’s prescient ‘economy of nature’ observes that ‘viewing land 
through the lens of nature’s economy reduces the significance of property 
lines.’25  Its consequence is ‘an emerging view of land as part of an 
ecosystem.’ 26 The ‘backwards looking’ alternative27 is one where land is inert, 
21 Rose above n6, 267 
22 Rose, above n6, 267-8. 
23 Curt Meine, Correction Lines Essays on Land, Leopold and Conservation (2004) 201. 
24 Paul Carter, Dark Writing Geography, Performance, Design (2009) 1. 
25 Sax, above n8, 1445. 
26 Ibid, 1438. 
27 Sax argues the majority judgment in Lucas affirmed a conception of land where owners 
bear no collective responsibility for the provision of natural services that land naturally 
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and owners share no obligation to participate in the natural (or ecological) 
services that their lands collectively provide. ‘Emphasizing the systemic (what 
Sax calls ‘ecosystemic’) reflects that ‘connections dominate.’28  
 
Connections between, and within, private, public and common land holdings 
have greater capacity to avoid Eric Freyfogle’s ‘tragedy of fragmentation’, the 
private stasis that paralyzes human landscapes. The inter-connective mosaic 
is an overarching mechanism that measures the impact of land use 
externalities, a subject further advanced in chapter 5. Its metaphor is akin to 
Tony Arnold’s complex ‘webs of interests’,29 or Henry Smith’s ‘architectural’ or 
‘modular’ conception of property,30 except that it inserts the full panoply of 
property tiles into the ‘seeing’. Its antithesis is the disaggregated bundle of 
rights, where universalized stick rights readily detach, and ‘in principle relate 
to anything else.’31  As Smith wryly notes, ‘the bundle-of-rights picture of 
property treats property in an atom-counting fashion, which is fine as far as it 
goes. But what we still need is a theory of how the pieces fit together.’32  
Property diversity starts to provide such a picture.  
 
2.3 Diverse property rights are use rights 
 
Sax’s ‘economy of nature’ also re-conceives ownership rights in land as use 
rights, not rights to possess, or rights of dominion. His ‘usufructuary model’33 
draws analogies with water. ‘Use rights prevailed in water law because of 
interconnections and community dependence on a resource’s natural 
functions – such attributes [that would] characterize land in an ecological 
provides in an ecosystem. In Lucas, the plaintiff’s land was located in a coastal environment 
zone that only permitted very limited uses, excluding residential development.  The landowner 
successfully obtained compensation for this ‘taking.’ The court did not accept that the land 
provided important natural services such as wetlands, an erosion buffer zone, or wildlife 
habitat. 
28 Sax, above n8, 1445. 
29 Craig Anthony Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests’ 
(2002) 26 Harv. Envtl. LR 281. 
30 Henry Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’ (2012) 125 Harvard Law Rev. 1691 
31 Smith, above n30, 1700. 
32 Ibid, 1709. 
33 In 1789, Thomas Jefferson declared ‘that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.’ 
Gregory Alexander, Commodity & Propriety Competing Visions of Property in American 
Thought 1776-1970 (1997) 26-27.  
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perspective.’34 Their ecological credentials rest on their regulation of 
resources as ‘continuous and inter-connected’ and the caveat that the private 
right to extract is subservient to the community’s dependence on the 
resource. Use rights thus ‘serve two masters, the community and the 
individual.’35  
 
Carol Rose and Eric Freyfogle likewise see the parallels between water and 
emergent use rights in land. Rose invites readers to imagine a paradigm 
where water is property in land’s ‘chief symbol.’ 
 
We might think of property rights…in quite a different way. We might think of 
rights… as more fluid and less fenced-in; we might think of property as 
entailing less of the Blackstonian power of exclusion and more of the qualities 
of flexibility, reasonableness… moderation, [and] attentiveness to others.36 
 
Freyfogle predicts that were property law to develop like water law, property 
rights would ‘increasingly exist as a collection of use rights, rights defined in 
specific contexts, and in terms of similar rights held by other people.’37 
Context and accommodation - between the right-holder, other right-holders, 
and the environment- figure prominently in Freyfogle’s ongoing advocacy of 
use rights.38 
 
Use rights escape from theory to practice in US natural resources and public 
lands law. This vast jurisprudence of property in natural resources39 offers an 
instructive counter-point to traditional Anglo-common law approaches to real 
34 Sax, above n8, 1452-3. 
35 Ibid, 1453. 
36 Carol Rose, ‘Property as the Keystone Right?’ (1996) 71 Notre Dame L. Rev. 329, 351 
37 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law’ (1989) 41 Stanford 
Law Rev. 1529.  
38 Freyfogle has advocated use rights widely, ‘prescribed private rights to use while nature 
remains in public hands’ in Eric Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on 
the Ownership of Land (2007) 141. 
39 Anthony Scott ‘Development of Property in the Fishery’ (1988) 5 Marine Resource 
Economics 289; Anthony Scott, The Evolution of Resource Property Rights (2008). Scott 
observes that ‘the emergence of property rights to natural resources is overlooked.’; Barry 
Barton, ‘Property Rights Created under Statute in Common Law Legal Systems’ in A. McHarg 
et al (eds.) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2009) 80; Leigh 
Raymond, Private Rights in Public Resources (2003). 
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property. Natural resources (whether of an extractive40 or non-extractive41 
nature) are capable of capture, monetization, or transfer. Yet property in 
natural resources is overwhelmingly couched in the terminology of permits, 
licences, concessions, or privileges, rights predicated on use not possession.  
Importantly, use rights permit the sharing of resources, since uses are not 
automatically mutually exclusive. Thus, on the American rangelands, private 
rights to graze share the public domain with public rights of recreational 
access.42 American natural resources law, like water law, has avoided the 
yoke of possession, and fostered instead long-standing policies of ‘multiple 
use sustained yield’.43  
 
Use rights are desirable for a number of reasons. They enable (and reflect the 
reality of) multiple rights co-existing in the one parcel of land. They are 
consistent with the common law’s view of property rights as relative not 
absolute. And the grant of a private use right does not exhaust or consume 
residual public rights in land. Even where exclusive, use rights focus on the 
proper question of exclusivity of access to the resource, not the falsely 
conflated right to exclude.44 And as Sax identifies, use rights are more attuned 
to an ecological perspective, concentrating on the tangible resource, how it 
relates to other inter-connected resources, and ultimately, each resource’s 
finitude.  
  
While the common law does not eschew the usufruct completely, its 
incorporeal hereditaments are hierarchically inferior, frequently ‘burdens’ on 
possessory estates rather than templates for the future imaginings of property 
in land. By contrast, diverse property rights reverse this logic, since public and 
40 Mining, forestry, and grazing (the mineral, timber, and range resource) were staples of the 
western economy, Scott Lehmann, Privatizing Public Lands, (1995); Samuel Trask Dana & 
Sally Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy Its Development in the United States (2nd ed, 1980) 
41 Wildlife, recreation and preservation are treated as natural resources, George C. Cameron 
et al (eds.) Federal Public Land and Resources Law (6th ed., 2007).  
42 John Page, ‘Grazing Rights and Public Lands in New Zealand and the western United 
States: A Comparative Perspective’ (2009) Natural Resources Journal 403. 
43 Dana & Fairfax, above n40. 
44 What is exclusive in the context of use rights is the right to enforce a monopoly over a 
particular use. It may be a corollary of that exclusivity that the use right can only be exercised 
where another’s rights to be included are denied. Equally, it may be a corollary of that 
exclusive right that other compatible uses can feasibly co-exist; Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and 
Exclusivity in Property Law’ (2008) Univ. of Toronto Law Journal 275, 277. 
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common rights to land are use rights.  Rather than being seen as quaint 
exceptions to possessory estates, private use rights are seen in pluralistic 
context. 
 
2.4 Diverse property in land is contextual 
 
John Orth’s identification of the unifying themes of the American common law 
of property reveals in its opening paragraphs a profound truism.  Orth writes 
‘[a]ll property law is local, … the place where the land lies.’  His efforts to 
reach generic conclusions only make sense, he argues, when applied to 
‘some specific time and place.’45 
 
Orth’s plain observation runs counter to the prevailing orthodoxy that property 
rights are universalized relations between persons about things. In the world 
of property law, place is irrelevant.  Having reached its abstract apogee with 
Wesley Hohfield’s analysis of relations between jural persons,46 abstraction’s 
end game is famously that of illusion.47 According to Nicole Graham, the 
paradigm of placelessness means ‘that property is not about things, that 
property is not really “real”, [and] that property is de-physicalised.’48  Nick 
Blomley observes that modern property has been emptied of all its 
heterogeneity and distinctiveness.49 Yet such critiques, descriptions of the 
totalizing and universalizing tendencies of post-enclosure property, jar with 
Orth’s simple logic. 
 
Theodore Steinberg takes property’s detachment from place to absurd lengths 
when writing of the ‘folly of owning nature.’50  Steinberg cites private 
appropriations of the surface of the Moon, or property disputes over the 
weather, as comedic attempts to own that which is beyond capture. ‘It is a 
45 John Orth, Reappraisals in the Law of Property (2010) viii. 
46 Wesley Hohfield ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning’ 
(1913) Yale LJ 16; Wesley Hohfield ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal 
Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale LJ 710. 
47 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252. 
48 Nicole Graham, Lawscape Property Environment Law (2011) 7. 
49 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City (2004). 
50 Theodore Steinberg, Slide Mountain, or The Folly of Owning Nature (1995). 
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tribute to the colonizing impulse at the heart of property law that it has been 
able to encroach’ into these surreal realms.  Steinberg warns that a world 
where everything can be converted into property may be a creative one, but it 
is also ‘an impoverished, … dangerous world as well’.51  
 
The destructiveness and perverseness that Steinberg identifies is however a 
consequence of the over-reach of private appropriation. And as Graham and 
Blomley agree, property was not always so place-less. Graham observes that 
pre-enclosure common property was diverse, localized and heterogeneous, 
while Blomley sees resistance to enclosure an ongoing sub-text of modern 
property. Such ‘resistance’ can be seen in the localized collective claims to 
property that Blomley documents in his home city of Vancouver, evidence that 
(at least some) property is still local.  
 
Diverse property reaches back to the rights of pre-enclosure commoners as 
much as it incorporates the dissentient voices of Blomley’s poor and 
unpropertied.  And it agrees with John Orth’s intuitive assertion that property 
is local, contexted to the place where the land lies. 
 
2.5 Neither exclusion nor inclusion is paramount 
 
Property diversity also recognises that exclusion cannot be understood in 
isolation. Chapter 1 observes that the right to exclude has always been 
qualified by exigency52 and that ‘too much exclusion’ leads to unbalanced 
perversities. Chapter 2 argues that public property’s right of inclusion is a 
critical foil to private property’s exclusion. And chapter 3 examines the 
paradox of common property, exclusionary on the outside, but inclusive 
within. As each chapter demonstrates, exclusion in itself provides an 
incomplete, unsatisfactory account of property.  
 
51 Ibid, 165. 
52 State v Stack 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).  
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In stark contrast, the central logic of property uniformity is that property 
‘center[s] around the idea of exclusion.’53 To Shyamkrishna Balganesh, 
classifying an interest as a property right universally ‘entails endowing it with 
an exclusionary significance.’54 Yet Balganesh himself is forced to create a 
‘plausible’ category of quasi-property to explain those interests that fall 
outside his exclusion thesis.55 For pluralists such as Hanoch Dagan, ‘large 
slabs of property doctrine’ would need to be discarded if exclusion was its 
sole premise.  
 
Numerous property rules, prescribing the rights and obligations of members 
of local communities, neighbors, co-owners, partners, and spouses cannot be 
fairly analyzed under the exclusion paradigm; the whole point of these 
elaborate doctrines, after all, is to provide structures for cooperative, rather 
than competitive, relationships. These doctrines are not marginal to the life of 
property. Rather, they deal with some of our most commonplace human 
interactions and thus tend to blend into our natural environment.56  
 
Property diversity does not compel its proponents to take absolutist or 
implausible positions. Instead it recognizes that exclusion and inclusion are 
two-halves of the one dialectic, where property is shaped by the constant 
interaction (and at times overlap) of each irresistible force. Dagan’s delicate 
‘balance of property values’57 is one where the diversity of context, and the 
particularity of resource, determines the contours of property form, and its 
coalesced, commensurate proportions of inclusion and exclusion.  
 
2.6 Diverse property in land is multivalent 
 
Another central logic of property diversity is that it is more varied and 
multivalent than the private liberal paradigm supposes. This extends not only 
to the seeing of the public and common estates, and their respective property 
53 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Property, Like, But Not Quite Property’ (2012) 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1889, 1892. ‘Central to the idea of property is exclusion.’ 1899. 
54 Balganesh, 1899. 
55 Ibid, 1924-5. 
56 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Property and the Public Domain’ (2009) 18 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 84, 85-6. 
57 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (2011). 
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norms, but also to the seeing of private property’s long ignored social and 
communitarian values.   The latter is a key focus of the scholarship of Hanoch 
Dagan. 
 
Dagan argues that monistic, totalizing theories of property are incomplete in 
their account of the ‘lived experiences of property’.58  Thus, Dagan rejects 
theories that celebrate ‘property as independence’ because, lacking any 
social obligation, such accounts ultimately entrench widespread human 
dependence for those that are property-less. Likewise he criticizes theories 
that promote ‘property as interdependence’ because their refusal to 
countenance voluntary exit creates illiberal communities that ironically dilute 
community values.59 Instead he endorses a ‘pluralistic account of property.’60  
Pluralism means that it is ‘reasonable, even desirable, for the law [of property] 
to adopt more than one set of principles and more than one set of coherent 
doctrines.’ 61 It reflects a truth of property law that recognizes ‘different 
meanings of ownership in different social contexts and with respect to 
different resources.’62 Once relieved of the burden of property monism, 
heterogeneity can be acknowledged for what it is: ‘a testimony of property 
law’s appreciation of the significance of facilitating multiple forms of human 
interaction.’63 And because ‘free people have diverse ends, diverse forms of 
property are necessary to realize those ends.’64  
 
Diverse property enacts Dagan’s theories. Different meanings of ownerships 
do arise according to context and the nature of the resource; even if the 
common law is sometime loathe putting a different name to it.65 And it is 
reasonable, as Dagan argues, for property to have more than one set of 
58 Ibid, 57-75. ‘Given that property law governs so many aspects of human action and 
interaction, the commitment to pluralism is … a major reason for property theory to resist 
unifying normative accounts of property law in its entirety.’ Ibid, 72.  
59 Ibid, 63, 69.  
60 Ibid, 70, 71.  
61 Ibid, 71. 
62 Ibid, 72. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Dagan uses the fee simple and marital co-ownership as exemplars of contextually different 
institutions that endorse a ‘free choice of multiplicity’.  The former affirms an individual’s ‘safe 
haven’; the latter is a ‘framework for interdependence and mutual responsibility.’ Ibid, 73. 
65 For example, the freehold life tenant and the leasehold tenant, despite common 
nomenclature, are different ownerships.   
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principles, since the institution of property is not a monolith. The normative 
mosaic that is yielded up by the property mosaic is further canvassed in 
chapters 5 and 6.  
 
2.7 Diverse property is eclectic 
 
The flipside of diverse property is that it is untidy.  If ‘real not abstract’, then by 
necessity it is customized to context.  Such untidiness could be simply 
explained as proof of Dagan’s proposition that ownerships vary according to 
context and resource.  However, another interpretation is more problematic - 
that customized property is unpredictable and unstable, in short, unworthy of 
property status.  
 
The latter interpretation aligns with the ‘closed list’ view of property mandated 
by the ‘meta-principle’66 of numerus clausus. This deeply implicit concept, it is 
alleged 
 
expresses the stringency of the common law's approach to property rights, 
particularly over land. In essence, the principle holds that landowners are not 
at liberty to customise land rights, in the sense of re-working them in an 
entirely novel way to suit their particular individual needs and circumstances. 
Rather, any new rights must fit within firmly established pigeonholes, of which 
the law permits only a small and finite number… In this respect, property law 
is highly prescriptive: the system of rights in rem is a strictly circumscribed 
one, with a tight regulatory regime governing the range and form of available 
rights over land.67 
 
Numerus clausus prescribes that there are only so many estates, servitudes, 
and security interests68 that the law will recognize as things of property. If the 
interest under scrutiny is outside that list, then ‘it will be impotent against 
66 Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, ‘Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle’ (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1. 
67 Brendan Edgeworth, ‘The Numerus Clausus Principle in Contemporary Australian Property 
Law’ (2006) 32 Monash Uni. Law Rev. 387, 387-8. 
68 Edgeworth, above n67, 389. 
138 
 
                                                        
successors in title.’69  Unlike the liberties of contract law, parties are not free 
to create new categories of enforceable property.  Henry Smith and Thomas 
Merrill justify such restrictiveness on the drily economic argument that 
‘excessive information costs’ are imposed on third parties where property 
interests are non-standard, such that any resultant interest is ‘sub-optimal’.70  
 
Yet the edifice of numerus clausus is not as imposing as it first appears. It is a 
creature of the civil law. Elsewhere, Henry Smith explains that numerus 
clausus must be seen in its historical milieu, a doctrine designed ‘for the 
wholesale stripping of feudal custom out of [civilian French] property law.’71  
Prior to 2000, it was prominent by its absence in the common law.72  As Smith 
and Merrill admit, the deeply implicit principle ‘has no [common law] name.’73  
Indeed it is more a ‘pigeon holing exercise’,74 a norm of judicial self-
governance that assumes that the creation of new property rights is solely a 
legislative concern.75 The norm thus operates to ensure that courts defer to 
the legislature, even if unaware of the reason why.76  
 
Landmark property cases however, undermine this assumption.77 Brendan 
Edgeworth cites Tulk v Moxhay78 as ‘brazenly shunning’ numerus clausus. 
But even to accept that courts are reluctant or aberrational property 
lawmakers does not explain the converse freedom of legislatures to create 
69 Ibid. 
70 Merrill and Smith use a ‘Monday watch’ as an example of a highly idiosyncratic property 
right that imposes too high an information processing cost on subsequent owners as 
strangers to that title. Merrill & Smith, above n66, 26-7. 
71 Henry Smith, ‘Community and Custom in Property Law’, (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 5, 35.  
72 Merryman’s comparative study of Italian and American land law attributes the absence of 
trusts or future estates in Italian law to numerus clausus, versus their widespread use in 
Anglo-American common law John Merryman, ‘Policy, Autonomy, and the Numerus Clausus 
in Italian and American Property Law (1963) 12 Am. J. Comp. L 224.   
73 Merrill & Smith, above n66, 4. 
74 Ibid, 11. 
75 ‘Merrill & Smith, above n66, 58. 
76 Ibid, 8. 
77 For example, Mabo (no. 2) v Queensland (1992) ALR 1 recognized native title within 
Australian common law. 
78 Tulk held that restrictive covenants were enforceable in equity as property rights, Tulk v 
Moxhay (1848) 41 ER 1143. 
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new property outside the closed list – a power unfettered by any judicial norm 
of self-restraint.79  
 
Away from the numerus clausus debate, the values of untidiness in property 
have been more generally observed. Carol Rose sees property law optimally 
as a self-adjusting balance between the certainty of crystalline statute and the 
pragmatism of the common law’s mud.80 Muddying the waters may be messy, 
but it provides necessary relief to the jagged unintended consequence of 
statute.81 Joseph Singer goes further, arguing that contrary to the intuitive 
view, flexible standards are more important to predictability in property law 
than fixed, certain rules.82  Singer calls these variables the ‘rules of reason’ 
that ‘rule property law’.  The reasons that courts ‘eschew clarity in favor of 
ambiguity’ is that ‘[p]roperty law is simply too complicated and too contextually 
nuanced to be rigidly defined by categorical rules.’83 Ambiguity is on balance 
more useful to property law than not. 
 
Ambiguity promotes moral reflection, allows us to shape property rights to 
promote our deepest values, deters fraud and abuse of rights, and allows 
individual property rights to be made consistent with each other through 
regulating the systemic effects of the exercise of individual rights.84 
 
To recognize that diverse property is customized is to accept that it can be 
nuanced. But it is not to concede that it is unprincipled. There is a middle 
course between the extremes of property’s polarities; the unyielding rigidity of 
the ‘closed list’, or the infinite possibilities of laissez-faire customization.  
79 For example, the pastoral lease in s 66 Land Act 1948 (NZ). 
80 Carol Rose, ‘’Crystal and Mud in Property Law’ (1988) 40 Stanford Law Rev. 577. 
81 A Brower and J Page, ‘When the Law is Silent, Trespassers W…: Law and Power in 
Implied Property Rights’ (2012) 42 Environmental Law Reporter 10 242, 10 244. 
82 Joseph Singer, ‘The Rule of Reason in Property Law’ (2013) 46 UC Davis Law Rev. 1369, 
1373.  Singer goes ‘further’ - it is not about balance between statute and common law, but the 
supremacy of standards over rules. 
83 Ibid, 1404. Henry Smith’s ‘modular theory’ of property is premised on similar rationales. 
Smith argues that property needs to be reduced to manageable inter-connected modules 
because of its inherent complexity. What we see in property is the ‘module’ not necessarily 
the whole edifice. Smith, above n30.  
84 Singer, above n82, 1434.  Singer also cites (at 1385) Lehavi’s view of property rights as 
‘inherently incomplete’ as consistent with his ‘rules of reason’ analysis, Amnon Lehavi, ‘The 
Dynamic Law of Property: Theorizing the Role of Legal Standards’, (2010) 42 Rutgers L.J. 81. 
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Judges refer to the guidance of property’s ‘principled parameters.’85 Henry 
Smith sees the mediation of ‘things’ as giving property its in rem character,86 
since property law is after all the ‘law of things.’87 Hanoch Dagan likewise 
demonstrates that plurality can be reconciled with principle.88   Eclecticism is 
a challenge to property’s ‘logic of centrality’, the uncritical assumption that 
‘property is what we expect it to be’. But it is also ‘a mindset that is conformist, 
unreflective, and narrow’89, in short, unimaginative. Often context may yield 
property relationships that are ‘not always a good thing.’90 Yet it also shows 
that property, much like communities and urban landscapes, is ‘indelibly 
human.’91  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Reimagining property in land as a mosaic of ‘property diversity’ is to shift 
focus, to lift our eyes from the self-limiting hegemony that is the private 
ownership paradigm. It is to see something familiar, but from a different, much 
higher vantage point.  In gaining altitude, we see the constraints that bound 
our current imaginings of property, and the narrowness of our present vision.  
The following Part 3 proceeds to identify the constituent elements of the 
property mosaic that this heightened perspective throws into sharper relief.  
 
3. What comprises the mosaic? Property types and values + Property 
interests + diverse ‘ownerships’ of property 
 
The ‘property mosaic’ is a converged model, where property types and their 
commensurate values intersect with a plethora of property interests and 
divergent concepts of ‘ownership’. It is a jumbled mix of orthodox and sui 
generis property in land, drawing hybrid strength from its heterogeneity. It is, 
85 Lord Millett quoted in from Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land (2006). 
86 ‘An in rem right originally meant a ‘”right in a thing.” Smith, above n30, 1691.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Dagan, above n57. 
89 AJ van der Walt, ‘The Marginality of Property’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n33. 
90 Personal correspondence with the author, May 2013. 
91 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power (1994). 
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to borrow Hanoch Dagan’s description of private property plurality, a full (and 
sometimes cacophonous) symphony, not a singular melody line.92   
 
This part 3 deconstructs this symphony into its constituent parts. First, it 
examines property type, private, public and common property in land, and 
their respective values. It reiterates the conclusions reached in earlier 
chapters: that private property’s absolutist right to exclude is flawed, that 
public property has been obscured by private rhetoric, and that common 
property is more obvious than supposed.  It describes not only a physical 
confluence of property type, but also a confluence of property values, a 
normative ‘mosaic’ that matches the mix of property type on the ground. 
Second, it describes the mosaic’s elements, the mélange of property interests 
in land, corporeal, incorporeal, and otherwise that spills across the boundaries 
of type.  Third, it canvasses the many meanings of ownership both within and 
beyond the private modality. 
 
3.1 A confluence of property type; physical and normative 
 
To see the ‘property mosaic’ is to see private, public, and common property in 
situ. It is to lift and widen one’s perspective, to recognize that ‘property’ in land 
is not constrained by a monistic paradigm.  Chapter 1 enables this envisioning 
by its analysis of the right to exclude, the descriptive paucity that records only 
absolutist interpretations of exclusive possession, not nuanced 
understandings of exclusive use.93 The latter allows for plurality, the co-
existence of multiple and simultaneous interests in land: private, public and 
common. Chapter 2 canvasses the varieties of public property type, the ‘more 
the merrier’ implications of public ownership, and the scope of its right of 
inclusion. And chapter 3 posits that common property is neither an oddity nor 
a tragedy, but a viable and more obvious player in the contemporary ‘mosaic’ 
than we suppose.  Cumulatively, the net effect is the property mosaic, a 
92 Dagan, above n57. The analogy is both borrowed and modified.  
93 Freyfogle says use rights must be coupled with a qualified right to freedom from 
interference. 
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faithful image of propertied human landscapes, described in the case studies 
of part 5, and pictured in part 6 of this chapter.  
  
The complementary values of property have also been canvassed in the 
opening chapters.  Chapter 1 discusses the strengths of private property; its 
security of title, durability, and clarity that have unleashed the economic 
potential of land, the acquisition of private wealth through commoditization, 
and land’s efficient and productive use. Public values provide a welcome foil; 
inclusion, and a macro-sociability premised on the widest ‘comedy of the 
commons’. Public property in land is also democratic, a forum open to all, 
while away from the maddening crowd, public wilderness allows for self 
contemplation and solitude. Critically, public property fulfills a function of 
propriety, where the public estate endows well-ordered communities with a 
capacity for human flourishing.  Chapter 3 completes the normative mosaic by 
highlighting the under-regarded values of common property; the micro-
sociability of community and belonging, its environmental norms of prudence, 
responsibility, and moderation, and its example of use rights untainted by 
tragedy. As Michael Brill observes, common property provides for ‘community 
life’, which is often confused with ‘public life.’ Each is different, in scale, 
density and the ‘physical environments it needs to be robust.’94 Brill describes 
the sociability of public space as one ‘with a diversity of strangers’ while the 
sociability of community space is one ‘with people you somewhat know.’95 
Each imbues ‘important graces, tolerances and social learnings [that] are 
becoming lost to us’96 as community and public life is displaced by an 
‘exaggerated private domain.’97  
 
The ‘exaggeration’ that Brill identifies is not always simply one of private 
versus public normative dominance.  It is also a skewing of the relative values 
94 Michael Brill, ‘Problems With Mistaking Community Life for Public Life’ (2002) 14(2) Places 
48, 50. 
95 Ibid, 48. Brill identifies community sociability occurring at varied locales, ‘a mix of both 
semi-public and semi-private places, like the neighborhood bar, the often- walked public 
street, the school PTA meeting and the church dinner.’ Public sociability occurs ‘in the 
square, park and street.’ Ibid, 50. 
96 Ibid, 49. 
97 Ibid, 51. 
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of private property itself.  Private property is more complex and multivalent 
than its exclusionary or ‘land as commodity’ rhetoric suggests. Private 
property has values important to personhood: the protection of privacy, the 
promotion of self-expression, or the securing of personal autonomy and 
choice.98 It also has overlooked or forgotten social and communitarian values.   
 
A great deal has been written about the individual values that property rights 
serve: autonomy, liberty, individual actualization, development and self-
expression.  There can be no doubt that such values are crucial to our 
understanding of the institution. Less has been written about private 
property’s collective or communitarian values…. Such understandings are 
equally important in explaining and justifying private property, and in simply 
understanding the institution’s fullest, socially situated dimensions.99 
 
Gregory Alexander sees private property’s collective values in terms of 
‘inclusiveness’ (the opportunity to join and belong) and ‘community’ (the 
facilitating of social relations). 100 These values reflect the reality that much of 
contemporary sociability occurs on private lands, ‘the strip, shopping malls, 
atriums of skyscrapers, casinos, sports arenas, amusement parks, [or] 
racetracks.’101 Brill observes that the modern migration of public or community 
life to private space has the curious effect of masking the inherent sociability 
of private property. Brill attributes this to the less ‘esteemed’ sociable activities 
that occur in these ‘private commons’, the hedonism of ‘spectacle, 
entertainment, the (sometimes anti-social) testing of social behavior, and the 
consumption of … objects of commerce and trade.’102  
  
The ownership of private property may also be virtuous. David Lametti sees 
the contribution of private property’s under-regarded communitarian values in 
98 Gregory Alexander, ‘Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values’ (2013) Cornell 
Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 107.  Alexander lists 5 ‘personhood-like’ values: 
autonomy, personal security/privacy, self-determination, self-expression, and responsibility. 
99 Alexander and Penalver, above n33, 4. 
100 Public values include equality (egalitarianism), inclusiveness (the opportunity to join and 
belong), and community (facilitating social relations). Alexander, above n98. 
101 Brill, above n94, 53. 
102 Ibid. 
144 
 
                                                        
terms of social wealth,103 a mutually symbiotic concept where the attainment 
of individual virtue in turn enhances community virtue, and vice versa.104 The 
clues to understanding this ‘less than well understood, social aspect of private 
property’105 lie in the ethical underpinnings of ‘virtue ethics’ scholarship, 
Aristotlean notions that private ownership is meant to serve, promote, or 
develop individual virtue. In particular, ownership of private property helps an 
individual develop the virtues of moderation and liberality, which in turn, as 
virtues of good conduct, benefit one’s community. In a mutually reinforcing 
way, a virtuous community comprises virtuous citizens. Moderation of private 
ownership is contrasted to immoderation, the pursuit of property for its own 
accumulation.  Liberality refers to the use of property ‘for the sake of 
generosity to deserving friends’, somewhere ‘between the extremes of 
prodigality and meanness.’106  Liberality and moderation permeate Joseph 
Singer’s description of the ‘uncommonly decent’ Aaron Feuerstein; the factory 
owner who re-built his marginal textile mill in Lawrence, Massachusetts after it 
was destroyed by fire, and paid his workers during the lay-off to avoid the 
devastating impacts his withdrawal of capital would cause.107 Feuerstein 
personifies the object of virtuous private ownership, ‘a set of individual 
virtues…greater than the sum of its parts, [one that] leads to a collective state 
that is happy, just, and good.’108 
 
3.2. An array of real property interests 
 
Not only is the property mosaic one of diverse types and values, it is also a 
compendium of diverse real property interests: a functioning system of corporeal 
estates, incorporeal interests, and sui generis partnerships of public, private and 
103 David Lametti, ‘The Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social Wealth’  
(2003) 53 Univ. Toronto LJ 325. 
104 Aristotle expresses the role of private property as ‘private in possession but common in 
use.’ 
105 Alexander and Penalver, above n33, 5. 
106 Lametti, above n103, 19. 
107 Joseph Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Morality of Ownership (2000) 3-4; 
7-17. 
108 Lametti, above n103, 22. 
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community owners. Its individual parts may appear to operate in isolation,109 yet 
as chapter 5 discusses, the mosaic is optimally an integrated network, best 
understood as a functioning whole. As the sum of many parts, this section will 
attempt to categorise, and in turn identify, those real property interests that 
make up each loose category of the mosaic. As a precursor to the remainder of 
this chapter and chapter 5, each interest will also be briefly considered in terms 
of its utility in achieving ‘good land use’ ends.  
 
3.2.1 Corporeal estates 
 
It is possible that modern real property interests can be simultaneously abstract 
and corporeal; a paradox that is often not seen for the curious anomaly it 
presents.  However, as a traditional classification, it is convenient for the 
purposes of property diversity with its implicit admission that (at least some) 
property in land is tangible, and hence contextual. 
 
Corporeal estates in modern land law usually comprise the fee simple and 
freehold life estate.  In some jurisdictions, the fee tail may limp on.  If one 
discards the feudal fiction of chattels real, the leasehold is another corporeal 
estate in land.110 Each is an interest in the property mosaic, a right to use for a 
duration that varies from an infinite uncertainty to a certain term of years.   
 
The fee simple is the most important of the modern corporeal estates, indeed it 
is ‘universalising and totalising’ of the category as a whole. Yet despite its near 
omnipotence, the absence of scholarly scrutiny of the fee simple is another 
paradox. Simon Douglas notes that ‘surprisingly little is written about its content’, 
perhaps because of our ‘strong intuitive grasp of what it means to own land.’111 
Douglas posits that fee simple owners enjoy ‘open ended’ liberties to use 
109 Smith outlines a ‘modular theory of property as a law of things’ that limits a seeing of 
property to the relevant self-contained module. This module appearance masks the inter-
modular connections that exist. Smith, above n30. 
110 The lease is rarely mentioned as a tool for sustainability, Adrian Bradbrook, ‘The Role of 
the Common Law in Promoting Sustainable Energy Development in the Property Sector’ in 
Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010). 
111 Simon Douglas, ‘The Content of a Freehold: A Right to Use Land?’ in N P Hopkins (ed.) 
Modern Studies in Property Law (7th ed., 2013) 359. 
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land,112 a ‘right’ better explained by the under-scrutinised right to use than the 
dominant ‘exclusion thesis.’113 As a property tool for sustainability, the fee simple 
is a blunt instrument with limitations. Seen within the property monotone, it 
manifests in private environmental organisations purchasing conservation lands, 
either in perpetuity or through ‘revolving fund’ transactions.  As a stand-alone 
strategy for conservation, the fee simple is limited by high acquisition costs, 
succession issues where ownership is ostensibly perpetual, or the belief that 
conservation is not served by a retreat into enclaves.114 Richard Brewer lists 
‘transactions costs, initial capital expenses, and costs of continuing 
stewardship.’115 State owned national parks and conservation reserves 
represent the public fee simple.  They are impacted by similar restraints - the 
scarcity of taxpayer dollars and identical concerns about enclave retreat.116  
 
The life estate is more an outlier. It is rarely cited in sustainability literature, 
despite it possessing a common law doctrine concerned with intergenerational 
consequence, the law of waste.  While a possessory estate, its doctrines 
strongly focus on use rights of the life tenant, be it rights to income, timber or 
emblements. Its characteristics are prescient of (the equivalent of) Sax’s 
economy of nature.  
 
In a sense all landowners are life tenants, albeit the fee simple owner has an 
estate of potentially infinite duration… All landholders hold their interests for 
the benefit of posterity as well as their own use. Landowners are thus 
trustees for the future.117 
 
Corporeal estates need to be seen in context, as one category in a diversity of 
real property interests. Similarly, within the category, the fee simple needs to be 
112 Douglas relies on a Hohfieldian analysis in reaching this nomenclature. These liberties 
may be constrained by external regulations such as planning or environmental laws, but their 
‘open-ended’ nature remains fundamentally unimpaired. Ibid. 
113 Ibid, 360. 
114 The alternative is ‘preserving entire ecosystems of public and private property.’ Sally 
Fairfax et al, Buying Nature, The Limits of Land Acquisition as a Conservation Strategy 1780-
2004 (2005) 254.  
115 Richard Brewer, Conservancy The Land Trust Movement in America (2003) 133 
116 Fairfax et al, above n114, 256. 
117 John Cribbet ‘Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property’, (1986) 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 40. 
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seen as one freehold estate, and not the defining paradigm. A consequence of 
seeing corporeal estates through this taxonomic context is to recognize what is 
common to all corporeal estates, an entitlement to use land distinguished by 
different durations.  
  
3.2.2 Incorporeal/less than fee interests 
 
The diversity of real property interests is more apparent with incorporeal 
interests. Easements and covenants are regular features of propertied 
landscapes, and along with the lesser known profit a prendre, positively or 
negatively regulate the use of land.  However, as discussed, incorporeal 
interests are typically seen as burdens on corporeal estates, hierarchically 
less significant, and thus diminished.  
 
In exemplifying sustainable practice, easements have been adapted to protect 
scenic corridors, or to secure solar access to solar collector panels.118 Its 
limitations include the need for transactional consent and a common law 
reticence to protect aesthetic values. However statutory intervention can 
supervene.119 Covenants, positive and restrictive, likewise are widely 
employed to achieve environmental outcomes.120 In particular, positive 
covenants can impose stewardship obligations on future landowners, again 
with the assistance of statute.121 Chapter 2 has already traversed the 
popularity of conservation covenants to protect biodiversity corridors, open 
space, and so on.122 More novel applications include the preservation of dark 
sky preserves.123 The ancient profit a prendre can also be re-tooled, as a 
device to sequester carbon, although its essentially extractive nature is 
118 Bradbrook, above n110, 397. 
119 For example the US scenic easement has been put on a statutory footing, while 
easements of necessity can be imposed where reasonably necessary for the use and 
enjoyment of the benefitted land, s 181 Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 88K Conveyancing 
Act 1919 (NSW). 
120 Such as guaranteeing wind access to turbines, Bradbrook, above n110, 401. 
121 The rule in Austerberry Corporation precludes the burden of positive covenants running 
with land, but in most jurisdictions statute has validated positive covenants, s 97A Land Title 
Act 1994 (Qld). 
122 Douglas Farr, Sustainable Urbanism Urban Designs with Nature (2008) 93-4, 120-3. 
123 John Copeland Nagle, Laws Environment How the Law Shapes the Places We Live (2010). 
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problematic.124 The common law’s adaptability also leaves open the potential 
for obsolete incorporeal hereditaments to be future tiles in the diverse 
property mosaic. These include the rentcharge, franchise,125 or profit a 
rendre.126  
 
Nor is the property mosaic restricted to traditional incorporeal interests. 
Imaginative sui generis rights such as grassbanks,127 solar access rights,128 
or conservation banks129 expand the seemingly exponential plurality of what 
can constitute an incorporeal interest in land.  
 
3.2.3 Public/private/community partnerships 
 
Other ‘interests’ in land fall outside of, or crossover, the arbitrary distinction of 
corporeal versus incorporeal.  Sally Fairfax and her colleagues describe the 
rise of partnerships or collaborations between public, private and community 
actors as the defining feature of modern conservation.  
 
Multiple agents now own partial interests in a single parcel of land for a wide 
variety of purposes that are often in conflict. The result…is an interlocking 
network of policies and actors that defies easy categorization. Neither 
regulatory or market based, neither public nor private, the result is best 
described as an emerging mosaic of claims on land.130 
 
According to Fairfax et al, four factors make these partnerships the new norm.  
These include a changing philosophy of governance, (where governments 
vacate or downgrade their role in land use management to private actors or 
124 s 88AB(2) Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). 
125 Kevin Gray identifies the franchise as a forgotten incorporeal interest in land, Kevin Gray, 
Regulatory Property and the Jurisprudence of the Quasi-Public Trust’, (2010) 32 Sydney Law 
Rev. 237, 248. 
126 The profit a rendre is a right ‘to go onto land to add something to the land that is of benefit 
to it’, MacDonald et al, Real Property Law in Queensland, (3rd ed., 2010) 714; Brendan 
Edgworth, ‘Profits a rendre: A reincarnation?’ (2006) 12 Australian Property Law Journal 200.  
127 Grassbanks are a species of tradable development rights, see chapter 5; Richard Register 
Rebuilding Cities in Balance with Nature, Ecocities (2006) 261. 
128 ‘Solar rights’ are created through a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions 
(CCRs) in Village Homes, Judy & Michael Corbett, Designing Sustainable Communities 
Learning from Village Homes (2000) 35, 163. 
129 Nagle, above n123, 86-7. 
130 Fairfax et al, above n114, 8. 
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quasi-autonomous entities), changing conservation goals over time, changing 
economic conditions, and changing ideas about property.131 The latter is 
especially critical. Post- bundle, ‘a continuous reinterpretation of property has 
resulted in complex ownership ideas and …increasingly fragmented and 
intricate arrangements among public and private actors.’132  Fairfax concludes 
on balance that this is a good thing, representing ‘at best… a new, 
collaborative and sophisticated approach that can approximate the elusive 
win-win model so frequently touted in conservation circles.’133 
 
Multi-ownership collaborations can be formally structured and documented, 
such as the Malpai Borderlands Trust outlined in chapter 5, or they may be 
informal groupings that ‘just happen’ in response to threat or exigency. Amnon 
Lehavi describes such haphazard groupings as ‘limited management 
commons’ discussed in chapter 6.  While governance of formal joint ventures 
may depend on black letter law and enforceable rules, governance of informal 
groupings often depends on a blend of law, social norms, and co-operative 
strategies.134 
 
The ‘rise’ of the amorphous multi-owner partnership, whose ‘rules’ define ‘who 
gets to do what and where’ as an incident of land ownership, demonstrates a 
diversity of interests in land that transcends traditional classifications.  Instead 
of ‘what is property in land’ being confined to the all-pervasive, all-
encompassing fee simple, property diversity offers the imaginative possibility 
of so much more.  
 
3.3 Diversity of property ownerships 
 
This part concludes by canvassing the conceptual breadth of what constitutes 
‘ownership’ of interests in land, both from within, and outside, the private 
liberal paradigm. Some of these concepts have already been traversed in 
131 Ibid, 9-11. 
132 Ibid, 10. 
133 Ibid, 272. 
134 ‘The governance of urban public space by informal collective action’ Nicole Garnett, 
‘Managing the Urban Commons’ (2012) 160 Uni. Pennsylvania Law Rev. 1995. 
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earlier chapters, others will be considered in greater detail in later chapters 5 
or 6. 
 
Within the property monotone, ‘ownership’ of land demands that ‘propertiness’ 
is restricted to state-enforced private rights that ‘run with the land.’  Concepts 
of private ownership only vary as to the measurable impact of their external 
effects. At one end of this short spectrum, an owner may be sovereign of their 
‘castle’. At the other, their ownership is (variously described) as a ‘citizenship, 
good neighbor or environmental’ construct.135 The ‘castle’ view is a 
rhetorically powerful caricature, derived from a selective interpretation of 
recent property history.136 The castle owner is supposedly free to raise the 
drawbridge, and ignore trans-boundary effects of adverse land uses. Joseph 
Singer is highly critical of this interpretation. Singer prefers the latter 
understandings because they import obligation alongside property right, and 
take account of harmful land uses.  
 
The castle … models of property over-emphasize individual rights, while the 
citizenship model rests on the notion that owners have obligations as well as 
rights…  Obligation is inherent in liberalism, but the castle and market models 
marginalize it.  They seek to suppress consciousness of the obligations 
inherent in ownership, to draw our attention away from them.137 
 
Ownership can also embrace common property rights of ownership, described in 
its traditional form as an ‘ownership without possession.’138 As chapter 3 argues, 
these common ownerships, traditional but especially modern, are more obvious 
than supposed.  ‘Ownership’ of public property is far more contestable and 
esoteric, a diffuse ‘sum of interests in which the individual concerned has no 
greater claim than any other member of the public.’139  
 
135 Joseph Singer, ‘The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments 
and Just Obligations’ (2006) 30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 309. 
136 See chapter 1 - Blackstonian and Lockean interpretations of private property. 
137Singer, above n135, 330. 
138 J Neeson, Commoners: common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-
1820 (1993). 
139 Stow v Mineral Holdings (Australia) Pty Ltd (1977) 51 ALJR 672, 679.  
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Alternative claims to ‘what is ours’ derive legitimacy from theories such as 
Andreas van der Walt’s ‘marginal’ perspective on property law, where the 
analytical focus is on ‘dissent and contention rather than consensus.’140 In a 
similar vein, Nick Blomley argues that the ownership claims of society’s 
marginalized, concretized in claims to ‘community-owned’ property, are acts 
of resistance against the ongoing enclosure of non-private rights. Apart from 
contest, other bases for collective ownerships include adherence to 
customary practice, or the observance of social norms.141  
 
Communitarian ownerships by their very non-alienable nature must necessarily 
concern the ‘property as propriety’ half of the dialectic.  To claim a vested 
interest in such an amorphous subject matter is to articulate non-paradigmatic 
ideas like ‘property as belonging’.  Davina Cooper argues that this ‘quite different 
understanding of property’ yields an ownership in community assets that is 
‘constitutive of community life.’  Cooper does not dismiss the private ownership 
model, but says that its deficiency lies in its failure to capture the full picture of 
what ownership entails. By ignoring property’s norm of inclusion, private 
ownership ‘not only misses but also misrecognizes what is going on.’142 
Ultimately, the gap between ‘ownership as belonging’ and illusory ownership, 
such as Kevin’s Gray’s discourse on a proprietary place in a queue, is wafer thin.  
Yet, despite it’s jarring with property’s ‘central logic’, the literature continues to 
give voice to these alternative claims. Importantly, property diversity, by its 
inclusiveness, is open to this vast array of ownerships. Thomas Merrill’s 
‘property strategy’ (perhaps unintentionally) sums up this open-ended approach. 
 
The point is that the property strategy is not limited to rights that enjoy the 
imprimatur of law or even of the customs of the relevant social unit… It also 
operates inside households, business firms, schools and universities (think of 
faculty offices). As long as there is a discrete resource and someone who 
140 AJ van der Walt, ‘The Marginality of Property’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n33, 103.  
141 Robert Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth (2008). 
142 Davina Cooper, ‘Opening up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and the 
Productive Life of Property’ (2007) 32(3) Law and Social Inquiry 625. 
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exercises residual management authority and residual accessionary rights 
with respect to the resource, the property strategy is at work.143 
 
The diverse property mosaic is a messy human network of the private, public, 
and common estates, and modern variants of all three. It infuses diverse 
property values into human landscapes, and functions through a working 
system of real property interests that are traditional and novel.  Its sense of 
‘ownership’ of interests in land is broad, and reflects the vast diversity of 
relationships that people have with their propertied landscape. Having 
examined its core principles in part 3, and now its discrete elements, it is 
timely to ‘test’ property diversity beyond simply describing it. Parts 4 and 5 set 
out to do this, by searching for signs of the property mosaic in the literature of 
sustainable communities, and then to ‘look more carefully’ for it through the 
prism of specific case studies, to reveal that in actual place ‘there is a diversity 
of property on the ground.’144  
 
4. The property mosaic in sustainable communities literature 
 
Nick Blomley comments that ‘the centrality of the ownership model renders 
other modalities of ownership invisible.’145 Yet the recent literature of 
sustainable communities146 suggests otherwise. It observes that communities 
showcased as successful models of ‘livability’ feature property diversity in 
their design or functioning. In so doing, this literature reveals diverse property 
to be visible. It provides a glimpse from that higher vantage point, a re-
imagining of property in land where sustainable cities are capable of being 
seen as ‘intensely propertied places’.  This part 4 observes that many 
sustainable communities are property diverse. It does not claim however that 
diversity is determinative of sustainability per se; it merely notes this under-
regarded coincidence.  
 
143 Thomas Merrill, ‘The Property Strategy’ (2012) 160 Uni Pa Law Rev. 2075-6 
144 Blomley, above n49, 9. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Also referred to as sustainable urbanism or sustainable design. It covers diverse 
disciplines - planning, architecture, landscape architecture, public policy, and urban design. It 
is ‘recent’ in the sense of its 1960s origins.  
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It begins with Jane Jacobs’ seminal study of American urban space in the 
early 1960s, ‘The Death and Life of Great American Cities.’147 Jacobs 
deduced that vibrant cities possess city diversity, a complex quality of 
‘intricate urban mixtures’148. To generate a requisite ‘exuberant diversity’, 
Jacobs isolates four conditions as indispensable; that communities must 
serve more than one primary function149; that city blocks should be short and 
thus ‘opportunities to turn corners … frequent’; that a ‘closely grained’ 
mingling of buildings of variable age and condition was essential, and that 
there is a ‘sufficiently dense concentration of people’ including residents.150 
Significantly, city diversity relied on a congenial interplay of public and private 
property.  
 
In our American cities, we need all kinds of diversity, intricately mingled in 
mutual support…. Public and quasi-public bodies are responsible for some of 
the enterprises that help make up city diversity – parks, museums, schools, 
most auditoriums, hospitals, some offices, some dwellings. However most city 
diversity is the creation of incredible numbers of different people and different 
private organizations, with vastly differing ideas and purposes, planning and 
contriving outside the formal framework of public action. The main function of 
city planning and design should be to develop… cities that are congenial 
places for this great range of unofficial plans, ideas, and opportunities to 
flourish, along with the flourishing of the public enterprises.151  
 
Jacobs could be writing of the multiple values of private property in her 
reliance on the private estate to do diversity’s ‘heavy-lifting’: commerce, 
personhood, sociability, or personal autonomy. Yet private property cannot do 
it alone, public property is an ‘anchor’ around which a multiplicity of private 
uses swirl and coalesce. It is the duty of the (smaller) public estate to 
establish itself at key locations that ‘add effectively to diversity’, and thereafter 
incumbent on public lands to ‘stand staunch in the midst of different 
147 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961). 
148 Ibid, 150. 
149 This compels the sharing of common spaces at different times by different people. 
150 Jacobs 150-151. Jacobs stressed that ‘the necessity for these four conditions is the most 
important point this book has to make.’ Ibid, 151. 
151 Ibid, 241. 
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surrounding uses, while (private) money rolls around them and begs them to 
roll over.’152 The public/private interaction is symbiotic, city diversity depends 
for its flourishing on well-positioned, defiantly ‘staunch’ public amenities, 
compact city blocks crisscrossed by a network of walkable public streets, 
lanes and sidewalks, and a vibrant blend of private land uses in close and 
dense proximity.  
 
Jacobs’ work is pioneering in its prescience, its intuitive yet simple 
understanding of what makes successful cities flourish.153 Largely seen as the 
planning equivalent of Rachel Carson’s ‘Silent Spring’, The Death and Life of 
Great American Cities foresaw the essentiality of diversity in healthy cities. It 
also highlighted the interaction of public and private land as a mechanism by 
which that diversity is established and then maintained, an idea resurrected 
30 years later in James Kunstler’s The Geography of Nowhere.154  Jacobs’ 
analysis continues to inform literature in this field.155  
 
This part argues that property diversity may be seen in sustainable 
communities literature in three distinct ways.  First, it may be seen as Rose’s 
literal picture, visible in a community’s physical layout of private, public and 
common spaces. Optimally, these property patterns result in the convivial 
neighborhoods of the ‘new urbanists’,156 where parks, community food 
gardens, cycleways, and walkable streets and footpaths successfully integrate 
with surrounding private property. Second, (and as a corollary of the first) 
152 Ibid, 254-5. 
153 Jacobs also wrote of cities lacking the four indispensable conditions, ‘virtually all of Detroit 
is weak on vitality and diversity…it is a ring superimposed upon ring of failed gray belts.’ Ibid, 
150. The 2012 film ‘Detropia’ cited low population density and diffuse city blocks as key 
factors in that city’s terminal decline, and affirmed Jacobs’ ‘great blight of dullness.’ Ibid, 357.  
154 James Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere (1990). 
155 Farr describes ‘great neighborhoods’ as possessing walkable size, a mix of land uses and 
housing types, an integrated network of walkable streets, and sites reserved for civic 
purposes – ‘civic buildings should occupy landmark sites that are the permanent anchors for 
community pride.’ Farr, above n122, 130. Brill writes of ‘public buildings that are proudly 
located.’ Brill, above n94, 51. 
156 New urbanism ‘asserts that our communities must be designed to re-establish and 
reinforce the public domain, that our districts must be human-scaled, and that our 
neighborhoods must be diverse in use and population.’ Peter Calthorpe, The Next American 
Metropolis: Ecology Community and the American Dream (1993) in The Sustainable Urban 
Development Reader (2nd ed., 2009) Stephen Wheeler & Timothy Beatley eds. 90; Paula 
Franzese, ‘Does it Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise 
of Community’, (2002) 47 Villanova Law Rev. 553. 
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diversity can be seen as a narrative, the stories by which a community’s 
propertied physical environment adds to, or detracts from, its ‘social capital’.  
Third, property diversity can be seen as a metaphor of competing property 
values, principally the contest of communitarian versus individual, equally 
analogized in Gregory Alexander’s property as commodity versus property as 
propriety dichotomy.  
 
4.1 Property diversity as a literal picture 
 
Seeing property diversity as a picture is to recognize its separate constitutive 
parts, the discrete elements that comprise the variegated patchwork of 
private, public and common lands, the physical infrastructure of community. 
Two components of this patchwork that are the subject of much study in 
sustainable communities literature are sidewalks and open spaces. Each is 
visible (either because of their presence or absence), each illustrates the 
importance of public or community property contributing to the ‘livability’ of 
sustainable communities, and each highlights the interaction of private and 
non-private property in urban settings.  
 
The sidewalk was the subject of the three opening chapters in Jacobs’ 1961 
classic.157 Sidewalks (along with streets and lanes) are foundational to 
Jacobs’ small city blocks, one of her four generators of city diversity. As public 
conduits, sidewalk networks provide countless opportunities for planned and 
unplanned civic interactions, where street corners ‘are often turned’. Pre-
dating Carol Rose’s writings on the sociability of public property, Jacobs 
describes Boston’s North End in 1959 as a place ‘alive with children playing, 
people shopping, people strolling, people talking. The general street 
atmosphere of buoyancy, friendliness and good health was so infectious that I 
began asking people for directions just for the fun of getting in on some 
talk.’158  Post-Jacobs, sidewalks and other public rights of way are 
157 Chapter 2 - The use of sidewalks safety; chapter 3 - The use of sidewalks: contact, and 
chapter 4 - The use of sidewalks: assimilating children. Jacobs, above n147. 
158 Jacobs, above n147, 9. 
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consistently identified as essential to the creation of convivial, ‘walkable’ 
neighborhoods. 
 
An alternative perspective on sidewalks is that of legal geographer Nicholas 
Blomley, and his identification of an all-pervasive ‘pedestrianism’ as the 
dominant logic of sidewalk governance.159 Blomley argues that sidewalks are 
simply functional spaces for pedestrian circulation, ‘a conduit for purposeful, 
directed flow’160 from points A to B.  Alternative explanations of the sidewalk 
as sites for protest (political space) or the promotion of civic society (civic 
space) are subsumed by the ‘technical and commonsensical’161 
underpinnings of pedestrianism.  Interestingly, and most significantly in this 
context, pedestrianism proves to be a rare counter-example to the premise of 
chapter 1 - the erstwhile unidirectional propensity of private property to erode 
public space. Sidewalks are ‘staunch’ defenders of the public realm that resist 
private encroachments into the public right of free flow and passage. 162 
Despite being a ‘fragile commons’ or ‘finite public resource’,163 Blomley 
observes a policing of sidewalks that rarely acquiesces to the private 
expropriation of public space.164 Indeed the opposite is often truer, ‘in 
Vancouver the sidewalk has been expanded and enhanced by set-back 
requirements that in essence reclaim a slice of private space for the public 
streetscape.’165  That sidewalks are so unequivocally and defiantly public 
sharpens the visibility of property diversity in urban landscapes. 
 
Ian McHarg’s ‘Design With Nature’, published in 1969, is widely 
acknowledged as a seminal work on the links between open space and 
sustainable urban design.166 McHarg argues that ‘nature should be integrated 
159 Nicholas Blomley, Rights of Passage Sidewalks and the regulation of public flow (2011). 
160Ibid, 12. 
161 Ibid, 12-13. 
162 ‘An encroachment is inherently private, entailing an unlawful intrusion onto public property 
by a private actor…. They are an avaricious enlargement of an individual’s estate and an 
illegitimate usurpation of a public entitlement.’ Ibid, 48. 
163 Ibid, 32. 
164 Ibid, 93. 
165 Register,  above n127, 131. 
166 The Garden Cities Movement of the late 19th century saw evils in both cities (their ‘closing 
out of nature’) and the country (‘Trespassers beware’). In Howard’s ‘Town-Country Magnet’ 
there were ‘fields and parks of easy access’. The Sustainable Urban Development Reader 
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into the metropolis’, emphasizing the ecological services that open space 
provides to cities.167 McHarg also maps open space to urban contexts, putting 
into green relief its (then) declining incidence.168  Such maps (to borrow a 
Carol Rose phrase) ‘hit you in the eye’, visualizing a rudimentary picture of 
private and public property.  Later literature developed this further, arguing 
that parks, urban forests, green belts, community gardens, treed street 
verges, and ‘naturalized private backyards’169collectively contribute to 
indicators of city sustainability.170 These include the presence of ecological 
corridors and wildlife habitat, the provision of recreational opportunities, the 
reduction of the urban heat island effect,171 better drainage and water quality, 
increased absorption of pollutants, and increased community space and 
aesthetics.172 Open space (public, common and private) inculcates the natural 
environment into urban living, such that cities are seen as ‘granite gardens’, 
environments within, not outside nature.173 
 
Interestingly, Jane Jacobs did not list parks as one of her four diversity 
drivers. Indeed, she observed of Boston’s North End that ‘it has little 
parkland… everything conceivable is presumably wrong … in orthodox 
planning terms.’ More important than open space to Jacobs was sociability, 
informed in the North End by its ‘very small blocks …badly cut up with 
“wasteful” streets.’  Others observe that poorly frequented parks are sites of 
anti-social activity, or that green belts on city fringes are latent ‘greed belts.’174  
(2nd ed., 2009) Stephen Wheeler & Timothy Beatley eds. Lewis Mumford championed 
Howard’s ‘garden city’ movement in the US, Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities (1938). 
167 Ian McHarg, Design With Nature (1969) 67. Services include airsheds, surface water 
reservoirs, and aquifer recharge areas. 
168 Ibid, 57. 
169 Mark Roseland, Toward Sustainable Communities (2009) 45. 
170 Simon Bell & Stephen Morse, Sustainability Indicators Measuring the Immeasurable (2nd 
ed., 2008).  In San Francisco, key sustainability indicators relate to open public space, 
namely ‘percentage of the population with a recreational facility and a natural setting within a 
10 minute walk, number of neighborhood green street corridors, expenditures on parks, open 
spaces, streetscapes.’ Kent E. Portney, Taking Sustainable Cities Seriously (2003) 11. 
171 Green ‘wedges’ funnel cool, clear air into congested downtown areas, and reduce ambient 
summer temperatures.  
172 Roseland, above n169, 45-7; Timothy Wheeler & Beatley, above n166.  
173 Sophie Spirn, ‘The Granite Garden: Urban Nature and Human Design (1984)’ in Wheeler 
& Beatley, above n166, 140. 
174 McHarg saw green belts as greed belts ‘where the farmer sells land rather than crops, 
where the developer takes the public resource of the city’s hinterland and subdivides it to 
create a private profit and a public cost.’ McHarg, above n167. 
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Such conflicting arguments suggest that seeing property diversity as ‘literal 
picture’ is simply one building block in the overall structural diversity of 
sustainable cities. Or it may simply reflect that some public spaces are poorly 
conceived.175 Arguably, more significant is the relationship between a 
propertied urban environment and its accrued ‘social capital’, the collective 
narratives that these property pictures tell, and entrench in the communal 
culture.  
 
4.2 Property diversity as narrative - building social capital 
 
Carol Rose saw ‘property as narrative’ as one of the key if underrated aspects 
of her scholarship.176  To Rose, property is a form of story telling. It helps to 
explain leaps in doctrinal logic, or smooths over the implausibility of the 
common law’s legal fictions. Its corollary is that property is persuasion, a 
complex, multi-layered tale that must engage and convince its listener for the 
particular form of property to prosper.177 In sustainable communities literature, 
property narratives are discerned in the way that property patterns enrich or 
pauperize ‘social capital’. Diverse property recounts stories of inter-
connectivity, sociability and inclusion.  Conversely, private uniformity tends to 
speak of isolation, exclusion and dislocation.  
 
[C]ommunities must be designed to re-establish and reinforce the public 
domain, … our neighborhoods must be diverse in use and population.  
Settlement patterns are the physical foundations of our society and like our 
society they are becoming more and more fractured. Increasingly they isolate 
people and activities in an inefficient network of congestion and pollution- 
rather than joining them in diverse and human scaled communities.178  
 
Mark Roseland describes social capital as ‘the “glue” that holds communities 
together, ‘the shared knowledge, understandings and patterns of interactions 
175 Brill, above n52. 
176 Carol Rose, ‘Property and Language, or the Ghost of the Fifth Panel’ (2006) 18 Yale 
Journal of Law and the Humanities 1. 
177 Rose, above n6. Orth writes how ‘tenancy by entireties’ survives in North Carolina by 
constantly re-inventing its story, John Orth, Reappraisals in the Law of Property (2010) 35-45. 
178 Calthorpe, above n156, 90. 
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that a group of people brings to any productive activity, the relationships, 
networks, and norms that facilitate collective action.’179 It is a unique public 
good; it does not wear out by use, but where unused, its fragility leads to its 
rapid deterioration, it cannot be readily created, it resists confected 
construction, and it is inherently non-transferable. In sustainable communities 
literature, the overriding objective is to locate and multiply a community’s 
social capital.180 
 
Reliant on formal and informal interactions, a community’s built (and therefore 
propertied) environment creates the opportunities that either enable or impede 
social capital. Formal interactions (such as planned meetings or sporting 
events) are integral to ‘building social capital between (otherwise disparate 
and isolated) people … and strengthen ties among people already bound by a 
common thread.’ Critically, they can only happen ‘where there is a place for 
them to occur.’181 Equally important are informal interactions; impromptu 
encounters whose efficacy depends on physical factors such as ‘street layout, 
(private) building features, … the width of sidewalks.’182 Whether transactions 
in private shops or businesses, or encounters on streets, parks, sporting 
fields, or community-owned clubs or associations, the frequency (and 
therefore social capital value) of planned or unplanned interactions is 
multiplied where the built environment is mixed and diverse.183 It is a recurrent 
theme of sustainable communities literature that ‘[t]here is a positive 
association between social capital and communities with mixed uses, access 
to civic amenities, and walkable neighborhoods.’184 
 
179 Roselund, above n169, 9.  
180 Ibid, 10. 
181 Caitlin Eicher and Ichiro Kawachi, ‘Social Capital and Community Design’ in Andrew 
Dannenberg, Howard Frumkin and Richard Jackson (eds.) Making Healthy Places Designing 
and Building for Health, Well-being and Sustainability (2011) 121 
182 Ibid, 122. 
183 Informal groups can be regular customers of a shop, users of a park…. members of such 
groups may not necessarily know each other…yet they are an immense reservoir of energy 
and imagination if it can be accessed and organized.’ Roselund, above n169, 11. 
184 Reid Ewing, Gail Meakins, Grace Bjarnson and Holly Hilton, ‘Transportation and Land Use’ 
in Dannenberg et al, above n181, 160. 
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Social capital is commonly located in so called ‘third spaces’, community-
shared ‘living rooms’185 in which social interactions occur away from home or 
work. Third spaces and social capital are intimate in both their cause and 
effect, the more time spent in them the greater the return, but ‘conversely the 
more time people spend away from the public eye at home, the more 
disinvestment there is in community social capital.’186 Community food 
gardens meet the definition of viable ‘third spaces.’ Providing for urban food 
production not only meets sustainability criteria such as cooling cities, 
reconnecting people to the food chain, or reducing the carbon footprint of food 
transport, but it also enhances urban conviviality through social interaction.187 
Howard Frumkin and Jared Fox observe that community gardens build a 
sense of community, encourage mental and physical well-being, and restore 
blighted neighborhoods.188 
 
More broadly, communities with high levels of social capital tend to be 
pedestrian-oriented. Pedestrian travel (whether on foot or by bicycle189) 
promotes a ‘cycle of informal social interaction’ that builds a much stronger 
sense of community.190  By contrast, urban sprawl tends to be associated with 
built environment characteristics that make interactions less frequent, 
‘reliance on cars has a detrimental effect on civic life, due in part to decreased 
opportunities for chance encounters.’191 Urban sprawl is characterized in this 
literature as typically ‘a suburban world of cul-de-sacs, detached single-family 
houses, single-use zoning and dependence on automobiles’,192 a 
predominantly private lawscape. Peter Calthorpe sums up the significance of 
the pedestrian, and its propertied context.  
 
185 Beatley & Wheeler, above n166, 335.  
186 Caitlin Eicher and Ichiro Kawachi, ‘Social Capital and Community Design’ in Dannenberg 
et al, above n181, 122. 
187 Anthony Capon and Susan Thompson, ‘Built Environments of the Future’ in Dannenberg 
et al, above n181, 370-1. 
188 Howard Frumkin and Jared Fox, ‘Contact with Nature’ in Dannenberg et al, above n181, 
237; Farr, above n122, 179-180. 
189 Philippa Howden-Chapman et al, Sizing Up the City Urban Form and Transport in New 
Zealand (2010). 
190 Caitlin Eicher and Ichiro Kawachi, ‘Social Capital and Community Design’ in Dannenberg 
et al, above n181, 123. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Calthorpe, above n156, 89. 
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Pedestrians are the catalyst, which makes the essential qualities of 
communities meaningful.  They create the place and the time for casual 
encounters and the practical integration of diverse places and people. 
Without the pedestrian, a community’s common ground - its parks, sidewalks, 
squares and plazas – become useless obstructions to the car. Pedestrians 
are the lost measure of a community.193 
 
Hollie Lund’s empirical study of the relationship between the urban physical 
environment and its creation of a ‘sense of community’,194 strongly suggest 
that pedestrian-friendly settings contribute to the development of a richer 
social environment.195 Lund compared a TN (traditional-era neighborhood) 
with a MSN (modern suburban neighborhood) in Portland, Oregon. In the 
former, with its compact rectangular blocks, structured public and semiprivate 
space, and local stores and neighborhood facilities, there was a reported 
higher sense of community. Much of this sentiment was based on residents’ 
ability to engage in ‘pleasure-driven strolling trips’ that arise where ‘strollers 
feel like being part of the neighborhood or feel like running into or socializing 
with their neighbors.’196  By contrast, residents in MSNs tended to drive, or 
engage in ‘purposeful destination walks’ to neighborhood shops located on 
the fringes of MSNs, the net effect being a decreased sense of community. 
 
Conversely, a lack of community ‘common space’ pauperizes its stock of 
social capital. Mark Roseland observes that ‘ a community must have 
commons’, meeting places or clusters where social interactions occur.  ‘[A] 
lack of common space impairs community self-image’, and the resultant 
‘heavy emphasis on the private domain’ discourages participation. In its quest 
to multiply social capital, sustainable communities literature stresses the 
193 Ibid, 90. 
194 Lund defines sense of community as ‘a sense of mutual aid, neighborhood security, sense 
of belonging (and) shared values.’ Hollie Lund, ‘Pedestrian Environments and Sense of 
Community’ (2002) 21 Journal of Planning Education and Research 301, 302. 
195Lund’s empirical research endeavors to show the significance of pedestrian-friendly 
environments ‘above and beyond [other] important demographic factors.’ Ibid, 311. 
196 Ibid, 310. 
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desirability of many different ‘thoughtful’197 sites of social interaction, a 
potential enlivened and enlarged by property diversity.  
 
Diverse property tells more than the singular or dominant story. In particular, 
its narratives embrace the idea of diffuse198 ownerships beyond the orthodox 
private model, sociable tales of community gardeners and strolling 
pedestrians, of ‘belonging’ to physicalized third spaces outside the private 
realm.  Such narratives speak of enhanced and frequent interaction, invoking 
(as sustainable communities literature theorizes) multiplied social capital.  The 
propertied landscape of ‘new urbanists’,199 and their fostering of social capital 
through physical urban design, is one that incorporates key tenets of property 
diversity, a serendipitous yet noteworthy convergence. 
 
4.3 Property diversity as a metaphor of values 
 
Rose’s third way of seeing property, as metaphor, is also discernible in 
sustainable communities literature. It occurs as the symbolic representation of 
property’s competing individualistic and communitarian values. While private 
lawscapes chiefly enact the values of the former, the composite mosaic 
makes room for the latter. And in recognizing that property is multivalent, the 
mosaic also highlights the inherent tension between the two.  
 
This tension forms the basis of Gregory Alexander’s under-regarded dialectic 
of modern property law, property as commodity versus property as 
propriety.200 Alexander argues that the ascendant market-oriented view of 
property is only ‘half-right.’ He traces the history of American legal thought 
from the 18th century to argue that property is not monistic, that it has ‘multiple 
meanings and multiple traditions’,201 and that one-half of this continuity is a 
view of property as propriety. This Alexander defines as ‘property [as] the 
material foundation for creating and maintaining the social order, the private 
197 A ‘thoughtful interaction’ of public, private, semi-private, and common land enhances 
‘civicness.’ Roselund, above n169, 11. 
198 Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000). 
199 Franzese, above n156; Roselund, above n169, 141-2. 
200 Alexander, above n33. 
201 Ibid, 7. 
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basis for the public good.’202 Importantly this dialectic has ‘normative 
commitments’, with property as commodity based on the value that the 
‘market is the primary mechanism for mediating individual preferences within 
society.’203 
 
In sustainable communities literature, Kent Portney uses a similar historical 
narrative204 to ultimately argue that sustainability indicators should not only 
measure environmental factors, but should also actively foster communitarian 
values in modern cities. In this way American cities will then faithfully reflect 
their shared (but presently skewed) traditions of individualism and 
communitarianism.205  
 
To many advocates of sustainable communities, making cities livable requires 
changing the fabric of civil society.  To state it succinctly, the concept of 
sustainable communities is fundamentally communitarian in nature… it is a 
question of public values.206 
 
For Portney, sustainability cannot be realized until communitarian values 
effectively counter the adverse effects of ‘rampant individualism.’207 This 
occurs when ‘great import is placed on the function of civil society, [on] the 
institutions and social processes that influence how residents interact.’208 
Public space is Portney’s metaphor for such values. In San Francisco, public 
space is green space, measured by proximity to natural settings, parks, or 
treed street corridors. In Seattle it is access to public cultural amenities such 
as libraries and galleries.209 
 
202 Ibid, 1. 
203 Ibid, 3. 
204 Portney mirrors Alexander’s ideas about competing values in the American tradition, that 
of individualism vs. communitarianism, arguing (like Alexander) that both have been present 
in American history from its founding. Portney, above n170, 130. 
205 Such ‘social justice’ SIs focus on participatory governance and egalitarianism, for example 
‘how participatory are the processes to develop sustainability plans?’ Ibid, 149. 
206 Ibid, 127-8. 
207 These include ‘the NIMBY syndrome, the tragedy of the commons, and trans boundary 
exporting of environmental impacts.’ Ibid, 130-153. 
208 Ibid, 125. 
209Ibid, 11.  
164 
 
                                                        
Many sustainability indicators are likewise indicia of property diversity.  The 
strategic siting of civic property amidst the private estate; dense, compact 
networks of sidewalks and public rights of way; the virtues of mixed land use; 
thoughtful interactions of public and private property in land that generate 
social capital; or the values of public and community space,210 all exemplify a 
common ground, one that speaks to new paradigms, and recognizes the 
shared flaws of the old.  
 
This literature also illustrates that property ‘penetrates everywhere in the 
realm of daily life’.211 Theodore Steinberg uses case studies, ‘Indians along a 
river, farmers in a desert, oil companies on a lake’212 to illustrate this point. In 
a similar case based study of the effects of environmental laws, John 
Copeland Nagle observes that ‘there is a special need … to recover the 
importance of place in environmental law.’213  The same holds true for 
property. Re-physicalizing property to place is to engage in what Nicholas 
Blomley calls ‘resistant re-mapping.’  Part 5 adopts this theme, situating the 
property mosaic to place, an act of resistance to a paradigm that poorly 
describes the landscapes in which it is sited.  
 
5. Mapping the property mosaic to place: case studies 
 
The locations selected in this part are ‘convenient’ in that they are, to varying 
degrees, the subject of existing study. In at least two cases, they are also 
‘imperious’ landscapes, places of great natural beauty where ‘property hits 
you in the eye.’ These two factors make the task of ‘mapping’ the property 
mosaic easier, and somehow more credible. However these locations are not 
exceptional, all human landscapes are ‘intensely propertied’, such that any 
locale, mundane or otherwise, could form the content of this exercise.   
 
The settings vary from rural through coastal peri-urban to suburban. In the 
first case, the mosaic is binary, where one (failed) public property tile is 
210 Noting the differences between the two, Brill, above n94. 
211 Steinberg, above n50, 9. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Nagle, above n123, 252.  
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substituted by another. In the second, a new mosaic replaces an earlier, more 
singular property mix. In the third, the mosaic is elaborately designed, a 
greenfield suburb well known for its sustainability and sense of community.  
These micro-studies infer that each place is better for its property diversity, in 
terms of either community ethos, the instituting of Aldo Leopold’s ‘good land 
use’, or both.  While these observations preface subsequent discussions in 
chapters 5 and 6, the primary objective of this part is to simply identify and 
situate the diverse property mosaic to actual place. In so situating, its 
objective is not to claim that property diversity is the sole or dominant driver 
for each community’s livability, but merely that it is observable, and thus 
noteworthy. 
 
5.1 The Central Otago Rail Trail, New Zealand 
 
This 150-kilometre rail trial is a publicly owned corridor that stretches from 
Middlemarch to Clyde in the Central Otago region of New Zealand’s South 
Island. The trail connects to a functioning rail line from Middlemarch to 
Dunedin, owned by the Dunedin City Council, and operated by a private 
tourism business. 214 
 
Construction of the branch railway line commenced in 1879 and was 
completed in 1921. Prior to World War II, the line carried passengers from the 
rural region to Dunedin, and freighted fruit, livestock and wool.215 The line’s 
slow demise began in the immediate post-war years when passenger services 
gave way to cars, and rail freight lost the regulatory protection that state-
owned railways once enjoyed against road freight competitors.216 In 1990, the 
line was closed and dismantled, leaving a disused public corridor vulnerable 
to private encroachment.217 The slow loss of government services and 
214 Taieri Gorge Limited. 
215 From Steam Trains to Pedal Power: The Story of the Central Otago Rail Trail (2004) 
(‘Steam Trains to Pedal Power‘) 11. 
216 For instance in 1961, road freight could only be carried for a maximum of 48 kilometres, 
ibid. 
217 In Oturehua, a local privately owned freight depot began parking trucks across the disused 
corridor, effectively privatizing the public lands. In the early 1990s when the NZ Department of 
Conservation (DoC) started to plan the development of the rail trail, it took DoC several years 
to re-claim the small section of the trail for public purposes and discontinue the illegal private 
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enterprises (including the railway) formed a pattern of ‘long decades of 
decline that dispirited the community. So much so, that when the idea for the 
Rail Trail was first put to the people living along the track, they wondered why 
anyone would pedal or walk through this barren land with no history.’218 
 
Led by the Otago Conservancy, the Department of Conservation (DoC) 
purchased the corridor from New Zealand Railways in 1993 with the intention 
of developing the nation’s first rail trail. In an era of declining public ownership, 
this conservation investment was a significant counter-example. Acquired as 
a ‘recreation reserve’ under the Reserves Act,219 DoC realized that 
community ‘ownership’ of the proposal was vital to its long-term viability.220 In 
1994, the Otago Central Rail Charitable Trust was formed, its stated purpose 
to  
 
Establish, develop and maintain the trail and any part of it for public 
recreation and enjoyment, and to assist and coordinate with the Department 
of Conservation, any local or regional authority or other group or person in 
that purpose. Walking, cycling and horse riding uses of the trail shall be 
paramount.221 
 
The Trust became the ‘face of the project…. gathering support for the trail as 
a recreational facility, ensuring its sustainability, coordinating its promotion 
and fundraising.’222 With financial and community support from the Trust, DoC 
re-built the line from 1994 to 2000, re-surfacing the former tracks, re-decking 
use, notwithstanding that the land had never passed out of public ownership. Private 
conversation, Graeme Duncan, Wedderburn, 29 December 2012. 
218 Steam Trains to Pedal Power, 12 
219 Under s 17(1) Reserves Act 1977 (NZ), the primary purpose of recreation reserves are to 
provide ‘areas for the recreation and sporting activities and the physical welfare and 
enjoyment of the public, and for the protection of the natural environment and beauty of the 
countryside, with emphasis on the retention of open spaces and on outdoor recreational 
activities, including recreational tracks in the countryside.’ The public has ‘freedom of entry 
and access to the reserve’ under s 17(2)(a), meaning that entry fees cannot be charged.  
220 DoC was also required to ensure that the ‘re-development of the line should not impact on 
or divert funds from other priority conservation work.’ Steam Trains to Pedal Power, 12. 
221 It also receives and administers donations.  It has 4 trustees and a patron ‘who provide a 
geographic spread along the trail and who come form a diverse range of business and 
community backgrounds.’ Many on the trust were the original community leaders who first 
advocated the idea of a rail trail and lobbied DoC to purchase the line. Ibid, 64-5. 
222 Steam Trains to Pedal Power, 12. 
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bridges, and restoring historic infrastructure such as ganger’s huts, viaducts 
and culverts.223  
 
The re-development of the rail corridor faced widespread opposition from 
adjoining private landowners.  Farmers feared interferences with agricultural 
practices, unchecked trespass, and heightened risks of pests and fire. Many 
thought the corridor should be used for grazing, with sections sold to 
neighboring landowners. Today, most farmers are happy to be proved wrong. 
Many embrace the commercial opportunities that recreationalists provide, 
establishing lodgings or food outlets224 along the length of the track.  The 
public agency’s investment has breathed economic life back into moribund 
rural communities, and restored the region’s pride in its history. Once 
sceptical private landowners agree with the sentiment that ‘DoC had shown a 
lot of foresight and should be congratulated.’225 
 
The trail passes through a majestic, empty landscape of mountains, high 
country valleys, and tussock grasslands, interspersed by small towns that 
service grazing industries, a ‘land of schists and tors’ and climatic extremes. 
Its stark, rugged natural beauty engenders a sense of belonging that Otago 
poet Brian Turner describes as ‘the surpassing glory of our right habitation of 
place.’226 Turner writes of the landscape invoking in him a strong land ethic, a 
duty of stewardship ‘underpinned by an acceptance that life is not all about us 
but about what’s all about us.’227  The advent of the trail has enhanced ‘good 
land use’ in the region, ‘since its completion many communities have become 
actively involved in developing the trail further, helping and initiating 
replacement and restoration of station buildings and creating shade-giving 
223Ibid, 13. 
224 For example the Duncan family who have farmed at Wedderburn since 1894, established 
accommodation cottages on their farmland adjoining the track. Personal conversation, 29 
December 2012.  The track has been described as a ‘latter lover’s dream’, 13. Tourist 
numbers are estimated at 120,000 per year, including 5,000 who complete the full 150 
kilometre journey. The rail trail has ‘allowed for significant exposure of the region to hikers, 
cyclists, and backpackers across all seasons.’ David Duval, ‘When buying into the business, 
we knew it was seasonal; perceptions of seasonality in Central Otago, New Zealand’ (2004) 6 
Int. Journal of Tourism Research 325, 327. 
225 Graeme Duncan, ‘Community Head of Steam – From a Rail to a Trail’ video recording, 
undated.  
226 Brian Turner, Elemental: Central Otago Poems (2012) 14. 
227 Ibid. 
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plantings of native trees.’228 Significantly the statutory basis for the trail 
mandates that ‘those qualities of the reserve which contribute to the 
pleasantness, harmony, and cohesion of the natural environment and to the 
better use and enjoyment of the reserve shall be conserved’, including water, 
soil, and forest values.229 
 
The property mosaic in the Central Otago is a largely private landscape of 
broadacre grazing stations and small urban holdings connected by a 150 
kilometre public conduit, a thin ‘ribbon’ of public land that now defines the 
propertied landscape. Although legally structured as a recreation reserve, the 
partnership between DoC and the Otago Central Rail Trust diffuses DoC’s 
ostensible title to the trail, adding a further nuanced layer of community 
ownership. Meanwhile the trail’s status as statutory reserve impresses upon 
the agency’s bare title a beneficial ownership on behalf of all New 
Zealanders230 (one akin to Carol Rose’s ‘unorganized public’), where 
sociability becomes the public estate’s core rationale.231 The presence of a 
vibrant public estate also enhances the value of nearby private lands, 
engenders a renewed sense of community in the towns along the trail,232 and 
inserts into the landscape a statutory obligation to protect natural and scenic 
resources. The surrounding private estate also shapes the contours of the 
public right. Similar to the UK Countryside Rights of Way Act, a code of 
conduct requires trail users to ‘leave gates as you find them, not disturb stock, 
and not to venture onto private property’233, accommodating private values 
such as productivity and privacy in the exercise of the public right. The trail 
also fulfills Gregory Alexander’s property as propriety; property’s capacity to 
enable well-lived human lives, a quality that infuses Brian Turner’s ode to 
‘Biking the Central Otago Rail Trail’. 
 
228 Steam Trains to Pedal Power, 14. 
229 Section 17(2)(c) & (d) Reserves Act 1977 (NZ). 
230 Gibbs v The New Plymouth District Council [2006] NZHC 231. 
231 Carol Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom and Inherently Public 
Property’ (1986) 53 U. Chi. LR 711. 
232 Carla Jellum & Arianne Reis, Otago Central Rail Trail Economic Impact and Trends 
Survey 2008; Sarah McGregor & Michelle Thompson-Fawcett, ‘Tourism in a small town: 
impacts on community solidarity’ (2011) 3 Int. Journal of Sustainable Society 174. 
233 Steam Trains to Pedal Power, 25. 
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 From Waipata, north to Wedderburn 
 On a clear, still bright autumn Saturday, 
 It’s airy and eerie on the old rail trail, 
 The land sloping right to left 
 from the Ida and Hawkdun ranges 
 to the Taieri headwaters, the ridgelines 
cut into the sky, the mountains hanging 
as if suspended in air rather than 
rising out of the brown-top land. 
The day’s tricked up but not tricked out 
and the line runs straight onto Ranfurly 
and out the other side, going west.234 
 
5.2 The Sea Ranch, California 
 
The Sea Ranch is a 4,000-acre planned residential community along ten 
miles of northern Californian coastline. Devised as an ‘open’ and ‘exploratory’ 
architectural experiment,235 The Sea Ranch was ‘born in the era of Rachel 
Carson and Ralph Nader, the rise of …awareness of environmental concerns, 
[and] the introduction of the term ecology.’236 Its founding ideals were 
visionary, with landscape architect Lawrence Halprin aiming for  
 
[a] feeling of overall ‘place’, a feeling of community in which the whole was 
more important than the parts…if the whole could link buildings and 
nature…then we could feel that we had created something worthwhile which 
did not destroy, but rather enhanced the natural beauty we had been given.237 
 
Before its developer Oceanic Properties bought the family owned ‘Rancho del 
Mar’ in 1963 the property mosaic was simple, a large, privately owned farm, 
with a history of ranching and redwoods logging.238 Any public interest in the 
234 Turner, above n226, 23. 
235 Donlyn Lyndon, ‘The Sea Ranch Qualified Vernacular’ (2009) Journal of Architectural 
Education 81, 82. 
236 Donlyn Lyndon and Jim Alinder, The Sea Ranch (2004) 29. 
237 Ibid, 19. 
238 The Sea Ranch’s history is detailed in Susan Clark Images of America The Sea Ranch 
(2009) 
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landscape comprised the dormant public trust in the wet sands of the beach, 
and the meandering California State Highway 1. The purchase by Oceanic 
Properties merely substituted one private owner for another, leaving the basic 
property pattern intact for the short term. 
 
In 1965 as the development plans gathered pace, a residents association was 
formed in which common property in the development was vested.239  The 
original design was heavily influenced by the ‘establishment of large stretches 
of commons that would preserve the dominance of the natural setting’;240 an 
effort to share the landscape rather than having it ‘sequestered in separate 
private ownerships’.241 Fifty percent of all land set aside for open space would 
be ‘held in common for all Sea Ranchers to own and enjoy.’242 Commons 
served environmental and aesthetic functions, where ‘large areas of 
commonly held land…would ensure the perpetuation of the coastal 
ecology.’243 Commons also had social implications. 
  
Throughout Sea Ranch, the land held in common, particularly the commons 
in the coastal meadows became a focal point of shared interest. Management 
of this treasured asset was expressed as a community responsibility, not a 
task for individual property owners looking out for their own parcels…  That 
no one citizen exclusively owned a piece of the natural resource- the 
resource that is the very foundation of the community - …defied conventional 
development wisdom and cemented a bond of common interest…244 
 
As the 1960s ended, another interest was added to the mosaic, an assertive 
awakening of the public trust interest in beach access and the preservation of 
coastal vistas. Many started to see The Sea Ranch as an enclave of private 
privilege, groups such as ‘Californians Organized to Acquire Access to State 
239 The resident’s association was also charged with enforcing a ‘declaration of covenants, 
conditions and restrictions’, title restrictions that regulated building materials and design, but 
more importantly imposed a strict landscape plan where houses were clustered to mimic the 
coastal landscape of ridgelines, pastures and hedgerows.  
240 Lyndon & Alinder, above n236, 19. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Lawrence Halprin, The Sea Ranch Diary of an Idea (2002) 35. 
243 Lyndon & Alinder, above n236, 19. 
244 Richard Sexton, Parallel Utopias: The Quest for Community (1995) 35. 
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Tidelands’ (COAST) complained of it locking up ten miles of access to publicly 
owned tidelands.  In 1968 COAST sponsored an unsuccessful county 
initiative to force coastal access through almost every mile of the property.  A 
deal with Sonoma County Supervisors, in which 100 acres of public park245 
were traded for public access rights over the ten miles of coastline, attracted 
much criticism in the early 1970s.246   Eventually the public interest in coastal 
access prevailed, with the passage of Proposition 20 that established regional 
and statewide Coastal Commissions.247 The planning powers of the North 
Central Coastal Commission effectively halted The Sea Ranch for eight years 
through its blanket refusal of building permits. In 1980 the State of California 
ended the stalemate by entering the mosaic legislatively, in the process 
asserting all Californians’ interest in the beach and unimpeded coastal vistas. 
The specific state bill248ended the planning powers of the North Central 
Coastal Commission in return for the guarantee of five dedicated access 
easements, a near halving of the number of house sites249, and scenic 
corridors from State Highway 1. The compromise formalized public rights to 
access and coastal prospect, and imposed public restraints on private rights.  
 
The Sea Ranch illustrates the construction of a mosaic from relatively simple 
property arrangements in the early 1960s, to a complex inter-connected mix 
of public, private and common property post-1980. The transition resulted in a 
shift from a ‘look-but-don’t-touch’ landscape, to one with some public access 
and entitlement. It resulted in a landscape that was more aesthetically and 
ecologically sustainable than the landscape constructed by its earlier property 
patterns.250 The Sea Ranch’s deliberate property structures were designed to 
245 Gifted by Oceanic Properties with the intention of providing the sole public access, alter 
expanded to 140 acres.  
246 Dion Dyer, ‘California Beach Access: The Mexican Law and the Public Trust’, (1972) 2 
Ecology L.Q. 571, 573, 585-6. 
247 Calif. Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 (Proposition 20), codified as Cal. Pub. Res. 
Code SS 27000 et seq.  The act also created the Californian Coastal Commission, and had 
statewide implications for coastal zone land management and recreational beach access.  
248 Bane Bill 1980. 
249 Housing lots reduced from 5,200 to 2,300. Also sites for low-income housing were 
mandated.  
250 ‘What has emerged [at The Sea Ranch] is a landscape with much more vegetation than 
when Oceanic arrived. In addition to the large-scale plantings, the forest has expanded of its 
own accord. Invasion of the meadows no longer kept in check by grazing.’ Lyndon and 
Alinder, above n236, 73. 
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integrate community and social cohesion (a sense of the ‘whole’ rather than 
an aggregate of sequestered housing lots251); stewardship was articulated in 
terms of ‘lightly living with the land’;252 and the shared nature of the coastal 
landscape emphasized co-existing uses, not exclusive dominion.  Private 
housing rights adjoined communal use of meadows and community 
infrastructure, while public rights to the beach, access paths and coastal 
vistas were enshrined by statute. The blurring of property lines253 predicted by 
Joseph Sax in his ‘economy of nature’ came to pass 
 
Fences enforcing property lines are discouraged…Where houses are very 
close together, fences are considered necessary for privacy and for screening 
cars, but not for demarcating property lines. An intentionally fuzzy line is 
desired for the boundary between individually owned and community 
property.254 
 
In the (mostly architectural and landscape) literature written about The Sea 
Ranch, the diverse property mosaic is never far below the surface. The 
following excerpt, describing the aesthetics of the ‘Hedgerow Houses’, typifies 
this invocation of property plurality. 
 
[As a] model for quiet, thoughtful delineation of common boundaries….the 
long row of simple board fence at the property line is made as a common face 
for the public realm, and not as an individuated expression of the private 
properties beyond it.  It speaks of continuity and public purpose…the 
ensemble creates a place of real distinction - a place that shows respect for 
the private worlds of each house, as well as for the common realms of street 
and meadow.255 
 
251 Halprin’s vision was of a ‘social community for people of like minds, with a love of 
nature…for whom “living lightly on this land” would be a governing principle. We decided to 
imagine the entire ranch as a community of people and design holistically.  We would cluster 
buildings densely as in a farm village, by doing so we could leave at least half the land open 
for nature, undisturbed.  The large common areas around which the buildings would be 
grouped were to remain open forever and form the matrix of the community.’ Ibid, 287. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Another example of the blurring of property lines is the original transitioning between 
private and common areas designed by its landscape architect, Halprin, above n242, 41. 
254 Sexton, above n244, 36. 
255 Lyndon and Alinder, above n236, 55. 
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5.3 Village Homes, Davis, California 
 
The third case study is another planned community, the suburb of Village 
Homes in the university town of Davis, California. A greenfield project, its first 
homes were built in 1975 with the final build out in 1982.  It has been called 
‘one of the most important and inspiring built examples of sustainable 
community design in the United States.’256 
 
The designers of Village Homes sought to realize two radical objectives, 
‘helping people live more lightly on the land, and creating a sense of 
community.’257 Determined to avoid outcomes of ‘only private houses and 
private yards,’258 design innovations included narrower, no-through streets, 
small housing clusters of 8 dwellings, the extensive use of paths and cycle 
ways,259 and the dedication of 25% of the site to public and community open 
space. The latter includes 12 acres of greenbelts and open space, 12 acres of 
common agricultural land, two village greens, and a community swimming 
pool and meeting centre.260 The common lands are subdivided into three 
typologies; household commons, greenbelt commons and agricultural lands, 
in which all Village Homes residents hold common property interests. The 
neighborhood constitution specifies three sanctioned uses of the commons, 
‘enjoyment, flowers and food, and profit’,261 the latter two referring to 
widespread planting of edible vegetation,262 and a 300 tree almond orchard 
that raises income to offset neighborhood fees. Apart from utilitarian263 and 
aesthetic purposes, the common spaces also enhance sociability by providing 
‘a place and a reason for people to come together, thereby allowing a sense 
256 Mark Francis, Village Homes A Community by Design (2003) xi; Wheeler & Beatley, above 
n166, 418-420. 
257 Judy Corbett and Michael Corbett, Designing Sustainable Communities: Learning from 
Village Homes (2000) 8. These twin objects remain central to the community’s rationale, see 
the Village Homes website at http://www.villagehomes.com. 
258 Corbett, above n257, 3. 
259 These paths connect housing clusters and provide meeting and interactive places for 
residents, in an echo of Jane Jacobs’ drivers of ‘city diversity’. 
260 Francis, above n256, 9, 47. 
261 Ibid, 36. 
262 The list of edible plants include grapes, citrus fruit, cherries, apricots, peaches, plums, figs, 
persimmons, guavas, and almonds. ‘With the exception of the almonds, residents are invited 
to pick whatever they like without charge.’ Corbett, above n257, 39. 
263 An important use of the greenbelt commons was to provide for natural drainage swales 
that capture storm water run-off. Ibid, 43-47. 
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of community to develop.’264Importantly, these commons are ‘lived in’ 
landscapes, where good land use is performed. They are not simply 
manicured ‘look at’ spaces. 
 
There are people actually using these open spaces – walking, digging, or 
playing for example. When empty, there are physical traces of use such as 
garden furniture, tools, and children’s toys. Together this activity 
communicates a sense of stewardship – people caring for and feeling 
attached to where they live.265 
 
Mark Francis compares Village Homes to the rest of the city of Davis, 
internationally renowned in its own right for urban sustainability. Taylor 
observes that visitors to Davis typically fail to perceive the city’s reputation, 
with its conventional, largely private suburban layout. Yet in Village Homes, 
with its patent common spaces, sustainability is more persuasive, it ‘hits you 
in the eye.’ 
 
Village Homes displays several interesting features of the diverse property 
mosaic. First is the blurring of boundaries, particularly between private and 
non-private space. The ‘household commons’ deliberately blends private into 
common, residences front and overlook the common gardens, not the street, 
and the differentiation between ‘heavily vegetated private and shared land’ is 
not discernible.266 Covenants preclude internal dividing fences, only carefully 
planted hedges, trees, or shrubs provide a substitute for privacy. Private 
outdoor courtyards segue effortlessly into common orchards and drainage 
watercourses; here the emphasis is on use, not demarcated dominion. If there 
is any sense of boundary, it is the line that divides Village Homes from the 
rest of Davis, not internal boundaries within the suburb.267  
 
264 Ibid, 32. Specific events that foster ‘community’ include an annual festival that coincides 
with the almond harvest. The authors conclude that up to 80% of residents regularly 
participate in communal activities, a factor attributed to 25% of the land being devoted to 
common open space. Ibid, 140-2. 
265 Francis, above n256, 11. 
266 Corbett, above n257, 37. 
267 Ibid, 140. 
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Second, and a consequence of the first, is a tangible sense of diffused 
ownership of common land. In Village Homes this translates into lower crime 
rates. 
 
Residents have planned and maintained their commons, they have a vested 
interest in the spaces, and they have every right to protect these areas from 
intruders. Even the more public greenbelts are less vulnerable to vandalism 
than an adjacent park.  Residents pay for maintenance of the greenbelts; they 
have played a part in hiring the gardeners; and they may have participated in 
planning or building a pool, play structure or orchard. Therefore they have a 
direct interest in defending the open spaces around them.268 
 
Third, is a strong recognition by residents of the distinction between public 
and common property.  This manifests in disputes where outsiders pick fruit 
from community orchards.  Residents enforce their common rights to the 
produce, posting signs indicating that the fruit trees are on community not 
public land, and warning against unauthorized picking.269 And in the official 
typology of ‘open space’, there is an explicit characterization of ‘streets, 
bicycle and pedestrian paths, and central greens’ as public lands, while 
‘community vineyards and orchards, and household commons’ are common 
lands. This recognition of the diversity of non-private property, especially the 
legal distinction between public and common, is rare. While not an ‘imperious’ 
natural landscape, the constructed landscape of Village Homes has become 
one where, as Carol Rose predicts, people ‘see’ property and debate its 
implications.  
 
The ‘mapping’ exercise is descriptive only, portraying in words the place and 
role of private, public and common lands in three chosen landscapes. In some 
literature, actual maps have been drawn; the original concept plan of Village 
Homes being the most expressive in terms of delineating the private, public 
268 Ibid, 144. 
269 Francis, above n256, 67. 
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and common estates.270 Yet to ‘map’ the diverse property mosaic is to go 
beyond the two-dimensional, it requires the addition of nuanced overlays 
(such as trust ‘ownership’ of the Central Otago Rail Trail), as well capturing 
pictorially the complex interconnections between public, private and common 
lands that are a daily component of community life.  Mapping the mosaic is 
also problematic where boundaries are designed to blur, or because use 
rights predominate.  Yet despite its challenges, it is a future task worth 
pursuing. Efforts to pictorially represent the property mosaic in this thesis are 
left to the following part 6, and its photographic recording of diverse property 
in situ. 
  
270 Ibid x. Other examples include a map of traditional versus modern subdivision layouts in 
Lund, above n194, 304; or the map of ownerships in California’s Cosumnes Valley 
conservation project in Fairfax et al, above n114, 247. 
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6. Picturing property diversity 
 
 
  
Figure 1    
  
Figure 2  
Figure 1 The right to exclude is both 
dominant and domineering in private 
property discourse. The US Supreme Court 
says it is ‘one of the most treasured strands 
in an owner’s bundle of property rights’.  
Jerry Anderson says modern property has 
‘canonized’ the right, placing it at the top of 
the judicial ‘woodpile’ without regard to 
context, community values or social norms. 
Its spectral monopolization has rendered 
other property types invisible, and produced 
Nicole Graham’s monotonous ‘lawscape’ 
where ‘‘standardised, universal and 
measurable space [is] grafted over place so 
that physicality and particularity of places 
became irrelevant.’ 
 
Figure 2  Carol Rose ‘sees’ abandoned 
fences as symbolic of private property’s 
‘impermanence and pathos’ and a refutation 
of its pretence of unchanging fixity. It is also 
symbolic of Theodore Steinberg’s ‘folly of 
owning nature.’     
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Figure 3   
  
Figure 4 
 
Figure 3  Southampton Common in the UK was an example of ‘traditional 
common property.’  Today it signifies the misunderstandings about the nature of 
property other than private property. Its open access as a park has effectively 
transformed it into public land. 
 
Figure 4  The Clunes Common in NSW illustrates the transportability of 
traditional ideas of common property, where use rights of the land is restricted 
to members of the association in whom the common rights are vested.  Public 
access to the grounds is however permitted, again indicating a blurring of 
property type at the edges. 
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Figures 5 and 6 
 
Figure 5  In this image, Crown pastoral tenure in the NZ high country  abuts public 
conservation land.  The fence line to the right of the tramper’s hut represents the 
boundary line. It also represents the powerful rhetorical force of the private right to 
exclude to devour other co-exisiting rights, effectively landlocking and precluding 
public access to the hut on the conservation estate. 
 
Figure 6  The wet and dry sands of beaches signifiies the boundary line between 
private littoral lands and inherently public property under the US doctrine of the public 
trust.  Public rights of access to such public lands across dry sands is problematic, 
and varies between jurisdictions. 
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Figure 7   
 
Figure 8 
 
Figure 7  This boundary fence separates two forms of public lands, one the 
conservation estate, and another encumbered by a private right to graze.  The fence 
is practical (in keeping sheep enclosed) but also symbolic of the propensity of the 
private right to conflate and extinguish co-existing public property rights in the context 
of vast, empty landscapes, such as the NZ high country.  
 
Figure 8  The rough hand-painted sign indicating the location of the ‘public track’ is 
misleading, as everything in this image is public property.  The NZ bach located on 
coastal foreshore is a post-hoc sanctioned private right to use (valid on weekends 
and vacations). ‘What we see is what we get’, an image that suggests at first blush 
the typical intersection of public and private property.  If we ‘see’ deeper, we get 
public foreshore, private rights to use, and unseen indigenous rights.  
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Figure 9 
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 9  Opponents of coal seam gas (CSG) exploration seek to ‘zip’ up their lands, 
as this public art at Southern Cross University, NSW demonstrates.  This art speaks 
to a certain desire to re-physicalize property rights in land, a defence against 
separable and abstract property sticks, such as the right to exploit divisible resources. 
 
Figure 10  At The Channon Oval, NSW, residents ‘stand on their patch’, a rough 
scale drawing of local valleys, creeks and roads etched on the oval’s turf, in a further 
protest against CSG.  This image speaks again of people re-contextualsing their 
property rights to landed place.  It also invokes ideas of Nicholas Blomley, of 
mapping property rights beyond the ‘central logic’, private as well as collective.  
Blomley sees property constantly made and performed, especially through contest, 
dissent and protest. 
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Figure 11 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 11 and 12  The Central Otago rail trail in NZ is a thin ribbon of public property 
that transects this rural region.  It epitomizes the values and rationales of public 
property in land, the likes of a democratic sociability with strangers, recreation, and 
the human need for solitude. These foster Gregory Alexander’s ‘property as 
propriety’, the forgotten half of the property dialectic, a capacity for public 
infrastructure to enhance well-lived civic lives. 
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Figure 13  
 
Figure 14 
 
Figure 13  The public domain in the western US is subject to private rights to graze 
under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, however public rights of recreational access 
are unaffected. Here signs speak of inclusion, not exclusion.  
 
Figure 14  This public walking track in NZ (secured by the Queen’s Chain) crosses 
over private farmland.  Here exclusion and inclusion co-exist with compromises. 
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Figure 15 
 
 
Figure 16 
 
Figure 15  The sociability of public property in land is Carol Rose’s ‘comedy of the 
commons’, sociable street scenes where’ the more is the merrier’.  
 
Figure 16  Again public property in land provides the physical and metaphorical 
space and infrastructure for egalitarianism, as these public handball courts in Los 
Angeles enact.   
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Figure 17   
 
Figure 18  
Figure 17  At The Sea Ranch, an ethos of ‘living lightly off the land’ saw property 
lines blur. The shared nature of the coastal landscape emphasizes co-existing uses, 
not exclusive dominion.  Private housing rights adjoin communal use of meadows 
and community infrastructure…  
Figure 18   Seeing property through Joseph Sax’s ‘economy of nature’ blurs the 
significance of property lines.  We see the land in between and across boundaries, 
not the markers that dissect it into atomized, disconnected parcels.  Here empty 
landscapes such as the Central Otago in NZ are largely uncluttered with the indicia 
of (at least private) property. 
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Figure 19 
 
 
Figure 20  
Figure 19 and 20  Coastal landscapes are visually imperious ones, where property 
as Carol Rose explains, ‘hits you in the eye.’ Here the property mosaic is more 
apparent, with well-trodden grassed paths asserting public rights over what otherwise 
appears to be private land.  Elsewhere the demarcation is more marked, by fences 
and properly constructed trails. 
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Figure 21 
 
 
Figure 22  
Figure 21  Private rights encroach readily on vulnerable public ones.  Here a truck 
depot encroached onto abandoned rail tracks on the Central Otago Rail Trail in NZ. It 
took years for the Department of Conservation to rectify the unauthorized private 
trespass. 
 
Figure 22  Signs in the middle of paddocks speak of the far from neat public/private 
divide. As Margaret Davies explains, there is ‘no bright line’. 
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Figure 23 
 
Figure 23  Nicholas Blomley says the public sidewalk is a staunch and vigorous defender 
of the public estate. Here the sidewalk comes up against Georgette Poindexter’s neatly 
manicured lawn, which she describes as a suburban ‘idolization of the private realm’ that 
eviscerates community and other collective values.          
189 
 
 
Figure 24. 
 
 
Figure 25 
 
Figure 24 and 25   Carol Rose says that the norms of common property include 
moderation and proportionality in the shared use of resources. Here an intentional 
community ‘lives lightly off the land’, performing acts of good land use, including 
rainforest re-vegetation, and micro-hydro power generation. Title to the property is 
held by a co-operative, with shareholdings conferring exclusive use within residential 
envelopes. All other lands are common lands, used for food growing, rainforest re-
vegetation, and the running of a dairy herd. It exemplifies the outside private shell 
and inside common collective. 
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Figure 26 
 
 
Figure 27 
 
Figure 26   Anti-CSG (coal seam gas) protestors invoke William Blackstone’s ‘sole 
and despotic dominion’ trope in ‘locking the gate.’ 
 
Figure 27  This road sign talks of collective property being ‘protected by community’. 
It has strong parallels to Nicholas Blomley’s study of collective property claims in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside in Unsettling the City Urban Land and the Politics of 
Property (2004). 
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 Figure 28 
 
 
Figure 29 
 
Figure 28   Rose says that property can be seen as picture, metaphor, narrative or 
illusion.  Here a sand sculptor sees his ‘private property’ in his creative effort, seeking 
to exclude and to make income.  His property rights are of course an illusion. Illusory 
property rights however can be less obvious, such as Kevin Gray’s public ‘rights’ in 
private shopping malls. 
 
Figure 29  Modern common property can be seen in the unlikeliest and most 
everyday of places. Here a ski lodge at Mt Hotham, Victoria operates on common 
property principles, as an outside private shell with inside communitarian use rights 
for a small community of lodge members.   
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Figure 30  Sue Farran’s account of an 
‘extraordinary return to the land’ 
describes new and evolving 
relationships between people and land. 
This phenomenon is ‘seen’ through a 
resurgence of interest in community 
gardens, orchards and allotments. 
Farran argues this ‘return to the land’ 
poses challenges to orthodox land law, 
with its innovative tenures (such as 
crop-shares and tree-leases) and its re-
emphasis on the social and cultural 
values of property. 
 
Figure 31 This sign at the Santa 
Monica Community Garden in 
California is interesting in its Lockean 
articulation of private property in a 
distinctly hybrid context. Private rights 
are asserted in a publicly accessible 
forum, but where use rights to garden 
and cultivate are restricted to eligible 
communal members.  
Figures 30 and 31 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter canvasses the idea of diversity in property in land. It has 
identified both its defining characteristics and its constituent elements. It has 
sought out its telltale signs in the literature of sustainable communities, 
situated it to specific place, and enlivened its words with pictures. It now ends 
where it began, with Carol Rose’s homespun tales about ‘seeing’, and the 
transformative power of imagination. 
 
There is an old adage, told of plain people and plain things: what you see is 
what you get.  Property seems plain in this way too: what you see is what you 
get. With property, the nature of “things” imposes their own constraints. Yet 
even with those, what you see in property is what you and others have talked 
yourselves into about those “things”; and given some imagination, you may 
talk yourselves into seeing something else, with all the effects on 
understanding and action that a new “envisioning” may bring.271 
 
For some centuries, we have talked ourselves into seeing a narrow picture of 
property in land.  The limitations of this perspective, and its vexed 
consequences for land obligation and community are the subject of 
succeeding chapters.  Perhaps a fresh burst of imagination; a new 
‘envisioning’ of property in land may ‘talk us into seeing something else.’  As 
Charles Reich exhorted nearly 50 years ago in his unrealized call to action, it 
may be time to see and describe a ‘new property’.         
271 Rose, above n6, 297.  194 
 
                                                        
Chapter 5 Land Obligation and Property Diversity 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To ‘see’ property patterns in human landscapes is to invoke a duality of 
perspective.  One view is atomistic, an image of individual land parcels, and 
the distinct property lines that divide and fragment ownerships.1  The other is 
holistic, the collective ‘warp and woof’2 of property type that weaves a 
pluralistic fabric across place.  The atomistic view is premised on a private 
paradigm where ‘standardized, universal and measurable space’3 de-
physicalizes place from context, and primacy is accorded to rights between 
persons about things. 4 By contrast, the holistic vision is intimately contextual 
and diverse, where rights, uses and claims to property inter-connect person to 
place. Into this conflicted ‘seeing’, where only the private half-truth of the 
dialectic prevails,5 land obligation is an ideal adrift. Yet as James Karp 
explains, developing a land ethic is critical. 
 
Land is fundamentally different from other forms of property.  Because any 
parcel of land is part of a network of natural systems extending beyond the 
boundaries described in the deed, it attains an importance superior to any 
individual landowner or to any period of time. Land is essential to our right of 
survival.  Although a legally recognized landowner has extensive rights to 
use, to exclude and to convey land to others, those rights should be limited by 
a duty of land stewardship.6 
 
This chapter argues that Karp’s call for ‘a duty of land stewardship’ will go 
largely unheeded where property in land is depicted through the private lens, 
1 ‘Land parcels are discrete things, managed separately, and connected to one another only 
at the  
edge.’ Eric Freyfogle, ‘Bounded People, Boundless Land’ in Richard Knight & Peter Landres 
(eds.) Stewardship Across Boundaries, (1998) 17; Curt Meine, Correction Lines: Essays on 
Land, Leopold, and Conservation (2004) 202 
2 Aldo Leopold, For the Health of the Land: Previously Unpublished Essays and Other 
Writings, 
J. Baird Callicott & Eric T. Freyfogle (eds.) (1999) 168  
3 Nicole Graham, Lawscape Property Environment Law (2010) 
4 Stuart Banner, American Property A History of How, Why and What We Own (2011) 101-6 
5 Cf Gregory Alexander, Commodity & propriety Competing Visions in American Legal 
Thought 1776-1970 (1997) 
6  James Karp,  ‘A Private Property Duty of Stewardship: Changing our Land Ethic’, (1993) 23 
Envtl. Law 735. 
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a paradigm largely ill suited to generating concepts of obligation alongside 
right. It also describes how property diversity offers new ways to rethink the 
closed loop we seem stuck in. This chapter does not argue why we must 
change from the hegemonic view, but it does describe its failings, and 
conversely, the potentiality of a diverse reconceptualization.  
 
Part 2 commences by observing that definitions of ‘stewardship’ or ‘land 
obligation’ are inevitably instrumental where property is monistic. The vexed 
place of obligation in modern property is then canvassed in part 3, whether in 
terms of property traditions, theories, or hierarchies. In Part 4, three 
institutional factors of modern property are identified that singly and 
cumulatively impede stewardship; abstraction, commoditization, and 
individualism. Part 5 concludes by examining landscapes where property 
diversity fosters an ownership ‘suffused with moral content.’7  
  
Eric Freyfogle says that property patterns matter because they create a 
‘framework for managing and using nature…they explain who gets to do what 
and where.’8 Ultimately, which patterns we ‘see’ and their implications for 
‘who gets to do what and where’ depend on which side of the duality prevails. 
This chapter considers how the implications of property diversity may resolve 
this dialectic tension.   
 
2. Defining stewardship through the (private) property lens 
 
Stewardship is a nebulous, ill-fitting concept in modern property.  Richard 
Barnes describes it as having ‘a long theoretical heritage, albeit an ambiguous 
and marginal one, which has struggled in the shadow of the stronger, pro-
dominion approach to the control of resources.’9 While often asserted as a 
duty,10 its place in property’s structure is unsettled, an issue explored in part 
3.   Many scholars aspire to a property right imbued with an environmental 
7 Eduardo Penalver, ‘Land Virtues’ (2009) 94 Cornell LR 876. 
8 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society Land Culture Conflict and Hope (2007) 
107.  
9 Richard Barnes Property Rights and Natural Resources (2009) 155-6, Margaret Davies, 
Property Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 131. 
10 Karp ,above n6. 
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ethic.11  But defining ‘stewardship’ through the private lens illustrates the 
unbridged gulf between aspiration and implementation. The result is that 
‘stewardship’ is articulated as practical and outcomes measured, an 
essentially ‘extra-property’ construct. 
 
Joseph Sax calls stewardship the law’s ‘awkward little secret,’12 an 
inconvenient truth about property’s problematic relationship with place.  
Margaret Davies explains the orthodoxy, and its counterpoint. 
 
Property is not an object at all, but rather a legally defined relationship 
between persons with respect to an object. ‘Property’ is only an effect, a 
construction, of relationships between people, meaning that its objective 
character is contestable. Alternative constructions of property, such as the 
notion of stewardship, may challenge the subject-object and person-property 
distinctions.13 
 
Its ‘awkwardness’ is also explicable when various property law rules allude to, 
or have a passing resonance of, ownership obligation.   These chimeric 
‘sightings’ encourage optimistic claims, Eric Freyfogle’s assertion that 
property law and ecology are kindred disciplines,14 or Alyson Flourney’s 
comment that the ‘clearest lens on society’s environmental ethic is the 
common law of property… a logical starting point.’15  
 
But what are these steward-like doctrines that constitute Flourney’s ‘logical 
starting point’?  Property rules have long accommodated fragmented 
beneficial ownership, that idea that land ownership is a ‘trust with attendant 
11 Rose, above n46; Alyson Flournoy,, ‘In Search of an Environmental Ethic’, (2003) 28 
Colum. J. Envtl. Law 63. 
12 Joseph Sax, Playing Darts with a Rembrandt Public and Private Rights in Cultural 
Treasures (1999) 59. 
13 Davies, above n9, 13-4. 
14 ‘Ecology explains how activities on one land parcel cab affect landowners and land uses 
elsewhere, [while] property law then evaluates these spillover effects.’ Freyfogle, above n8, 
107-108. 
15 Flournoy, above n11, 98. 
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obligations.’16 However, legal history tends to attribute the evolution of the use 
to selfish rather than altruistic aims, the avoidance of feudal dues, or the 
preservation of dynastic privilege. Less typically was the use employed for 
‘some greater scheme … religious, ethical, or ecological.’17 Likewise, rules 
such as waste or the rule against perpetuities, purport to protect the interests 
of future unborn owners, thus suggesting a concern for inter-generational 
consequence. Yet waste is not a generalized mandate to ‘live lightly off the 
land’,18 but a blunt safeguard against deliberate damage to a remainderman’s 
capital improvements. 19 In part 3, other examples are given, such as the 
prohibition on implied profits a prendre, or the good husbandry rules of 
agricultural tenancy. Yet collectively these principles lack any overarching 
guiding principle, more ad hoc than doctrinally consistent.  It seems that 
property obligation stalls amidst a paucity of corroboration.  
 
At the conceptual level, Joseph Singer’s description of the ‘castle’ model of 
land ownership is one that makes adverse externalities ‘magically vanish.’20 
The ‘castle’ reinforces the boundaries of dominion, and the illusion that trans-
boundary spillovers are hermetically contained. Its dominance obviates the 
urgency of any need for right to be tempered by obligation. Its effect is seen in 
the historical record. ‘Private owners are … not good stewards: their 
perspectives are too short, they ignore ecological ripple effects, and their 
isolated decisions can produce chaotic land-use patterns.’21  
 
Ultimately, stewardship literature is compelled to jettison property’s unfulfilled 
beginnings, and define stewardship in purely instrumental terms, self-evident 
truths about why ‘land remains productive, fertile, and biologically diverse’. 
16 Lynton Caldwell, “Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use? The Need for a New Conceptual 
Basis for Land Use Policy” (1974) 15 Wm. & Mary LR 759, 766; Richard Brewer, 
Conservancy The Land Trust Movement in America (2003) 115. 
17 Brewer above n, 16. 
18 Eric Freyfogle, Why Conservation is Failing and How it Can Regain Ground (2006) 149; 
Caldwell, above n,16, 766.  
19 Purdy argues that the adaptation of English waste doctrine to the American landscape 
stressed progress and economic expansion, such that ‘[i]t would be an outrage on common 
sense to call enhancement (the clearance of native forests) waste.’ Jedediah Purdy, The 
Meaning of Property Freedom, Community, and the Legal Imagination (2010) 61. 
20 Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000). 
21 Freyfogle, above n8, 99. This ripple effect renders retreat into public land ‘enclaves’ futile. 
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Is the soil kept fertile and in place? Are waterways clean and full of life? Are 
tracts of land devoted to uses for which they are ecologically well suited?  Are 
landscapes sensibly laid out and pleasing to the eye and the ear? And are the 
modes of living and working on land likely to endure for centuries, without 
nature lashing back? 22  
 
William Lucy and Catherine Mitchell concur:’[s]tewardship is not a substantive 
moral doctrine in itself but an instrumental concept… a practical 
mechanism.”23  Despite its intuitive potential, stewardship remains property’s 
awkward and ill-defined ‘secret’ because, by and large, our dominant ‘seeing’ 
of the private ownership modality keeps it so.  
 
3. Locating stewardship in property traditions, theories, and structure 
 
Laura Underkuffler reasons that ‘[p]roperty is a zero-sum game in the context 
of finite resources.’24  Win-lose becomes self-perpetuating, pitting property 
against the environment in an inexorable contest of futility. Re-calibrating this 
‘game’ requires either finding a viable place for obligation in property, or a 
fundamental re-conceptualization of property in land. This part 3 pursues the 
former.  First, it seeks out the available evidence of stewardship within 
existing property traditions. Second, it canvasses those legal theories that are 
sympathetic to property obligation. Third, it engages directly with institutional 
issues of structure. Despite some limited scope for developing stewardship 
within existing frameworks, this part concludes that in the main Underkuffler is 
depressingly right.  
 
 
 
 
 
22 Ibid, 18.  
23 William Lucy & Catherine Mitchell, ‘Replacing Private Property: The Case for Stewardship’ 
(1996) 55(3) CLJ 566, 596, 599. 
24 Laura Underkuffler, ‘Property as Constitutional Myth: Utilities and Dangers’ (2006) 92 
Cornell LR 1239, 1247. 
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3.1 Stewardship and property traditions 
 
Common law25 ideas of property obligation subsist largely on the ‘edge of the 
field,’26 peripheral to its mainstream concerns. ‘Limits on property rights are 
the exception, not the rule, the periphery rather than the core.’27  By contrast, 
‘caring for country’ is an elemental tenet of indigenous laws and customs. In 
settler societies, cultural perspective strongly influences the importance and 
role of obligation within property discourse.  
 
The feudal nature of the Anglo common law28 and its attendant doctrines of 
tenure and estates, speak faintly of obligation as an historic consequence of 
ownership.29  Although the Statute of Tenures rationalized feudal incidents, 
the ‘ghost’ of feudalism30 was not fully exorcised, and principles that 
reinforced estate holder obligation to the Crown, such as escheat31 or quit 
rents,32 persist to limited extents, or are imitated by like ideas.33  Other 
property rules concerned with obligation also remain as isolated exemplars.  
The doctrine of waste precludes harmful activities by life tenants that 
permanently alter land for future reversioners or remaindermen,34 riparian 
right is premised on obligations owed to downstream owners, profits a 
prendre cannot be implied or prescribed because of their extractive nature,35 
and agricultural tenancy laws are fashioned on concepts of good husbandry. 
Yet collating these principles into the one sentence is confected, falsely 
25 The focus on common law jurisdictions overlooks other legal traditions, for example Donna 
McKenzie Skene et al, ‘Stewardship: From Rhetoric to Reality’ (1999) 3 Edinburgh LR 151, 
155. 
26 Joseph Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on Obligations of Ownership (2000).  
27 Gregory Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (2009) 94 
Cornell LR 745. 
28 While modern legislation may facilitate stewardship (such as the registration of voluntary 
conservation covenants), the statutory paradigm is primarily concerned with environmental 
regulation rather than property obligation. 
29 Fred Bosselmann, ‘Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility; Opportunity’, (1994) 
24 Envtl. Law 1439. 
 
30 Andrew Buck, The Making of Australian Property Law (2006). 
31 Escheat remains in Western Australia.  
32 Quit rents were common until the mid 19th century, Buck, above n30. 
33 Modern analogies of quit rents include state land taxes.  
34 Murray Raff, ‘Environmental Obligations and the Western Liberal Property Concept’, (1998) 
22 Melb. Univ. Law Rev. 657; Purdy, above n19.  
35 David Bederman, “The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings”, (1996) 96 Columbia Law Rev. 1375, at 1406-1407. 
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conflating the common law’s concern for future consequence. Nearly all are 
‘marginal outliers.’36  As James Karp notes  
 
It is comforting for those trained in the law to tie any new idea or perspective 
neatly to the past or to existing rules.  Thus, equating the duty of stewardship 
to the duty to prevent waste and the law of nuisance is a bow to that 
important tradition.  But stewardship means more.  It demands that we 
abandon the strict economic approach to land-use decision-making that 
entails broad privileges and few obligations.  Stewardship requires a respect 
for the relationship between humans and the land that receives little attention 
in our [Anglo-American] law.37  
 
By contrast, indigenous laws and customs are intimately attentive to the 
relationship between humans and the land. Bonds between people are place 
are familial, physical, cultural and spiritual, indicating a ‘different construction 
of the idea of property and ownership,38 a construct where ‘the role of humans 
[is] part of an interrelated living whole.’39 Nin Thomas asserts that Maori land 
values ‘provide a bedrock of duties owed to the environment’, while western 
law ‘effectively dispenses with one of the Maori’s three essential worlds, 
ultimate reality…or at least marginalize it into being irrelevant to legal 
reasoning.’40 Inherent to this worldview is continuity, oral traditions that place 
responsibility to protect and preserve for ‘[in the case of the Haudenosauness 
nation] seven generations to come.’41 
 
Hugh Brody’s anthropological study of the Inuit peoples of northern Canada in 
the 1970s observes the settled nature of their relationship with land, and 
concludes that contrary to the stereotype, western attitudes to land are more 
nomadic than the simple hunter-gatherer’s.  Westerners experience ‘the lure 
of opportunity… moving on, making progress, wondering if we might prosper 
36 Raff , above n34, 690.  
37 Karp, above n6, 749. 
38 Nicole Graham, ‘Owning the Earth’ in Exploring Wild Law (P. Burdon ed., 2011) 263. 
39 Nin Thomas, ‘Maori Concepts of Ranga tiratanga, Kaitiakitanga, the Environment, and 
Property Rights’ in David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor (eds.) Property Rights and Sustainability: 
The Evolution of Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges, (2011) 220, 226. 
40 Ibid, 226. 
41 J Ronald Engel, ‘Property: Faustian Pact or New Covenant with Earth?’ in Grinlinton & 
Taylor, above n39, 75. 
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there rather than here,’ our mobility being ‘the source of energetic colonial 
power.’42 By contrast, the Inuit’s worldview did not extend beyond their home; 
they had to manage the ‘complicated business of maintaining the world 
around them to ensure that its produce is bountiful.’ Central to this imperative 
was the maintenance of the natural world. ‘The assumption held deep within 
this point of view is the place where a people lives is ideal: therefore change 
is for the worse.’43 Brody’s thesis places stewardship at the heart of the 
indigenous relationship with land, an imperative to conserve the only earthly 
Eden known.  
 
Indigenous land laws are also knowledge-based and localized, informed by 
the capacities and limits of the lands over which they apply.44  Conversely, as 
Nicole Graham observes, modern property rights exist independently of their 
location. ‘Modern property law conceptualizes and articulates limits to its 
application in terms of jurisdiction and authority.  Yet this authority and 
jurisdiction derives not from the specific physical conditions of local places, 
but from itself in a circuitous and irrational fashion.’45 Ownership, 
responsibility, and knowledge are all inter-connected in the indigenous 
mindset, a self-correcting propensity to sustain land usage within geographic, 
climatic, and temporal limits.  
 
The risk in idealizing indigenous land law’s contribution to land stewardship is 
one of hyperbolic over-reach. Carol Rose argues that indigenous people’s 
management of natural resources is extensive and their practices have 
‘contributed to numerous species’ extinction in prehistoric as well as more 
recent times.’46 Tellingly, Rose argues that indigenous perspectives have less 
to offer a modern property ethic than superficially appears. Her reasoning is 
twofold, first they are premised on environmental bounty rather than scarcity, 
and second their norms focus on human humility, rather than the immediate 
42 Hugh Brody, The Other Side of Eden (2000) 101. 
43 Ibid, 117. 
44 An analogy is pre-enclosure English common rights, many of which were specific to locality’ 
Graham, above n3.  
45 Graham, above n3, 267. 
46 Carol Rose, ‘Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental Ethics’, (1994) 
Envtl. Law 1. 
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task of addressing destructive human behavior.47  Despite Rose’s cautionary 
note, indigenous perspectives underline the significance of property pluralism, 
and the broadening effects such diversity has on the meagre offerings of the 
common law.  
 
3.2 Stewardship and property theory 
 
If property doctrine (outside indigenous law) is a barren place for stewardship, 
to what extent can it flourish in more fertile theoretical soil?  Again, the answer 
falls mainly to the edges, restricted to theories concerned with personal 
identity, or social or communitarian values, and less applicable to mainstream 
law and economics analyses of property.  
 
Margaret Radin’s personhood theory is a ‘long-ignored’ 48 intuitive property 
theory that ‘focuses on personal embodiment or self-constitution in terms of 
things.’49 Identity or embodiment of self becomes bound up with certain types 
of property.  Radin distinguishes between personal and fungible property, and 
uses loss as a means to define each.50  Radin’s personhood theory is useful 
in explaining the motives of stewardship. For example, Courtney White’s 
study of the environmental ethics of ranchers in the American west identifies 
personal fulfillment as a key driver in a changing paradigm. White quotes one 
rancher 
 
Ranchers have become applied ecologists…nowadays its all about 
stewardship, not food and fiber. But its also having a passion about what you 
are doing…like many, I’m grateful for the privilege of being allowed to take 
care of a little piece of the planet for whatever short amount of time we 
have.51  
47 Ibid, 14-19; Stone likewise queries the “vaunted harmony between American Plains Indians 
and Nature’. Christopher Stone, ‘Should Trees Have Standing? – Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects’ (1972) S. Cal. L. Rev. 450. 
48 ‘Property helps to define me and you within the liberal cultural context’, Davies, above n9, 
13. 
49 Margaret Radin, ‘Property and Personhood’, (1982) 34 Stanford Law Rev. 957, 958. 
50 Ibid, 960. 
51 Courtney White, Revolution on the Range: The Rise of the New Ranch in the American 
West (2008) 48. 
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 Such relationships surpass purely commercial or economic rationales. Rather 
the property becomes in Radin’s words ‘affirmatively part of oneself… a scene 
of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth, an embodiment of personal 
autonomy.’52 The difficulty with personhood theory lies in drawing the line 
between personal and fungible property.53  Radin acknowledges that the 
dichotomy is in truth a continuum,54 one where stewardship values are closer 
to the personal end of the spectrum.    Personhood also inspired a related 
theory of ‘peoplehood’ to explain group ownership of cultural property.  
Peoplehood ‘draws upon … themes of custody, care, and trusteeship, rather 
than comparably more fungible conceptions of property, ’55 a principle that 
includes both rights and obligations independent of traditional title that ‘lies at 
the heart of cultural stewardship.’56 
 
The links between property and stewardship are explicitly articulated in 
progressive property theory.57  Progressive scholars challenge the ‘near 
hegemony of law and economics analyses of property’58 and seek to 
‘distinguish between dominant conceptions of property, and [their] underlying 
realities.’59 Progressive theorists say the former is ‘inadequate as the sole 
basis for resolving property conflicts or for designing property institutions.’ 
Rather one must look to ‘the underlying human values that property serves 
and the social relationships it shapes and protects.’60 Such values are 
pluralistic; and include environmental stewardship, where ‘attentiveness to the 
effects of …exercising property rights on others, including future generations, 
and on the natural environment, and the non-human world’ is critical.61  
 
52 Ibid, 992 
53 Penalver  explores the blurred distinction between fungible and personal in terms of the 
family home, Penalver above n9.  
54 Ibid, 986. 
55 Kristin Carpenter et al, ‘In Defense of Property’ (2009) 118 Yale LJ  1022, 1067. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Gregory Alexander et al, “A Statement of Progressive Property” (2009) 94 Cornell LR 743. 
58 Alexander, above n27; Penalver, above n7; Joseph Singer, “Democratic Estates: Property 
Law in a Free and Democratic Society” 94 Cornell LR 1009, 1036. 
59 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Performing property, making the world’ at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2053656. 
60 Alexander et al, above n57, 743 
61 Ibid, 744. 
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Amongst its proponents, Eduardo Penalver is prominent for his advocacy of 
the virtues of land ownership. Penalver sees human flourishing62 enhanced by 
a long neglected ‘virtue theory of property’,63 specifically industry, justice, and 
humility. Humility is especially significant to land ethics; it requires a 
landowner, uncertain of the future consequences of their actions, to be guided 
by precaution and an intergenerational view of ownership.  Humility is integral 
given the finitude of land, the inertia of land memory, and the adverse path 
dependence this engenders.64 In other words, human changes made to land 
have long-lasting, often irreversible effects that compound and mutually 
reinforce each other. 
 
The notion that land has a memory that stretches the impact of our current 
choices far into the future suggests an enormous responsibility on the part of 
those who make decisions about how to use it.65 
 
Within dominant law and economics analyses of property, stewardship may 
be justified if it is sufficiently efficient or welfare maximizing. Harold Demsetz’s 
seminal analysis that property rights arise ‘when it becomes economic for 
those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs’66 may explain 
why it is economic in some circumstances for a private landowner to efficiently 
use scarce resources in a steward-like way. Moreover, law and economics 
theories invest heavily in the primacy of the private owner being best placed 
to ‘take into account … competing claims of the present and the future.’67 
Private ownership creates incentives to use land wisely in response to market 
signals about the scarcity or value of the land’s resources.68 But such 
perspectives fail to explain why land may equally ‘facilitate the direct 
enjoyment of non-fungible and often social human goods [that] overshadow 
62 Human flourishing is ‘the obligation to support and nurture the social structures necessary 
for development of human capabilities’, Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver, An 
Introduction to Property Theory (2012) 95-6. 
63 Virtues are ‘acquired, stable dispositions to engage in characteristic modes of behavior 
conducive to human flourishing’, Penalver above n7, 876 
64 Ibid, 831. 
65 Ibid, 884. 
66 Harold Demsetz,“Toward a Theory of Property Rights”, (1967) 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 354. 
67 Ibid, 355.  
68 Penalver, above n7, 826. 
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the motivating force of its investment value.’69 It also does not counter the 
alternative and equally logical conclusion that it may be more efficient in some 
circumstances for a private landowner to adopt the most destructive land use 
available. 
 
The capacity of modern property to generate obligation as well as right is not 
a mainstream concern of liberal property theory or doctrine. Its outlier status is 
symptomatic of a wider systemic issue; is it possible to coherently locate 
stewardship within the structure of property, and if so, where? At a threshold 
level, the question posed is one of inherency; is land obligation inherent or 
autonomous to property? And if the former, the question becomes one of 
type: is stewardship a duty, a right, a rule, a qualification, or something 
else?70 The remainder of part 3 canvasses the many divergent responses to 
these questions.  
 
3.3 Stewardship and property’s Structure – is stewardship internal to, or 
external of property? 
 
The case for obligation to be a ‘thing’ internal to property is heavily reliant on 
the assumption that property as a human institution is inherently social and 
relational.  For example, Joseph Singer prefers a socially situated concept of 
property, the variously termed ‘good neighbor’, ‘environmental’ or 
‘citizenship’71 model, where rights and other-regarding obligations72 are 
‘deeply entwined in ownership, a ‘reality’ that the dominant ‘castle’ conception 
masks. 
 
The citizenship model starts from an assumption that obligations are inherent 
in ownership. … Obligation is inherent in liberalism, but the castle and market 
69 Ibid, 832. 
70 ‘When we gather together to make rules for our shared landscapes, we exercise one of our 
most important, positive liberties.’ Eric Freyfogle, Why Conservation is Failing and How it Can 
Regain Ground (2006) 193. Richard Brewer sees stewardship as a modern extension of the 
discourse of improvement, Brewer, above n16, 118-9. 
71 Joseph Singer, ‘The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments and 
Just Obligations’ (2006)  30 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 309, 329.  
72 Joseph Singer, The Edges of the Field: Lessons on the Obligations of Ownership (2011) 
20. 
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models marginalize it.  They seek to suppress consciousness of the 
obligations inherent in ownership, to draw our attention away from them.73 
 
In a similar vein, Gregory Alexander identifies a social-obligation norm 
inherent to Anglo-American law that has ‘never been explicitly recognized … 
or systemically developed.’74 Alexander’s logic is parallel to Singer’s.  
 
More generally, property owners owe far more responsibilities to others, both 
owners and non-owners, than the conventional imagery of property rights 
suggests. Property rights are inherently relational; because of this 
characteristic, owners necessarily owe obligations to others.75 
 
While the social-obligation norm is primarily social, with its concern for human 
flourishing, well-lived lives, and a civic culture, it also has environmental 
implication.  
 
Because human flourishing depends on social structures, the communities to 
which property owners belong may legitimately make demands of them to 
contribute out of their resources or to share their property in order to sustain 
those social matrices. Similar arguments… can justify that individuals’ use of 
their property [is] made in ways that do not permanently harm the 
environment.76 
 
Others draw inherency from comparative study.  Murray Raff examines 
obligation in civilian traditions (particularly German property law) to assert that 
an environmental obligation in property is ‘implicit and too frequently 
overlooked.’77 It is ‘an aspect of property itself…. at the deepest 
73 Singer, above n71, 329-330. 
74 Alexander, above n27.  
75 Ibid,, 747-8.  
76 Alexander & Penalver, above n62, 95-6. Obligation may also be also owed to future 
generations in cases of life-traversing projects, Gregory Alexander, ‘Unborn Communities’ 
(2013) Cornell Law School research paper No. 13-83. 
77 Raff, above n34, 658. McHarg concludes it is axiomatic that “property rights…are regarded 
as necessarily carrying with them obligations of a social nature,’, arguing that property’s 
relational nature is the source of external legislative regulation. Aileen McHarg, “The Social 
Obligations of Ownership and the Regulation of Energy Utilities in the UK and the EU” in A. 
McHarg et al, (eds.) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2009) 360, 361-
2.  
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jurisprudential level.’78 Raff does not require any Hohfeldian correlative to 
offset the whereabouts or existence of duty, ‘[s]ocial and individual 
obligations…lie within the very essence of property… without judicial 
presupposition of a basic right  to do anything with it.’79  
 
Yet despite such claims of inherent ‘obviousness’, obligation remains 
stubbornly peripheral to common law property discourse. Thus, Alexander 
calls his social-obligation norm ‘grossly underrated’, and Singer’s citizenship 
model remains aspirational. Indeed, Nick Blomley suggests that Singer would 
be better engaged asking why the practice of the castle model is so 
successful, rather than fruitlessly trying to impugn its clearly dominant 
values. 80 The premise that individuals owe obligations to others because we 
live in social communities is lost on the mainstream rational actor. 
 
The counterpoint position is that stewardship is an anathema to property, and 
must by definition stand outside of it.  This autonomous view, articulated by 
William Lucy and Catherine Mitchell,81 dismisses the norms and practices of 
private property as dysfunctional and normatively objectionable, a form of 
‘useless currency’. Conceptual incompatibility means that stewardship must 
be a replacement for private property, not simply an adjunct to it.  ‘It is not 
feasible to claim the most extensive rights of exclusion, control and alienation 
over a resource, and yet be subject to a vast range of duties in relation to that 
resource for the benefit of other persons…. A steward does not enjoy the 
extensive trinity of rights characteristic of private property.’82  
 
78 Raff, above n34, 691. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Blomley suggests that Singer would be better engaged asking why the practice of the 
castle model is so successful, rather than fruitlessly trying to impugn its values, Blomley, 
above n39. 
81 Lucy & Mitchell, above n23. 
82 Ibid, 586.  Lucy and Mitchell scrutinize common property as an alternative model for land 
custodianship, but find it wanting, chiefly on tragedy grounds, Ibid, 600. Indigenous claims to 
‘cultural property’ are likewise ‘better explained and justified through a stewardship model’ 
rather than an ownership model. Stewardship tends to fall outside the paradigms of 
individuality and alienability upon which classic property law is premised.’ Carpenter et al, 
above n55, 1028-9. 
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Likewise, scholars who recognize that obligation is a self-imposed moral or 
ethical restraint acknowledge that it is a duty ‘outside of the law.’ 83  As Carol 
Rose simply observes, if we are to have ‘environmental good things… we need 
to exercise some self-restraint.’84  Or if not ‘outside of the law’, then stewardship 
is the responsibility of a discipline ‘outside’ property law. As Klaus Bosselmann 
argues, ‘[d]eveloping a property regime with inherent responsibilities is the 
purpose of environmental law.’85  
 
If obligation is ‘inside’ the institution of property, its case for inherency is either 
worn thin by its ceaseless circularity, or is simply over-reliant on assertion.  
This fragility is underscored when this chapter next examines the unsettled 
place of obligation within property’s formal structures.  
 
3.4 Stewardship and property’s structure - duty, right or rule? 
 
At the taxonomic level, what form should stewardship take? Logically, a 
steward is a duty-bearer.86  Aldo Leopold talks of ‘a positive duty that society 
might rightly impose on landowners.’87 Richard Barnes similarly describes a 
steward as an owner subject to overriding duties, obligations that reflect the 
‘high degree of interest a community has in a particular resource.’88   
 
Distilling the literature on stewardship reveals two key features; the duty to 
conserve and the duty to preserve. These duties have a profound effect on 
two particular incidents, the right to the capital (which includes the right to 
exclude) and the prohibition on harmful use.89 
 
83 ‘The stewardship tradition is obviously powerful and deeply rooted, and impressively it 
grows out of self-imposed restraint, not as a duty imposed by law or even the strictures of 
public opinion.’ Sax, above n12, 72. 
84Rose, “above n46, 100.  
85‘Environmental law is failing because it still only floats over the surface of property law.  It 
creates a body of second order legal principles, which reflect a second-order legal interest…. 
Seen in these terms, it could be said that environmental law has not adequately penetrated 
the content of property law.’ Grinlinton & Taylor above n39, 12. 
86 Karp, above n6, 748.  
87 Leopold, above n2, 193. 
88 Barnes, above n9, 52. 
89 Ibid, 157. 
209  
                                                        
Barnes’ linkage of duty to property’s incidents reflects an analysis attributed to 
American jurist Wesley Hohfield.  Hohfield’s ‘main contribution to legal theory 
was to identify and name eight building blocks…from which all legal 
relationships could be built.’90  The Hohfeldian analysis of right, duty, 
privilege, no-right, power, liability, immunity and disability, was designed to 
promote rigor in legal thinking.91 While it may be a ‘hocus pocus [that] never 
caught on’,92 Hohfield does help in ‘thinking straight’93 about stewardship’s 
place in property’s structure. His linkage of right and duty affirms the capacity 
of property to generate duties, and exposes the fixation on property as merely 
a source of ‘rights’.  
 
Hohfield’s building blocks work in two ways, as jural opposites and jural 
correlatives.  Duty is the jural opposite of privilege, and the jural correlative of 
right. Importantly, the latter pairing requires that a duty will only subsist as a 
consequence of a strictly defined right. Hohfield criticizes the indiscriminate 
use of the term ‘right’, arguing that it frequently misdescribes a multitude of 
contexts, including mere privilege. Hohfeldian right is properly ascribed to that 
which is solely a legally enforceable claim.94 Hence a duty of stewardship 
requires a parallel and strictly defined property right. Eric Freyfogle implies 
that stewardship is a consequence of the right to use,95 ‘[w]e should embrace 
a notion that landowners are stewards, with clear rights to use but only limited 
rights to degrade and consume.’96  
 
Moreover duty may be positive, ‘an affirmative duty to preserve’97, or 
negative, a duty to refrain from doing harm.  Such duality reflects the 
90 Banner, above n4, 102-3. 
91 Cf imprecision that ‘all too often [leads to a] corresponding paucity and confusion as 
regards actual legal conceptions’, Wesley Hohfield ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Legal Reasoning’ (1913) Yale LJ 16, 29. 
92 Banner, above n4, 104. 
93 Hohfield, above n91, 18; J. Hamilton & N. Bankes, ‘Different Views of the Cathedral: The 
Literature on Property Law Theory’ in Property and the Law in Energy and Natural 
Resources, 19-20 (A. McHarg et al eds, 2010). 24-5.  
94 Hohfield, above n91, 32. 
95 Honore listed the “right to use” second in his incidents of property, A M Honore, 
‘Ownership” in A G Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961). 
96 Eric Freyfogle, On Private Property Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land 
(2007) 141. 
97 Sax, above n12, 57-8. 
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preservation versus conservation tension in stewardship discourse. In 
practice, a steward’s duty is invariably positive as well as negative, 
conforming to Hohfield’s explanation of duty as ‘that which one ought or ought 
not to do.’98   
 
To whom the duty is owed is likewise open-ended. It may be immediate: to 
neighbors, the local community; or more widely to society,99 the environment, 
or the Earth itself.  James Karp is not exclusive in this respect.  
 
We owe a duty of responsibility to ourselves, to our community, to other 
members of other communities on the planet, and the generations to 
follow.100 
 
To others, stewardship is not articulated as a duty per se, but the result of a 
qualified right.  Proponents of cultural property101 for example argue that 
stewardship arises as a limitation on the right to dispose.  In other words, 
rather than being a reciprocal consequence of a right as Hohfield pre-
supposes, stewardship is the consequence of a diminished right. Joseph Sax 
explains that ‘[i]ndisputably, any such imposition takes something away from 
the owner, but it does not intrude markedly on the [owner’s] core interests.’102 
The owner of a Rembrandt painting,103 much like the private owner of a 
biodiversity hotspot, is not denied rights to alienate, exclude, or reap 
economic benefit; yet there is no right to destroy, to ‘throw darts at the 
masterpiece’ that is implicit in the rights of ownership.  This view is analogous 
98 Hohfield, above n91, 32. 
99 John Cribbet, ‘Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property” (1986) 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 40. 
100 Karp, above n6, 752; Stewardship is ‘a duty that we all bear toward creation [that] has 
shaped our environmental law since the first Earth Day’. J. Peter Byrne, ‘Property and 
Environment: Thoughts on an Evolving Relationship’, (2004-2005) 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
679 688. 
101 Laura Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (2003), 110; John 
Merryman ‘The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet’ (1976) 27 Hastings LJ 1023, 1041; John 
Mousstakis ‘Group Rights in Cultural Property (1989) 74 Cornell LR 1179; John Merryman, 
‘The Public Interest in Cultural Property’ (1989) 7 California Law Review 339. 
102Sax, above n12, 68. 
103 Ibid. 
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to a conception of private ownership subject to the encumbrance of social104 
or public105 interests. 
 
Stewardship may also be articulated as a right, a public right to land health. 
Here the prism through which stewardship is viewed becomes a public, not a 
private one. As a result, esoteric debates about the parallel qualities of the 
private right, or the extent of its impairment, are subsumed by its wider focus. 
In this paradigm, rights are pluralistic and relative, however scholars concede 
that presently public rights can be untidy.106 Alison Rieser wistfully observes 
that ‘a right to expect … lands and natural areas to retain their natural 
characteristics’ is a public property right in search of a theory.107 David 
Farrier’s ambition for a ‘collective property right to biological diversity’108 is 
worthy, but lacks practicality, with ‘the scantest of toeholds in rural landowner 
communities.’109  
 
Finally, stewardship may be categorized as a rule. Christopher Rodgers’ 
‘resource allocation model’ of property accounts for positive stewardship 
obligations as property management rules.110 Property management rules 
‘prosecute a public interest objective - nature conservation’ by ‘controlling the 
terms on which access to the resource (land) is permitted.’111 Such positive 
management obligations, whether imposed by statute or contract, cannot be 
explained by ‘extant property rights scholarship.’112 Rather, a fourth category 
of rule is needed to capture the substance of stewardship, an addition to 
104 Victor Yannacone, ‘Property and Stewardship: Private Property Plus Public Interest Equals 
Social Property’ (1978) 23 South Dakota L. Rev. 71. 
105 Richard Babcock & Duane Feurer, ‘Land as a Commodity “Affected with a Public Interest”’, 
52 Wash. L. Rev. 289 (1976-1977). 
106 Rose, above n46, 19-25. 
107 Alison Rieser, ‘Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine 
in Search of a Theory’ (1991) 15 Harvard Envtl. L. Rev. 393, 393.  
108 David Farrier, ‘Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for Management or 
Compensation for Lost Expectations?’ (1995) 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 303. 
109 Christopher Elmendorf, Ideas, ‘Incentives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward Conservation 
Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective’, U. Ill. L. Rev. (2003), 
423, 456. 
110 Christopher Rodgers, ‘Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental 
Stewardship’, (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 550, 557.  
111 Ibid, 570. 
112 Ibid, 569.   
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Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed’s seminal rule hierarchy of property 
rules, liability rules, and entitlements protected by inalienability rules.113  
 
The taxonomic smorgasbord that is duty, right, rule or qualification, fulfills 
Hohfield’s prophecy of imprecise terminology fostering a ‘paucity and 
confusion as regards actual legal conceptions.’114 Such imprecision reflects a 
lack of vantage, the objective altitude necessary to gain perspective on 
stewardship’s place and role in property. Presently, the climb to that vantage 
point is strewn with obstacles, the litter of recent iterations of property. Part 4 
leaves structure aside, and inspects the content of that paradigmatic litter.  
 
4. The impediments to stewardship 
 
While stewardship may flourish in small, isolated outcrops, in the main it lies 
fallow on the unforgiving terrain of a liberal conception of property in land, a 
‘legal-economic ordering’ where property is ‘unitary, systemized and 
centralized.’115 Joseph Sax says that this liberal paradigm embraces two 
basic ideas, neither of which accommodates stewardship. One is political, 
based on individual autonomy and privacy, the other economic, based on the 
right to the product of one’s labor and effort.116  Its ascendancy dates back to 
(at least) the enclosure period of the 18th and 19th centuries.  Nicholas 
Blomley traces its genesis to early 17th century jurist Edward Coke, and his 
project of transforming the common law from a ‘variegated and diverse 
system of localized practices [into] a disembodied superstructure.’117  
 
In recent decades, its pre-eminence appears less assured, amidst a gathering 
sense that the paradigm is approaching a tipping point. Nicole Graham adopts 
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shift to situate our present predicament.  
Kuhn describes paradigms as ‘the result of an accumulation of knowledge that 
113 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089. 
114 Hohfield, above n91, 29. 
115 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space and the Geographies of Power (1994) 68-82. 
116 Joseph Sax, Ownership, Property and Sustainability 2010 Wallace Stegner Lecture (2010) 
4. 
117 Blomley, above n115, 76. 
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works in its specific time and place… [a] successful cultural adaptation to 
particular conditions.’ 118  These social and ecological relationships are not 
universal truths about inexorable human progress, but simply ‘true in a given 
time and place under a set of particular conditions.’119 Paradigms endure 
where ‘on ideological and practical levels they continue to make sense of the 
world.’120 Paradigm shifts occur when the prevailing body of knowledge is no 
longer temporally or geographically appropriate. Institutional mal-adaption is a 
dawning realization that ‘not only are other ideas or frameworks of meaning 
…more plausible than the current paradigm, but also… they seem more 
viable.’121  Graham argues that in the case of property, the liberal paradigm is 
dysfunctional and approaching crisis.  In ex-settler societies especially, far 
from the historicized context of the English enclosure period, it lacks 
plausibility.122  
 
This part 4 argues that abstraction, individualism and a ‘land as commodity’ 
mentality remain formidable impediments to the development of a land ethic.  
When viewed through the narrow private paradigm, they conceal the ‘crisis’ 
that Graham foresees, and diminish the sense that we are at the cusp of a 
Kuhn-like shift.  Whether their hegemony remains so definitive when the 
perspective changes, is another question postponed to part 5.  
 
4.1 The primacy of individualism 
 
Where property is universalized as a private and individual right, its relational 
attributes fade to near invisibility.  Property becomes an individual entitlement 
in a contextual vacuum.123 The private property rights movement, especially 
influential in the United States, exemplifies its one-sided excess.124  
118 Graham, above n3, 2. 
119 Ibid, 2. 
120 Ibid, 203. 
121 Ibid. 
122 ‘The dispossession and diaspora of the English regime of private property extended 
across the globe via colonization.’ Ibid, 204. 
123 Aldo Leopold warned of a “bogus individualism” rather than responsible citizenship. Meine, 
above n1. 
124 Cribbet, above n99, 42; Nancie Marzulla, ‘Property Rights Movement: How it Began and 
Where it is Headed’ in N Blomley et al (eds.) The Legal Geographies Reader (2001). 
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 However, such a skewed view represents a fundamental mis-reading of 
property. Scholars have written at length on the duality of property. Gregory 
Alexander describes it in terms of ‘property as commodity, and property as 
propriety’.125  Laura Underkuffler speaks of competing ‘comprehensive’ and 
‘absolute’ approaches.126 Eric Freyfogle identifies a cultural fault line, where 
abstract reasoning and individualism faces off ‘particularity, context, and 
community.’127 Freyfogle draws on history, identifying a watershed period 
after the Civil War in the United States, when a distinct public-private divide 
became prominent.  
 
The new public-private divide particularly influenced the ways people thought 
about private property… an entitlement that people held in their private lives. 
It was something they exercised not as a springboard to virtue and public 
service as in the 18th century or as part of a larger community, but to protect 
their privacy and promote their personal economic welfare. …As an 
intellectual concept, private property had largely been freed from communal 
obligations in a way that …reflected and fueled the breakdown of community-
centered sentiment.128 
 
In a stewardship context, excessive individualism conceals the substantive 
truth of a landowner’s129 communal responsibilities.130 Communitarian 
obligation is central to Aldo Leopold’s ‘land health’, where ‘a conviction of 
individual responsibility’ to land’131 is proportionate to an understanding of 
wider community responsibilities.132 US Supreme Court Justice Blackmun,133 
adopted Leopold’s refrain when he spoke of the context of private ownership. 
125 Alexander, above n5. 
126 Underkuffler, above n101. 
127 Freyfogle, above n8, 108.  
128 Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share Private Property and the Common Good (2003) 81. 
129 Cf Penalver argues that the virtue of humility applies equally to private and public owners, 
Penalver, above n7.  
130 Christopher Elmendorf, above n109, 437; Eric Freyfogle, “Private Rights in Nature: Two 
Paradigms” in P. Burdon (ed.) Exploring Wild Law The Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence 
(2011). 
131 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (1948) 236. Land health is the capacity of land for 
self-renewal. 
132 Leopold, above n2, 23-5; Meine, above n1, 321. 
133 The dissenting judgment is that of Justice Douglas who cited Christopher Stone’s article in 
his opening paragraph. 
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‘In this environmental context, I personally prefer the older and particularly 
pertinent observation and warning of John Donne … no man is an island, 
entire of itself, every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main.’134 
 
The decoupling of private ownership and communal obligation is prominent in 
disputes where landowners perceive that environmental restrictions represent 
a loss of property rights.135 In Australia, the implementation of native 
vegetation laws or water buy-back schemes is frequently countered by claims 
that property rights are being stripped away.136 Lynton Caldwell recognizes 
the futility of imposing stewardship obligations in the absence of cultural 
change, as such disputes illustrate.  
 
Before a land use system can embrace stewardship, society itself must shift 
its focus of attention from the rights of the current landholder to the communal 
rights of all present and future society members.137  
 
Excessive individualism has perverse consequences. Karp observes that 
‘individuals have won…excessive autonomy’ and a consequential ‘sheer 
irresponsibility’.138 The collective result of such excess is ‘a disassociation of 
humans from their environment on which they rely for survival’139 and an 
isolationist artificial view of the (non) context of property rights in land. 
 
4.2 Land as commodity 
 
Alexander’s ‘property as commodity’ has been the dominant half of his 
dialectic.  Particularly in settler societies, mobility has been dependent on a 
commodity view of land. Andrew Buck’s explanation of the development of a 
distinctively Australian property law emphasizes the centrality of 
134 Sierra Club v Morton cited in Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward 
Legal Rights for Natural Objects (2nd ed., 1988) 94. 
135Elmendorf calls ‘rural landholders the most consistently anti-environmental 
demographic…in America.’ Elmendorf, above n109. 
136 Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2010] HCA 28; Paul Martin et al, ‘Environmental 
Property Rights in Australia: Constructing a New Tower of Babel’ (2013) 30(6) Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 531. 
137 Caldwell, above n16, 323. 
138 Karp, above n6, 742. 
139 Ibid. 
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egalitarianism, an equal opportunity for all to acquire wealth through land as 
the original commodity.140  Similarly in the United States 
 
[t]he period of the European colonization of America witnessed a transition in 
the status of man-land relationships from vestiges of feudal land tenure to the 
treatment of land as a marketable commodity. The transition continued over 
several centuries and was influenced by economic forces and opportunities, 
rather than by a theory or master plan…. The possession of land conferred 
security, economic freedom, and social status, and the settler in America 
developed a deep hunger for ownership of land such as he could never have 
hoped to satisfy in the Old World. As an owner of land, he owed no obligation 
to neighbor or posterity, and very little to the state.141 
 
Viewing land as a purely fungible commodity has consequences for place, 
and the responsibilities owners have for its land health. Curt Meine’s study of 
the US survey grid is illuminating in terms of the links it draws between 
commodity and abstraction.  To Meine, the survey abstracts reality.  Its 
standardized treatment of land ‘overwhelmed the particularities of place, and 
for generations, encouraged the adoption of a hard utilitarian view of land as 
commodity.’142 Commodification has moral consequences, because it 
‘focuses…on the instrumental value of the good for sale, leading us to 
undervalue or disregard its inherent worth.’143  
 
Theodore Steinberg’s satire of the ownership of nature has a similar theme, 
landscapes such as Arizona’s Sonoran desert suffer when ‘the impulse to turn 
everything into [private] ownership… imposes the ‘logic of capitalism’ on the 
‘nonideological matter-in-motion we call nature’.  To see land as simply its 
140 Buck, above n30.  
141 Caldwell, above n16, 761.  
142 Meine, above n1. Corner attributes the National Land Survey to Thomas Jefferson’s 
concern to make land available for purchase. Its unintended consequence ‘is a ubiquitous 
and standardized built environment...  [where] every place, regardless of special 
characteristics, begins to look and feel alike - neutral, flat and bland.’  James Corner, Taking 
Measures Across the American Landscape (1996) 32. 
143 Hamilton & Bankes, above n93, 33. In the 1930s Leopold observed a phenomenon of 
farmers setting aside small areas for the restoration of prairie grasses. Leopold saw the first 
stirrings of a “capital R Revolt – a revolt against the constricted tedium of a merely economic 
attitude towards land.’ Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac with other Essays on 
Conservation from Round River (1966). 
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monetary value is symptomatic of ‘a culture so single-minded in its pursuit of … 
private property, [that it] may sacrifice what one anthropologist has called its 
“evolutionary flexibility” and thereby foreclose on other ways of relating to the 
earth.’144  
 
4.3 Abstraction 
 
Modern property also lacks connection to place, lost at some indeterminate 
tipping point when its focus shifted from the relationship between person and 
thing, to the relationship between person and person. The consequence of 
this de-contextualization is abstraction,145 a fait accompli so complete that 
jurists debate whether property is illusory ‘thin air’.146 Abstraction has cast 
stewardship haplessly adrift, the artifice of person-to-person relationship 
denying it physical nexus.  Michael Metzger recognizes its ecological risk.  
 
The source of our malaise may … be rooted in our capacity for dealing in 
abstractions … The invention of language… has enabled us to create 
separate realities, and to remove ourselves from the natural world in which 
we live to a cerebral world of our own creation. When we act in accord with 
our artificial world, the disastrous impact of our fantasies upon the natural 
world in which we live is ignored.147 
 
The entrenchment of abstraction in the Anglo common law has been an 
incremental yet unswerving process that began in earnest in the 18th century 
enclosure period.  Enclosure marked a displacement of communitarian and 
social ideas of property diversity, with liberal notions suited to a more 
universal private property.   Enclosure was totemic because it imposed 
metaphorical, de-physicalized rights on land and swept away ancient place-
144 Theodore Steinberg, Slide Mountain, or the Folly of Owning Nature (1995) 10.  
145 Burdon, above n130, 718-9; Caldwell, above n16, 322; Steinberg argues that property law 
serves to reduce the complexity and mobility of nature into a ‘giant legal abstraction.’ Property 
law is ‘the voice of reason that we use to tidy up the messy and dynamic world of nature.’ 
Ibid. 
146 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air” (1991) 50 Cambridge LJ 252. Stuart Banner calls it ‘the 
disappearing right’. Banner, above n4, 106-8. 
147 Michael Metzger, ‘Private Property and Environmental Sanity’, (1975-1976) 5 Ecology LQ 
793, 796. 
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based rights.148 Improvers, enclosers, and colonizers were said to prefer ‘a 
preordained cartographic structure of abstract space to the physicality and 
particularity of place.’ Nicole Graham cited landscape historian John Barrell to 
lament this loss 
 
To enclose an open field parish means in the first place to think of the details 
of its topography as quite erased from the map.  The hostile and mysterious 
road system was tamed and made un-mysterious by being destroyed; the 
minute and intricate divisions between lands, strips, furlongs, and fields 
simply ceased to exist…149 
 
Such radical change meant more than a mere readjustment of property right. 
Jeanette Neeson observes that common rights, what she termed ‘ownership 
without possession’, conferred on commoners a sense of who they were and 
where they belonged.150 The 1788 case of Steel v Houghton151 illustrates 
dispossession from place. In Steel, rights to glean enjoyed by the indigent 
parishioners of Timworth were swamped by new ideas of property. Common 
property rights became a ‘mere practice’ condemned by their ‘universal 
promiscuity’ and perceptions of vagrancy. Where once property rights 
enforced links to place, they now policed exclusion through trespass.  
 
This estrangement of right from place was further entrenched by the rise of a 
new property metaphor, the relative, divisible bundle of rights. ‘Ownership of 
land was no longer one aggregate right; but many distinct rights, of which a 
landowner could possess few or many.’152 The metaphor suited the changing 
times because its parts, especially the right to exclude, enabled the intensive 
exploitation of land and its resources free from interference. Land could be 
exploited without consequence to place.  As Michael Heller notes 
 
148 Freyfogle sees this disconnect between abstraction and context not only in terms of private 
property, but also ethics and ecology. Freyfogle, above n8, 107-127. 
149 Graham, above n3, 66. ‘Standardized, universal and measurable space [was] grafted over 
place so that the physicality and particularity of places became irrelevant’. Ibid. 
150 J M Neeson, Commoners: common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-
1820 (1993) at 180. 
151 Steel v Houghton et Uxor (1788) 126 ER 32 in Buck, above n30. 
152 Freyfogle, above n128, 19. 
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While the modern bundle-of-legal relations metaphor reflects well the 
possibility of complex relational fragmentation, it gives a weak sense of the 
“thingness” of private property.153 
 
For many reasons,154 the bundle percolated into property discourse, and in 
1888, two influential articles solidified its dominance.155 By the early 20th 
century, the seminal analysis of Wesley Hohfield (canvassed in chapter 1) 
entrenched the removal of legal relations from physical facts, such that ‘land 
is not property, but the subject of property.’156  Another contemporary 
abstraction was the hypothetical Blackacre. If landowner rights were 
essentially identical, then Blackacre was a useful contrivance to symbolize a 
universalized property in land. Freyfogle traces the rise of Blackacre to 
Harvard Law School in 1870, where the pedagogical practice of ‘scientific 
case method’ instilled rigor, the law library became a laboratory, and law 
reports evolved into data. To learn law, ‘a student need not and should not 
engage with the messy outside world.  There was no need to pay attention to 
actual people, to struggle with ethical enigmas, or know anything about 
nature.’ 157 This approach fostered high abstraction. ‘In the case of property 
law, land was land and a parcel’s physical features and context were legally 
irrelevant.  So irrelevant was context that law students did not talk of real 
places, but hypothetical tracts such as Blackacre.’158 
 
Abstraction in property has advanced by stealth. Stuart Banner blames 
property academics in part for its subtle entrenchment. 
 
There were no newspaper editorials or popular magazine articles insisting 
that property was or was not a relationship between people.  Only lawyers 
153 Michael Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’  (1999) 108 Yale LJ 1163, 1193. 
154 Fairfax sees the bundle as a weakening of the Lockean ideal of property. Banner explains 
its rise in terms of a judicial willingness to widen the US constitutional takings clause. 
Goldstein links its ascension to the burgeoning worth of corporate and intellectual property, 
‘from things to rights reflected the rise of corporations and commercial and intangible 
property. 
155 Robert Goldstein, ‘Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting Environmental Ethics and 
Ecology into Real Property Law’, (1998) 25 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 347, 367. 
156 Banner observes that Hohfield’s lasting legacy was his emphasis on property as relations 
between people, Banner, above n4. 
157 Freyfogle above n8. 
158 Ibid. 
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thought about the issue, and even then only a probably very small fraction of 
the most philosophically inclined. … And of course law schools were the entry 
point for an increasingly large percentage of the broad policymaking 
community.  All law students took a course in Property, and more and more of 
them would learn that property was not about things; it was about power over 
people.159 
 
Its incremental effect (whether by accident or design) is that property 
terminology fictionalizes the relationship between people and place,160 and 
removes it to a plane, where human actions, destructive or constructive, have 
no relevance or consequence. When Mary Houghton was legally displaced 
from ex- common lands of 18th century Timworth, a connection with her local 
place was irrevocably severed. By the early 20th century, ‘relationship to place 
[was] irrelevant’ and any thought to the contrary, Hohfield argued, was 
‘fallacious’.161 
 
Peter Burdon says this is ‘a most extraordinary idea’ and ‘one that would 
surely puzzle many farming communities that have farmed sustainably and 
lived on the land for generations.’162  But such people have what geographer 
Edward Relph calls an ‘authentic attitude to place’.  From such relations, 
‘authentic places emerge, places which in turn sustain the earth and those 
dwelling upon it.’  But centrality of place is ‘a mode of experiencing place that 
is not available to everyone.  In fact, in modern daily life…it is becoming 
increasingly rare’, a phenomenon exacerbated by Brody’s transient mobility or 
Kunstler’s ‘geography of nowhere’163, the ‘weakening symbolic qualities of 
modern places.’164  Property’s abstraction cannot speak to or describe an 
individual parcel of land’s ecological limits.  Nor can it remedy deepening 
estrangement from place. Hence stewardship is left stranded by a property 
159 Banner, above n4, 106. 
160 Hohfield, above n91. ‘Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from the 
fact that many of our words were originally applicable only to physical things so that their use 
in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative or fictional.’ 
161 Burdon, above n130, 719. 
162 Ibid. 
163 James Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere (1993). 
164 Rob Garbutt,, The Locals (2012) 55. Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan sees profound sentiment for 
land only persisting ‘in places isolated from the traffic of civilization.’  Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and 
Place The Perspective of Experience, (1977) 156. 
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dialogue that speaks solely of artifice.165 Writ large, abstraction blinds us to 
the ‘one terrible fact … that civilization is just russeting on the skin of the 
biosphere.’166 
 
4.4 Land memory 
 
The cumulative effects of abstraction, individualism, and a ‘land as 
commodity’ mentality, are harmful property patterns, what Penalver calls ‘land 
memory.167  
 
More consequential than causative, land memory works in two ways. Firstly, 
physical changes made to landscapes tend to permanence, either because 
the change is irreversible, or it is too costly to remedy. And the finitude of land 
means that particular choices made about land use or property type 
necessarily restrict alternatives.  Thus, the conversion of prime agricultural 
land into housing lots is a decision that has lasting land memory implications 
for both the stock of residential land and the corresponding quantity of food 
producing land.  The same dynamic works for urban private property and 
public open space  
 
Changes that human beings make to the land have a tendency to remain in 
place until they are affirmatively removed.  And because the quantity of land 
is fixed, we are fated to live our lives within the landscape that bears the 
indelible print of our forbears, even if we do not always recognize that imprint 
for what it is.168 
 
Secondly, the tenacity of land memory produces landscape inertia, an 
interplay of individual factors, physical, psychological, and social, that ‘pre-
suppose and yield a pervasive path-dependence in land use.’169  Accordingly, 
165 ‘The rectilinear grid imposed on the earth’s surface by the imperial survey… ha[s] no 
connection to the lie of the land- and in a sense, no interest in it. ‘ Paul Carter, Dark Writing 
Geography, Performance and Design (2009) 80. 
166 Alexander & Penalver above n62, 50. 
167 Penalver defines land memory as “the combined impact of the durability of land uses and 
the stabilizing consequences of human sociality, Penalver, above n7, 827. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid, 831 
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the blunt knife used to carve out property patterns establishes land uses that 
‘reinforce one another in ways that make it difficult to undo one piece without 
affecting many others.’ One single land use cannot be regarded in isolation, it 
is part of an interconnected network that is ‘collectively, exponentially more 
durable than each of its constituent parts.’170 
 
Property patterns closely inform land memory, and its self-perpetuating 
inertia.  Eric Freyfogle’s bleak account of Champaign County, Illinois, where 
public property accounts for less than 1% of the county “setting aside 
roadways and the remnants of a now-abandoned [and contaminated] air force 
base’171 is a depressing vision of a landscape monotone locked into inertial 
stasis. Conversely, diverse property patterns may enable more positive path 
dependencies that enhance human flourishing.  James Kunstler’s description 
of childhood visits to a New England town with its ‘substantial and dignified’ 
public spaces, are a stark counterpoint to the bland suburbia where he grew 
up, and its exultation of the private realm.  
 
Freyfogle’s ‘tragedy of fragmentation’ can also be understood through the 
land memory lens.  Freyfogle describes the landscape tragedy of 
disconnected private parcels, enclaves lacking any overarching mechanism to 
achieve landscape-scale goals, including stewardship.  Where the blunt knife 
has carved out separate, disconnected property monotones, the results tend 
to permanence and self-reinforcement. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Thus far, this chapter argues that seeing property through a narrow, one-
sided private view impedes land stewardship.  It renders its definition 
problematic beyond instrumental terms, fosters structural imprecision, and 
pushes stewardship to doctrinal and theoretical fringes. And to complete the 
picture, individualism, abstraction, and commoditization close the loop and 
170 Ibid 
171 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Private Rights in Nature: Two Paradigms’ in P. Burdon (ed.) Wild Law The 
Philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence (2011) 271.  
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institute an endless circularity. By contrast, part 5 explores an alternative 
vision: the links between property diversity and stewardship alluded to in the 
closing paragraphs of this part 4.  
 
5. Property diversity and stewardship 
 
Stewardship is more likely to emerge where land use externalities have 
consequence. Contrast this to an individualized view of property; abstract and 
divorced from place, where externalities, harmful or otherwise, have no, or 
negligible, impact. As Henry Smith surmises 
 
The bundle-of-rights picture of property treats property in atom-counting 
fashion, which is fine as far as it goes. But what we still need is a theory of 
how the pieces fit together.172 
 
Property diversity is a theory that amongst other things describes that the 
pieces can fit together, one truthful of ‘property on the ground.’ As such, 
cause and effect can be traced, its inter-connective structure less likely to 
make externalities ‘magically disappear’.   
 
This part 5 describes the architecture of property diversity, and its similarities 
to both environmental conceptions of property and alternative property 
metaphors. It next considers the inter-connective effect of diversity’s 
‘normative mosaic’, the mix of property values that the private, public and 
common estates add to landscapes. Lastly, it analyses property diversity 
though the perspective of performance theory, the imaginative idea that doing 
creates reality. It observes that acts of stewardship often involve cross-
boundary partnerships of private, public and community landowners, and asks 
whether a greater ‘seeing’ of good land use performances across diverse 
property fora may help to unfreeze an otherwise intransigent paradigm.  
 
 
 
172 Henry Smith, ‘Property as the Law of Things’, (2012) 125 Harvard Law Rev. 1709. 
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5.1 The architecture of property diversity 
 
Property diversity is important because it provides an institutional structure for 
the detection and measurement of harmful land use externalities. By contrast, as 
Henry Smith infers, if we see private property as an atom counting exercise, then 
we are blind to any overarching structure. Its legacy is to perpetuate the 
piecemeal; a belief that good land use can be achieved through the novel 
application or recalibration of individual property tools.173  
 
The downside to atom counting is that it is ad hoc. It applies micro-solutions to 
macro-landscape problems, such that atomistic perspectives yield atomistic 
solutions.  Paul Babie thus imagines urban landscapes re-shaped by an evolved 
easement for light that enables ‘green roofs and green spaces’, or easements of 
‘solar access’ or ‘wind power’ that secure renewable energies.174  It also leaves 
the ‘heavy lifting’ to incorporeal hereditaments, while widespread interests, such 
as leases, lay unused or under-utilised in the property toolbox. It also raises 
issues of enforceability. ‘Rights’ of amenity or aesthetics (like prospect175 or jus 
spatiandi176) are traditionally unenforceable as easement rights,177 raising 
doubts as to the easement’s environmental efficacy. Similarly, covenants have 
long struggled to achieve proprietorial credibility; positive covenants require 
legislative intervention to overcome common law prohibitions,178 while restrictive 
covenants must satisfy onerous tests as to the running of their benefit and 
burden in equity to have teeth.179  Susan French sees ‘problems of the future’ 
frustrating conservation covenants, especially those granted in perpetuity.180 
173 David Grinlinton, ‘Property Rights and the Environment’ (1996) 4 Australian Property Law 
Journal 1, 28-29. 
174 Paul Babie, ‘How Property Law Shapes Our Landscapes’ (2011) 38 Monash University 
Law Rev. 1, 16-23; Adrian Bradbrook, ‘The Role of the Common Law in Promoting 
Sustainable Energy Development in the Property Sector’ in Property and the Law in Energy 
and Natural Resources (2009) 391-412.  
175 Douglas Fisher, ‘Can the Law Protect Landscape Values?’ (2005) 9 NZ Journal of Envtl. 
Law 1, 23. 
176 Babie, above n174, 21. 
177 An easement will not be propertised if it does not accommodate the dominant tenement or 
form the subject matter of a grant.   
178 Rule in Austerberry v Oldham Corporation (1885) 29 Ch D 750. 
179 In Queensland, covenants cannot be registered in the Torrens register, and are effectively 
unenforceable, s 98A Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).  
180 These include that the conservation goals that covenants protect may become obsolete, 
useless or even harmful, or that development pressures will become too intense for private 
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Another problem is a mal-adaptation of traditional common law interests to suit 
contemporary environmental ends. Samantha Hepburn criticises the misuse of 
profits-a-prendre for the storage of sequestered carbon,181 noting that profits are 
conceptually concerned with extraction, yet the sequestration of carbon on 
forested land is primarily directed at long-term storage.182  
 
An alternative solution is to craft new statutory sui generis rights in the place 
of inappropriate common law ones. To start from a blank slate overcomes an 
institutional problem, ‘structural change in established property systems is not 
a prevailing theme. Property systems are inherently conservative, seeking 
continuity in their basic internal framework.’183 Adrian Bradbrook agrees that it 
is up to the legislature to take the lead in creating new property rights, in his 
case, to foster alternative energies.184 Bradbrook cites statutory solar access 
rights in New Mexico as a template for analogous on-shore wind energy 
rights.185 The pace of change required and the need for harmonisation is 
beyond the common law’s incrementalism.186 While worthwhile, this debate is 
stuck in the mindset of the individual property interest, be it existing or novel, 
judicial or statutory. The emphasis remains as to how private property rights 
shape landscapes.187 
 
By contrast, Douglas Fisher looks to the bigger picture of how the law protects 
landscape values.  Fisher concludes that ‘for most purposes, the general 
principles of common law have proved not very effective - largely because they 
are linked to issues of property and land in individual ownership.’188 Despite 
property’s natural predilection, the ‘perception of landscape [being] inextricably 
land trusts to resist, Susan French, ‘Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the 
Problem of the Future’ (2005) 27 Cardozo Law Rev. 2523.  
181 Samantha Hepburn, ‘Carbon Rights as New Property’ (2008) 31 Sydney Law Rev. 239.  
182 Ibid, 244.  
183 Ibid, 240. 
184 The role of the common law is a ‘subsidiary’ only, Adrian Bradbrook, ‘The Role of the 
Common Law in Promoting Sustainable Energy Development in the Property Sector’ in 
Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2009) 411.  
185 Ibid, 403. 
186 Ibid, 410-411. 
187 Babie, above n174. 
188 Fisher, above n175, 23. 
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linked to a range of notions of property’,189 property law has proved ineffectual in 
protecting landscape values. Fisher attributes this to property’s preoccupation 
with individual rights, and the disconnect this paradigm has with values ‘enjoyed 
and appreciated by members of the community at large.’ ‘If the land associated 
with the landscape is the subject of individual rights of property, then these 
rights of property are unlikely to be a suitable or effective mechanism through 
which the values of landscape may be protected.’190 Significantly, Fisher hints 
(in passing) that embracing a wider concept of property may be advantageous, 
citing native title or common property as emerging exemplars of property 
pluralism.  ‘ 
 
Fisher anticipates the potential of property diversity.191 As already traversed in 
chapter 4, context, inter-connectivity, and a faithful representation of real-life 
propertied landscapes are its hallmarks. This architecture192 of property 
diversity is also fundamentally the framework of an ‘ecological view of 
property.’193 In 1992, Joseph Sax recognized an emerging ‘economy of 
nature’ as requiring a ‘different attitude towards land and the nature of land 
ownership itself.’194 In this economy, land’s ultimate worth is measured by its 
provision of environmental services. 
 
Land is not a passive entity waiting to be transformed by its landowner. Nor is 
the world comprised of distinct tracts of land, separate pieces independent of 
each other.  Rather, an ecological perspective views land as consisting of 
systems defined by their function, not by man-made boundaries. Land is 
already at work, performing services in its unaltered state.195 
 
Sax identifies four features of a re-defined ‘property’ that serves both the 
needs of a transformative economy and nature’s economy. First, there is ‘less 
189 Ibid 5. 
190 Ibid,6.  
191 ‘Notions of property cannot be ignored, they lie at the foundation of the [landscape] 
system.’  Fisher, above n175, 6. 
192 Smith advocates that ‘an architectural approach to property can do much better [than the 
bundle metaphor].’ Smith, above n172, 1692. 
193 Joseph Sax, ‘Property Rights and the Economy of Nature Understanding Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council the Economy of Nature’ (1992) 45 Stanford Law Rev. 1445. 
194 Ibid, 1445 - also refer to the table on 1445-6. 
195 Ibid, 1442. 
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focus on individual dominion’, second, more public decision-making about 
private land uses, third, increased ecological planning, and fourth ‘affirmative 
obligations by owners to protect natural systems.’196 Collectively these 
attributes are ‘public, planned and ecosystemic’.197 Sax also sees the usufruct 
as the ‘closest existing model’ to capture an owner’s revised property rights in 
an economy of nature, a right that does not confer exclusive dominion, but 
rather a ‘right to uses compatible with the community’s dependence on the 
property as a resource.’198  Sax sums up ecological property as characterized 
by ‘physical interconnections and community dependence on a resource’s 
natural functions’,199 a design (absent external regulation) with strong 
similarities to the architecture of property diversity.  
 
The structure of property diversity also has its analogies in alternative 
property metaphors. While modern property is famously described as a 
bundle of private stick rights, the rise of environmentalism in the 1960s, and 
the basic ecological tenet ‘that everything is connected to everything else’200 
has weakened its hegemony.  Its slow unraveling is symbolized by ideas such 
as Robert Goldstein’s minimalist ‘green sticks’ inserted into the bundle201Myrl 
Duncan likewise re-engineers the bundle with an emphasis on context and 
public rights in land,202 adding a ‘public cord’ to complete the bundle, symbolic 
of the ecological and communal bonds that connect and bind disparate private 
sticks.203 By contrast, alternative metaphors reject the disaggregated bundle 
in favor of holistic, inter-connected conceptualizations analogous to diverse 
property.204 Tony Arnold’s ‘web of interests’ is oft cited, featuring  
‘interconnections among persons, groups, and entities with an … identifiable 
196 Ibid, 1451. 
197Ibid. 
198Ibid, 1452. 
199 Ibid, 1453. 
200 Metzger, above n, 147, 797. Yannacone suggested ‘social property’, an evolution of 
private property that recognized its non-absolute traditions, and the public interest in private 
land stewardship.’ Victor Yannacone, above n104; Babcock & Feurer, above n105; and 
(slightly later) David Hunter, “An Ecological Perspective on Property: Calls for Judicial 
Protection of the Public Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources” (1988) 12 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 311. 
201 Goldstein, above n155, 374. 
202 Myrl Duncan, “Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based 
Resource”, (2002) 32 Envtl. Law 773. 
203 Ibid, 804-5. 
204Amnon Lehavi, ‘The Property Puzzle’  (2008) 96 Geo. L. J. 1987.    
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object at the center of the web.’205 Water is another powerful metaphor suited 
to the diversity model, symbolic ‘of context and relativity, accommodation and 
community.’206   
 
Henry Smith’s ‘modular’ or ‘architectural’ theory is an insightful (and recent) 
addition to the catalogue of property metaphors.207 Smith sees property as a 
series of inter-connected modules, a basic architecture ‘whose parts are not 
as detachable as the bundle view would have it’.208  As semi-autonomous and 
mostly self-contained modules,209 their level of interaction is less obvious. 
What is often seen is the intense level of interaction within the module, while 
inter-modular connections are minimized in number, or concealed through 
interfaces that are ‘information hiding and limited.’210 Smith draws the analogy 
to a car, where independently functioning modules (such as braking systems 
and air-conditioning units) operate as part of an overarching architecture, but 
for reasons of information cost, most users do not need to know their level of 
integration. Smith says that a modular theory of property is information cost-
effective in managing property’s complexity.  Property owners need only know 
the relationship of how their property rights interact with related rights, and not 
the full architecture, much like knowing that hitting the brake pedal will stop 
the car. In explaining the popularity of the bundle, Smith notes that it only 
provides a  ‘partial outlook’ of the whole property structure.  Modularity by 
contrast ‘furnishes the things that property as a law of things contributes to 
private law,’211 and ‘explains the structures we do not find.’212 
 
205 The ‘web’ metaphor aligns with two environmental principles, ‘the interconnectedness of 
people and their physical environment, and the importance of the unique characteristics of 
each object. C A Arnold, ‘The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests’ 
(2002) 26 Harv. Envtl. L.Rev. 281, 281, 333. Kristen Carpenter et al concur that the bundle is 
inapt in its depiction of stewardship. Carpenter at al, above n55. 
206 Eric Freyfogle, ‘Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law’, (1988-1989) 41 
Stanford L. Rev. 1529. 
207 Smith dismisses the bundle as ‘more of a description than a theory’, Smith, ‘above n172, 
1694. 
208 Ibid, 1700. 
209 ‘Clusters of complementary attributes’ Ibid, 1703. 
210 Ibid, 1703. 
211 Smith, above n172, 1726. 
212 Ibid, 1702. 
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Smith’s modular theory has implications for property diversity, in depicting not 
only modules of ‘lumpy’ private property rights, but also their near-opaque 
links to public and common modules, structures ‘we do not find’.  But his 
theory is of most interest in explaining the effects, or non-effects, of 
externalities. It may explain why the adverse impacts of harmful land uses 
escape notice, since the impact is absorbed within the largely self-contained 
module, while any extra-modular ‘ripples’ almost disappear in the latent 
interfaces that exist between modules.  
 
Modularity manages complexity, because the ripple effects of modifications to 
one module have more defined consequences (through interfaces) than they 
would in an unconstrained system. … The system is easier to understand and 
to modify, and less vulnerable to shocks. Interactions and interdependencies 
can be intense within modules but are defined and relatively sparse across 
the interface with other modules.  The key is that the interface allows only 
certain information through; the rest is "hidden" in the module.213 
 
Externalities ‘hidden in the module’ are nothing compared to the atomized 
universally detachable bundle of sticks that deem harmful land uses 
irrelevant. Joseph Singer identifies property norms arising from the 
‘ownership’ or ‘castle’ models of property as responsible for making 
externalities ‘magically disappear’.  Singer argues that the exercise of 
property rights always has impacts on others,214 externalities imposed ‘on 
[those] not directly involved in a transaction or act.’215 Where no ‘legally 
relevant harm’ is caused, such externalities are ‘self-regarding’.216 
Conversely, where the effect is adverse, it is a harmful externality. 
Importantly, a society’s property norms interact with externalities by 
determining which acts are harmful, and which are benign self-regarding 
ones. In making this judgment, they then operate to ‘reveal or obscure the 
presence of externalities.’217 In castle or ownership models, property norms 
213, Ibid,1701. 
214 Singer , above n58, 1048-9.  
215 Joseph Singer, ‘Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership’ in Property and 
Community, 57, 60 (Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver eds., 2010) 57, 61.  
216 Ibid, 63. 
217 Ibid, 79. 
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frequently hide harmful impacts on others (including the environment), such 
effects dismissed as self-regarding because property norms deem them so.  
In this way, adverse externalities ‘magically vanish’218 since the prevailing 
property norm does not value or recognize the affected other’s property 
‘rights’. As traversed in chapter 4, Singer’s preference is a relational or 
socially situated concept of property, his ‘environmental’ or ‘good neighbor’ 
model.  In such conceptions, property norms expose rather than conceal 
harmful externalities.  
 
The monistic ‘property strategy’ divides human landscapes into discrete 
parcels of individual ownerships.  As Thomas Merrill observes, this strategy is 
a double-edged sword when it comes to externalities 
 
One advantage of this strategy… is that it eliminates certain kinds of 
externalities, notably those associated with commons tragedies. But the very 
process of carving up the world of resources into little boxes of ownership 
generates the preconditions for new externalities. By dividing the world into 
units of autonomous owner control, the property strategy creates a built-in 
incentive for owners to ignore aspects of their management that affect other 
units of autonomous owner control.219 
 
The architecture of property diversity ensures that any ‘in-built incentive’ to 
ignore harmful land uses is not realised.  As Merrill predicts, ‘paradoxically, 
private property must be interlaced with networks of open-access or public 
property if it is to work effectively as a strategy for managing resources’’,220 a 
‘Swiss-cheese pattern of ownership alternating between public and private 
property.’221  
 
If seeing property as a bundle of sticks is only a partial outlook as Smith 
supposes, then seeing property as slightly connected modules of lumpy private 
rights is but a further extension of the vista. The architecture of property diversity 
218 Ibid. 
219 Thomas Merrill, ‘The Property Strategy’ (2011-12) Uni. Pennsylvania Law Rev. 2061, 
2089. 
220 Ibid, 2091. 
221 Ibid, 2092. 
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is the long-range ‘full picture’, one where the inter-connections of public, private, 
and common modules are more clearly in focus, and the implications of adverse 
land uses can both be seen and measured in this ‘age of ecological 
consequence’.222  
 
5.2 Normative diversity 
 
The optimal conditions for land obligation are also enhanced when a visible 
property mosaic yields a ‘normative mosaic’ commensurate to the diverse mix 
on the ground. As outlined in chapter 4, property diversity inculcates multiple 
values across landscapes. To ‘see’ the totality of the private, public and 
common estates is to enliven a ‘values mosaic’ unique to each landscape.  
 
This part suggests that normative diversity may be desirable for a number of 
reasons: first, it reflects the truthfulness of property patterns, ‘the 
heterogeneity of property’s real-life manifestations’.223 Second, it dilutes the 
values of property monism. Third, it has the potential to re-balance the 
collective values of land ownership. Discussion of the first and third rationales 
(essentially the architecture of community and how different communities 
manifest) is postponed to chapter 6. This discussion will concentrate on the 
second.   
 
Exclusively private landscapes act in two ways: they distort the values of 
private property, and they marginalize or discredit any non-private value 
alternatives. As discussed in chapter 1, an unrestrained private estate falsely 
conflates exclusivity, and as noted earlier in this chapter, it promotes hard, 
utilitarian views of ‘land as commodity’, where land is seen in purely 
instrumental rather than ethical or personhood terms. Hanoch Dagan is critical 
of the values of a monistic view of property. Dagan says they fail to describe 
the ‘lived’ experience of property, the truth of people’s relationships with the 
various ‘institutions of property’ and the variable nature of the resource. His 
222 Grinlinton & Taylor, above n39, 4. 
223 Ibid, xii. 
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pluralistic view of property by contrast enables ‘rights and responsibilities’ and 
promotes human values. 
 
[E]xisting property configurations both construct and reflect the optimal 
interactions among people in given categories of relationships and with 
respect to given categories of resources.  By facilitating such various 
categories of human interactions, the forms of property can promote 
important human values.  Some property institutions are structured along the 
lines of the Blackstonian … “sole despotic dominion.” These institutions are 
atomistic and competitive. Other property institutions… are dominated by a 
much more communitarian view of property., in which ownership is a locus of 
sharing. Many other property institutions…lie somewhere along this spectrum 
between atomistic and communitarian norms. For instance with … common 
interest communities, both autonomy and community are of the essence, and 
thus ownership implies both rights and responsibilities.224 
 
What type of values mosaic is produced in the wake of the property mosaic? 
Or to put the question another way - what values do different property types 
contribute to a whole of landscape perspective?  Chapter 2 has canvassed 
sociability,225 and ‘pedestrian democracy’226 as enduring values of public 
property. In chapter 3, Carol Rose describes the norms of common property 
as ‘great bodies of law … [that] revolve around an ethic of moderation, 
proportionality, prudence and responsibility to the others who are entitled to 
share in the common resource.’227 And private property has been shown to be 
far more multivalent than supposed.228   The end yield is a values polyglot 
where private-centric impediments to land obligation are less dominant, and 
overlooked communitarian and social values provide balance.  
 
224 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (2011) 29. 
225 Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, (1986) 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711. 
226 Kevin Gray, ‘Pedestrian Democracy and the Geography of Hope’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 45. 
227 Carol Rose, ‘The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems’, (1998-1999) 83 Minn. L. Rev. 129. 
228 ‘It is a mistake to view private property as one-dimensional, that its values embrace more 
than simple commodity. Dagan, above n224.  
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[F]orms of property matter… because these configurations of property rights 
constitute property institutions that facilitate various categories of human 
interaction, and thus promote important human values…. As human 
institutions, the forms of property should be crafted through bundling in a way 
that fortifies their normative desirability.229 
 
Nor are property values static. For Dagan, pluralism means ongoing 
evaluation of the ‘institutions of property’ in terms of their values and 
‘continued validity and desirability.’230  Such a fluid approach ‘is … an 
exercise in legal optimism, an attempt to explain and develop the existing 
property forms in a way that accentuates their normative desirability while 
remaining attuned to their social context.’231  Like the reiterative effect of 
varied stewardship performances (to be discussed next), normative diversity 
has the potential to ‘unfreeze’ the dominant values of the ownership model, 
and to allow others in.  
 
5.3 A performance theory of stewardship 
 
Performance theory posits that ‘social reality is a relational effect brought into 
being by the very act of performance itself.’232  In other words, the reality of 
stewardship depends on its repeated acts and representations. Under this 
theory, stewardship is not a pre-existing concept, but an effect constructed 
through constant practice. This deceptively simple idea is powerful because it 
is the antithesis of abstraction.  
 
Performance theory applied to property diversity provides ‘real world’ 
examples of public, private and community acts of stewardship across a 
plurality of fora.  It intensifies the quantum of stewardship performance, and 
widens the class of steward-actors. Optimistically, it shifts stewardship from 
isolated one-off acts of altruism, to collective acts of land use that are 
universalizing and normalizing by their frequency and spread.  Its most critical 
229 Ibid, 35. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid, 31. 
232 Cited as performativity theory by Nicholas Blomley, Blomley above n39, 13. 
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effect may lie in its ‘unfreezing’ of property abstraction.  Nicholas Blomley’s 
use of performance theory to describe ‘the ownership model of property’ is 
equally analogous to stewardship. 233 To (mis)quote Blomley234  
 
If [stewardship] is a form of “frozen politics,” an emphasis upon the 
performance of [stewardship] perhaps begins to offer us some tools for an 
unfreezing to the extent that it alerts us that [stewardship] is iteratively 
produced in concrete social contexts, not found.235 
 
Doing acts of good land use in ‘concrete social contexts’ may be the simple 
tool that shifts focus. It may unfreeze our thinking about land stewardship, 
away from having to link duty with right, the discourse of subject-object, or 
other innumerable dilemmas. Stewardship simply is because it is done.  When 
performed in diverse property settings, its doing is multiplied and accentuated 
by its differences. 
 
Performance theory also requires successful repetition. Similar acts build, 
precedent-like, on what has been performed before, providing templates for 
future acts.  Blomley describes performance as ‘always derivative, taking hold 
and becoming real in the world to the extent that it successfully cites other 
such performances, and in so doing, compels future similar performances.’236 
This stare decisis effect of performance is called citational. The past acts that 
a present act must cite to demonstrate validity have to be ‘more or less 
successful’. By contrast, citational failures are ‘less likely to have performative 
effect, and thus to become reality.’237 In stewardship literature, piecemeal 
accounts of failure are numerous. There may be insufficient public ownership 
of critical conservation lands,238 over-reliance on financial ‘carrots’ such as 
incentives or grants,239 unsustainable retreats into national park ‘ghettos’,240 
233 ‘Recognizing the commons in our midst thus becomes a crucial political task through 
which non-capitalist possibilities can be discerned and revalorized.’ Blomley, 33. 
234 The ‘misquote’ substitutes ‘stewardship’ for the words ‘the ownership model of property.’ 
235 Blomley, above n39, 31. 
236 Blomley, 17. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Bradley Karkkainen, ‘Biodiversity and Land’, (1997-1998) 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1  
239 Elmendorf, above n109; Neil Gunningham and Mike Young, ‘Toward Optimal 
Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity Conservation’, (1997) 24 Ecology LQ 243. 
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or dysfunction outside small homogenous groups.241 Narratives of anecdotal 
failure are intended as lessons to avoid past mistakes, but their unintended 
consequence may be a debilitating precedent of citational failure.   
 
Nor is citation enough.  Performances must also be reiterative, since ‘for 
property to be made real requires sustained, repetitive… often complicated 
work.’242 Endlessly repeated performances are its precondition and means for 
continuance, what Blomley terms ‘sedimented, repetitive, duplicated form.’ 
Reiteration means that stewardship must be mundane and engrained, not 
exceptional. Reiteration is a concept familiar to the common law of property. 
The truism that landowners ‘cannot sleep on their rights’ is a warning that 
owners must continuously signal explicit indicia of possession, lest the law 
reward adverse trespassers with title. Indeed sufficient doing may be 
emblematic of property doctrine, as Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked ‘[t]he life 
of the common law has not been logic; it has been experience.’243 Like Carol 
Rose’s constant yelling of ‘this is mine’,244 stewardship requires consistent 
unequivocal performance.  
 
Lastly, effective citation and constant reiteration requires context, what 
Blomley terms assemblage245 the physical and human entities that actualize 
the performance and connect it to the world. Assemblage helps by 
‘concretizing a new set of discourses around property and space.’246  
Importantly, stewardship performance cannot occur in universalized 
Blackacres. 
 
 
 
240 Farrier, above n108.  
241 Caldwell, above n16, part 4. 
242 Blomley,above n39, 18. 
243 Oliver Wendell Holmes cited in Goldstein, above n 412, Terry Frazier, ‘The Green 
Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory’ (1995-1996) 20 Vt. L. Rev. 302, 53.  
244 Carol Rose, ‘Possession as the Origin of Property’, (1985) 52(1) Univ. Chicago Law Rev. 
73. 
245 Blomley, above n39, 21. 
246 During enclosure, hedges used to divide and enclose were the ‘assemblage’ that created a 
new property discourse. 
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5.4 Performative diversity: two micro-examples of stewardship 
performance 
 
Performances of stewardship frequently involve public, community and private 
actors collaborating across property boundaries.247 Similar to the happy 
coincidence of sustainable communities and property diversity (see chapter 
4), ‘connective conservation’248 efforts speak of an intuitive link between 
property diversity and stewardship.  This serendipitous convergence is noted 
by Sue Farran, and her observations of a contemporary phenomenon in 
England she calls an ‘extraordinary return to the land.’249 Farran writes of 
‘people going back to the land… coming together to cultivate land and grow 
things’250 in a growing sense of stewardship. These acts occur in diverse 
spaces; community gardens and orchards, resurgent allotments, city farms, 
and guerilla gardening plots.  Farran asks what this movement means for 
contemporary property, and concludes that many of these ventures occur 
outside traditional frameworks, novel arrangements such as ‘crop shares and 
tree leases in community orchards, raised-bed leasing in the community 
backyards of tenement buildings, land sharing, community farm shares and 
local food coalitions.’251 These diverse tenures, in turn, are located across a 
diversity of property type. 
 
Some of the manifestations of the phenomenon remain outside or on the 
edges of the public domain, while others represent or become hybrid 
public/private relationships with land… [some] forms of engagement may be 
distinct from and not dependent on ownership.252 
  
247 Knight & Landres, above n1. 
248 The term is used in the Gondwana Link project that aims to create a corridor of 1000 
kilometres in WA’s southwest. Administered by not-for-profit company (Gondwana Link Ltd), 
the project links public agencies with private landowners and community organizations, like 
Greening Australia, Bush Heritage and local friends groups. It uses combinations of outright 
purchase and conservation covenants in conjunction with public reserves and national parks 
to secure the corridor. http://www.gondwanalink.org/index.aspx (30 July 2013). 
249 Sue Farran, ‘Earth under the Nails: The Extraordinary Return to the Land’ in Nicholas 
Hopkins (ed.) Modern Studies in Property Law (7th ed., 2013). 
250Ibid, 173. 
251 Ibid, 188. 
252 Ibid, 175, 189. 
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This ‘extraordinary return to the land’ can be measured by performance 
theory. If, as Blomley argues, real property is enacted by performances like 
 
humble acts of fence building, mortgage foreclosures, judicial 
pronouncements, debates around the use of force in the protection of one’s 
home, burglary, instructions to children not to cross someone else’s lawn, the 
installation of security systems, law review articles, the creation of a cadastre, 
the cutting of hedges, struggles over gentrification, property registration, 
indigenous mobilizations, and so on.253 
 
equally, stewardship is enacted by Farran’s guerilla gardening, community 
orchard planting, or allotment farming.   
 
Performance theory across the diversity of property is best articulated by 
concrete examples of ‘sustained and citational labour.’   This part concludes 
by examining two place-based micro-studies of good land use. The first 
typifies conservation efforts in the rangelands of America’s West and is the 
subject of scholarly scrutiny254. The other is a simpler, local landcare narrative 
set in regional Australia. Each enacts cross-boundary stewardship. 
 
Recent land use conflicts in the American west have centered on the clash 
between commodity and non-commodity uses of publicly owned rangelands, 
specifically grazing and recreation.255  Over-grazing has been blamed for land 
degradation, soil erosion, and damage to riparian systems since the 1880s.256 
Environmentalists want cattle removed from the public domain.257 Cattle 
advocates respond that recreation is itself a form of consumptive use. On 
surrounding private lands, urban growth has fed sprawl and the loss of open 
space.   A collaborative model of land use management has been one 
response to the polarities of this land use debate.  
253 Blomley, above n39, 14. 
254 White, above n51.  
255 Courtney White, ‘Conservation in the Age of Consequences’ (2008) 48 Nat. Res. J. 1, 1-3 
256 Samuel Trask Dana & Sally Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy Its Development in the 
United States (2nd ed, 1980). 
257 Denzell & Nancy Ferguson, Sacred Cows at the Public Trough (1983); J. Wald et al, How 
Not to be Cowed (1991). 
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[P]eople from varied backgrounds have been seeking ways to depolarize 
environmental issues, reintegrate conservation, and build a new consensus 
for action. The common denominator is a commitment to land health on the 
part of individuals, neighborhoods, organizations, tribes, agencies and 
businesses, and a despite to achieve tangible results, whether on private, 
public, or community lands. These trends suggest the possibility of an 
emerging “cross-landscape” constituency that can address the harmful 
feedback loops that encourage continued degradation of urban, suburban, 
exurban, rural, and wild lands alike.258 
 
The Malpai Borderlands Group in New Mexico and Arizona is representative 
of this trend, a cross landscape partnership of private owners that act in 
concert with public agencies to sustainably co-manage the Malpai natural 
resource region.259 The Malpai comprises ‘more than a million acres of desert 
grasslands and broken mountains’,260 a mix of private and public lands, the 
latter including wildlife refuges and public domain leased under grazing 
permits.  The Malpai Borderlands Group (MPG) is a not-for-profit community 
organization formed in 1994, consisting primarily of local ranchers. The 
region’s centerpiece is Gray Ranch, a ‘biologically rich 322,000 acre’ property, 
considered ‘one of the most significant ecological landscapes … in private 
ownership.’261  Because of its unique ecological values, The Nature 
Conservancy262 purchased the Gray in 1990. Its aim was to transfer the 
holding to federal ownership as a wildlife refuge, but protests at the loss of a 
‘tax-paying, cowboy hiring’263 ranch forced a change in strategy. A charitable 
foundation264 was formed to purchase the ranch as conservation buyer and 
working ranch operator.  Under new ownership, the Gray Ranch pioneered 
the concept of ‘grassbanks’, where rights to graze on its rich grasslands were 
258 Meine, above n1, 61. 
259 Carol Rose, “The Several Futures of Property: OF Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission 
Trades and Ecosystems” (1998) 83 Minn. L.R 129, 178; Robert Keiter, “Public Lands and Law 
Reform: Putting Theory, Policy and Practice in Perspective” (2005) Utah L. R. 1127, 1175. 
260 Elmendorf, above n109, 482. 
261 White, above n51, 121. 
262 Brewer, above n16, 185-215. 
263 White, above n51, 121. 
264 The charitable trust established to purchase Gray Ranch is also a member of the Malpai 
Borderlands Group Inc.  
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sold to neighboring ranchers in return for open space conservation 
easements,265 the remediation of exhausted grazing lands, and publicly 
funded conservation programs.266  The MPG owns the conservation 
easements in its capacity as a land trust.267  The easements protect 75,000 
acres of private land as ‘natural wildlife habitat and productive ranch land by 
preventing subdivision and development.’268 What had once been a 
contentious landscape ‘transformed quickly into a model of collaboration and 
conservation,’269 ‘a land of intersecting groups.’270 
 
The second example is a micro-urban one in the ecological tradition of 
localism, historicized by Gilbert White and Henry David Thoreau.271 Indeed, 
Nicole Graham describes adaptation to a new property paradigm as a 
‘process of becoming local.’272 The Wilson River Landcare Group (WRLG) 
has rehabilitated the riparian zone adjoining the Wilson River in Lismore, 
Australia, turning a degraded area of ‘debris from past floods, car tyres, old 
fridges, plastic bags, and cow carcasses’ into a riverbank gallery rainforest on 
both sides of the river.273  The volunteer WLRG was formed in 1993 and 
initially commenced reforestation works on private lands to the north and 
south of urban areas. The group’s heartland is now a series of re-vegetated 
public parklands adjoining the river, and private flood prone land.  WRLG’s 
networks extend to Aboriginal, community and private landowners, as well as 
councils and schools.  Apart from restoration of the native rainforest, the 
265 The conservation easements are vested in the not for profit Malpai Borderlands Group, 
and preclude subdivision, and urban development. 
266 Such as “cool fire” burning that encourages native vegetative cover, or restoration of native 
grassland and savanna habitat. See  
http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/about.asp. 
267 Land trusts are often described in a physicalized way. “Land trust projects are place-
based, connected to a piece of the Earth rather than being abstract or abstruse… If we set up 
a new preserve, we can hike it, bird it, hug the trees, and wade in the water.” Brewer, 12. 
268 http://www.malpaiborderlandsgroup.org/about.asp. 
269 White, above n51, 122 
270 Elmendorf, above n109, 483. 
271 Worster attributes much of the intellectual force of modern ecological thinking to White 
who lived in the 18th century village of Selborne, Hampshire, and Thoreau, who lived in 19th 
century Concord village, Massachusetts. Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy A History of 
Ecological Ideas (2nd ed, 1994). 
272 Graham, above n3.  
273 “The earliest explorers could hardly see the sky when travelling up the river in boats…the 
vines and treetops touched overhead. The river was narrower before they took the trees away 
and the water was clear, they could see to the bottom.” Jennie Dell, “Planting seeds of 
regeneration” Northern Rivers Echo (Lismore) 24 May 2012, 6-7. 
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group has removed weeds, stabilized eroded riverbanks, and improved water 
quality. The group hopes its actions ‘in urban Lismore inspire landholders 
upstream to plant trees too…. ultimately we plant out of love for our amazing 
river.’274  
 
These vignettes affirm Joseph Sax’s prediction that ‘[v]iewing land through the 
lens of an economy of nature reduces the significance of property lines….’ .275 
Stewards tend to look less at the artifice of demarcation, and more at the land 
in between and across the lines. They see nature as an unfragmented whole, 
in WRLG’s case ‘a globally significant biodiversity hotspot’, not ‘distinct 
parcels of land and discrete natural resources valued piece by piece.’276 And 
it matters less whether the ‘landowners’ are private entities, public agencies, 
or a community group.  From the steward’s perspective, Joseph Singer’s 
‘castle’ is less plausible. This is an insight into a  ‘different way of thinking 
about what ownership entails.’277 
 
The performances of stewardship gleaned from these two examples are as 
diverse as Blomley’s earlier acts of real property - re-planting rainforest trees, 
cleaning flood debris, swimming in clear rivers, lighting cool fires, negotiating 
conservation easements, preserving rural ways of life, or trading grassbank-
grazing offsets. Blomley’s notion of performativity directs us to the important 
question: what sort of property in land do we wish to see performed? Is it one 
fixated on individual property rights absent context, or one where many 
diverse rights and obligation sit together? These performances, by diverse 
owners across the boundaries of property type, suggest by their repetitive and 
successful doing that stewardship is a vibrant concept intimately connected to 
the diversity of our many relationships with land.  
 
 
 
274 Ibid. 
275 Sax, above n193. 
276 Freyfogle, above n8, 13.                                                               
277 Joseph Sax, Ownership, Property and Sustainability 2010 Wallace Stegner Lecture (2010) 
9. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Parts 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter argue that the private ownership model 
impedes the generation of obligation as a corollary of property right in land. By 
contrast, part 5 describes how property diversity yields a vista where private, 
public, and community performances of good land use occur in situ, where a 
conceptual framework measures the impact of land uses, and an array of 
property values dilute one-sided norms that otherwise make harmful 
externalities ‘magically disappear.’    
 
Atomistic conceptions of property in land make it ‘hard to spot and appreciate 
the connections when all we see are the pieces.’278  In contrast to this singular 
vision, property diversity shifts landed patterns away from compartmentalized 
artifice to holistic interconnectedness; a re-sighting of property in land where 
generating obligation alongside right somehow seems less ‘awkward.’   
278 Freyfogle, above n8, 30-1 
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Chapter 6 Community and the Implications of Property 
Diversity in Land 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 1984, Joseph Sax identified community as the missing blank in American 
law. ‘The notion of community entitlement is virtually empty space in the legal 
constellation…. there isn’t even an accepted or commonplace legal definition 
of community.’1  Twenty-six years later, despite intermittent filling of that 
space, Sax sees little change, noting that ‘almost every conception of land in 
modern times has ignored community values.’2 Sax’s observations highlight 
the dilemma of reconciling community and property in land, a challenge with 
existential and normative implications.3  This chapter examines the 
marginalized links between property and community, a subject matter ‘left 
unexplored within property scholarship,4 and asks whether property diversity 
may present some answers to that dilemma. For as Sax also says ‘[d]iversity 
is a good thing, in human settlements as well as nature. Or, to put it another 
way, eclecticism is not a bad thing.’5  
 
Part 2 commences by exploring definitions of the term ‘community’ within 
property and geography scholarship. Part 3 then outlines legal theories that 
variously ‘explain and evaluate the interaction between property and 
community.’6  Other disciplinary insights into this relationship, principally the 
work of legal geographer Nicholas Blomley, form the basis of part 4.  Part 5 is 
the concluding cornerstone of this chapter, it analyses the reasons why 
1 Joseph Sax, ‘The Rights of Communities: A Blank Space in American Law’, July 11,  
1984, Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado, School of Law. 
2 Joseph Sax, ‘Ownership, Property and Sustainability’ 2010 Wallace Stegner Lecture, 13. 
3 By existential, I mean formal legal status. ‘The interests of a community have no formal 
status; they are not, for example, property rights. In the law's eye, they are only sentiment.’ 
Joseph Sax, ‘Do Communities Have Rights? The National Parks as Laboratories of New 
Ideas’ (1984) 45 University of  Pittsburgh LR 499, 506. By normative, I mean the values of 
community. 
4 Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver , ‘Introduction’ in G Alexander & E Penalver (eds.) 
Property and Community (2010) xxxiii. The authors add, ‘[m]oreover the dominant 
approaches within legal theory are poorly suited to the task of explaining and evaluating the 
interaction between property and community.’  
5 Sax, above n3, 509. 
6 Alexander & Penalver above n4, xxxiii.  
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property, in particular property diversity, is relevant to community. It argues 
that property and community are closely linked,7 however much their intimacy 
is obscured by a liberal polarity focused on either the state or the private 
individual.  Curiously, this binary paradigm does not reflect the propertied truth 
of our human landscapes. By contrast, property diversity better approximates 
the communities in which we live.  It ‘unsettles’ dominant assumptions of 
private uniformity,8 enlivens Joseph Sax’s eclectic, and connects people to 
community. It fulfills the promise envisaged by Eduardo Penalver, whereby 
property becomes an ‘entrance’ to rather than ‘exit’ from community.9 
 
2. What is ‘community’? 
 
‘Community’ is a contested term that is ‘maddeningly ambiguous’,10 a ‘fluid, 
often elusive concept.’11 While it is no longer as ‘empty’ a legal space as Sax 
described in 1984, it remains uncomfortable territory for property scholars. 
This part 2 is a chronological and inter-disciplinary journey, examining in turn 
property and geography scholarship to describe the complex meanings of 
‘community’.   
 
2.1 Community in property scholarship 
 
Joseph Sax’s innovative study12 of the fate of several ‘viable farming villages’ 
in an Arkansas national park was a ‘provocative point of beginning for thinking 
about the substance of community interests.’13 Sax chose to define 
community as an aggregate of attributes. Using these villages as exemplars, 
Sax identifies ‘distinctiveness, stability, a strong association of people with the 
landscape, [and the] maintenance of traditions and historical structures’14 to 
inform the meaning of community. Sax in particular emphasizes two factors; 
7 These links are ‘deeply intertwined.’ Ibid, xxxiii 
8 Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City Urban Land and the Politics of Property (2004), 156. 
9 Eduardo Penalver, ‘Property as Entrance’, (2005) Virginia Law Review 1889. 
10 Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xxix.  
11 Amnon Lehavi, ‘Property Rights and Local Public Goods: Toward a Better Future for Urban 
Communities’, (2004) 36 The Urban Lawyer 1, 45. 
12 Sax above n1 & 3.  
13 Sax, above n3, 503. 
14 Ibid. 
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distinctive diversity, and authenticity.  Distinctiveness is discerned by posing 
questions such as 
 
Is there a distinctive local lifestyle? Is there an indigenous architecture or a 
special flavor to the local economy? Is there a population that has generated 
some distinctive ties to the land, by continuity or by some special relation, that 
bind them to each other and to the place? Are the local interests internally 
rather than externally generated?15 
 
Authenticity is an innate and subjectively intuitive quality, ‘the genius of a 
place’ that gives locations vitality.  Humanist geographers such as Edward 
Relph16 write of the importance (and increasing disappearance) of authenticity 
of place. Authenticity is an organic measure, an amorphous quality generated 
from within, as contrasted to the confected indicia of ‘community’ imposed 
from without.17 
 
Few directly took up Sax’s ‘provocative’ invitation. In the ensuing years, there 
was a widespread perception that ‘scholarly attempts to define and 
conceptualize “community”’ was futile.’18  Certain scholarship focused on the 
dynamics of community norms, thereby defining ‘community’ obliquely in 
terms of its normative effects.  Robert Ellickson viewed ‘community’ through 
the prism of a small, homogenous group of ranchers in rural Shasta County, 
California, and the powerful effect of their insider norms maintaining a 
communal ‘order without law.’19  Ellickson observes that norms lose potency 
when strangers intervene, or the community becomes diffuse or 
heterogeneous.20 Implicit in this oblique perspective on community is an ‘us 
and them’ logic, what Alexander and Penalver call the ‘insider/outsider 
dilemma’, the necessity by implication to exclude outsiders in the process of 
15 Sax above n3, 509. 
16 Tim Cresswell, Place A Short Introduction (2004). 
17 Sax argues that authentic communities should not be viewed as museum pieces, and need 
to adapt to changing circumstances. Cf ‘totem objects designed to convince us that we live in 
a thing called community.’ James Kunstler, The Geography of Nowhere (1993) 123. 
18 Lehavi, above n11, 46. 
19 Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) 167. 
20 David Engel, ‘The Oven Bird’s Song, Insiders, Outsiders and Personal Injuries in an 
American Community’ in Carol Greenhouse et al (eds.), Law and Community in Three 
American Towns,  (1994) 51-2. 
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constituting and defining a community.21 Hanoch Dagan similarly recognizes 
that ‘some measure of practical or symbolic exclusion’ is necessary to define 
communities, which are ‘demarcated from broader society.’22 Such ‘logic’ has 
positive and negative impacts, inclusive for those within the group, but 
alienating for those without. The negative consequences of exclusion are 
discussed later. 
 
For the remainder of the 20th century, property scholars continued to struggle 
with ‘community’. In 1992, Stephen Gardbaum’s study of law, politics, and the 
claims of community, studiously avoided property.23 Two years later, Richard 
Ford claimed that defining ‘community’ was an exercise in tautology, that 
there was ‘no self-conscious legal conception of political space.’24 Ford 
attributed the irrelevance of the ‘development, population and demarcation’ of 
decentralized space to a binary liberal worldview that analogized community 
as either ‘the product of aggregated individual choices or the administratively 
necessary segmentation of centralized governmental power.’25  
 
In the 21st century, a shift occurred, particularly with the emergence of 
progressive property theorists who argued that this binary view failed to 
account for property’s ‘truth’. In 2009, Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Penalver, 
Laura Underkuffler and Joseph Singer summarized this evolving approach in 
a five-point ‘Statement of Progressive Property’.26  In a significant departure 
from orthodoxy,27 this ‘pluralistic and incommensurable’ conception of 
property places community as a key pillar. Their fifth point states 
 
Property enables and shapes community life. Property law can render 
relationships within communities either exploitative and humiliating or 
21  Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xxix-xxx. 
22 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Public Dimension of Private Property’ (2012) 30-1 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045487. 
23 Stephen Gardbaum. ‘Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community’ (1992) 90 Michigan Law 
Rev. 685. 
24 Richard Ford, ‘The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis (1994) 107 
Harvard Law Review 1857, 1857- 1860. 
25 Ibid, 1857.   
26 Gregory Alexander et al, ‘A Statement of Progressive Property’, (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 743. 
27 Described as the ‘ownership model’, or the law and economics theory of property. 
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liberating and ennobling. Property law should establish the framework for a 
kind of social life appropriate to a free and democratic society.28 
 
Progressive theorists reject the view that community is simply an 
agglomeration of individuals.29  Rather, it is a discrete and ‘intentionally 
capacious’ concept.30 Alexander sees community as primarily social, a 
‘mediating vehicle’ through which humans become socialized.31 Community 
has multiple forms that shatter the binary view.32 It is rarely unitary, but a 
complex network of communities that ‘interpenetrate one another so 
completely that they cannot be fully separated.’33  Progressive theorists are 
also insistent in their rejection of the liberal view that individuals are free to 
voluntarily exit community. While communities are groups we may join, 
usually membership is involuntary; they are groups we find ourselves in. 
Involuntariness is important to progressive theory, individual property owners 
rarely exit community effortlessly either because of coercive communal 
norms, or high exit costs.34 ‘Property is an institution that binds people 
together in … communities’35 irrespective of individual choice.  Liberal exit 
without consequence is its antithesis.  
 
While sympathetic to progressive theory, Amnon Lehavi rejects its broad 
understandings of ‘community’ as  ‘vague, [and] over-inclusive’.36 Instead, 
Lehavi devises three categories of community; intentional, planned, and 
spontaneous.  Intentional communities typically comprise groups with shared 
ideologies, values or beliefs distinctive from the mainstream.37 They are 
‘characterized by strong internal norms… that have sweeping effects on the 
28 Alexander et al, above n26, 744. 
29 Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver, ‘Properties of Community’ (2009) 10 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law 127, 129. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gregory Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Law’ (2009) 94 Cornell Law 
Review 745, 766. ‘Communities foster just relations with societies by shaping social norms, 
not simply individual interests.’ Ibid, 767. 
32 Ibid, 766-7. 
33 Ibid, 767. 
34 In the US in 2000 ‘renters changed residence at nearly four times the rate of homeowners.’ 
Penalver, above n9, 1948-9. 
35 Ibid, 1972. 
36 Amnon Lehavi, ‘How Property Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community (2009) 10 
Intellectual Inquiries in Law 43, 76. 
37 Lehavi uses the example of Israeli Kibbutzim. 
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lives of … members, and a consequent necessity for a certain level of … 
insulation from society's norms and institutions in order for such communities 
to survive.’38 Importantly, intentional communities do not arise because 
property structures make them easier or economically feasible.  By contrast, 
planned communities are often ‘green field’ residential communities; where 
there is little common interest between putative members, and property 
structures facilitate ease of incorporation and ongoing enforcement of 
community rules.39  Spontaneous communities arise from existing established 
groupings, what Lehavi calls ‘groups of physically-adjacent residents who live 
in "regular" neighborhoods [who] cooperate and coordinate over time, and in 
the process create a meaningful, enduring basis for localized communality.’40 
Lehavi cites communities that arise to protect public spaces under threat 
(‘friends of’ groups) as an example of this third category.  Lehavi’s taxonomy 
is designed to better analyze the connections between community and 
property. For example, while property rules provide significant ‘tailwind’ for 
planned communities, they may be neutral for intentional communities, and 
offer disadvantageous ‘headwinds’ for spontaneous communities.41  Property 
may ultimately create, maintain or undermine community.42  
 
2.2 Community in geography scholarship 
 
The comparative insight of geographers into the question of what is ‘place’ is 
a useful counterpoint to property scholarship. But like community, ‘place’ for 
geographers is a ‘slippery concept.’43  Overwhelmingly, ‘place’ is defined by 
its human meanings.  It possesses two aspects, its material and visual 
form(s), and its ‘relationship to humans, … the human capacity to produce 
and consume meaning.’44 Place without human meaning is simply space; 
mere physical location subsidiary to intangible social investments. Edward 
38 Lehavi, above n, 36. 
39 By covenants, rules, and restrictions (CRR) frequently seen in strata schemes. 
40 Lehavi, above n, 36. 
41 Ibid, 65- 75. 
42 Cf Alison Brown, ‘Crofter Forestry, Land Reform and the Ideology of Community’, (2008) 
17(3) Social & Legal Studies 333, 335.  
43 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power (1994) 112. 
44 Cresswell, above n16, 10. 
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Relph gives examples of these human meanings: ‘visuality, the sense of 
community that place engenders, the sense of time involved in establishing 
attachment to place, and the value of rootedness’.45 Penny English speaks of 
locales where ‘people’s life histories are threaded.’46  Yi-Fu Tuan likens place 
to a ‘calm center of established values’, ‘enclosed and humanized’ compared 
to the freedom and openness of space.47 
 
Nicholas Blomley’s Law, Space, and the Geographies of Power in 1994 was a 
groundbreaking work in the emerging discipline of legal geography, the study 
of the links between property and geography.48 Blomley unpacked ‘place’ into 
location, locales, and sense of place.  
 
Location refers to the relative position of any place in relation to other places. 
Locale conversely treats the place from within as a specific site in which social 
relations are bounded and locally constituted. Sense of place refers to the 
experiential and representational map constructed of a specific place by its 
occupants.49 
 
Location defines a community externally (vis-à-vis other communities), while 
locale defines it internally, as a physicalized, identifiable place invested with 
individual and collective meaning for its members. Its social aspects or sense 
of place describe the diverse relationships, connections, and norms that are 
necessarily intangible and aspatial. Sense of place is critical to understanding 
the fullness of community, that ‘territorially based groups of people share 
some … common denominator beyond mere proximity’,50 ‘shared values, 
participation in a shared way of life, identification with the group, mutual 
recognition’51 or a strong connection to a particular locality that enables it to 
45 Ibid, 22. 
46 Ibid, 465-6. 
47 Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place The Perspective of Experience, (1977) 54, 183-4. 
48Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Connecting Law and Geography in J Holder & C. Harrison 
(eds.) Law and Geography (2002). Blomley’s scholarship is described as ‘agenda-setting’ in a 
2014 historical review of legal geography, ‘Introduction Expanding the Spaces of Law’ in Irus 
Braverman et al (eds.) The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography (2014) 5. 
49Blomley, above n43. 
50 Lehavi, above n11. 
51 Andrew Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their 
Normative Significance (2000) 19-25.  
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become a ‘site of social solidarity.’52  
 
James Kunstler sees community in similar spatial and aspatial terms. 
‘[Community] is a living organism based on a web of interdependencies-… a 
local economy. It expresses itself physically as connectedness, as buildings 
actively relating to one another, and to whatever public space exists, be it the 
street, the courthouse square, or the village green.’53 Interestingly, Kunstler 
observes the significance of property to community, in particular the 
interaction of private and public lands.  
 
2.3 Community is exclusionary 
 
In defining community, it is cautionary not to overlook its negatives. Blomley 
warns that ‘we should not over-romanticize or essentialize the local 
community. Small towns and villages can be stifling or oppressive places… 
[G]ood or bad, such local sites are one vital means by which we acquire a 
sense of identity.’54 Similarly, Amnon Lehavi identifies ‘animosity, xenophobia 
and intolerance’55 as adverse communitarian characteristics. This inherently 
exclusionary nature of community informs its brutal side, an unpleasant 
consequence of an existential imperative to keep ‘outsiders’ out.  For Jeremy 
Waldron, this characteristic is all consuming 
 
 "True community" in the sense of "actually-existing community" - a real 
entity actually structured by a communitarian -is not always as nice as it looks. 
Actually existing communities are often exclusionary and inauthentic… 
Moreover I fear that this is not an aberration, but that these aspects of 
community -its exclusiveness and its ability to sustain collective illusions about 
the quality of social life - are precisely what is valued when self-styled 
"communitarian" claims are put forward in law and politics. It has come to the 
point where further objections to this tendency in the name of "true" community 
52 Avatil Margalit, ‘You’ll Never Walk Alone: On Property, Community and Football Fans’ 
(2009) 10 Intellectual Inquiries in Law 217, 223. This interpretation is also problematic for 
geographers because it synonymizes ‘place’ with ‘community. Doreen Massey cited in 
Cresswell, above n16. 
53 Kunstler, above n17, 185-6.  
54 Blomley, 220. 
55 Lehavi, above n36, 47. 
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may be futile, and where "inclusive community" might have to be regarded as 
an oxymoron.56 
 
This chapter restricts itself to territorial communities, physically bounded 
locations and locales. This interpretation ignores the phenomenon of non-
territorial communities.57 It does so because the interaction between property 
in land and community is its primary analytical focus.58 Its analogizing of 
‘place’ and ‘community’ is likewise a useful contrivance in drawing on the 
legitimate cross-disciplinary overlap of property and legal geography 
scholarship. Each shares in common a concept of ‘community’ that is 
bounded spatially but boundless socially. 59  
 
In sum, community is a capacious and complex concept, one that modern 
property struggles to explain.  In seeking answers to this conundrum, part 3 
examines property’s theoretical treatment of ‘community’.  
 
3. Legal theories of property and community 
 
As part 2 intimates, the notion of community is not a mainstream concern of 
modern property scholarship. That it is largely ‘unexplored’ is chiefly attributed 
to a dominant paradigm at worst hostile, or at best indifferent, to the 
interposition of a decentralized entity between the autonomous individual and 
the centralized state. Recent scholarship that links community and property 
reflects a fraying of that ‘central logic.’60 
 
56 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Community and Property: For Those Who Have Neither’, (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 161, 189. 
57 ‘Communities can exist without being in the same place’, Cresswell above n16, 68. 
‘Fandoms’ of football clubs are a community, Margalit, above n52; Cf Penalver’s view that 
geography does matter to communities, Penalver, above n9. 
58 Lehavi focuses on ‘territorial communities’ because ‘physical proximity facilitates closer 
interpersonal ties and repeat-play encounters, [and] reveals broader social patterns, and their 
powerful practical and symbolic societal effects’, Lehavi, above 36, 49. 
59 See for example J.K. Gibson-Graham, ‘Surplus Possibilities: Postdevelopment and 
Community Economies’, (2005) 26 Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 4, 16. 
60 A J van der Walt, The Marginality of Property; in Alexander & Penalver, above n4; Margaret 
Davies, Property Meanings, histories, theories (2007) 115-138.  
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The consequences of community’s marginalization are existential and 
normative. Community’s existential dilemma has negative implications for its 
self-definition as a legal concept. It also has implications for its rights-status 
and legal standing, whether interpreted narrowly as the discrete rights of a 
specific community, or more broadly as collective rights asserted by 
individuals who group-identify as community. Community’s normative 
dilemma is in part a corollary of its existential one. Yet, as Alexander and 
Penalver observe, irrespective of legal status, ‘community has a moral status 
that is distinct from those of neighboring owners or nonowning individuals.’61 
 
This part examines those legal theories and theorists that seek to explain (or 
not) the interaction of community and property. It situates them on a 
continuum, represented at one extreme by a view that community does not 
exist, rendering any interaction with property impossible, and at the other, by 
a view that community and property are intimately intertwined. At some 
indeterminate point on this spectrum, community also shifts from being an 
entity external to property, to an entity so immersed within the institution that it 
is no longer extricable. Identifying that moment of crossover is difficult given 
its opacity and deep implication.  
 
3.1 The liberal perspective 
 
For some neo-liberals, community as an entity does not exist. As Robert 
Nozick argues, ‘[t]here are only individual people, different individual people, 
with their own individual lives…. nothing more.'62  This ideological hostility to 
community reflects its failure to fit ‘neatly into liberal theory which sought to 
allocate all aspects of social life [including property] to one of the poles of its 
dualities…either to the sphere of the state or to… the free interaction of 
individuals within civil society.’63  To the extent that community is ‘seen’ at all, 
61 Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xviii 
62 Waldron, above n56, 168. 
63 Gerald Frug, ‘City as a Legal Concept’, (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 1057, 1076. ‘The 
evolution of liberalism can thus be understood as an undermining of the vitality of all groups 
that had held an intermediate position between what we now think of as the sphere of the 
individual and that of the state.’ Ibid, 1087. 
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it is viewed with deep suspicion in its capacity as an outlier agency of the 
regulatory state.64 
 
Yet the liberal paradigm is not a monolith. Some liberal theories acknowledge 
a conception of community, albeit as a mere or inadvertent consequence of 
individual choice, personal preference, or welfare maximization. This pale 
version of community is both a by-product and backdrop to rational actors 
voluntarily entering into, or exiting out of, associations of individuals.  
Importantly under this view, community is not an end in itself, but has value 
‘only to the extent that [it] conform[s] to the individual-state dualism.’65 
 
Alexander and Penalver identify utilitarianism and contractarianism as liberal 
theories with limited community resonance. Under utilitarian theory,66 the 
satisfaction of individual preference is the ultimate end.  Any ‘[u]tilitarian 
analysis of community is refracted through this maximizing lens.’67 The result 
is that community is instrumental; its value lies only in the extent to which it 
contributes to the satisfaction of an individual’s preferences.  Critical is a 
freedom to enter and exit communities at will, since individuals know best 
what satisfies their individual preferences, and as such, must be free to 
choose the communities into which they will enter or leave.68  This transforms 
‘the relationship between local communities and their potential residents [into] 
a competitive market in which individual preferences are more likely to be 
satisfied, than in an alternative in which individuals lack the ability to “vote with 
their feet”’.69 Utilitarian community is thus an unrestricted, market-driven 
exercise. Eduardo Penalver describes the relationship of property to 
community in this model as one of ‘property as exit’, an inalienable freedom of 
self-sufficient individuals to enter and exit community without constraint. Exit 
‘eviscerates community’ in that it weakens its ability to demand the carrying 
64 Ibid, 1076. 
65 Blomley, above n8, 77. 
66 The law and economics approach is its most prominent contemporary exemplar, Alexander 
& Penalver, above n4, xviii. 
67Ibid, xviii. 
68 Robert Ellickson, ‘Cities and Homeowners Associations’ (1982) 130 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1519. 
69 Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xix-xx.  The idea of households ‘moving with their feet’ to 
more enticing communities is attributed to Charles Tiebout. Ellickson, above n68, 1547-54. 
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out of ‘unpleasant tasks or [to] maintain internal disciple,’ simply because 
individuals ‘hold all the cards’.70 Community under the exit paradigm is 
optional, and is viewed with constant suspicion as ‘a potential threat to an 
individual’s negative liberty.’71 
 
The liberal contractarian72 conception of community is thicker in that it takes 
‘the idea of belonging in a community seriously.’ 73  Individuals agree to enter 
into communities, sometimes by overt choice, but more typically as a matter 
of implication.74 
 
[T]he relationship between the self and communities is both contractual and 
welfarist. The self and communities are bound together by mutual agreement, 
sometimes express but commonly implied, to associate with each other to 
pursue some shared end.75 
 
In ‘choosing’ to associate as a community, there is often a happy 
convergence of common and individual goods. ‘With convergent goods, 
individuals interact in pursuit of individually defined ends that happen to 
overlap with the ends pursued by others.  [Yet still] the goods are not 
constitutive of the group, or the community.’76 The core premise of liberal 
contractarianism remains the primacy of the autonomous individual,77 such 
that community persists as a collective consequence of individual 
preferences. Its conception of community is thicker for two key reasons; the 
idea of longer-term reciprocity, and its rejection of a monistic account of 
property.  
 
Under contractarian theory, an individual is never expected to make an 
uncompensated sacrifice for the community, since to sacrifice is to controvert 
70 Penalver, above n9, 1955. 
71 Ibid, 1900.  
72 Contractarianism remains liberal since the ‘individual stands ontologically prior to the 
community.’ Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xxii. 
73 Alexander, above n31, 758. 
74 Alexander & Penalver describe such contracts as ‘actual agreements or hypothetical 
bargains.’ Above n4, xxii. 
75 Alexander, above n31, 759-60. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid, 759. 
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the basic premise of personal autonomy, ‘self-effacement.’78 However the 
compensation need not be immediate, it may be ‘repaid’ over the longer term. 
‘To expect individuals to make personal sacrifices for the common good is 
legitimate just insofar as accounts will even up in the long run, that is, so long 
as reasonable grounds exist to believe that the total long-term burdens that 
the individual bears will balance out the total long-term benefits she 
receives.’79  Hanoch Dagan views the social responsibility of property 
ownership as one of ‘long-term reciprocity’, not one of ‘utopian 
noncommodification.’80 ‘Long term reciprocity urges us to adhere to our plural 
and ambivalent understandings of membership [of community] as both a 
source of mutual advantage and a locus of belonging.’81  Dagan believes that 
long-term reciprocity is most sustained in smaller local communities, where 
‘our status as landowners also defines our membership.’82 Dagan’s ‘socially 
responsible ownership’ is further along the continuum because it recognizes 
the longer-term nature of individual ‘investments’ in community, and because 
it strives to socialize an erstwhile liberal preoccupation with autonomous 
individualism. Importantly, it also sees the links between land ownership and 
community, and recognizes that a monistic view of property yields an 
incomplete and unsatisfactory account of community. 
 
Essentializing property as an exclusive right expresses and reinforces a culture 
of alienation that underplays the significance of belonging to a community, and 
perceives our membership therein in purely instrumental terms…. This 
approach defines our obligations qua citizens and qua community members as 
“exchanges for monetizable gains”, and thus commodifies both our citizenship 
and our membership in local communities. [Yet] the impersonality of market 
relations is not inherently wrong… by facilitating dealings on an explicit quid pro 
quo basis, the market defines an important sphere of freedom from personal 
ties and obligations.  A responsible conception of property can and should 
appreciate these virtues of the market norms…. at the same time it should 
78 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Craft of Property’ (2003) 91 California Law Rev. 1517; Gregory 
Alexander & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Property (2012). 
79 Alexander, above n31, 760. 
80 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Social Responsibility of Ownership’ (2007) 92 Cornell Law Review 
1255, 1266.  
81 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Takings and Distributive Justice’ (1999) 85 Virginia Law Review 741, 773. 
82 Ibid, 774. 
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avoid allowing these norms to override those of the other spheres of society.83 
 
3.2 The interface of property norms and community 
 
Another perspective on ‘property and community’ is provided by the study of 
community norms and the contours of property.  This scholarship sees 
community as a dynamic force, a tectonic-like plate that ceaselessly impacts 
on the content and boundaries of property rights. The intimacy inherent to this 
constant interaction pushes ever closer to the crossover point where 
community and property converge, where the colliding plates become an 
undifferentiated amalgam. This can be seen when the values of community 
become the values of property. For example, Hanoch Dagan citing the 
heterogeneous reality of property identifies a number of property values, 
including autonomy, personhood, utility, and community.84 Joseph Singer and 
Kevin Gray, amongst others,85 have written widely on the relationship 
between community norms and property.  Their scholarship reveals a fleeting 
‘snapshot’ of community; seen in the imprint it leaves on the contours of an 
owner’s property rights.  Their theoretical perspective is formative; community 
norms define the parameters of property rights; they presume the rightful 
‘owners’ of property entitlements, the legitimacy of their entitlements, and the 
effects of any externalities (harmful or self-regarding).  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, Joe Singer proposes that a community’s ‘property 
norms’ construct the externalities of property ownership.86 Property norms are 
‘standards that help allocate and define the legitimate interests of persons 
with respect to control of valued resources.’87 They ‘orient us in a moral 
universe’,88 by indicating first who is the owner, or nonowner, of a particular 
83 Hanoch Dagan, Property Values and Institutions (2011) 45. 
84 Ibid, 46-7. Elsewhere Dagan writes that ‘ a responsible conception of property can and 
should appreciate … virtues of the market norms, but should still avoid allowing these norms 
to override those of the other spheres of society.’ Dagan, above n 80, 1260.  
85 Other communities where norms inform property rights include surfers, Daniel Nazer; 
ranchers, Robert Ellickson; or university campus food cart owners, Gregory Duhl. 
86 Joseph Singer, ‘Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership’ in Alexander & 
Penalver, above n4. 
87Ibid, 65. 
88 Ibid, 66. 
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resource, and second, the extent to which that owner must consider the effect 
an exercise of a property right has on others, the externalities of property 
ownership.89 Certain externalities are harmful and invasive of other’s 
legitimate property rights; others are non-intrusive and ‘self-regarding.’  
Property norms also work to reveal and obscure the presence of externalities, 
by deciding what property interests are legitimate, and therefore worthy of 
protection, and which are not. Critically the legitimacy of legally relevant 
interests depends on ‘the values underlying the [claimed property entitlement] 
and the context in which the claim is asserted.’90 Where community property 
norms obscure externalities, they either determine one of the competing 
entitlements is a core aspect of ownership, or deem the other entitlement 
unworthy of protection. They thus hide the impact that an exercise of a 
property right has on others. ‘When norms function in these ways, and we 
view an action as a self-regarding act, externalities magically vanish.’91 There 
are qualifications on the extent to which an exercise of a property right can be 
self-regarding. Singer’s democratic estates thesis92 argues that an externality 
cannot be incompatible with the social and political norms of a free and 
democratic community. The effect of the exercise of property rights on others 
should conform at a minimum to a democratic expectation that people treat 
each other with ‘equal concern and respect.’93 
 
Kevin Gray’s ‘community’ is the random grouping of individuals who join a 
queue. ‘The queue is a self-help community, united both in its movement 
toward a common goal, and in a shared commitment to make the environment 
of the waiting line…more bearable.’94 Social norms regulate the practice of 
queuing; such as entitlements of order, sanctions against pushing in, excusing 
temporary ‘time out’ absences, or permitting the trading of places. An 
individual queuer’s proprietary entitlement is one based on time and place.  
89 Externalities are defined as ‘effects on others not directly involved in a transaction or act.’ 
Ibid, 61. 
90 Ibid, 77. 
91 Ibid, 79.  
92 Joseph Singer, ‘Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society’, 
(2009) 94 Cornell Law Review 1009. 
93 Ibid 1047. 
94 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in a Queue’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 192. 
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Gray likens place in a queue to a ‘mobile estate’ in land, which derives its 
primary strength from effluxion of time. A queuer has ‘a time-related and time-
generated status or “estate” that can be asserted against the rest of the world 
except those ahead in the queue.’  While Gray’s observations are consistent 
with external norms influencing the content of property ‘rights’, they also go 
further, speaking to a coalescence of (private) property and community. 
 
In the interdependency of the queue, rights are inseparable from 
responsibilities. Entitlement and obligation stand hand in hand, in the waiting 
line… It is indeed this network of reciprocal duty that marks out all forms of 
moral community…. The private property of each queuer mutates, subtly and 
indistinguishably, into a community property of peace, order and good 
government.95 
 
Singer and Gray are largely optimistic about the beneficial values of 
community on property. This optimism aligns with other scholars who write of 
the aspirational effect of community on property. Margaret Davies’ desire for a 
‘more modern relational understanding of property,’ is one that ‘concerns 
individuals and communities: how they are formed, how they live together, 
and how they use their resources.’96 Eric Freyfogle’s hope for property is one 
that is ‘back to the future’, a ‘community, or ecological vision that … protects 
lands and communities while encouraging lasting ties between people and 
places.’97 Elsewhere, Freyfogle advocates for context and connectivity across 
the disciplines of property, ecology, and ethics, under the banner of ‘Back 
Toward Community.’98  
 
3.3 The progressive perspective 
 
Progressive property theorists are located across the divide on the property 
and community spectrum. For progressive property, community is center-
stage. Indeed property and community are so intertwined that they cannot be 
95 Ibid, 192. 
96 Davies, above n60, 2. 
97 Eric Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the Common Good (2003) 133. 
98 Eric Freyfogle, Agrarianism and the Good Society Land, Culture, Conflict, and Hope (2007) 
108.  
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separated.  Gregory Alexander’s ‘sorely under-theorized’99 social-obligation 
norm depends on a commitment to human flourishing within viable 
communities, places where an individual’s capacity to become fully socialized 
is enabled. 100 Property exists not only to serve values such as ‘individual 
freedom or cost-minimization’, but also to support ‘communities that enable us 
to live well-lived lives.’101  Human flourishing is based on an ‘ontological 
conception of community that views the individual and community as mutually 
dependent.’102 
 
The connections between human flourishing, community, and property are 
(like progressive property) ‘pluralistic and incommensurable’.  Their inter-
connectivity is such that each constitutive element becomes inextricably 
dependent on, and bound to the other. Human flourishing requires a socially 
situated individual ‘to do well and to fare well.’103 Flourishing is a well-lived life 
‘that conforms to…objectively valuable patterns of human existence and 
interaction.’104 The perspective of the flourishing individual is relational and 
inter-dependent. 
 
Flourishing is an unavoidably cooperative endeavor rather than an individual 
pursuit or purely personal project. Our ability to flourish requires certain basic 
material goods and a communal infrastructure… However much we value our 
personal independence, it is quite literally impossible for a person to flourish 
without others.105 
 
Community106 enhances human flourishing in two ways; first where it provides 
a viable level of social infrastructure, and second where it facilitates those 
conditions that nurture the fullest development of an individual’s personal 
99 Alexander, above n31, 745. 
100 ‘Community is constitutive of human flourishing in a very deep sense’, Ibid, 818. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Alexander & Penalver, ‘Properties of Community’, (2009) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
127, 129. 
103 Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Penalver, An Introduction to Property Theory, (2012) 87-8. 
104 Alexander & Penalver, above n,102, 136. The ‘capabilities of a well-lived life include life, 
freedom, practical reason, and sociality, ‘Ibid, 138. 
105 Alexander & Penalver, above n103, 87. 
106 Progressive theory rejects the view that community is an agglomeration of individuals, Ibid, 
129. 
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capabilities essential to their own socialization. Community and individuals 
can never be fully separated. 
 
[A]s free, rational persons, we never cease to operate within and depend 
upon the matrix of the many communities in which we find ourselves in 
association. Each of our identities is inextricably connected in some sense 
with others with whom we are bound as members of one or typically more 
communities. Each of our identities is literally constituted by the communities 
of which we are members. Asked who we are, we inevitably talk about the 
communities where we were born and raised...107 
 
The centrality of obligation to property (arising from its inherently relational 
nature in progressive theory108) is the final interlocking piece in this jigsaw. 
Property owners are obliged ‘to contribute… resources, or to share …property 
in order to sustain th[e] social matrices’109 that make human flourishing 
possible. In small communities, the contribution may be voluntary or co-
operative, but in larger communities, some redistributive mechanism is 
required to fund adequate social infrastructure. In sum, the ‘essential 
obligations [of property]… are to belong, to participate, and to contribute’110 to 
community. Alexander suggests a number of bases for obligation to others in 
community, including a human need as social animals, long-term self-interest, 
the dependence to support social networks that arises from membership of a 
community, or a rational acknowledgement of the universality or mutuality of a 
community of rights, along the lines of ‘if I value my own flourishing, then I 
must value the flourishing of others as well.’ 111  
 
Penalver’s ‘property as entrance’112 thesis is an insightful contribution to 
property and community obligation in the progressive tradition.  In 
contradistinction to ‘property as exit’, ‘property as entrance’ sees individuals 
107 Ibid, 140. 
108 Alexander & Penalver, above n 103, 94-5; Alexander, above n31, 747-8. 
109 Alexander & Penalver, above n 103, 95. In the case of private property, ‘special obligations 
accompany private ownership of those aspects of a society’s infrastructure upon which the 
civic culture depends.’ Ibid, 182. 
110 Alexander & Penalver, above n 102, 144.  
111 Alexander, above n31, 769. 
112 Penalver, above n9. 
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as inherently social,113and highlights an ‘overlooked’ notion that ‘property 
facilitates entrance into community by tying individuals into social groups.’114 
Property gives owners ‘a [binding] stake in their communities….  by reducing 
their mobility, and inducing them to engage more fully in community life’.115 In 
the entrance paradigm, community provides stability and sociability that is 
‘given, not chosen, and … will often be characterized by relatively high costs 
of exit.’116 High exit costs occur because individuals over time increasingly 
identify with, and invest in community; and hence leaving becomes harder. 
The dividend of high(er) exit costs is ‘more robust and deeply satisfying 
communities.’117   
 
Robert Ellickson accepts the logic of property binding people to their 
community. In writing of U.S. housing co-operatives where rights of re-sale 
are pre-emptively restricted to below-market rates, he observes that ‘reduced 
owner-occupant turnover may enhance solidarity among the co-operative’s 
households.’118 In chapter 3, a shareholder in co-operative owned land in 
northern NSW echoes Ellickson’s ‘solidarity’ and links to community, noting 
that their share’s inalienability means ‘we don’t waste time wondering if we 
would be better off living somewhere else, … we have a commitment to place 
and community.’119 
 
The progressive inter-locking of property and community through human 
flourishing is crucible-like in its mutual self-reinforcement. It yields a 
composite characterized by the indivisibility of its once separate parts. 
Penalver speaks to this circularity. ‘Our ability to flourish requires the 
presence of a material and communal infrastructure that itself depends upon 
113 Ibid, 1911- 1918. 
114 Ibid, 1892. 
115 Ibid, 1940. 
116 Ibid, 1894. ‘The longer a person participates in a community, the more her life and her 
identity will become bound up with that community and, as a consequence, the higher her 
costs of leaving that community will climb.’ Ibid, 1923 
117 Ibid, 1955. Nicholas Blomley speaks similarly of people using property to ‘anchor 
themselves to community,’ Blomley, above n8, 156. 
118 Robert Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth (2008) 58. Elsewhere, 
Ellickson affirms that public communities are essentially involuntary, Robert Ellickson, ‘New 
Institutions for Old Neighborhoods’, (1998) 48 Duke Law Journal 75. 
119 Bill Metcalf, Co-operative Lifestyles in Australia: From Utopian Dreaming to Communal 
Reality (1995), 52. 
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the contributions of each of us.’120  Conversely, the weakness of a theory that 
is ‘pluralist and incommensurable’ is its indeterminacy. Proponents argue that 
progressive property represents a ‘lived experience of moral choice’, and 
rather than being a weakness, indeterminacy is its strength.121  Critics such as 
Jane Baron counter that progressive property is simply a conversation about 
human flourishing, common decency and democratic governance, which fails 
to send strong enough signals about property rights.122 Hanoch Dagan 
intimates that it is overly utopian, and fails to satisfactorily account for an 
individual’s need to satisfy preferences.  Dagan is specifically critical of 
progressive theory’s insistence on involuntary membership of community. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The continuum metaphor illustrates the expansive array of property and 
community interaction. At one end, a neo-liberal nihilist view rejects any 
conception of community. People are autonomous individuals and their 
property ownership involves nil consideration of community. Further along the 
spectrum, anaemic versions of community manifest only as an optional 
consequence of voluntary personal choice. Property is a unidirectional exit 
from community. More robust conceptions of community accept that 
investments in community may be longer-term, involve degrees of reciprocity, 
and that satisfaction of personal choices can also be measured by non-
commodity values. Where community norms inform the contours of property 
rights, the relationship between the two is necessarily close, and their location 
on the spectrum adjacent. And furthest from the neo-liberal perspective, 
theories of progressive property inextricably meld community and property 
through the medium of human flourishing. Along this spectrum, community 
120 Penalver, above n9, 870; ‘Ownership and obligation are deeply connected with each other 
and their mediating connection is community.’ Alexander, above n31, 819. 
121 Alexander & Penalver, above n103, 98-99.  
122 Jane Baron, “The Contested Commitments of Property” (2010) 61 Hastings L.J.  917. 
Baron’s criticisms have wider implication, specifically the ‘propertiness’ of entitlements to 
‘well-lived lives’, a concept central to progressive property theory. The extent to which such 
rights are more political than legal is moot, particularly where progressive proponents 
articulate such ideas through an American political prism. 
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changes from incidental backdrop to intrinsic context, and the role of property 
spins on its axis from ‘exit’ to ‘entrance’ to community. 
 
4. Alternative disciplinary perspectives on property in land and 
community 
 
As part 3 observes, apart from progressive property, most property theories 
see ‘community’ as instrumentalist.  It exists to serve welfare-enhancing 
individuals, or to shape the contours of property rights.  Part 4 considers other 
disciplinary insights into property’s relationship with community, principally 
those of legal geographer Nick Blomley. The part is structured around three 
perspectives that challenge the  ‘totalizing and individualizing’123 private 
ownership model. The first maps distinct property patterns to place, and 
rejects as inadequate, detached representations of space devoid of 
particularity and inter-connectivity.  The second argues that communities are 
sites of property contest, historical and ongoing, that define community 
through each conflict. The third sees property as a series of ceaseless 
performances that individually and collectively constitute community by their 
reiterative doing.   Mapping, contest, and performance are very different ways 
of ‘seeing’ property in community. Each sees property as contextual, each has 
an ontological view of community, and each is empathetic to the idea that 
property diversity may be an ‘entrance to community’ in ways oppositional to 
property uniformity being its ‘exit.’  
 
4. 1. Communities are maps of property diversity 
 
The truism that ‘context is everything’124 is not a universal one for property.  
Indeed, the reverse is more accurate; the nature of modern property in land is 
abstract and placeless, ‘divorced from the specificities and bonds of place and 
community.’125 Blomley identifies at the heart of the Anglo common law of 
property a conscious disembodying from context. 
123 Joseph Singer, Entitlements The Paradoxes of Property (2000). 
124 Holder & Harrison, above n48. 
125 Blomley, above n43, 53. 
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 What relation do legal interpretation and understandings, such as liberalism, 
have to the places and spaces of social life? According to some… the Western 
legal project is underwritten by an organized forgetting of [the places and 
spaces of social life], given that spatial diversity may affect core principles such 
as the rule of law and legal rationality. [The] English common law has been 
designed as a form of dis-embedding. The systemization of the English 
common law crafted by Edward Coke … entailed the attempt at the creation of 
a unitary legal map in which diverse local knowledges of the law were 
immediately suspect. Increasingly, legal knowledge is imagined as 
disembodied, true to its own internal logic…. This was a very conscious project, 
designed to eradicate the plurality and radical decentralization of legal voices. 
…126 
 
Blomley challenges this ‘project’.  He traces the ‘shared complicities’127 of real 
property and cartography128 that conjointly erased context and diversity from 
the geography of contemporary communities. While the common law was 
systematically homogenizing property,129 Blomley identifies a simultaneous 
‘cartographic sea change’ that caused a ‘profound change in social scale, 
from the world of the local community to the national and international spaces 
of mercantile capitalism and the nation-state.’130 The combined effect was to 
institutionalize a ‘displacement of the locus of social identity’,131 such that 
maps came to represent space as ‘an objectified and asocial entity to which 
only the cartographer ha[d] special access.’132 ‘Cartographic space [wa]s 
emptied of all the complexities and particularities that give it meaning on the 
ground.’133 
 
126 Nicholas Blomley, ‘From “What?” To “So What?” Law and Geography in Retrospect’, 
Holder & Harrison above n48, 25. 
127 Sarah Whatmore, ‘De/Re Territorializing Possession: The Shifting Spaces of Property 
Rights’ in Holder & Harrison , above n48, 211. 
128 Blomley, above n43, 67-105.  
129 Coke’s ‘common law systemization’ was not only an ‘inter-jurisdictional struggle between 
rival legal structures…it signaled ‘a shift in the spatiality of legal knowledge. The legal world is 
increasingly presented as unitary and centralized, rather than as fragmented and localized.’ 
Ibid, 80. 
130 Ibid, 83. 
131 Ibid, 80. 
132 Ibid, 91. 
133 Ibid, 68. 
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The sensuous and tactile nature of premodern mapping…gives way to a 
rational …presentation of space.  Space no longer appears to have a 
subjective quality, but increasingly appears as an objective and pre-given 
surface…. This modernist conception of space is that of something to be 
measured, contained, divided, manipulated, and crucially alienated.134 
 
Blomley contests the paradigmatic spatial-legal map by suggesting an 
alternative map that rejects the former’s ‘essentialized form.’ Formulating and 
drawing such a map is dependent on different spatial representations, 
‘alternative accounts of law, space, and social life’ as well as understanding 
the ‘contingencies, fractures, and conflicts’ by which the abstracted map came 
to dominate.135  
 
To document the hegemony dominant spatializations of property… is not to 
pre-suppose its ubiquity. There is…striking evidence of other understandings 
of property.  Interestingly such divergent and sometimes oppositional 
understandings of property can entail very different spatial representations 
and practices….’136 
 
His focus is the modern global city, which he sees as intensely propertied. His 
objective is to ‘unsettle the city’,137 to disrupt the empty ownership model, and 
supplant it with an alternative that acknowledges that cities are terra populi,138 
populated by distinctive communities with unique local practices and ‘local 
knowledge’139.  It is unnecessary to unsettle the city by resorting to 
precedents from ‘coterminous systems of native justice’140 or third world legal 
systems. ‘The shock that the “world is a various place” is profound given that 
we need not look abroad to find legal difference… Local legal cultures closer 
to “home” are doubly unsettling.’141 Blomley fleshes out his ‘unsettling’ city 
map in 2004, with a case study of the struggling Downtown Eastside precinct 
134 Blomley, above n43, 91. 
135 Ibid,105 
136 Ibid, 55. 
137 Ibid 
138 Ibid, 93. 
139 Property law is … “local knowledge”, Ibid, 56. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid, 57. 
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in Vancouver. Blomley cites community claims to an abandoned department 
store, struggles against gentrification and over-development, community 
‘ownership’ of a small neighborhood park, and the spread of ‘garden 
encroachments’ into urban blight, as exemplars of how competing and 
unorthodox property can be mapped to specific place. Blomley concludes that 
‘a closer examination of urban property reveals a greater diversity of 
possibilities than the map suggests… The ownership model however invites 
us to overlook or ignore these other estates’142, ‘to gloss over the plurality of 
“legitimate” claims and interests in land.’143   
 
Blomley posits that the true map of urban property is (ironically) ‘revealed’ by 
default, through gaps on ‘conventional’ city maps. This is unsurprising, given 
that real property has a negative relation144 with place that renders 
‘localization and heterogeneity’ invisible.145 Blomley reasons that the primary 
purpose of cartographic mapping is to arbitrate, not record, determining not so 
much ‘what is property’, but what to count as property.146 To accurately 
capture the social intricacies of city life, diverse property must be re-
embedded into its fragmented locality. Blomley exhorts that maps of such 
multiple geographies should not be ignored. ‘In large part these maps have 
not been documented in critical scholarship. This is not because they are 
absent but because no one has looked for them.’147 
 
Paul Carter is one scholar who has looked for such ‘maps’. Carter questions 
why ‘our representations of the world have become so hard and dry’, and why 
we treat as authoritative, maps that contain ‘no trace of the knower.’ 148 Like 
Blomley, Carter attributes blame to Enlightenment geography, arguing that 
‘[t]he rectilinear grid imposed on the earth’s surface… ha[s] no connection to 
142 Blomley, above n8, 22. 
143 Ibid, 18. 
144 Nicholas Blomley, ‘From “What?” To “So What?”: Law and Geography in Retrospect’, in 
Holder & Harrison above n48, 17. ‘The tendency of the law [is] to erase spatial specificity and 
local difference in the name of an ordered and apparently cohesive unity.’ 
145 Blomley, above n43, 79. 
146 Blomley, above n8, 15. 
147 Blomley, above n43, 54. 
148 Paul Carter, Dark Writing Geography, Performance, Design (2009) 5, 8. 
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the lie of the land- and in a sense, no interest in it.’149 Carter contrasts modern 
maps with the ‘maps’ of Australian Aboriginal artists, especially those of the 
Western desert school, which first come to prominence in the early 1970s.  
 
The Western Desert painters…felt no need to read a painting from right to left 
or from a standing position as presented upon a wall. A work was read from 
any direction, as if it were lying upon the earth, and able to be walked about…. 
The Papunya artists appear not to have had names for their paintings.  Asked 
what they called them, they might reply simply…”mine” or “my country”. The 
white reception of these paintings endowed them with an orientation.150 
 
Carter concludes that lines on maps are simply ‘narrow pencils of 
shadow…dark mortar joining the parts of the world together.’ Carter shifts the 
focus from what is seen to what is unseen.  Radically re-orienting our 
perspective reveals what Carter calls ‘dark writing’, ‘the swarm of possibilities 
that had to be left out when the line was taken.’  
 
The act of mapping property diversity within variegated community is a direct 
challenge to the private ownership model, since the latter ‘renders other 
modalities of ownership invisible. [It] leaves no space for property that is 
neither private nor public.’151 By finding that space, by entertaining the ‘swarm 
of possibilities’ left out, a fuller, and more robust picture of community 
appears. 
 
4. 2. Communities are places of property contest 
 
The ability to see diverse property patterns in community, to ‘notice the 
marginal’,152 is heightened by an awareness of the contested nature of 
property in land. In the case of many Israeli property scholars, it is the 
backdrop of Jewish settlements on disputed territory.153 For South African 
property jurists, the contest is racial as well as conceptual, a conflict between 
149 Ibid, 80.  
150 Ibid, 127-128. 
151 Blomley, above n8, 15. 
152 AJ van der Walt, ‘Property and Marginality’ in Alexander & Penalver above n4, 91-97. 
153 Nomi Stolzenberg, ‘Facts on the Ground’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4.  
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pre and post apartheid property.154 For Blomley it is the historical narrative of 
his childhood village in the English Home Counties, where ‘enclosures in the 
17th and 18th centuries swept away many traditional commoner’s rights in the 
name of improvement and monetarization… [and conflicts] were fought out in 
the [surrounding] woods, fields, and villages.’155  By contrast, the traditional, 
settled view of property in land as ordered and peaceful is a stable and 
uncontested monotone.  Ongoing contest or ‘resistant re-mapping’ seems an 
important sub-text to property diversity.  
 
Blomley extends his 18th century agrarian analysis to the modern city, 
comparing the contextualized plurality of pre-enclosure England with the 
heterogeneity of urban place.156 Yet the city is more than an analogue, it is a 
contemporary iteration of an ongoing contest, part of a continuum - the 
historical resistance against the loss of the commons. Eighteenth century 
commoners are now the twenty-first’s marginalized and poor. ‘Struggles over 
the spaces of the city can be understood as part of the long-standing struggle 
to resist the enclosure of the commons, and carve out a right to place.’157 
Where private interests prevail over the collective, not only is community 
property displaced, it also ‘appropriates and encloses. It turns a collective 
interest into an individualized one.’158 Further, it is a contest that seems 
destined to continue, at least in less affluent neighborhoods that contest the 
assumption that property is settled and peaceful. The Downtown Eastside ‘is 
itself created through that contest, serving in turn to become a vital symbolic 
and practical component in future contestations.’159   
 
Contest also occurs across different planes of understanding. Not only is 
resistant re-mapping a conflict between private and collective forms of 
property; it is a more profound struggle over the meaning and ultimate form of 
154 Van der Walt writes of a property law taught in law schools relevant to privileged white 
residential areas and business, compared to the property law of much of the black majority, 
AJ van der Walt, ‘Property and Marginality’ in Alexander & Penalver above n4. 
155 Blomley, above n8, xxii. 
156 Blomley, above n43, 79; Nicole Graham, Lawscape Property Environment Law (2010). 
157 Blomley, above n8, xix.   
158 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor’, (2008) 17(3) 
Social & Legal Studies 311, 316. 
159 Blomley, above n8, 54. 
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modern property. Thus at one level, planning disputes over gentrification 
conceal conflicts between individual property rights and localized community 
ownership: ‘[C]ontemporary development contentions often pit the developer-
owner’s private property against the community’s common property.’160  
At the macro level however, the contest thrown up by property diversity is a 
direct challenge to the hegemony of property’s central logic.  
 
For those opposed to gentrification, the concept of “community” is understood 
not as a disaggregated bundle… but as a localized set of relations that is 
conceived exclusively in terms of social interaction and effective bonds.161 
 
Blomley argues that private property must continue to police and sanction its 
own property relationships, and discredit public and communal alternatives.162 
To concede once is to condone the enactment of alternative claims in land, 
one lost battle that is a portent of a lost war, ‘the possibility, perhaps even the 
inevitability, of rearticulations of property.’163  
 
Seeing property as contest is to recognize that the dominant iteration of 
property is far from settled. Contest is integral to marginal property analysis, 
premised on an awareness ‘that property rules and practices are vague and 
contested rather than clear and consensual.’  Where there is a focus on 
‘dissent and contention rather than…. apparent consensus’164 the diversity of 
property, and its links to community, manifest. 
  
4.3 Property in community is performed 
 
The idea of property as performance has arisen through the influence of 
geographers, such as Yi-Fu Tuan, who define place as a metaphor for 
160 Blomley, above n158, 317. 
161 Blomley, above n8, 94. 
162 Ibid, xvi, 22-3. 
163 Ibid,18-9. 
164 AJ van der Walt, ‘Property and Marginality’ in Alexander & Penalver above n4, 104. 
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stopping, resting and becoming involved. ‘Enclosed and humanized space is 
place.  Compared to space, place is a calm center of established values.’165 
Yet despite the images of rest and contemplation, the idea of becoming 
involved encompasses connectivity and constant practice. ‘Places need to be 
understood as sites that are connected to others around the world in 
constantly evolving networks which are social, cultural, and natural. Places 
need to be understood through the paths that lead in and out.’166 And once 
aligned with such networks, place must be constantly affirmed through 
reiteration, quotidian social practices that make and re-make.  The need for 
constant practice therefore means that place is never finished, it is a perpetual 
work in progress.  
 
As discussed in chapter 5, performance theory supposes that property is a 
‘relational effect, not a prior ground, that is brought into being by the very act 
of performance.’167 Doing does not merely describe or represent property, it 
enacts it. Geographers use performance theory to constitute ‘place’.  Tim 
Cresswell argues that ‘places are never established.  They only operate 
through constant and reiterative practice - place is made and remade on a 
daily basis.’168  Nicholas Blomley says that where performance theory is 
applied to property, it challenges the modalities of the ownership model that 
recognize only two temporal moments, the initial creation of property, and any 
subsequent transfer(s) of title.  Instead, time is always important, as 
performance belongs in the constant acts of doing. ‘Property depends on a 
constant doing. The enactment of property… entails various forms of 
continuing persuasive practice.’169  The constancy of performance over time 
also has a citational effect, one successful act ‘cites other performances, and 
in so doing, compels future similar performances.’170 
 
165 Yi-Fu Tuan, above n47, 54. 
166 Cresswell, above n, 16, 43. 
167 Nicholas Blomley, Nicholas Blomley, ‘Performing property, making the world’ at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2053656, 13.  
168 Cresswell, above n16, 38-9.  
169 Blomley, above n8, 22. 
170 Blomley, above n167, 17.  
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Performances of property are not always positive, or optimistic. They may 
constitute a new community that displaces or dispossesses an earlier one, 
such as Stolzenberg’s Jewish settlements on disputed Palestinian territory.  
The performance of these altered ‘facts on the ground’  ‘transform[s] de facto 
possession into de jure reality,’171 the goal to create new communities with 
such an entrenched land memory,172 that they cannot be uprooted. Such non-
innocent performances underscore the negative, exclusionary realities of 
community previously described.  
 
Good or bad, if property is doing, it becomes intimately contextual, rooted to 
its places of performance. Doing is the antithesis of detached objectivity; it is 
‘grounded in locally lived experience.’173  Whether mapped, contested or 
performed, what Nicholas Blomley calls ‘alternative landscapes of property’ 
offer new ways of seeing and explaining property in community.  Their effect 
is to unsettle ‘the divide between abstract representations and grounded 
materiality’,174 and the paradigmatic premise upon which property uniformity is 
built.  
 
5. Why is property, and property diversity, important to community? 
 
Property as ‘exit from community’ exerts a powerful normative force.  As part 
2 illustrates, it obfuscates how ‘community’ is defined. Part 3 argues that it 
relegates legal theories that explain property and community interaction to the 
spectral margins. And as part 4 exemplifies, it takes new, alternative 
perspectives on property in community to make sense of what occurs on the 
ground. In sum, the private ownership model sets ‘property as exit’ as the 
default. Part 5 argues that property’s importance to community is both central 
and under-rated. Yet this centrality is overlooked. By contrast, property 
diversity has the potential to re-set this default calibration.  Diversity and its 
balance of property values not only reflect the ground-level ‘truth’ of 
community; it also, as Hanoch Dagan notes, shapes and determines the 
171 Nomi Stolzenberg, ‘Facts on the Ground’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 113.  
172 Penalver, above n9. 
173 Blomley, above n8, 55. 
174 Ibid.  
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contours of community.175  
 
The centrality of property to community is not unremarked. Kevin Gray opines 
that ‘[t]here is no community on earth without some concept of property: 
property is too closely intertwined with the preservation of our social and 
economic arrangements….’176 To Alexander and Penalver ‘property stands … 
squarely at the intersection of the individual and community because systems 
of property are always at the creation of some community.  Whenever we 
discuss property, we are unavoidably discussing the architecture of 
community and the individual’s place within it.’177  
 
Jeremy Waldron was critical of decisions made by American city authorities in 
the 1990s that restricted access by homeless people to public spaces such as 
parks, footpaths and public toilets. This demonization of the homeless 
effectively rendered them ‘property-less’, denying them space to undertake 
basic human functions such as sleeping, eating or urinating. Waldron argues 
a group in a community who bears all the restrictions of property, but none of 
its benefits, is ‘less free’ than others.  
 
Everything that has to be done has to be done somewhere.  No one is free to 
perform an action unless there is somewhere he is free to perform it. Since we 
are embodied beings, we always have a location…. One of the functions of 
property rules, particularly as far as land is concerned, is to provide a basis for 
determining who is allowed to be where. For the purposes of these rules, a 
country is divided up into spatially defined… places. The rules of property give 
us a way of determining, in the case of each place, who is allowed to be in that 
place, and who is not….178 
 
Waldron observes a basic truth of the relationship between property and 
community.  Property’s rules regulate and enforce entitlements to exclude on 
embodied place.  It tells people where they belong or not, and in the process 
175 Dagan, above n83. 
176 Kevin Gray, ‘Property in a Queue’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 192. 
177 Alexander & Penalver, above n29.  
178 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Homelessness and the issue of freedom’ (1991) 39 UCLA Law Review 
295, 296.  
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sketches a rudimentary outline of community’s skeletal structure.   
 
Yet the ‘sketch’ of community that the ownership model draws is simplistic 
and under-developed, rendered incomplete by Blomley’s multiple gaps. These 
absences include not only the inconvenient patchworks of public and common 
spaces scattered amidst the private estate, but also the unorthodox property 
claims of community, and the physicalized implications of private property’s 
social and communitarian values.  
 
To ‘see’ beyond the private ownership model is to recognize the ‘concealed’ 
property patterns that suddenly materialize, the ‘maps’179 that emerge and 
reveal a pluralistic, inter-connected and proportionate landscape of 
community; private, public, and communal. To see property in the diversity of 
its accepted and eclectic forms is to establish (and maintain) an infrastructure 
that is ‘the medium [for] the material and metaphorical embodiment of 
community’.180  To borrow from Hanoch Dagan, property diversity is ‘a 
complex piece of music with full orchestration’; its alternative is ‘looking only 
at a melody line [that] risks missing most of the performance.’181 
 
Part 5 canvasses a number of implications of property diversity for 
community. The list is not exhaustive. First, it highlights that property diversity 
and community are complementary, that the architecture of community is 
moulded by the heterogeneity of property.  Second, it observes the ‘normative 
mosaics’ that are a corollary to each re-drawn map of diverse property.  
Normative mosaics not only reflect a community’s localized ‘balance of 
property values’, but they are also in turn constitutive of each community. 
Third, it creates a theoretical space for ‘community’ in an otherwise barren 
liberal binary worldview. Fourth, it explains the relevance, and unrealized 
potential, of what Andreas van der Walt calls property’s ‘eclectic marginality.’ 
And fifth, it gives physicalized context to a variety of performances that 
collectively constitute and give meaning to community. The import of these 
179 Blomley, above n8, 89. 
180 Brown, above n42, 335. 
181 Dagan, above n83, 72. 
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implications lie in their joint and several ability to make clearer, and in the 
process, normalize the links between property and community. 
 
5.1 Facts on the ground: a community’s architecture 
 
A snapshot of any community in Nicholas Blomley’s ‘intensely propertied’ city, 
reveals a ‘diversity of property on the ground.’182  Communities comprise a 
patchwork of private, public and common lands that adjoin, interconnect, 
overlap and compete.  Property diversity is the embedded architecture of 
community, a faithful representation of the ‘facts on the ground.’ It creates, 
maintains, and enforces the structure of private, public and community 
spaces, as well as hybrid zones that are not so clearly delineated.183 It 
determines formally and informally184 ‘who is allowed to be where.’185 
 
This pluralistic image accords with what Hanoch Dagan calls ‘the lived 
experience of property’,186 the mix of property institutions that reflect an 
infinite multiplicity of human relations and physical contexts. Indeed Dagan 
suggests that it if we were to start afresh with a blank slate, it would be 
extraordinary if property was conceived as a formless, context-free bundle of 
rights. 
 
I believe that property should be construed as it actually is in law and in life: a 
set of institutions, each constituted by a particular configuration of rights. 
More precisely: the meaning of property, the content of an owner’s 
entitlements, varies according to the categories of social settings in which it is 
182 Blomley, above n8, 15. More ‘diversity of [property] possibilities than the map suggests.’ 
Ibid, 22. 
183‘Property law is like a language that direct[s] the shapes of physical spaces.’ Carol Rose, 
‘Property and Language, or, the Ghost of the Fifth Panel’ (2006) 18 Yale Journal of Law and 
the Humanities 1, 3. 
184 ‘Property rights are based partly on formal documents of title…and partly on expectations 
that grow from informal arrangements such as long-standing possession, a course of 
dealings, oral statements, informal understandings, personal relationships, social practices 
and customs of the trade.’ Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property (2000) 45-
6. 
185 Waldron, above n178, 296. 
186 Dagan, above n83.  
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situated, and according to the categories of resources subject to property 
rights.187   
 
To deny the patency of such ‘facts on the ground’ is in Blomley’s words 
‘geographical nonsense, [an] anti-geography’ that fails to contend with ‘the 
complex spatiality and the “place-boundedness” of society.’188  Blomley says 
that property must conform to this geographic and structural diversity. To do 
otherwise would be to condone a taking.  For if property is theft, as Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon suggests, then Blomley’s riposte is that 
 
The larceny entails that of the diversity (and perhaps the radical potential) of 
property. … Cities are sites in which people live inside the ownership model, 
but also depart from it. Collective claims to land and space are made. And 
private property turns out to be a good deal more multivalent, both ethically 
and analytically, than is supposed.189 
 
Amnon Lehavi likewise prefers the truthfulness of ‘facts on the ground’, where 
communities are given form and structure as a panoply of property type. 
 
[C]ontrary to the intuitive association between communality and common 
property, the lives of communities necessarily involve the full range of property 
regimes, including private, public, common, open access, and mixtures of 
these forms, as well as informal modes of resource control and management. 
This richness is not only a matter of fact, but also has normative merit.190 
 
5.2 Normative diversity: a plurality of property values 
 
Lehavi’s second observation of ‘normative merit’ speaks to another implication 
of property diversity and community, the richness of diverse social values that 
arises from heterogeneity. Private, public and common property is each 
grounded in different, often complementary, social values.191 As Hanoch 
187 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Reimagining Takings Law’, in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 48. 
188 Blomley, above n8, 53. 
189 Ibid, 15. 
190 Lehavi, above n36, 45.  
191 Dagan, above n22, 3, 20. 
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Dagan observes, ‘property, is deeply involved in our social values, reflects 
them, and at times even participates in their formation.’192 When ‘mapped’ 
across community, each property type therefore contributes proportionately to 
an infused aggregate that is both reflective and constitutive of the community 
in question.  
 
The values and ideals of common and public property have been traversed in 
earlier chapters, the likes of sociability, ‘pedestrian democracy’,193 and shared 
moderation of resource use. By contrast, the values of private property are 
typically individualistic and exclusive,194 the antithesis of community. 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, private property also has overlooked 
social and communitarian dimensions,195 a vindication of individual 
independence (personal autonomy196), a commitment to personal identity 
(personhood), and the aggregate welfare of community.197 These values do 
not diminish private property, but rather enhance it, by playing a ‘crucial role in 
supporting diverse forms of interpersonal interaction and thus diverse forms of 
human flourishing.’198   
 
For Eric Freyfogle, the links between private property and its normative values 
are explained by historical context. Freyfogle argues that private property only 
‘makes sense’ where it serves or promotes the public good.  Its legitimacy 
depends on the rules of private property reflecting prevailing societal 
values.199  Until the late 19th century, private property conformed to settled, 
agrarian values, where quiet enjoyment, a qualified freedom from 
192 Ibid, 4. 
193 Kevin Gray, ‘Pedestrian Democracy and the Geography of Hope’ (2010) 1 Journal of 
Human Rights and the Environment 45. 
194 ‘Central to the idea of (private) property is exclusion’, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ‘Property, 
Like, But Not Quite Property’ (2012) 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1899. 
195 Private property is ‘diverse and pluralistic in terms of its institutions, doctrines, and values.’ 
Hanoch Dagan, Property and the Public Domain (2009) 18 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 84, 84. 
196 Dagan above n22, 18, 29; Dagan describes personal autonomy as ‘an entitlement to the 
property needed to sustain human dignity’, Ibid, 30. 
197 ‘Property institutions can, and often do, create an institutional infrastructure that facilitates 
the long-term cooperation necessary for successful communities fostering human flourishing’, 
Ibid, 30. 
198 Ibid, 33. 
199 Eric Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land 
(2007) 20, 25-6. 
276  
                                                        
unreasonable interference, was its core rationale. This then shifted to an 
aggressive, industrial view, ‘a right to halt physical invasions of space’,200 that 
matched a new priority, maximizing the exploitation of land.201 Freyfogle yet 
again detects a shift in the early 21st century, where the public good may be 
served by private property reflecting emerging ecological and environmental 
values.202 Freyfogle inserts community into this new value paradigm. ‘For 
private property to serve contemporary society it needs to move in … the 
direction of community, responsibility and social connection.’203 The valorized 
sense of private property in this century may be its relevance to community.  
 
A multivalent private estate, combined with the norms of public and common 
property, produces a rich and variable mosaic of property values. Its variability 
depends on the property mix in each community; the end composition being 
what Dagan terms a ‘local balance of property values.’204 ‘Local’ implies a 
bounded place that shares degrees of social commonality, while ‘balance’ 
refers to the relative proportion of one property value vis-à-vis others. In 
practice, the most likely ‘balance’ is the ratio of private values to public and 
community ones.  
 
One logical enquiry that flows from ‘local balance’ is the implications of 
imbalance. To adapt another Dagan proposition,205 the relative proportions or 
degree of the mix may influence how individual communities constitute (and 
thereby see) themselves. Kunstler’s study of the decline of America’s cities 
tangentially touches upon this issue of relative mix.  Kunstler blames a 
multitude of factors for urban decay; the car, the rise of ubiquitous shopping 
malls, and so on.  He also singles out the decline of public property, which he 
attributes to a post World War II phenomenon that is ‘an extreme 
200 Ibid, 56. 
201 ‘This was the legal right that industries valued the most, because it allowed them to keep 
people off their lands.’ Ibid. 
202Freyfogle, above n97, 133. 
203 Ibid, 279-280. 
204 Hanoch Dagan, ‘Reimagining Takings Law’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 48. ‘Local’ 
implies a bounded locale that shares degrees of social commonality, and ‘balance’ the 
relative proportion of different property values. 
205 ‘Property, is deeply involved in our social values, reflects them, and at times even 
participates in their formation’, Dagan above n22, 4. 
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individualism of property ownership’. This perversity ‘tends to degrade the 
idea of the public realm, … the landscape tissue that ties together the 
thousands of pieces of private property that make up a town, a suburb, a 
state.’206  Lack of public property leads to isolation, disconnection, and 
ennui.207 Re-introducing more public property however provides ‘decent public 
spaces that bring people together into casual face-to-face contact’ and 
overcomes the monotony of private values that are by nature ‘homogenizing 
and intolerant of diversity’.’208 Sheryll Cashin also draws this link.  In 1950, 
she cites that over 70% of metropolitan Americans lived in central cities. ‘As a 
consequence…. city residents used and competed for the same public 
institutions-city schools, parks, transportation, and city hall. Common public 
institutions were a unifying force for a heterogeneous urban polity.’209 But by 
1990, over 60% lived in suburbs dominated by private property.  For Kunstler 
and Cashin, recalibrating the property mix to accentuate a viable public estate 
may mean that ‘Americans can have a decent public life, [and] redress the 
extreme privatization of life in postwar suburbia.’210  
 
Georgette Poindexter argues that one implication of property imbalance is an 
unhealthy idolatry of private property, manifested in ‘richly textured social 
patterns’211 including the suburban deification of manicured front lawns.  
 
The maniacal attention to lawn along the “fenceless state” of suburbia can be 
used as a metaphor for the tension between the individual right to private 
property and the social interconnectedness of all property. It begs the 
question: who owns your front lawn - you or your neighborhood…212  
 
The effective privatization of public road verges ‘eviscerates the 
neighborliness aspect and relegate[s] the public interest of the wider 
206 Kunstler, above n17, 26-7. 
207 Kunstler, above n17, 14. 
208 Property diversity provides ‘odd little corners for people with odd little lives’, Kunstler, 
above n17, 260. 
209 Sheryll Cashin, ‘Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism;, (2000) 88 Geo. LJ  1985, 1991-2. 
210 Kunstler, above n17, 262. 
211 Georgette Poindexter, ‘Idolatry of Land’ in Holder & Harrison, above n48, 191. 
212 Ibid, 204. 
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community … to the silent sidelines.’213  Accepting the premise that 
performance constitutes property, Poindexter observes ‘land is a practiced 
place.  It is activated by social interaction, cultural significance of place-based 
identity, and by law.  Idolatry flourishes when the law fails to champion the 
rights of the community.’214   
 
Disproportionate private imbalance tends to diminish community.215 
Practically, it impairs a community’s self-image and discourages civic 
participation.216  Normatively, it elevates the individualistic values of private 
property (its commodity or exclusionary tendencies), and ignores its other less 
visible communitarian values. It relegates the public and common estates to 
the margins,217 and vigorously resists public ‘encroachment’.218 Imbalance is 
by its nature a one-sided drawing of community, an incomplete map that 
empowers private insiders, and consigns non-private outsiders to Paul 
Carter’s ‘dark writing’.  Private imbalance may explain why Jeremy Waldron 
cynically concludes that ‘inclusive community’ is an oxymoron.  
 
5. 3 Locating community in property theory 
 
A third implication of property diversity is the theoretical space it creates for 
community.  In so doing, property diversity potentialises a pre-liberal 
paradigm, where intermediate entities (such as community) may be 
conceivably interposed between the state and an individual. In this way, it 
addresses the existential dilemma that community confronts. 
 
213 Ibid, 205. 
214 Ibid, 206. 
215 ‘Post-industrial changes eviscerated many pre-determinants of community’ and ‘prior to 
the 20th century phenomena of industrialization and urbanization, sense of community was a 
natural part of life.’ Paula A. Franzese, ‘Does it Take a Village? Privatization, Patterns of 
Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community’, (2002) 47 Villanova Law Rev. 553, 565. 
216 Mark Roseland, Toward Sustainable Communities (2009) 141. 
217 Such ‘marginality’ is remarkable where ‘open-access public streets and parks’ represent 
up to one-third of an American city’s landmass, Robert Ellickson, ‘The Inevitable Trend 
Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of Property Claims’ (2010) 19 William & Mary Bill of 
Rights Journal 1015, 1026. 
218 Opposition to public paths or rail trails amongst adjacent private owners is common. 
Landholders neighboring the Otago rail trail in New Zealand were vocal in their opposition. 
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Property diversity achieves this because it countenances that there are more 
property types than the dominant liberal ownership model allows.219 Property 
diversity frays the hermetic tidiness of any owner/non-owner, or private/public 
divide, essential to the liberal paradigm.  
 
The tendency to view property as essentially private, and periodically public, 
reproduces the wider tendency to view legal orderings as binary, with a 
privileging of one pole. We should not be surprised by this, given the 
prevalence of a particular worldview… which offers a powerful view of law, 
society, and power. The liberal discourse assumes a view of property 
rights…as belonging to atomized individuals located in a realm of private 
liberty, confronting a threatening collective… This clearly fits into the ownership 
model, with the centrality it accords the individual and the incoherence of 
collective claims to property.220 
 
Property diversity also better explains the nature and importance of 
community. Liberal views stress the primacy, autonomy, and isolation, of the 
individual, and by association, their private property.  ‘The self is … innate, 
and is not even constituted partially, by relationships with community.’221  
Community, to the extent it is recognized, is seen as a voluntary association, 
an entity into which rational actors periodically choose to enter and/or exit to 
maximize their welfare, or enhance their personal choice. At best, community 
is merely instrumental and incidental. The only compellable relationship an 
individual has is with the state, and because of this compulsion, it is viewed 
with suspicion. But as Alexander and Penalver note, such a binary worldview 
is unsatisfactory.  
 
The utilitarian focus on community as a means to satisfy individual preferences 
and the classical liberal focus on the voluntary assumption of community life 
reflect impoverished understandings of… community.  The communities in 
which we find ourselves…play crucial roles in the formation of our preferences, 
219 ‘The city is … crosscut by claims to land that are neither private nor statist.’ Blomley, 
above n8,, 153. 
220 Ibid, 5. 
221 Blomley, above n43, 205. 
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the extent of our expectations, and the scope of our aspirations.222  
 
Carol Rose understatedly observes that ‘the common law tradition is not 
entirely friendly to group [property] rights,223 and like Blomley, she says this is 
despite the evidence.  While intermediate collective property is ‘all around us,’ 
it is ‘relatively little noticed’.224 Rose attributes this myopia to a convergence of 
many factors, including  ‘the powerful libertarian appeal of individual property - 
property seen as that realm in which the individual has ultimate control, free 
from any intrusion except those she invites, and in which she is free to 
express herself exactly as she wishes.’225 In such a realm there is no 
constraint of community; indeed there is no community.   
 
The ‘squeezing out’ of community and the creation of a vacant theoretical 
space between the autonomous individual and the regulatory state is 
evidenced historically by the decline of the corporate city, and with it, its 
collective status and power. Nicholas Blomley226 and Gerald Frug227 each 
offer an account as to why city power declined in their respective countries. 
Their consistent theme is a liberal hostility towards decentralized power, those 
entities intermediate between the state and the individual. Blomley traces the 
decline of ‘the localized and particularized privileges of the medieval city’ to 
the quashing of trade and mercantile monopolies in the early 17th century.  
Frug explains that early US cities lost their ‘considerable autonomy and 
agency’ when two categories of corporation were created in the 18th century, 
one public and the other private. The public corporation was seen as an entity 
identified with the power-wielding state (and therefore suspect), while the 
private corporation was a rights-holder. The separation of power and rights 
between public and private corporations was problematic for the city, Frug 
argues, because once the rights enjoyed exclusively by the private 
corporation were removed, ‘there was nothing left that seemed to demand 
222 Alexander & Penalver, above n4, xxv, xxii-xxv. 
223 Rose, above n183, 13. 
224 Carol Rose, ‘Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and Economics of 
Property’  (2000) 79 Oregon Law Review 479, 484. 
225 Ibid, 484. 
226 Blomley, above n43, 99-105. 
227 Frug, ‘above n63. Sax says Frug’s article is ‘a refreshing and instructive exception’ to the 
lack of legal attention to community. Sax, above n3, 499. 
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protection’.228 The city shifted ‘from an association promoted by a powerful 
sense of community and an identification with the defense of property, to a 
unit that threatens both the members of the community and their property.’229 
The city/community fell between the poles of the autonomous individual and 
the consolidating power of the nation-state,230 and as a result ‘the legal 
universe [became] at once totalizing and individualizing.’231 Generically, 
 
[t]he evolution of liberalism thus can be understood as an undermining of the 
vitality of all groups that had held an intermediate position between what we 
now think of as the sphere of the individual and that of the state.232  
 
As discussed, recent property and community scholarship suggests that this 
liberal view may be unraveling.233 Property diversity is consistent with this 
trend, one where community re-discovers its synergies with older notions of 
property in land that are specific and localized, rather than placeless and 
universalized.   
 
5.4 The eclecticism of property 
 
A fourth implication of property diversity for community is its enabling of 
alternative conceptions of property in land beyond strictly enforceable right.  
To be open to difference is to reveal a prolific array of practices, norms, and 
claims that define people’s diverse and heterogeneous relationships with land. 
Such claims include collective property ‘rights’ being enforced by community, 
or the notion that a person’s sense of belonging is somehow proprietorial. 
Recognizing the marginal or eclectic234 is a start to ‘seeing’ property as 
something that ‘potentially brings a community together, rather than that 
which separates it into exclusive units.’235 Nicholas Blomley recognizes the 
228 Frug, above n63, 1108. 
229 Ibid, 1119. 
230 Blomley, above n43, 108. 
231 Ibid, 102. 
232 Frug, above n63, 1088. 
233Rose, above n183. 
234 ‘Marginal’ refers to the marginality thesis developed by A J van der Walt. ‘Eclecticism’ is a 
virtue according to Sax, above n3. 
235 Davies, above n60, 127. 
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telltale signs of (an otherwise amorphous) community through its unorthodox 
claims to collective ‘property’.  Locked out by the liberal paradigm, community 
nonetheless finds voice, and importantly form, when it asserts such alternative 
claims. Property diversity shifts focus from the all-consuming narrative of 
private property, and countenances the radical possibility of community, and 
its marginalized, having discernible interests in land. 
 
South African property jurist Andre van der Walt argues that property’s ‘logic 
of centrality’ blinds us to the importance of its margins. The ‘logic of centrality’ 
refers to an habitual acceptance by ‘lawyers, owners, and users of property 
that property institutions naturally assume a central place in society and that 
property as an organizing concept, similarly assumes a central role in law and 
legal theory.’236 The consequences of centrality are twofold, first that 
intellectual habits about property become unreflective and thereby narrow, 
and second that this inhibits a ‘much needed social and legal transformation 
that [otherwise] condemn[s] certain persons to the margins of society and of 
the law.’237   By contrast, a marginal perspective on property seeks to 
‘unsettle the assumed “normality condition” of liberal tradition’238 so that ‘we 
do recognize or “see” the rights [of the marginalized].’239  Van der Walt’s 
‘unsettling’ of liberal tradition shares strong parallels to Blomley’s ‘unsettling of 
the city’240 and its ‘resistant re-mapping’.241 Marginal property finds fertile 
ground in activist community dissent, advocated by ‘property outlaws’ who 
‘offer a view of property law as a dynamic institution… broadly reflective of 
evolving community values as opposed to a fixed set of natural 
entitlements.’242 Blomley’s property outlaws are the poor and marginalized in 
Vancouver’s down-market Downtown Eastside,243 who collectively make 
claim to a disused ex-department store, Woodwards, as community space. 
The site is to be converted into gentrified private apartments, but protests, 
236 AJ van der Walt, ‘Property and Marginality’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 81. 
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid, 83. 
239 Ibid, 102. 
240 Blomley, above n8.  
241 Blomley, above n158.  
242 Eduardo Penalver & Sonia Katyal, Property Outlaws: How Squatters, Pirates, and 
Protestors Improve the Law of Ownership (2010) 15.  
243 Blomley, above n8, 53. 
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vigorous claims to the site as ‘community property’, and (eventually) a 
sympathetic city council, ‘save’ Woodwards from private re-development.   
 
The unitary claim of the developer is challenged by the argument that the poor 
also have a legitimate property interest in, and claim to, the site. This interest is 
a collective one – note the frequent invocation of ‘us’ – and also a clearly 
localized one. This property interest in Woodward’s, moreover, is not one of 
alienation or transfer. It cannot be monetarized but is, rather, predicated on 
use, occupation, domicile and inherent need…. The redevelopment of 
Woodward’s is bad, activists say, not simply because it displaces but because 
it appropriates and encloses. It turns a collective interest into an individualized 
one.244 
 
The marginal perspective on property is by its very eclecticism outside 
property’s central logic. It lacks the imprimatur of formal legal standing or 
rights status. But it is identifiable to those that seek it, enacted by diverse 
performances, and occasionally vindicated. It even possesses a certain 
doctrinal logic. 
 
Marginality …requires paying more attention to facts and unique circumstances 
and relying less on abstract principles and doctrine. [It] has its own logic in that 
it will tend to look for the paradox and the contradiction rather than for broad 
theory and grand narrative, for diversity rather than uniformity, for dissent 
rather than consensus, for conflict and chaos rather than consent and order. In 
other words, it directs our attention to fault lines or historical breakdowns rather 
than concentrating on or searching for the golden thread of continuity.245  
 
Margaret Davies argues that it is desirable for the post-enclosure ‘dominant 
idea of private property’ to be ‘resisted, challenged or reconceptualized’246 
wherever possible. One such strategy involves ‘constructing different 
concepts of property and/or rediscovering non-private forms of ownership 
from Western legal history.’247 As this indicates, Davies sees alternative 
244 Blomley, above n158, 316; Blomley, above n8, 52. 
245 AJ van der Walt, ‘Property and Marginality’ in Alexander & Penalver, above n4, 100.  
246 Davies, above n60, 115-116.  
247 Ibid, 117. 
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property in both ancient and modern forms.  She cites the Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act 2000 as a statutory re-enactment of the former.  A 
manifestation of the latter is a community’s contemporary interest in heritage, 
a shift from erstwhile ‘class-ridden’ ideas about stately homes, to ‘community-
based intangible heritage’,248 and a democratic and inclusive version of the 
collective interest in living streetscapes or communities.249 Davies draws the 
link between property diversity and community.  She sees it as means to 
break down atomistic private ownerships into a wider network of property 
types that brings community together through connectivity. 
 
Amnon Lehavi’s ‘local public commons’ is an example of marginal property 
that facilitates community cohesion.250 ‘Local public commons’ are ‘modest’ 
public lands ostensibly owned by local governments (such as parks, 
playgrounds, or swimming pools) that are claimed and controlled by residents 
in close proximity to the resource. Lehavi analyses the factors that make 
successful local public commons work, identifying a neighborhood intimacy 
that allows frequent users to become acquainted, and develop ‘a limited level 
of reciprocal norms of "contribution in return for use."’251  Those outside the 
immediate area rarely use such commons, either because of the cost of 
commuting, or the availability of similar local commons elsewhere. Nicholas 
Blomley attributes such collective ‘local ownership’ to two factors; a history of 
use and habitation, and a local landscape that is achieved through collective 
action or political struggle.252 
 
Avitil Margalit’s property as belonging is yet another example of the potential 
for property diversity to enhance community. Margalit describes the interest of 
a community of fans in a football club as a social interest in property, derived 
in part from the multiple meanings of ‘belonging’.  
 
248 Ibid, 128. 
249 Ibid, 130. 
250 Lehavi, above n11.  
251 Ibid, 47; Davina Cooper, ‘Opening up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings, and 
the Productive Life of Property’ (2007) 32(3) Law and Social Inquiry 625. 
252 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Landscapes of Property’ in The Legal Geographies Reader, Nicholas 
Blomley, David Delaney & Richard Ford eds., (2001) 124. 
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Something "belongs" when it is an attribute or a part of a person or thing. 
Moreover, to belong means to be a member of a group or an organization. 
Finally, belonging also denotes a property relationship -when something 
belongs to a person, it means that it is the property of that person. 253   
 
Davina Cooper also sees property as belonging.  Cooper’s communitarian 
study of a maverick English school identifies collective identity and community 
as constituting ‘a quite different understanding of property.’ Property relations 
between students and teachers reflect a ‘tension between the right to exclude 
and the norm of inclusion…. While the right depicts things and spaces as 
[conventional] property… the norm represents the space as property, in the 
sense of being constitutive of community life.’254 Cooper surmises that this 
‘socially variegated’ school community only makes sense to outside observers 
such as herself if ‘the black box of unofficial property interests’ is opened up.  
 
State law is not unimportant…. in many contexts, state law will prove the 
dominant normative structure determining practices and outcomes. However, 
in contexts where other institutional authorities have significant effects, where 
property interests are fragmented, and the power ensuing from such interests 
is limited, fluid, and contested, a broader and more open approach to what 
counts as propertied things and relations, which can look beyond the kinds of 
property forms recognized by state law, is important. An analysis that only 
sees Readhead’s [the school owner’s] property interests not only misses, but 
also misrecognizes, what is taking place. 
 
Seeing the eclectic in property enables a ‘creative bricolage’ with the 
dominant and ‘oppositional ownership model’,255 an interaction that 
potentialises creativity and flexibility in our thinking about property. Diversity 
enables collective claims to property outside the ownership model, and as a 
consequence aggregates otherwise disconnected elements of community.  As 
van der Walt counsels, ‘[w]e cannot afford to see the hegemony of the normal, 
253 Margalit, above n52. 
254 Cooper, above n.251.  
255 Blomley, above n8, 23. 
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the everyday or the mass consensus as a norm; we have to leave room for 
otherness, for difference.’ 
 
5.5 A diversity of performance 
 
A fifth implication of property diversity lies in the sheer variety of performances 
of property that occur across a community. The collective sum of this doing is 
Hanoch Dagan’s full orchestration of property in community, a complex 
harmony that correlates to the intricate patterns of property right, use, and 
claim ambitiously ‘mapped’ by legal geographers. 
 
Property diversity means that across community, there are many and varied 
enactments of property across many and varied venues.  Private property is 
created by ‘fence-building, instructions to children not to cross someone else’s 
lawn, the installation of security systems, and property registration.’256 Such 
performances enact and affirm the normative values of private property; 
privacy, commodity, and personal autonomy.  On public lands, people 
likewise perform acts that affirm values such as sociability and inclusion; 
playing Saturday soccer on sports fields, hiking though urban forests, or 
picnicking in riverside parks. And on common property, eligible owners assert 
common use rights that reinforce proportionality and shared moderation; 
tending community gardens, exercising membership rights in clubs or co-
operatives, or using common property such as pools or tennis courts in strata 
schemes.  
 
The collective narrative of property diversity is the narrative of community, a 
myriad of enactments that are physicalized to bounded location, and 
representational of sense of place.257  ‘Owners’ of diverse property, whether 
enforceable right, or valorized sense of belonging, perform a conception of 
property that is not by automatic default external to community.  
 
 
256 Blomley, above n 167, 14. 257 Blomley, above n8, 22-3. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter argues that property in land and community share a close 
relationship, albeit one that is not overtly recognized, defined, or theorized.  
Property in land is both structural and constitutive of community. It reflects 
how community is made up.  ‘Maps’ of property patterns in community can be 
detached cartographic outlines that reflect the simplicities of the private 
ownership model. Or as Nicholas Blomley argues, alternative maps can be 
drawn that capture the eclectic, inter-connected modalities of property beyond 
the orthodox. Property, and its range of diverse values, is also constitutive of 
community, its normative measure. 
 
Yet routinely property is seen as ‘exit from community’.  Property is the private 
realm of autonomous, welfare-maximizing individuals. As best, community is 
an instrumentalist (and optional) construct that exists to serve such 
individuals. At worst, narrow private values eviscerate community.  The 
significance of property diversity lies in its potential to recalibrate this ‘property 
as exit’ default.   As part 5 canvasses, property diversity has many 
implications for community.  It tells its geographic truth and conforms to its 
structure, it yields commensurate mosaics of property values, it finds it 
theoretical space, and it potentializes alternative property paradigms 
grounded in the ‘real-world’ context of community.  Property diversity helps to 
fill Joseph Sax’s ‘missing blank’. 
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Conclusion   
This thesis promised in its introduction ‘not to take property for granted.’  It 
also promised ‘to be attentive as to how things are not.’ In trying to keep to 
these commitments, it has explored two key questions – what comprises 
‘property diversity’ in land, and what are (at least) some of its implications for 
our propertied landscapes.  Its call to action is to be conscious of the myopic 
constraints that limit our ‘seeing’ of property in land. Optimally, we should be 
enlivened to property’s imaginative possibilities. If, as Carol Rose warns that 
‘what we see is what we get’, then we must be prepared to be open to the 
possibilities, to the seeing of something paradigmatically new, ‘with all the 
effects on understanding and action that a new “envisioning” may bring.’1 
 
In responding to these two enquiries, this thesis has canvassed the literature 
of the private, public and common estates, property and community 
scholarship, and stewardship discourse. It has also reached beyond legal 
property scholarship in its review of legal geography and sustainable urban 
design.  Its novelty lies in not only collating this literature into one body of 
work, but in viewing it through the prism of landed property diversity. Some of 
this literature is extensive, in particular that of common property or 
stewardship. Other literature is emergent, like property and community. And 
other areas are surprisingly threadbare, of which the standout is the near 
vacuum of public property jurisprudence.  
 
The thesis also flagged numerous concepts worthy of further study.  The 
theoretical underpinnings of public property in land, especially the relationship 
of propriety to inclusion, remain underdone. Likewise there is much scope to 
expand on the coincidental convergence between discernible patterns of 
property diversity, and the design and functioning of livable communities.  
Another idea meriting wider investigation is the ‘mapping’ of the property 
mosaic to specific place, reducing the complexities of diversity and inter-
connectedness to pictorial form. And yet another putative project lies in the 
1 Carol Rose, ‘Seeing Property’ in Property and Persuasion Essays on the History, Theory 
and Rhetoric of Ownership (1994). 
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implications of  ‘local balances of property values.’2 How constitutive of 
community are its relative patterns of property? Does ‘too much’ private 
property inform a community markedly different to one with extensive public or 
community estates? Each line of (now future) enquiry has proved to be 
beyond the scope, and word length, of this present thesis. 
 
Another major item of  ‘unfinished business’ is the question, what if the private 
ownership model is not an inadvertent or accidental default, but a positive 
normative choice? What if the atomized, ‘property as exit’ iteration of property 
in land is a conscious, societal preference?  Is property diversity then reduced 
to an esoteric and ultimately moot exercise that seeks out ‘in Canutian fashion 
… property forms that buck the trend’?3  
 
A tentative answer to this particular ‘unfinished business’ is to recognize that 
property is likewise, and perpetually, unfinished business. As chapter 1 
outlines, the idea of private property has constantly evolved. Prior to the 18th 
century, there was ‘no clear and unqualified definition’ of private property in 
any ‘legal dictionary or the works of any legal writer.’4  Yet by the end of the 
20th century, private property seemed unassailable. Property’s meanings and 
dimensions ebb and flow with the tide of societal imperative. What now 
appears settled and appropriate – arguably the result of our present normative 
choices - may not be so felicitous in the future.   
 
Performance theory suggests likewise. If property is enacted by ongoing, 
infinitely variable performances, there is no inevitability that these 
performances are locked into a ‘closed loop.’5  Things change. Where 
different performances of property make better contextual sense, analogous 
performances are likely to recur, and incrementally a new pattern manifests 
that becomes citational in its reiteration. As recent property history shows, 
these shifts are imperceptible, since ‘every morning, as we wake up, property 
2 Hanoch Dagan, ‘The Public Dimension of Private Property’ (2013) 24(2) Kings Law Journal 
260, 274. 
3 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Performing property making the world’ http://ssrn.com/abstract=2053656. 
4 Nicholas Blomley, ‘Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of 
Hedges’  (2007) 18 Rural History 1, 4. 
5 Blomley, above n3.  
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is – more or less – as it was when we went to bed.’6 It is rare to ‘see’ the 
precise moment when different property performances begin, except perhaps 
in retrospect, or through the eyes of the prescient observer.  In chapter 5, the 
closing discussion of ‘earth under the nails’ chronicles the ‘extraordinary’ rise 
of ancient and new ways of engaging with the physicality of land.  Sue 
Farran’s communitarian phenomenon may be the forerunner of some 
paradigm shift, or it may be a false dawn. But either way, it is testament to 
property’s dynamism. ‘The very necessity that property has to be performed – 
often through bodily practices – opens the possibility, perhaps… the 
inevitability, of rearticulations of property and subjectivity.’7 
 
If property is a series of ceaseless performances, then Nicholas Blomley’s 
‘truth versus success’ critique directs us to the most important question - what 
sorts of performances render alternative property paradigms less marginal 
and thus more successful? Chapter 4 points to the thoughtful design 
interaction of private, public and common space, and the observable 
outcomes this has for sustainable human landscapes. Chapter 5 ‘sees’ cross-
boundary collaborations of good land use. Chapter 6 identifies performances 
of diverse property that find legal space for community. Indeed, this thesis is 
one such ‘act’, a written ‘performance’ of an envisioning of a different property 
in land that challenges how we describe the so-called dominant paradigm.   
 
The private ownership model is (mostly) our propertied reality because that is 
what we practice, day in, day out.  It is ‘successful’ because it largely is. The 
extent to which it purports to tell property’s ‘truth’,8 or reflects majoritarian 
sentiment, or conscious normative choice, is secondary to its pragmatic 
reality. In restricting ourselves to this narrow paradigm, we have got back 
what we see. But as this thesis illustrates, this paradigm has consequences.  
It is abstract.  It views land as commodity. It divides the world into 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Stuart Banner says that ‘philosophers and law professors try to discern property’s true 
nature’ but usually without success. Banner concludes that property ‘is a human institution 
that exists to serve a broad set of purposes. These purposes have changed over time, and as 
they have, so too has the conventional wisdom about what property is “really” like.’ Stuart 
Banner, American Property (2011) 289-90. 
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disconnected atomized parcels. It makes adverse land use externalities 
‘magically disappear’. It marginalizes the communities in which we live.  Stuart 
Banner’s remark (in chapter 5) that property academics bear a certain 
responsibility for the rise and entrenchment of property abstraction is equally 
cogent for property diversity. Perhaps it is incumbent on us to have teach less 
Blackacre and more the variegated ‘where we live’.  
 
What does this thesis mean for property law?  As a body of work, the thesis is 
a nuanced description of a re-conceptualized property right in land that 
(notwithstanding its explorations of diversity’s outer limits) remains grounded 
in the common law, and the common law jurisdictions discussed herein. 
However, in extolling the descriptive virtues of a wider ‘seeing’, it has 
institutional consequence. At one level, it deliberately sets out to break the 
nexus between ‘property’, and the reactive universalizing assumption that 
‘property’ is only the private right. At another level, it means that the res 
matters. The thing, in this case, the land, is not simply the object of the 
property relationship; rather it is an integral part of it. This implication is 
significant because it departs from the orthodoxy that property is a unified 
category. If context matters for real property, then what does this mean for 
other forms of property?  What is the effect of one property type diverging 
from the core tenet that property is not dependent on the nature of the res?  
 
From the outset, this thesis has explicitly restricted itself to land. It has 
(unwittingly) taken Henry Smith’s modular approach by concerning itself only 
with the module called ‘real property’. In so doing, it has ignored extra-
modular impacts. Perhaps, like Smith’s metaphor, where side effects are 
intensely felt within the module, but have negligible impact outside, any 
spillover from this reconceptualization may be self-absorbed and largely self-
contained. As James Karp observes in chapter 5, maybe land is 
fundamentally different. Yet as logic dictates, this difference does impugn the 
integrity of the unified category of property. This thesis acknowledges the 
irony that in looking at the broad diversity of real property, it has itself been 
myopic to consequential effects outside the ‘module’. This paradox joins the 
ever-expanding list of ‘spin-off’ topics worthy of subsequent study.   
292  
 The private ownership model is a descriptively inadequate and incomplete 
account of ‘what happens on the ground’. ‘Seeing’ the extent of this paucity is 
a first and necessary step in starting to ‘imagine’ the ‘swarm of possibilities’ 
that a diverse reconceptualization offers property in land.     
 
 
   [END]  
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